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D.T.C & Ors. v. Meena Kumari & Anr.

Delhi High Court
Feb 3, 2010
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Factual and Procedural Background

This is an appeal against a Motor Accident Claims Tribunal award. The Tribunal had awarded compensation of Rs. 1,50,000/- to the claimants in respect of the death of Sansar Pal. The appellants filed MAC. App. Nos. 512-513 of 2006 and MAC. App. Nos. 570-571 of 2006: the former challenges liability (contending DTC is not liable), and the latter seeks enhancement of the award.

Material facts as found by the Tribunal and recited in the opinion: on 29 January 1992 a bomb blast occurred in a DTC bus (No. DEP 8264) at Mall Road Bus stand, resulting in the death of Sansar Pal. The deceased was about 28 years old and survived by his widow, one minor son, one minor daughter and his parents. At the Tribunal level, compensation computations used minimum wages (Rs. 1,300), a deduction of one-third for personal expenses and a multiplier of 18; awards were Rs. 5,000 (funeral), Rs. 5,000 (loss of love and affection), Rs. 10,000 (pain and suffering) and dependency loss computed leading to a total of Rs. 2,00,000, from which an ex-gratia payment of Rs. 50,000 paid by the Lt. Governor of Delhi was deducted to arrive at Rs. 1,50,000 awarded to the claimants.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the Delhi Transport Corporation (DTC) is liable to pay compensation for the death of Sansar Pal arising out of a bomb blast in a DTC bus (i.e., whether the accident "arose out of the use" of the motor vehicle).
  2. Whether the award of compensation should be enhanced and, if so, on what basis (issues raised include the correct income to be taken, applicability of minimum wages adjustments, deduction for personal expenses, multiplier, components such as loss of consortium and loss of estate, deduction of ex-gratia payment, and the rate of interest).
  3. What effect, if any, the widow's remarriage has on entitlement to compensation or the apportionment of the award among beneficiaries.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellants (DTC) — MAC. App. No. 512-513 of 2006

  • At the hearing the learned counsel for the appellant in MAC. APP. No. 512-513/2006 argued that the accident did not occur due to rash or negligent driving of the bus driver and therefore DTC is not liable to pay compensation to the claimants.

Appellants (seeking enhancement) — MAC. App. No. 570-571 of 2006

  • Sought that the deceased's income be taken as Rs. 2,000 per month with 50% added as future prospects.
  • Alternatively, urged that increase in minimum wages due to inflation and price index be taken into consideration.
  • Requested reduction of the deduction for personal expenses from one-third to one-fourth.
  • Claimed additional components: loss of consortium and loss of estate.
  • Asked for enhancement of parents' share in the award.
  • Sought to set aside the deduction of the ex-gratia amount of Rs. 50,000/- paid by the Lt. Governor of Delhi.
  • Prayed for enhancement of the rate of interest from 5.5% to 7.5% per annum.

Claimants

  • The claimants' counsel (and witnesses) produced evidence and argued that the deceased was employed as a supervisor with Ravi & Co. earning Rs. 2,000/- per month. A salary certificate dated 12 January 1993 (not formally proved by the employer) and witness testimony (PW-1, R3W1) corroborated the income figure.
  • The claimants sought consideration of the proved income and future prospects; they contested the Tribunal's use of minimum wages.

Defence (DTC) — Further Contentions

  • Submitted that compensation awarded exceeded the amount claimed before the Tribunal and relied on precedent permitting just compensation even if it exceeds the claimed amount.
  • Argued that the widow's entitlement to dependency should cease on her remarriage and relied on an earlier judgment of this Court to that effect.

