The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

Kurian Joseph, J.:— The inter-rleationship between Ss.11(4)(iv) and 11(8) of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’) arises for consideration in this case. This writ petition is at the instance of a tenant in a Rent Control filed by the 4th respondent landlord under Ss. 11 (2), 11(4)(iv) and 11(8) of the Act. The Rent Control Court allowed the petition on all the three grounds as per Ext. P2 order, which was confirmed in Ext. P3 judgment by the Rent Control Appellate Authority and that led the petitioner to this court in the writ petition.

2. The tenant entered into a written agreement with the landlord on28.7.1978 for the occupation of the petition schedule building for a period of six months agreeing to pay a monthly rent of Rs. 60. Thereafter in 1982 when the landlord required the petitioner to surrender vacant possession, the tenant took up a contention that after the rental arrangement originally agreed to for six months he had made certain investment in the building for the purpose of his tyre resoling business and that those arrangements were made on the basis of an oral agreement between the parties that the tenant could continue for a period of ten years and an amount of Rs. 1000/- had already been paid on that basis to the landlord. Refuting the position the landlord approached the Munsiff's Court, Wadakkancherry in O.S No. 88 of 1982 during the pendency of which the provisions of the Act were extended to Choondal Panchayat where the building is situated. Hence proceedings under the Act were initiated by the landlord for eviction on the grounds of S. 11(2)-arrears or rent-,S.11(4)(iv)-bona fide need for reconstruction - and S. 11(8) - bonafide need for additional accommodation. It is interesting to note that the landlord had taken up a Commission for substantiating the need for reconstruction. Ext. C3 is the report dated 21.3.1986 of the Assistant Engineer, Public Works Department (Buildings and Roads) Section, Kunnamkulam which reads as follows:

“I have inspected the schedule property on 15.3.1986 w.r.f above. I may report that the building concerned is in a very dilapidated condition which may collapse at any time. The walls are seen out of plump and main pillar which takes load is sunk and is temporarily protected by two wooden pillars. There are cracks in masonry also which was constructed in laterite in mud which is also not safe. Hence I may report that the entire building concerned is not safe in the present condition and there is no possibility to repair the existing building.”

3. We are told at the Bar that inspite of such a precarious condition the petition schedule building is still occupied by the tenant though only certain ‘parts’ of the room are there now. It is to be noted that the petition schedule room forms part of a line building having two rooms and a hall and the eastern most room is the one occupied by the tenant. The hall is occupied by the landlord and she is conducting a rice mill business there. It is for expansion of the said business she needed the premises and hence ground under S. 11(8). As already mentioned above both the authorities have entered a clear finding concurrently that the landlord is entitled to succeed on all the three grounds. The learned counsel appearing for the petitioner Sri. N.P Samuel mainly urged that a petition under Ss. 11(4)(iv) and 11(8) of the Act is misconceived and would belie the bonafides which is required to be established in both the sections. There was also a further contention that for succeeding under S. 11(8) of the Act the landlord should require part of the buildings as such in the possession of the tenant and not the space occupied by the tenant which can be used after reconstruction.

4. It is profitable to extract the relevant statutory provisions before analysing the inter-relationship between Ss.11(4)(iv) and 11(8) of the Act:

“11. Eviction of tenants:-

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(4) A landlord may apply to the Rent Control Court for an order directing the tenant to put the landlord in possession of the building:-

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(iv) if the building is in such a condition that it needs reconstruction and if the landlord requires bona fide to reconstruct the same and if he satisfies the Court that he has the plan and licence, if any required, and the ability to rebuild and if the proposal is not made as a pretext for eviction:

Provided that the landlord who evicts a tenant and does not reconstruct completely the building within a time which may be fixed or extended by the Rent Control Court, shall on a petition before that Court be liable to a fine of rupees five hundred, if it is proved that he has wilfully neglected to reconstruct completely the building within such time:

Provided further that the Court shall have power at any time to issue directions regarding the reconstruction of the building and on failure of compliance by the landlord, to give effect to the order in any manner the Court deems fit and in appropriate cases to put the tenant back in possession or award to the evicted tenant damages equal to the excess rent he has to pay for another building that he is occupying in consequence of such eviction:

Provided further that the tenant who was evicted shall have the first option to have the reconstructed building allotted to him with liability to pay its fair rent; or”

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(8) A landlord who is occupying only a part of a building, may apply to the Rent Control Court for an order directing any tenant occupying the whole or any portion of the remaining part of the building to put the landlord in possession thereof, if he requires additional accommodation for his personal use.

