- Bookmark
- Share
- CaseIQ
Modi Telefibres Ltd. And Others v. Sujit Kumar Choudhary And Others
Factual and Procedural Background
The respondent workmen had obtained an award from the Labour Court. Alleging that the appellant–employer failed to comply with that award, the workmen initiated contempt proceedings under the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 before a learned Single Judge of the High Court. On 5-3-2003, followed by a further order on 22-5-2003, the Single Judge found that the employer had not paid all dues—including variable dearness allowance—and therefore held the employer guilty of contempt, directing its officer to appear with bank drafts to purge the contempt. The employer preferred an appeal to the Division Bench of the same High Court. By order dated 29-4-2003, the Division Bench dismissed the appeal on the ground that the contempt matter was still pending before the Single Judge. The present decision addresses the employer’s further appeal, challenging the Division Bench’s refusal to entertain the appeal.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the Single Judge’s order recording a finding of contempt but adjourning the matter for possible punishment is an appealable order under Section 19(1) of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971.
- Whether the Division Bench erred in refusing to hear the employer’s appeal on the premise that the contempt proceedings were still pending before the Single Judge.
Arguments of the Parties
The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the parties' legal arguments.
Table of Precedents Cited
No precedents were cited in the provided opinion.
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court noted that the Single Judge had already reached a definitive conclusion that the employer had committed contempt by failing to pay the full dues under the Labour Court award. Because the finding of contempt is final as to liability, the order cannot be treated as merely interlocutory. The Court then turned to Section 19 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, which expressly grants a right of appeal “as of right from any order or decision” of a High Court exercising contempt jurisdiction when the order is by a Single Judge. The provision does not hinge on whether punishment has been determined; it is triggered by the finding of contempt itself. Consequently, the Division Bench erred in characterising the Single Judge’s order as non-appealable and in denying the employer the statutory right of appeal.
Holding and Implications
APPEAL ALLOWED; ORDER OF DIVISION BENCH DATED 29-4-2003 SET ASIDE; MATTER REMANDED FOR DECISION ON MERITS.
Direct Effect: The Division Bench must now hear and decide the employer’s appeal against the Single Judge’s contempt finding on its merits. No broader jurisprudential rule was laid down beyond reaffirming the statutory right of appeal under Section 19 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971.
Order
1. Leave granted.
2. Heard learned counsel for the parties finally on the merits of the case.
3. For the alleged non-compliance with the award of the Labour Court in favour of the respondent workmen, proceedings under the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 were initiated. The learned Single Judge by an order passed on 5-3-2003 followed by a subsequent order dated 22-5-2003 has clearly recorded his conclusion that all dues of the workmen including variable dearness allowances have not been paid by the appellant employer and thus the contempt was committed. The learned Single Judge directed the officer of the employer to remain present with bank drafts to be paid to the workmen. It is in these circumstances that the appellant employer approached by way of an appeal to the Division Bench of the High Court. The Division Bench of the High Court by the impugned order dated 29-4-2003 has dismissed the appeal on the short ground that the matter arising out of the contempt proceedings was still pending before the learned Single Judge.
4. After hearing the learned counsel for the parties and perusing the impugned order, we find that the Division Bench has committed gross error in overlooking the contents of the order of the learned Single Judge in which the finding has been recorded that the employer has committed contempt by not paying full dues of the workmen under the award.
5. Such an order of the learned Single Judge could not have been treated to be an interlocutory order and the right of appeal denied to the appellant employer merely because the learned Single Judge had adjourned the contempt proceedings to enable the alleged contemnor to purge the contempt or else for deciding the quantum of punishment.
6. Section 19 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 gives a right of appeal against the order of learned Single Judge of the High Court to the Division Bench of the High Court. Section 19 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 reads thus:
“19. Appeals.—(1) An appeal shall lie as of right from any order or decision of High Court in the exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt—
(a) where the order or decision is that of a Single Judge, to a Bench of not less than two Judges of the Court;
(b) where the order or decision is that of a Bench, to the Supreme Court:
Provided that where the order or decision or decision is that of the Court of the Judicial Commissioner in any Union Territory, such appeal shall lie to the Supreme Court.
(2) Pending any appeal, the appellate court may order that—
(a) the execution of the punishment or order appealed against be suspended;
(b) if the appellant is in confinement, he be released on bail; and
(c) the appeal be heard notwithstanding that the appellant has not purged his contempt.
(3) Where any person aggrieved by any order against which an appeal may be filed satisfies the High Court that he intends to prefer an appeal, the High Court may also exercise all or any of the powers conferred by sub-section (2).
(4) An appeal under sub-section (1) shall be filed—
(a) in the case of an appeal to a Bench of the High Court, within thirty days;
(b) in the case of an appeal to the Supreme Court, within sixty days,
from the date of the order appealed against.”
7. In view of the above provisions, the Division Bench was clearly wrong in refusing the right of appeal to the appellants.
8. For the aforesaid reasons, the impugned order dated 29-4-2003 is set aside and the case is sent back to the Division Bench to decide the appeal preferred by the appellants on merits.
9. The appeal is allowed accordingly.
Alert