Assistance to the Court

  • The Court appointed Ms. Rajdipa Behura as amicus curiae to assist on questions of law relating to compensation payable in cases of bomb blasts; the Court later appreciated the effective assistance rendered by the amicus.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Shivaji Davanu Patil v. Vatschala Uttam More, 1991 ACJ 777 (SC) "Use" of a motor vehicle includes times when stationary or disabled; "arising out of use" has wider connotation and need not be direct and proximate causation. Applied to hold that explosion/bomb blast consequences can be considered as arising out of use of the vehicle; supported DTC liability for death resulting from bomb blast.
Rita Devi v. New India Assurance Co. Ltd., 2000 ACJ 801 (SC) Interpretation of "death due to accident arising out of the use of motor vehicle"; accidental murder can fall within this phrase where dominant intention is not to kill. Used to support the proposition that heirs are entitled to compensation where death arises from use of vehicle even if facts of death are unusual or involve third-party criminal acts.
Samir Chanda v. Managing Director, Assam State Transport Corporation, 1998 ACJ 1351 (SC) Bomb blast injuries inside vehicle can give rise to compensation claims under principles in Shivaji Patil. Relied upon to support awarding compensation for injuries/death due to bomb blast inside a vehicle.
Kaushnuma Begum v. New India Assurance Co. Ltd., 2001 ACJ 428 (SC) Principle of strict liability (Rylands v. Fletcher) applicable in motor accident claims; distinct from statutory "no fault" liability. Supported the proposition that owners can be liable even absent negligence and Tribunal was correct to award compensation.
National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Shiv Dutt Sharma, 2004 ACJ 2049 (J&K) Passengers injured by bomb explosion or terrorist activity in a bus can claim compensation; even persons outside vehicle may be entitled. Cited to confirm that victims of bomb/terrorist activity in buses are entitled to compensation under established authorities.
Sarla Verma v. Delhi Transport Corporation, 2009 (6) Scale 129 (SC) Guideline for multipliers and deduction for personal expenses: where deceased leaves 4–6 legal representatives, appropriate deduction is one-fourth; appropriate multiplier for age 28 is 17. Applied to reduce personal expenses deduction from one-third to one-fourth and to reduce the multiplier from 18 (used by Tribunal) to 17 for age 28.
Kanwar Devi v. Bansal Roadways, 2008 ACJ 2182; National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Renu Devi (2008) ACC 134; UPSRTC v. Munni Devi (MAC. APP. No. 310/2007) Judicial notice to be taken of increase in minimum wages over time to account for inflation/price index; view that minimum wages tend to double over 10 years and income for computation can be taken as average of minimum wages and its double. Used to compare the Tribunal's minimum-wage figure and conclude that adjusted minimum wages (after inflation) would be approximately Rs. 1,950 and that the proved income of Rs. 2,000 is almost equal to that adjusted figure.
United India Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Patricia Jean Mahajan, (2002) 6 SCC 281 / AIR 2002 SC 2607 Where a claimant has received a specific benefit/ex-gratia in respect of injuries or death, that amount should be deducted from compensation if the benefit was received for the same loss. Applied to uphold deduction of Rs. 50,000 ex-gratia paid by Lt. Governor of Delhi from the enhanced award.
Dharampal v. UP State Road Transport Corporation, III 2008 ACC (1) SC Authority for enhancing rate of interest on awards (applied to increase interest rate to 7.5% in relevant cases). Applied to enhance interest from 5.5% to 7.5% per annum from the date of filing of the petition (as adopted by this Court in this matter).
Nagappa v. Gurudaval Singh, 2003 ACJ 12 (SC) Under the Motor Vehicles Act there is no restriction preventing a Tribunal/court from awarding compensation exceeding the amount claimed; the function is to award "just" compensation based on evidence. Relied upon to reject the objection that the award exceeded the amount claimed and to confirm the court's power to award just compensation beyond the pleaded amount.
Seema Malik v. Union of India, 2005 ACJ 1389 (J&K); Regal Sports v. Mohd. Siddique, 1994 ACJ 294 (Rajasthan); Kiran Lata v. RSRTC, 1993 ACJ 130 (Rajasthan); Vimla Devi v. Chaman, 1992 ACJ 1048 (Rajasthan); Rajinder Kumar v. Soma Devi, 2001 ACJ 307 (HP); Chandan v. Kanwarlal, 1989 ACJ 816 (Delhi); Khairullah v. Anita, 1994 ACJ 1017 (AP); Nankuram Sarajdin v. Member, M.A.C.T., Thane, 1994 (2) TAC 346; Halki Bai v. New India Insurance Co. Ltd., 1999 ACJ 187 (MP); Bhanwar Lal v. Munshi Ram, 1988 ACJ 283 Authorities holding that the remarriage of a widow does not disentitle her (or other dependants) to compensation; public policy and social reasoning against deductions for remarriage. Followed by this Court to hold that remarriage/possibility of remarriage of the widow will not deprive persons of compensation; the Court apportioned enhanced award taking remarriage into account and allocated shares accordingly.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court proceeded through a sequence of legal determinations applying the authorities cited and the evidentiary record:

  1. Liability: The Court held that the accident and death "arose out of the use" of the motor vehicle. It relied on the Supreme Court's decisions (notably Shivaji Davanu Patil) and subsequent authorities (including cases dealing with bomb blasts and terrorist incidents) to conclude that consequences of an event occurring in, or in close relation to, the vehicle (even if stationary or disabled) fall within the ambit of "use" and "arising out of" such use. Accordingly the claimants were entitled to compensation under Section 163-A of the Motor Vehicles Act.
  2. Income proved and future prospects: The Court accepted the testimonial evidence (PW-1, R3W1) and the salary certificate stating the deceased's income as Rs. 2,000/- per month. Although the employer was not formally examined, the documentary evidence was corroborated by witness testimony and therefore the Court held that income of Rs. 2,000/- per month was proved. The Court rejected the claim for additional future prospects because it was not proved that the employment was permanent in nature.
  3. Minimum wages / inflation adjustment: The Court noted that even if minimum wages were adopted, judicial notice of increases due to inflation would make an adjusted minimum wage effectively similar to the proved salary. The Court applied its cited line of authorities that the computation may take the average of minimum wages and its double and computed an adjusted minimum-wage figure (Rs. 1,950) to show the proved salary was in line with such adjustment.
  4. Deduction for personal expenses: The Court applied Sarla Verma (requiring one-fourth deduction where 4–6 legal representatives exist) and reduced the Tribunal's deduction from one-third to one-fourth.
  5. Components of compensation: The Tribunal had not awarded amounts for loss of consortium and loss of estate; the Court awarded Rs. 10,000 each for those heads.
  6. Multiplier: While the Tribunal applied multiplier 18 (Second Schedule of the Motor Vehicles Act), the Court applied the Sarla Verma table and reduced the multiplier to 17 for a 28-year-old deceased.
  7. Computation: Using the proved monthly income of Rs. 2,000 and deduction of one-fourth, applying multiplier 17 and adding the other heads (funeral, love and affection, pain and suffering, loss of consortium, loss of estate) the Court computed total compensation of Rs. 3,46,000.
  8. Deduction of ex-gratia: The Court upheld the Tribunal's deduction of Rs. 50,000 ex-gratia paid by the Lieutenant Governor of Delhi, relying on United India Insurance v. Patricia Jean Mahajan that benefits received for the same loss must be deducted. After deduction the net award was Rs. 2,96,000.
  9. Interest: The Tribunal had awarded interest at 5.5% per annum. Applying Dharampal, the Court enhanced the interest to 7.5% per annum from the date of filing of the petition (and in the operative paragraph specified interest from date of filing up to the date of notice under Order 21 Rule 1 of the CPC for the purposes set out in the order).
  10. Claim exceeding prayer: The Court rejected the contention that compensation could not exceed the amount claimed, referring to Nagappa which allows a Tribunal to award "just" compensation even if it exceeds the pleaded amount.
  11. Widow's remarriage and apportionment: The Court reviewed divergent High Court authorities and sided with the line that remarriage/possibility of remarriage will not deprive a person of compensation. Nevertheless, taking factual circumstances into account (the widow remarried about three years after the death, minors remained with the widow), the Court apportioned the enhanced award so as to provide 10% to the widow for maintenance till her remarriage and to allocate defined shares to the parents and children; the Court fixed shares: widow 10%, father 15%, mother 15%, each child 30%.
  12. Practical directions: The Court directed DTC to deposit the enhanced award with UCO Bank within 60 days into a specified account and gave detailed instructions for release, fixation of fixed deposits, restricted withdrawals, issuance of passbooks, monthly interest credits for minors, half-yearly bank statements to the Court, and other administrative measures to secure funds for beneficiaries.