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(10) The Rent Control Court shall, if it is satisfied that the cl aim of the landlord under sub-ss. (3), (4), (7) or sub-s. (8) is bona fide, make an order directing the tenant to put the landlord in possession of the building on such date as may be specified by the Rent Control Court, and if the Court is not so satisfied, it shall make an order rejecting the application:

Provided that, in the case of an application made under sub-s. (8), the Rent Control Court shall reject the application if it is satisfied that the hardship which may be caused to the tenant by granting it will outweigh the advantage to the landlord:

Provided further that the Rent Control Court may give the tenant a reasonable time for putting the landlord in possession of the building and may extend such time so as not to exceed three months in the aggregate.”

5. S. 11(4)(iv) of the Act provides that after reconstruction the tenant has the first option to have the reconstructed premises. Under both Ss. 11(4) and 11(8) the landlord has to establish the bonafides in seeking eviction. However under S. 11 (8) read with S. 11(10) the Rent Control Court is bound to weigh the hardship vis-a-vis the advantage to the landlord and only if the court is satisfied that the former does not outweigh the latter the order for eviction could be granted. A landlord who is in occupation of a part of the building requiring additional accommodation for his personal use is entitled to apply for the same under S. 11(8) of the Act to the Rent Control Court for getting possession of whole or any portion of the remaining part of the building occupied by any tenant. On a close analysis of the said section it can be seen that the said section can be invoked only by a landlord (a) who has shared his building with a tenant/tenants, (b) who requires additional accommodation for his personal use, (c) whose claim is bona fide and (d) who satisfies the court that the hardship which might be caused to the tenant by eviction will not outweigh the advantage to the landlord. It could be seen that the proviso on the comparative hardship under S. 11 (10) is an additional rigour on the landlord seeking eviction under S. 11(8) whereas under S. 11 (4)(iv) all that a landlord should satisfy the court is the need for reconstruction of the building and the bonafides of the landlord in that behalf. In other words if only all the four ingredients are established a landlord can succeed under S. 11(8) whereas under S.11(4)(iv) he needs to satisfy the court only two ingredients; the need for reconstruction and the bona fides in it. But is it not open to a landlord to use as he requires the additional accommodation which he sought and obtained after reconstruction? That naturally takes us to the second contention referring to the interpretation of additional accommodation as to whether it is restricted to the building or the space occupied by the building.

6. Building is defined under S. 2(i) of the Act which reads as follows:

2. Definitions:- In this Act, unless the context otherwise requires,-

(1) “building” means any building or hut or part of a building or hut, let or to be let separately for residential or non-residential purposes and includes -

(a) the garden, grounds, wells, tanks and structures, if any, appurtenant to such building, hut, or part of such building or hut, and let or to be let along with such building or hut;

(b) any furniture supplied by the landlord for use in such building or hut or part of a building or hut;

(c) any fittings or machinery belonging to the landlord, affixed to or installed in such building or part of such building, and intended to be used by the tenant for or in connection with the purpose for which such building or part of such building is let or to be let, but does not include a room in a hotel or boarding house;”

7. From the very opening ‘unless the context otherwise requires’ it may be seen that the word ‘building’ need not always be narrowly construed but it is capable of contextualised interpretation. But at the same time it is significant to note that the Section specifically excludes a room only in a hotel or a boarding house and not anywhere else. In this context it may be seen that the petition schedule building in the instant case is a room in a line building and the request of the landlord is for additional space for expanding her business. In such circumstances does the legislature intend a narrow interpretation on the additional accommodation to the word ‘building’, in the instant case as the room, or does it entitle a landlord to have the additional occupation of the space occupied by the room so as to make use of the same on reconstruction. It may be seen that the need for additional accommodation was necessitated for expanding the business of the rice mill of the landlord. And for that purpose petitioner needs a bigger hall including the space occupied by the tenanted premises and not the room as such. After all the building belongs to the landlord and is it not for the landlord to choose her mode of use of the building? It may be that the landlord might use it as an independent room, it may be that the landlord might remove the separating wall and make it a common hall or it could also be that the landlord might reconstruct the whole building and use the additional space for the purpose for which she obtained possession from the tenant. On a purposive interpretation of the provisions we are of the clear view that the landlord is certainly entitled for such a choice. It is not for the tenant to dictate to the landlord as to how the landlord should use her premises. It is pertinent to note that eviction was ordered by the court after weighing the comparative hardship that will be caused to the tenant as against the advantage to the landlord and only on being satisfied that the hardship does not outweigh the advantage, eviction was ordered.

