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Tulsidas Kilachand v. Commissioner Of Income Tax, Bombay

Gujarat High Court
Jan 3, 1960
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Factual and Procedural Background

This judgment concerns the disposal of Civil Appeals Nos. 134 to 137 of 1959 filed by four assessees, arising from similar facts. The assessment year under consideration is 1952-53, with the previous year being the calendar year 1951. One appellant, Mr. Tulsidas Kilachand, declared a trust in favor of his wife, Vimla, whereby he held shares in two companies upon trust to pay the income thereof to her for seven years or until her death, and declared the trust irrevocable. The income from these shares was assessed for income tax, with a dispute over whether it should be included in Mr. Kilachand's total income or not.

The Income-tax Officer rejected the appellant's contention that the income should be exempt under the third proviso to section 16(1)(c) of the Indian Income-tax Act, on the basis that the income had accrued to Mr. Kilachand and was merely paid to his wife. This decision was upheld on appeal by the Appellate Assistant Commissioner and the Tribunal. The Tribunal referred a question to the High Court of Bombay regarding the correct tax treatment of the dividend income under the trust deed. The High Court affirmed that the income was taxable in the hands of Mr. Kilachand under section 16(3)(b). The appeals before the Supreme Court challenge this conclusion.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the net dividend income arising from shares held under a trust for the benefit of the wife is liable to be included in the total income of the settlor (Mr. Tulsidas Kilachand) under the Indian Income-tax Act.
  2. Whether the third proviso to section 16(1)(c) applies to exempt the income from inclusion in the settlor's total income.
  3. Whether the transfer of shares under the trust constitutes a transfer of assets to the wife or to another person for her benefit within the meaning of section 16(3)(a)(iii) or section 16(3)(b).
  4. Whether the transfer was made for adequate consideration, thereby affecting the applicability of the provisions requiring inclusion of income in the settlor's hands.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellants' Arguments

  • The income from the shares held in trust for the wife should not be included in the settlor's total income under the third proviso to section 16(1)(c) because the trust was irrevocable for more than six years or during the lifetime of the beneficiary without any benefit to the settlor.
  • There was no transfer of assets to the wife or any person for her benefit because ownership rights (such as voting and participation in profits) were not transferred; only a trust was created to pay dividends to the wife.
  • Even if a transfer is held to have occurred, it was for adequate consideration, being love and affection, which should exempt it from inclusion under section 16(3).

Respondent's Arguments

  • The income is taxable in the hands of Mr. Kilachand under sections 16(3)(a)(iii) and 16(3)(b), as the shares were transferred to the wife or to another person for her benefit without adequate consideration.
  • The third proviso to section 16(1)(c) is not applicable because the shares were held in trust and did not remain the property of the settlor.
  • The transfer to the trustee (who is the settlor himself in a different capacity) amounts to a transfer to "any person" under section 16(3)(b), making the income taxable in the settlor's hands.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Chamberlain v. Inland Revenue Commissioners Legislative intent to prevent tax avoidance by treating income from settlements as income of the settlor. The Court relied on Lord Macmillan’s observations to interpret section 16 as designed to prevent taxpayers from avoiding tax by disposing of property while retaining benefits.
Provat Kumar Mitter v. Commissioner of Income-Tax Distinction between assignment of income and transfer of income source; applicability of section 16(1)(c) and third proviso. The Court distinguished the present case from Provat Kumar Mitter, holding that in the present case the shares themselves were transferred in trust, not just the income, thus attracting different provisions.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court began by examining the relevant statutory provisions under section 16 of the Indian Income-tax Act, which govern exemptions and inclusions in computing total income, particularly regarding income arising from settlements or dispositions of assets.

The Court noted that section 16(1)(c) deems income arising to any person by virtue of a settlement or disposition to be income of the settler, with a third proviso exempting income arising from irrevocable settlements exceeding six years or during the lifetime of the beneficiary, provided the settler derives no direct or indirect benefit.