Holding and Implications

CORE RULING: The appeal is allowed and the award of the Tribunal is enhanced. The Tribunal's award of Rs. 1,50,000/- is increased to Rs. 2,96,000/- after deducting Rs. 50,000/- ex-gratia; interest is granted at 7.5% per annum from the date of filing of the petition (operationally stated up to the date of notice under Order 21 Rule 1 of the CPC in the operative paragraph).

Direct Consequences and Implementation

  • DTC is directed to deposit the enhanced award amount along with interest into a specified UCO Bank account within 60 days.
  • The Court fixed the apportionment of the award: widow 10%; father 15%; mother 15%; each child 30%.
  • Detailed banking directions: release mechanisms for the widow, partial release and fixed deposits for parents, fixed deposits for children (two years) with monthly interest paid into saving accounts, restrictions on withdrawals and loans against the deposits without Court permission, issuance of photo ID, fixed deposit passbooks, and half-yearly statements to the Court.

Broader Legal Implications

The Court applied and followed established Supreme Court and High Court authorities on (i) the wide construction of "use" and "arising out of" for motor vehicle accidents (including bomb/terror-related incidents), (ii) the application of strict liability principles in motor accident claims, (iii) accepted approaches to judicial notice of increases in minimum wages for compensation computations, (iv) the Sarla Verma methodology for multipliers and deductions, (v) deduction of ex-gratia benefits received, and (vi) enhancing interest rates per contemporary Supreme Court guidance.

The opinion does not purport to lay down a novel legal principle; it applies and follows prior precedents and implements them factually in the present matter.

Show all summary ...

J.R Midha, J.:— The appellants have challenged award of the learned Tribunal whereby compensation of Rs. 1,50,000/- has been awarded to the claimants. The appellant in MAC. App. No. 512-513 of 2006 has challenged the award on the ground that appellant is not liable to pay any compensation to the claimants whereas the appellants in MAC. APP. No. 570-571 of 2006 are seeking enhancement of the award amount.

2. The accident dated 29th January, 1992 arising out of a bomb blast in DTC Bus bearing No. DEP 8264 at Mall Road Bus stand resulted in the death of Sansar Pal.

3. The deceased was survived by his widow, one minor son, one minor daughter and parents. The deceased was aged about 28 years at the time of the accident and was doing a private job earning Rs. 2,000/- per month. The learned Tribunal took the minimum wages of Rs. 1,300/-, deducted ⅓rd towards the personal expenses and applied the multiplier of 18 to compute the loss of dependency at Rs. 1,87,200/- rounded off to Rs. 1,80,000/-. The learned Tribunal awarded Rs. 5,000/- towards funeral expenses, Rs. 5,000/- towards loss of love and affection and Rs. 10,000/- towards pain and suffering. The total compensation was computed to be Rs. 2,00,000/- out of which Rs. 50,000/- paid by Lt. Governor of Delhi as ex-gratia payment was deducted and Rs. 1,50,000/- was awarded to the claimants.

4. The learned counsel for appellant in MAC. APP. No. 512-513/2006 has urged, at the time of hearing of this appeal, that the accident did not occur due to rash and negligent driving of the driver of the bus and, therefore, DTC is not liable to pay any compensation to the claimants.

5. The learned counsel for the appellant in MAC. APP. No. 570-71/2006 has urged the following grounds at the time of hearing of this appeal:—

(i) The income of the deceased be taken to be Rs. 2,000/- per month and 50% be added towards future prospects.