8. As already held by us, once the Rent Control Court orders eviction under S. 11 (8) of the Act, the choice regarding the mode of use is entirely that of the landlord. In that view of the matter once a landlord succeeds under S. 11(8) it is ordinarily unnecessary to consider a prayer under S. 11(4)(iv) of the Act. But there may be situations where consideration under S. 11(4)(iv) of the Act is also necessary. For example, in the case of a line building consisting of several rooms and the landlord in occupation of one or two rooms requiring additionally only one or two rooms and the nature of the use of the additional accommodation requires reconstruction of the whole line building, then certainly as against the other tenants who are not sought to be evicted under S. 11(8), eviction under S. 11(4)(iv) would be necessary.

9. This court had occasions to consider the inter-relationship of S. 11(8) vis-à-vis S. 11(3). Poti, J. (as he then was) has considered the issue in the decision reported in Lakshmana Naikan v. Gopalakrishna Pillai, 1981 KLT 167 at paragraph 3 of the judgment, which reads as under:

“…………the test of bonafides under S. 11 (8) read with S. 11 (10) is not whether the landlord could very well afford to live without the additional accommodation, but whether in seeking the additional accommodation the landlord is pleading an honest purpose and not merely setting up an excuse to obtain eviction……….”

10. In Abdul Rahiman v. Ramankutty Moothan, 1983 KLT 726, Khalid, J. (as he then was) considered the issue at paragraph II wherein it was held as follows:

“…………In an application under S. 11(8) the Court has to test the bonafides of the requirement. It has also to consider the first proviso to S. 11(10). If the evidence satisfies both these requirements, the landlord is entitled to an order in his favour. The Court cannot insist upon the landlord to occupy it without any alteration or reconstruction. When the requirement of additional accommodation is established and eviction ordered, the landlord will be at liberty to make necessary alteration to the building or even to reconstruct it to suit his purpose. There is nothing in S. 11(8) which prohibits it.”

11. The meaning and purport of the claim being bona fide has been explained by Poti, J. in the decision reported in Subramania Iyer v. Krishnaswamy, ILR 1981 (2) Kerala 442 at paragraph 3 which reads as follows:

“………..If the court finds that such claim is not bona fide in the sense that it is not honestly made, either because he wants to evict the tenant on this ground or for other ulterior purposes, then, the court can rightly reject the claim of the landlord.”

12. The Apex Court in Davis v. Sebastian, 1999 (3) KLT 225, has considered the scope of S. 11(8). Paragraph 8 reads as follows:

“8. Now, what is the meaning of the expression ‘personal use’ in sub-s. (8)? It is a well settled principle of interpretation that words in a statute shall be given their natural, ordinary meaning; nothing should be added to them nor should any word be treated as otiose. Two comprehensive expressions ‘additional accommodation’ and ‘personal use’ are employed in sub-s. (8). The expression ‘additional accommodation’ takes in both residential as well as non-residential buildings. ‘Personal use’ is also an expression of wide amplitude. There is nothing in the sub-section which restricts the import of that expression. The said requirement of sub-s. (8) will be complied with on the satisfaction of the Controller about bona fide need of the additional accommodation for personal use of the landlord. To what use the additional accommodation should be put, is the choice of the landlord. In the case of a non-residential building whether a new business should be set up in the additional accommodation or whether it should be used for expansion of the existing business, is left entirely to the option of the landlord. This being the intendment of the legislature, the court cannot impose any restriction with regard to the use of the additional accommodation from which the eviction of the tenant is sought.”

13. On a close reading of the above decisions also it can be seen that to what use the additional accommodation should be put, is the choice of the landlord. In the case of non-residential building whether a new business should be set up in the additional accommodation or whether it should be used for expansion of the existing business, is also left entirely to the option of the landlord. This being the intendment of the legislature the court cannot impose any restriction with regard to the use of the additional accommodation from which eviction of the tenant is sought. The only difference, as far as the present case is concerned, is that on a purposive interpretation of the provisions the additional accommodation need not necessarily be confined to the building or room but it could even be the space occupied by the said building or room or structure. We are sure that there is no room for any heartburn to the tenant in the instant case since in 1982 his main contention was that the landlord had agreed for a period of ten years and that since the tenancy had commenced only in 1978 eviction was defended as unjustifiable. As of now fortune has favoured him and instead of one decade he had more than two decades. The Rent Control Court has found that alternate accommodation in the locality is available to the tenant for his tyre resoling business. There is the specific finding regarding genuine need for additional accommodation to the landlord, of course on consideration under S. 11(10) of the Act.

14. We do not find any illegality, irregularity or impropriety in the concurrent findings of the Rent Control Court as well as the Rent Control Appellate Authority. There is no merit in the contentions of the petitioner and accordingly the original petition is dismissed.