However, the Court found that the shares did not remain the property of the settlor but were held by him as trustee, meaning section 16(1)(c) and its proviso did not apply. It then turned to section 16(3), which includes income arising from assets transferred to the wife or for her benefit in the total income of the husband if the transfer was not for adequate consideration.

The Court rejected the appellants' argument that no transfer of assets had occurred, holding that the declaration of trust constituted a transfer of assets to the trustee (the settlor in a different capacity), which counts as a transfer under the Transfer of Property Act and section 16(3)(b).

Regarding consideration, the Court held that "adequate consideration" excludes mere love and affection, which, although good consideration for contract purposes, is insufficient to avoid inclusion of income for tax purposes.

Therefore, the Court concluded the income fell within section 16(3)(b) and not within the third proviso to section 16(1)(c), affirming the High Court's decision that the income is taxable in the hands of Mr. Kilachand.

Holding and Implications

The appeals are dismissed with costs.

The Court held that the dividend income arising from shares held in trust for the wife is includible in the total income of the settlor under section 16(3)(b) of the Indian Income-tax Act. The third proviso to section 16(1)(c) does not apply because the shares are held in trust and do not remain the property of the settlor. The transfer to the trustee (the settlor in a different capacity) constitutes a transfer of assets for the benefit of the wife without adequate consideration, thus attracting inclusion of income in the settlor's hands.

No new legal precedent was established beyond affirming the correct application of existing provisions to the facts. The direct effect is that the appellants must include the dividend income in their taxable income for assessment.

Show all summary ...

M. HIDAYATULLAH, J. L. KAPUR, J. C. SHAH

(1.) This judgment governs the disposal of Civil Appeals Nos. 134 to 137 of 1959. They have been filed by four assessees with special leave and arise out of similar facts and it is not necessary to refer to more than one case to consider the point in question.

(2.) The assessment year under consideration is 1952-53 and the previous year the Calendar year 1951 In that year Mr. Tulsidas Kilachand one of the four appellants made a declaration of trust in favour of his wife a portion of which may be quoted here:

...I Tulsidas Kilachand hereby declare that I hold 244 shares of Kesar Corporation Ltd. and 120 shares of Kilachand Devchand and Co. Ltd. upon trust to pay the income thereof to my wife Vimla for a period of seven years from the date hereof or her death (whichever event may be earlier) and I hereby declare that this trust shall not be revocable.

(3.) In the year of account a sum of Rs. 30 404 was received as dividend Income of those shares and the assessee contended that this income after being grossed up was not liable to be included in his total income in view of the third proviso to sec. 16(1)(c) of the Indian Income-tax Act. The Income-tax Officer did not accept this contention and though the assessment order is not before us we gather from the statement of the case that the reason he gave was that the income had accrued to or had arisen in the hands of Mr. Tulsidas Kilachand and had been paid by him to his wife. The Income-tax Officer held that the words of the proviso income arising to any person by virtue of a settlement of disposition did not apply to this income.

(4.) On appeal the Appellate Assistant Commissioner held that the case was governed by sec. 16(1)(b) and need not be considered under the third proviso to sec. 16(1)(c) of the Act. It appears to have been conceded before him that if the former provision applied the proviso would not save the income from being assessed in the hands of Mr. Tulsidas Kilachand. The appeal was dismissed

(5.) In the appeal before the Tribunal Mr. Tulsidas Kilachand again relied upon the third proviso to sec. 16(1)(c) and contended that the case was not governed by sec. 16(3)(b) and that the dividend income could not be included in his assessment. The Tribunal came to the conclusion that the case was covered either by sec. 16(3)(a)(iii) or by sec. 16(3)(b) and that the income from shares was therefore liable to be included in the income of Mr. Tulsidas Kilachand. The Tribunal however raised and referred the following question under sec. 66(1) of the Act to the High Court of Bombay;

Whether on a true construction of the deed of declaration of trust dated 5/03/1951 the net dividend income of Rs. 30 404 on 120 shares of Kilachand Devchand and Co. Ltd. and 244 shares of Kesar Corporation Ltd. held under trust by the assessee for the benefit of his wife was income liable to be included in the total income of the assessee ?