(ii) In the alternative, increase in minimum wages due to inflation and rise in price index be taken into consideration.

(iii) The deduction towards the personal expenses of the deceased be reduced from ⅓rd to ¼th.

(iv) The compensation be awarded for loss of consortium.

(v) The compensation be awarded for loss of estate.

(vi) The share of the parents in the award amount be enhanced.

(vii) The deduction of ex-gratia amount of Rs. 50,000/- paid by Lt. Governor of Delhi to the claimants be set aside.

(viii) The rate of interest be enhanced from 5.5% per annum to 7.5% per annum.

6. Considering the question of law with respect to the compensation payable in case of bomb blast, this Court appointed Ms. Rajdipa Behura, as amicus curiae to assist this Court.

7. The first question that arises for consideration in these appeals are whether DTC is liable to pay compensation for death of Sansar Pal arising out of a bomb blast in a DTC bus.

8. The law with respect to aforesaid question is well settled by the following judgments:

(i) Shivaji Davanu Patil v. Vatschala Uttam More, 1991 ACJ 777

There was a collision between a petrol tanker and a truck due to which the petrol tanker went off the road and fell at a distance of about 20 feet from the highway leading to leakage of petrol which collected nearby. Later an explosion took place in the petrol tanker resulting in fire. Number of persons who assembled near the petrol tanker sustained burn injuries and few of them succumbed to the injuries. The victims filed the claim petitions which were dismissed by the Claims Tribunal on the ground that the explosion and the fire had no connection with the accident, and was altogether an independent accident. The appeal was allowed by the learned Single Judge of the High Court holding that the explosion was a direct consequence of the accident. The Division Bench of the High Court affirmed the findings of the learned Single Judge against which the matter came up before the Hon'ble Supreme Court.

The Hon'ble Supreme Court dismissed the Special Leave Petition holding that the explosion and fire resulting in injuries and death was due to the accident arising out of the use of the motor vehicle. The findings of the Hon'ble Supreme Court are reproduced hereunder:—

“25. These decisions indicate that the word “use”, in the context of motor vehicles, has been construed in a wider sense to include the period when the vehicle is not moving and is stationary, being either parked on the road and when it is not in a position to move due to some break-down or mechanical defect. Relying on the abovementioned decisions, the Appellate Bench of the High Court had held that the expression “use of a motor vehicle” in Section 92-A covers accidents which occur both when the vehicle is in motion and when it is stationary. With reference to the facts of the present case the learned Judges have observed that the tanker in question while proceeding along National Highway No. 4 (i.e while in use) after colliding with a motor lorry was lying on the side and that it cannot be claimed that after the collision the use of the tanker had ceased only because it was disabled. We are in agreement with the said approach of the High Court. In our opinion, the word “use” has a wider connotation to cover the period when the vehicle is not moving and is stationary and the use of a vehicle does not cease on account of the vehicle having been rendered immobile on account of a break-down or mechanical defect or accident. In the circumstances, it cannot be said that the petrol tanker was not in the use at the time when it was lying on its side after the collision with the truck.”

“35. This would show that as compared to the expression “caused by”, the expression “arising out of” has a wider connotation. The expression “caused by” was used in Sections 95(1)(b)(i) and (ii) and 96(2)(b)(ii) of the Act. In Section 92-A, Parliament, however, chose to use the expression “arising out of” which indicates that for the purpose of awarding compensation under Section 92-A, the causal relationship between the use of the motor vehicle and the accident resulting in death or permanent disablement is not required to be direct and proximate and it can be less immediate. This would imply that accident should be connected with the use of the motor vehicle but the said connection need not be direct and immediate. This construction of the expression “arising out of the use of a motor vehicle” in Section 92-A enlarges the field of protection made available to the victims of an accident and is in consonance with the beneficial object underlying the enactment.”

“36. Was the accident involving explosion and fire in the petrol tanker connected with the use of tanker as a motor vehicle? In our view, in the facts and circumstances of the present case, this question must be answered in the affirmative. The High Court has found that the tanker in question was carrying petrol which is a highly combustible and volatile material and after the collision with the other motor vehicle the tanker had fallen on one of its sides on sloping ground resulting in escape of highly inflammable petrol and that there was grave risk of explosion and fire from the petrol coming out of the tanker. In the light of the aforesaid circumstances the learned Judges of the High Court have rightly concluded that the collision between the tanker and the other vehicle which had occurred earlier and the escape of petrol from the tanker which ultimately resulted in the explosion and fire were not unconnected but related events and merely because there was interval of about four to four and half hours between the said collision and the explosion and fire in the tanker, it cannot be necessarily inferred that there was no causal relation between explosion and fire. In the circumstances, it must be held that the explosion and fire resulting in the injuries which led to the death of Deepak Uttam More was due to an accident arising out of the use of the motor vehicle viz. the petrol tanker No. MKL 7461.”

(ii) Rita Devi v. New India Assurance Co. Ltd., 2000 ACJ 801 (SC)

The deceased was employed to drive an auto rickshaw for ferrying passengers on hire. On the fateful day, the auto rickshaw was parked in the rickshaw stand at Dimapur when some unknown passengers engaged the deceased for journey. As to what happened on that day is not known. It was only on the next day that the police was able to recover the body of the deceased but the auto rickshaw in question was never traced out. The owner of the auto rickshaw claimed compensation from the insurance company for the loss of auto rickshaw. The heirs of the deceased claimed compensation for the death of the driver on the ground that the death occurred on account of accident arising out of use of the motor vehicle. The Apex Court held that the heirs of the deceased would be entitled to compensation. The question as to whether the case of murder would be covered was also gone into. Paras 9 and 10 are relevant and are quoted below:—

“9. A conjoint reading of the above two Sub-clauses of Section 163A shows that a victim or his heirs are entitled to claim from the owner/Insurance Company a compensation for death or permanent disablement suffered due to accident arising out of use of the motor vehicle (emphasis supplied), without having to prove wrongful act or neglect or default of any one. Thus it is clear, if it is established by the claimants that the death or disablement was caused due to an accident arising out of the use of motor vehicle then they will be entitled for payment of compensation. In the present case, the contention of the Insurance Company which was accepted by the High Court is that the death of the deceased (Dasarath Singh) was not caused by an accident arising out of the use of motor vehicle. Therefore, we will have to examine the actual legal import of the words ‘death due to accident arising out of the use of motor vehicle’.

10. The question, therefore, is can a murder be an accident in any given case? There is no doubt that ‘murder’, as it is understood, in the common parlance is a felonious act where death is caused with intent and the perpetrators of that act normally have a motive against the victim for such killing. But there are also instances where murder can be by accident on a given set of facts. The differences between a ‘murder’ which is not an accident and a ‘murder’ which is an accident, depends on the proximity of the cause of such murder. In our opinion, if the dominant intention of the Act of felony is to kill any particular person then such killings is not an accidental murder but is a murder simplicitor, while if the cause of murder or act of murder was originally not intended and the same was caused in furtherance of any other felonious act then such murder is an accidental murder.”

(iii) Samir Chanda v. Managing Director, Assam State Trans, Corporation 1998 ACJ 1351 (SC),

The Apex Court upheld the claim for compensation in respect of injuries were suffered by the claimant due to bomb blast inside the vehicle relying on the decision given in Shivaji Dayanu Patil's case (supra).

(iv) Kaushnuma Begum v. New India Assurance Co. Ltd., 2001 ACJ 428

The Hon'ble Supreme Court held that the principle of strict liability propounded in Rylands v. Fletcher 1861 All E R 1 was applicable in claims for compensation made in respect of motor accidents. The relevant findings of the Hon'ble Supreme Court are reproduced hereunder:—

“12. Even if there is no negligence on the part of the driver or owner of the motor vehicle, but accident happens while the vehicle was in use, should not the owner be made liable for damages to the person who suffered on account of such accident? This question depends upon how far the Rule in Rylands v. Fletcher (supra) can apply in motor accident cases. The said Rule is summarised by Blackburn, J. thus:

“The true rule of law is that the person who, for his own purposes, brings on his land, and collects and keeps there anything likely to do mischief if it escapes, must keep it at his peril, and, if he does not do so, he is prima facie answerable for all the damage which is the natural consequence of its escape. He can excuse himself by showing that the escape was owing to the plaintiff's default, or, perhaps, that the escape was the consequence of vis major, or the act of God; but, as nothing of this sort exists here, it is unnecessary to inquire what excuse would be sufficient.”

“19. Like any other common law principle, which is acceptable to our jurisprudence, the Rule in Rylands v. Fletcher can be followed at least until any other new principle which excels the former can be evolved, or until legislation provides differently. Hence, we are disposed to adopt the Rule in claims for compensation made in respect of motor accidents.

20. “No Fault Liability” envisaged in section 140 of the mv act is distinguishable from the rule of strict liability. In the former the compensation amount is fixed and is payable even if any one of the exceptions to the Rule can be applied. It is a statutory liability created without which the claimant should not get any amount under that count. Compensation on account of accident arising from the use of motor vehicles can be claimed under the common law even without the aid of a statute. The provisions of the MV Act permits that compensation paid under ‘no fault liability’ can be deducted from the final amount awarded by the Tribunal. Therefore, these two are resting on two different premises. We are, therefore, of the opinion that even apart from section 140 of the mv act, a victim in an accident which occurred while using a motor vehicle, is entitled to get compensation from a Tribunal unless any one of the exceptions would apply. The Tribunal and the High Court have, therefore, gone into error in divesting the claimants of the compensation payable to them.”

(v) National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Shiv Dutt Sharma, 2004 ACJ 2049 (J&K)

Two sets of claims were made in this case; one relating to the accident in a bus and the other relating to an accident where bullets of terrorists killed the passengers of a bus. The Jammu and Kashmir High Court held as under:—

“43. On the basis of the judicial pronouncements and the material which has come on the record, it is concluded:

(i) That a passenger travelling in a bus when he suffers from an injury on account of bomb explosion or on account of any other activity including terrorist activity, he would be well within his rights to claim compensation. This view is spelt out from the decision given by the Supreme Court of India in Shivaji Dayanu Patil v. Vatschala Uttam More, 1991 ACJ 777 (SC) and the latter decisions noticed above;

(ii) That even if a person is not actually in the vehicle and is standing outside and suffers an injury, even in that case Supreme Court of India has allowed compensation in Shivaji Dayanu Patil v. Vatschala Uttam More, 1991 ACJ 777 (SC). Therefore, merely because some of the victims were taken out of the bus and thereafter shot dead, would not make any difference;

(iii) That the material which has come on the record justified the grant of the compensation and the quantum thereof is accordingly sustained.”