(6.) The High Court came to the conclusion that though sec. 16(1)(c) was not satisfied in view of the third proviso sec. 16(3)(b) was applicable to the case and answered the question in the affirmative.

(7.) In the appeal before us the case for the Department was based both on sec. 16(3)(a)(iii) and sec. 16(3)(b) while the appellants contended that this disposition fell within the third proviso to sec. 16(1)(c). The relevant provisions are:

16 Exemptions and exclusions in determining the total income (1) In computing the total income of an assessee .. ... .. .. ... ... ... ... (c) all income arising to any person by virtue of a settlement or disposition whether revocable or not and whether effected before or after the commencement of the Indian Income-tax (Amendment Act 1939 (VII of 1939) from assets remaining the property of the settler or disposer shall be deemed to be income of the settler or disposer and all income arising to any person by virtue of a revocable transfer of assets shall be deemed to be income of the transferor: Provided .. ... ... ... ... .. ... ... Provided further ... ... ... ... .. ... ... Provided further that this clause shall not apply to any income arising to any reason by virtue of a settlement or disposition which is not revocable for a period exceeding six years or during the lifetime of the person and from which income the settler or disposer derives no direct or indirect benefit but that the settler shall be liable to be assessed on the said income as and when the power to revoke arises to him. (2) .. ... .. .. .. ... ... . . . (omitted) (3) In computing the total income of any individual for the purpose of assessment there shall be included (a) so much of the income of a wife or minor child of such individual as arises directly or indirectly (i) .. ... ... ... .. .. .. (ii) ... ... ... ... .. .. ... ... (iii) from assets transferred directly or indirectly to the wife by the husband otherwise than for adequate consideration or in connection with an agreement to live apart; or ... ... .. .. ... .. .. .. . ... (b) so much of the income of any person or association of persons as arises from assets transferred otherwise than for adequate consideration to the person or association by such individual for the benefit of his wife or a minor child or both.

(8.) The object of framing sec. 16 can almost be taken from the observations of Lord Macmillan in Chamberlain v. Inland Revenue Commissioners (1) where he stated as follows:

(9.) This legislation(is) designed to overtake and circumvent a growing tendency on the part of tax payers to endeavor to avoid or reduce tax liability by means of settlements. Stated quite generally the method consisted in the disposal by the taxpayer of part of his property in such a way that the income should no longer be receivable by him while at the same time he retained certain powers over or interests in the property or its income. The legislatures counter was to declare that the income of which the taxpayer had thus sought to disembarrass himself should notwithstanding be treated as still his income and taxed in his hands accordingly.

(10.) These observations apply also to the section under consideration and the Indian provision is enacted with the same intent and for the same purpose. Section 16 thus lays down certain exemptions and exclusions in determining the total income of an assessee. Some of the provisions lay down the conditions for inclusion of certain income while others law down the conditions for exclusion of other income. We are concerned with the income accruing in case of settlements and the conditions under which income of a wife is treated as the income of the settler disposer or as the income of husband. We have to see if the provisions for exclusion or inclusion apply to this case.

(11.) Section 16(1)(c) provides that income from assets remaining the property of the settler or disposer or arising to any person by virtue of a revocable transfer of assets shall be deemed to be the income of the transferor. What cl. (c) means was decided by this Court in Provat Kumar Mitter v. Commissioner of Income -Tax (2). There Provat Kumar Mitter had assigned the dividends only and had not transferred the relevant shares It was held by this Court that this was a case of application of one own income aid not assignment of the source from which the income was derived which alone saved the income from Tax subject however to provisions like sec. 16(1)(c) and sec. 16(3). The deed in favour of the wife in that case gave only a right to the dividends and not being a transfer of an existing property of the assessee sec. 16(1)(c) and the third proviso were not attracted. That case thus has no application to the facts of the present case were the disposition is differently made.