9. Following the aforesaid judgments, it is held that the accident in question arose out of the use of the motor vehicle and, therefore, the claimants are entitled to compensation under Section 163-A of the Motor Vehicle Act.

10. The deceased was aged 28 years at the time of accident and has left behind five legal representatives. According to the judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Sarla Verma v. Delhi Transport Corporation, 2009 (6) Scale 129, the appropriate deduction where the deceased has left behind 4 to 6 legal representatives is ¼th. The personal expenses of the deceased are therefore reduced from ⅓rd to ¼th.

11. The learned counsel for the claimants has submitted that the deceased was working as a supervisor with Ravi & Co. drawing a salary of Rs. 2,000/- which should be taken into consideration for computation of compensation. Learned counsel for the claimants further submits that the future prospects should also be taken into consideration. The widow of the deceased appeared in the witness box as PW-1 and deposed that her husband was engaged in a private job earning Rs. 2,000/- per month. The salary certificate dated 12th January, 1993 issued by Ravi & Co. was placed on record in which it was certified that the deceased was working with the said company since 18th December, 1990 till his death on 29th January, 1992 as Supervisor at a salary of Rs. 2,000/- per month. The father of the deceased also appeared in the witness box as R3W1 and deposed that the deceased was earning Rs. 2,000/- per month. R3W1 proved the documents relating to the educational and technical qualifications and the first job of the deceased as Ex. R3W1/1 to Ex. R3W1/8. Though the salary certificate has not been formally proved by examining the employer, it has been corroborated by the statements of PW-1 and R3W1 and, therefore, the income of the deceased at the time of the accident is taken to be Rs. 2,000/- per month. The learned Tribunal has erred in not taking the aforesaid documents into consideration. Since the income of the deceased has been proved, the principle of minimum wages has no application to the present case. The claim of future prospects is rejected as it has not been proved that the job of the deceased was of permanent nature.

12. There is another aspect of the matter. Even if the minimum wages are taken into consideration, the amount after taking the inflation and rise in price index would be almost equal to the salary of the deceased. The learned Tribunal has taken the minimum wages as Rs. 1,300/-. However, the increase in minimum wages has not been taken into consideration. It is well settled by the catena of judgments of this Court in the cases of Kanwar Devi v. Bansal Roadways, 2008 ACJ 2182, National Insurance Company Limited v. Renu Devi III (2008) ACC 134 and UPSRTC v. Munni Devi, MAC. APP. No. 310/2007 decided on 28.07.2008 that the Court should take judicial notice of increase in minimum wages to meet the increase in price index and inflation rate. This Court has taken the view that the minimum wages get doubled over the period of 10 years and increase in minimum wages is not akin to future prospects and the income should be computed by taking the average of minimum wages and its double. Following the aforesaid judgments, the minimum wages after taking the increase due to inflation and rise in price index would be Rs. 1,950/- per month [(Rs. 1,300 + Rs. 2,600)/2]. The income of Rs. 2,000/- per month of the deceased is, therefore, almost equal to the minimum wages.

13. The learned Tribunal has not awarded any compensation towards loss of consortium as well as loss of estate. Rs. 10,000/- is awarded towards loss of consortium and Rs. 10,000/- towards loss of estate.

14. The learned Tribunal has applied multiplier of 18 according to the Second Schedule of Motor Vehicles Act. According to the judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Sarla Verma v. Delhi Transport Corporation, (supra), the appropriate multiplier at the age of 28 is 17. The multiplier is therefore reduced from 18 to 17. The claimants are entitled to total compensation of Rs. 3,46,000/- [(2,000 × ¾; × 12 × 17) + 5,000 + 5,000 + 10,000 + 10,000 + Rs. 10,000].

15. The learned Tribunal has deducted Rs. 50,000/- paid to Govt. of NCT of Delhi as ex-gratia amount. The said deduction is in conformity with the principles laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of United India Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Patricia Jean Mahajan (2002) 6 SCC 281 : AIR 2002 SC 2607 where the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that the claimant is not entitled to claim compensation in respect of which the claimant has received the benefit as a consequence of the injuries sustained which otherwise he would not have been entitled to. The deduction of Rs. 50,000/- by the Claims Tribunal is upheld. After deduction of Rs. 50,000/- the claimants are held to be entitled to compensation of Rs. 2,96,000/- (Rs. 3,46,000 - Rs. 50,000).

16. The learned Tribunal has awarded interest @ 5.5% per annum. Following the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Dharampal v. UP State Road Transport Corporation, III 2008 ACC (1) SC, the rate of interest is enhanced from 5.5% per annum to 7.5% per annum from the date of filing of the petition till realization.

17. The learned counsel for DTC submits that amount of compensation awarded to the claimants is more than the amount claimed in the claim petition. It is well settled that the claimants are entitled to just compensation which can exceed the amount claimed. In Nagappa v. Gurudaval Singh, 2003 ACJ 12, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held as under:—

“21. For the reasons discussed above, in our view, under the M.V Act, there is no restriction that Tribunal/court cannot award compensation amount exceeding the claimed amount. The function of the Tribunal/court is to award ‘just’ compensation which is reasonable on the basis of evidence produced on record.”