(12.) The disposition here is for a period of seven years or the life of the settlee whichever is shorter. During that period or the life of the settlee Mr. Tulsidas Kilachand has bound himself upon trust to pay the dividend to his wife and not to revoke the settlement. The intention is obviously to put this case within the third proviso to sec. 16(1)(c) because cl. (c) does not apply to any income arising to any other person provided the disposer derives no direct or indirect benefit even though the assets remain his property . If it were only a question of the application of the proviso. this disposition would be exempt. But by the deed of trust the settler holds the shares in trust; the shares do not remain the property of the settler. Section 16(1)(c) has therefore no application and the proviso is not attracted.

(13.) The section goes on to deal with other situations and to provide for them specially Sub-section (3) provides specially for assets transferred to the wife or minor child. income from assets transferred to the wife is still to be included in the total income of the husband (a) if the assets have been transferred directly or indirectly to the wife by the husband otherwise than for adequate consideration [ vide sub-sec. (3)(a)(iii) or (b) so much of the income of any person or association of persons as arise from assets transferred otherwise than for adequate consideration to the person or association by such individual for the benefit of his wife [vide sec. (3)(b)]

(14.) The first question is whether there can be said to be transfer of assets to the wife or to any person for the benefit of the wife. The second question is whether there was adequate consideration for the transfer if there was one. The contention of the assessee is that there was no transfer of any assets at all. It is contended that the ownership of shares involves a bundle of rights and that they are generally speaking (a) right to vote (b) right to participate in the distribution of assets on dissolution and (c) right to participate in the profits e.g. dividends which might be declared It is pointed out that none of these rights was transferred to the wife because transfer of assets connotes a creation of a right in the assets in praesenti. It is urged that there was no transfer of assets either to the wife or to any person for the benefit of the wife but merely a creation of a trust in respect of the shares the dividends from which were payable to the wife and that thus sec. 16(3)(a)(iii) or sec. 16(3)(b) was not applicable. It is lastly contended that even if it be held that there was such a transfer it was for adequate consideration being for love and affection which is a good consideration.

(15.) The contention that there was no transfer at all in this case is not sound. The shares were previously held by Mr. Tulsidas Kilachand for himself. After the declaration of trust by him they were held by him not in his personal capacity but as a trustee. No doubt under sec. 5 and 6 of the Indian Trusts Act if the declarer of the trust is himself the trustee also there is no need that he must transfer the property to himself as trustee; but the law implies that such a transfer has been made by him and no overt act except a declaration of trust is necessary. The capacity of the declarer of trust and his capacity as a trustee are different and after the declaration of trust he holds the assets as a trustee. Under the Transfer of Property Act there can be a transfer by a person to himself or himself and another person or persons. In our opinion there was in this case a transfer by Mr. Tulsidas Kilachand to himself as a trustee though there was no formal transfer.

(16.) The assessee also stresses the words any person or association of persons in sec. 16(3)(b) and contends that such a person must he other than the husband who transfers. The word any person is wide enough to include the husband who transfers property to himself in another capacity. The change of capacity makes him answer the description any person. In our opinion this deed must be regarded as involving a transfer by the husband to a trustee and even though the husband is the same individual in his capacity as a trustee he must be regarded as a person distinct from the transferor. In our opinion sec. 15(3)(b) covers the case.

(17.) It remains to consider whether there was adequate consideration for the transfer. Reliance has been placed only upon love and affection. The words adequate consideration denote consideration other than mere love and affection which in the case of a wife may be presumed. When the law insists that there should be adequate consideration and not good consideration it excludes mere love and affection. They may be good consideration to support a contract; but adequate consideration to avoid tax is quite a different thing. To insist on the other meaning is really to say that consideration must only be looked for when love and affection case to exist.

(18.) In our opinion this cease falls within the special rules concerning wife and minor child laid down in sec. 16(3)(b) and not within third proviso to sec. 16(1)(c). It must thus be held that there was a transfer of the assets to the husband-trustee for the benefit of the wife. The answer given by the High Court was thus correct.

(19.) The appeals fall and are dismissed with costs. One hearing fee. Appeals dismissed.