18. The learned counsel for the DTC submits that the widow of the deceased shall be entitled to compensation for loss of dependency from the date of accident till the date of her remarriage. The learned counsel for DTC has referred to and relied upon the judgment of this Court in the case of Nisha v. Gyanvati, MAC. APP. 794/2005 decided on 14th March, 2007 in which this Court has held that the widow shall be entitled to compensation only till her remarriage. The learned counsel submits that the widow got remarried within three years of the accident and, therefore, would not be entitled to compensation thereafter.

19. The Jammu and Kashmir High Court and the Rajasthan High Court have held that the re-marriage of widow cannot deprive her of compensation payable for the death of her husband in the following cases:—

(i) In Seema Malik v. Union of India, 2005 ACJ 1389, the Jammu and Kashmir High Court examined the judgments of various High Courts on this issue and held as under:—

“5. Another issue which is required to be taken note of is with regard to the rights of a widow to claim maintenance even if she re-marries. The judicial opinion is to the effect that simply because a widow has remarried, is not to be made a ground for declining her compensation. In Hariram v. Commissioner for Workmen's Compensation, 1994 ACJ 1094 (MP), the view expressed was that the widow on remarriage cannot be deprived of her right of getting compensation. In the above case the argument put across was that as the widow had re-married, therefore, the entire amount be given to the father of the deceased. It was held that this legal proposition cannot be sustained. The reasoning given was that the inheritance never remains in abeyance and, therefore, rights of a widow are to be taken and recognised on the date when her husband dies. Therefore, she cannot be deprived of her right of getting compensation.

6. The Rajasthan High Court in the case reported as Regal Sports v. Mohd. Siddique, 1994 ACJ 294 (Rajasthan), held that the widow cannot be declined compensation on her remarriage. Amount awarded was Rs. 66,420/-. This was reduced in appeal to Rs. 50,000/-. What is sought to be pointed out is that the widow was held entitled to claim amount of compensation. In Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation v. Kiran Lata, 1993 ACJ 130 (Rajasthan), the view expressed was that to deny compensation on the ground of possibility of remarriage of the widow would be enforcing a view which is against the public policy and would be violative of Section 23 of the Contract Act. It was accordingly observed that the question of possibility of remarriage would not come in the way at all and compensation is not to be based by taking into consideration the question of marriage or possibility of remarriage. In another decision of the Rajasthan High Court, reported as Vimla Devi v. Chaman, 1992 ACJ 1048 (Rajasthan), it was held that the denial of compensation is not to be on account of possibility of re-marriage of the widow of the deceased. Some other decisions dealing with this aspect of the matter are Rajinder Kumar v. Soma Devi, 2001 ACJ 307 (HP); Chandan v. Kanwarlal, 1989 ACJ 816 (Delhi); Khairullah v. Anita 1994 ACJ 1017 (AP); Nankuram Sarajdin v. Member, M.A.C.T, Thane, 1994 (2) TAC 346 and Halki Bai v. New India Insurance Co. Ltd., 1999 ACJ 187 (MP). Learned Judges in these cases have consistently held that remarriage of a widow would not disentitle her to claim compensation.

7. Another reason which re-enforces the above conclusion that on re-marriage of a widow the social stigma which stood imposed earlier is not completely washed of. Some negative factors continue to exist and are taken note of in the case of re-marriage of a widow. She may on re-marriage may not enjoy the same status and frame of mind. Re-adjustment when widow has an infant, creates other social problems and she has to provide some security to the child or children from the first husband. This factor has to be taken note of. As such a widow on re-marriage cannot be deprived of the compensation.

8. The mother of the minor had stated that the amount of compensation was required to be spent on educating and bringing up her minor son. According to her, that much amount which she would have got would have been spent on the upkeep of the minor. Her counsel has stated that whatever amount she becomes entitled to now be given to her son; so that this monetary relief be of some solace for the fatherly love which he was unable to enjoy. As the appeal has been preferred by the son and mother of the deceased, the awarded enhanced amount shall go to the son.”

(ii) In Vimla Devi v. Chaman, I (1992) ACC 170, the Rajasthan High Court held that public feeling requires that there shall not be any deduction on account of possibility of remarriage. The findings of the High Court are as under:—

“4. Mr. Bhartiya has also cited before me the case of Makbool Ahmed v. Bhura Lal 1986 ACJ 219 (Rajasthan). My brother Vyas, J., was considering the question of remarriage and held that the compensation should be paid only upto the date of remarriage and for the parents the multiplier was considered as 15 years. This case does not help Mr. Bhartiya in the facts and circumstances of the case in any way. However, I will like to observe that the Constitution of India guarantees equal treatment and particularly Article 15 of the Constitution read with preamble of the Constitution. Chapter IV of the Constitution directs the court and the Government to provide equality of opportunity, equality of status and to give special facilities and concession to the weaker class of the society, namely, the women. The days when the widow remarriage was prohibited have gone and after coming into force of the Hindu Marriage Act and Hindu Succession Act, the doctrine of limited case also lost its ground. Widow has a right to remarry and it is in the interest of the society that remarriage of the young lady should be encouraged and the court should not be an impediment because of the old traditional approach, where the power vested in the man and the females were considered as the second class members. For this purpose, Section 14 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 also provides the right of absolute ownership to a woman and I am of the view that to say that on account of the remarriage or possibility of remarriage deduction of compensation will be against the spirit of the Constitution and will put a check on the remarriage system provided under various legislations enacted by the Parliament and the State Assembly. I am in disagreement on this point that there should be any impediment or restriction, directly or indirectly, compelling a woman not to remarry. On the contrary, an incentive should be given for remarriage for the preservation of better society. After remarriage generally a woman does not get the same status and benefits of decent life as she used to get earlier. Public feeling requires that there shall not be any deduction on account of possibility of remarriage.”

(iii) In Bhanwar Lal v. Munshi Ram, 1988 ACJ 283, the Rajasthan High Court held that the widow remarriage is a matter of satisfaction for all concerned but other members of the family should not suffer on this account. The deductions may act as impediment in the path of encouragement to widow remarriage. The relevant findings of the High Court are as under:—

“7. …In Hindu society remarriage of widow is still rare and considered to be a taboo even till today. Therefore, if a widow remarriage, it is a matter of satisfaction for all concerned but on this account, there is no reason why the other members of the family of deceased should suffer. The deductions may act impediment in path of encouragement to widow remarriage. Apart from this, the act is a piece of social legislation which has been enacted with a view to give benefit to the members of the family of the unfortunate victim who lost his life in a sad accident. I am, therefore, of considered opinion that it will not be appropriate and justified on any ground to deduct anything on account of remarriage of the widow of the deceased and to deny the benefit of the compensation to the aging parents of the deceased person.”

20. I am in respectful agreement with the view of the Jammu & Kashmir High Court and the Rajasthan High Court and hold that the remarriage/possibility of the remarriage will not deprive a person from compensation for the death of his/her spouse. The learned counsel for claimants submit that the widow got re-married after about 3 years of the death of the deceased and, therefore, enhanced award amount be apportioned considering that the ex-gratia amount of Rs. 50,000/- was received by widow alone and out of the amount awarded by learned Tribunal, the parents were given only Rs. 12,500/- each and the remaining amount was released to the children. It is noted that apart from the widow, the deceased has left behind two minor children and parents. The minor children continued to live with the widow even after her remarriage. No compensation has been awarded to the widow by the Claims Tribunal. However, out of the enhanced award amount, 10% of the compensation is reasonable to be given to the widow towards maintenance till her remarriage and for discharging her liability to maintain the children and the expenses incurred on that account. The remarriage of the widow has been considered by this Court and the shares of the children and parents are fixed considering the remarriage of the widow.

21. The appeal is allowed and the award amount is enhanced from Rs. 1,50,000/- to Rs. 2,96,000/- along with interest @ 7.5% per annum from the date of filing of petition up to the date of notice under Order 21 Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

22. Considering the facts and circumstances of the case, it is directed that shares of the claimants in the enhanced award amount shall be as under:—

(i) Share of widow of the deceased: 10%

(ii) Share of father of the deceased: 15%

(iii) Share of mother of the deceased: 15%

(iv) Shares of children: 30% each.

23. The enhanced award amount along with interest be deposited by DTC with UCO Bank A/c Suparo Devi, Delhi High Court Branch through Mr. M.M Tandon, Member-Retail Team, UCO Bank Zonal, Parliament Street, New Delhi (Mobile No. 09310356400) within 60 days.

24. Upon the aforesaid deposit being made, UCO Bank is directed to release the share of the widow, Meena Kumari by transferring the same to her Saving Bank Account. With respect to the shares of the parents. 50% amount be released to them and the remaining 50% be kept in fixed deposit for one year with cumulative interest. The shares of the children be kept in fixed deposit for two years on which monthly interest be paid to them.

25. The interest on the aforesaid fixed deposits of the children shall be paid monthly by automatic credit of interest in the Savings Account of the respondents.

26. Withdrawal from the aforesaid account shall be permitted to the respondents after due verification and the Bank shall issue photo Identity Card to the respondents to facilitate identity.

27. No cheque book be issued to the respondents without the permission of this Court.

28. The Bank shall issue Fixed Deposit Pass Book instead of the FDR to the respondents and the maturity amount of the FDRs be automatically credited to the Saving Bank Account of the beneficiary at the end of the FDR.

29. No loan, advance or withdrawal shall be allowed on the said fixed deposit receipts without the permission of this Court.

30. Half yearly statement of account be filed by the Bank in this Court.

31. On the request of the respondents, the Bank shall transfer the Savings Account to any other branch of UCO Bank according to the convenience of the respondents.

32. The respondents shall furnish all the relevant documents for opening of the Saving Bank Account and Fixed Deposit Account to Mr. M.M Tandon, Member-Retail Team, UCO Bank Zonal, Parliament Street, New Delhi.

33. List on 3rd May, 2010.

34. This Court appreciates the effective assistance rendered by Ms. Rajdipa Behura, Advocate appointed as amicus curiae by this Court in this matter.

35. Copy of the order be given dasti to counsel for both the parties under the signatures of the Court Master.

36. Copy of this order be also sent to Mr. M.M Tandon, Member-Retail Team, UCO Bank Zonal, Parliament Street, New Delhi (Mobile No. 09310356400) through the UCO Bank, High Court Branch under the signature of Court Master.