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Jai Singh And Others v. Gurmej Singh .

Supreme Court Of India
Jan 20, 2009
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Factual and Procedural Background

The vendor, Bhartu, executed a registered sale deed dated 11-4-1990 by which he sold 20 kanals of land (400/3723 share out of a total holding of 186 kanals 3 marlas) to the present appellants for Rs 1,80,000. Respondent Gurmej Singh, claiming to be a co-sharer in the joint khewat, filed a suit for possession by way of pre-emption under Section 15(1)(b) of the Punjab Pre-emption Act, 1913.

The vendees resisted the suit on two grounds: (i) the khewat had allegedly undergone an oral partition before the impugned sale, and (ii) the vendor had conveyed only his defined share, not an undivided interest, therefore the respondent held no superior right of pre-emption.

The trial court framed multiple issues but finally decided only two—whether the plaintiff had a superior right of pre-emption and whether he was estopped from filing the suit. Both issues were answered in favour of the plaintiff. The vendees’ first appeal before the District Judge, Kurukshetra, was dismissed. In second appeal under Section 100 CPC, a learned Single Judge of the Punjab & Haryana High Court affirmed the lower courts. The present appeal under Article 136 of the Constitution (leave having been granted) challenges that High Court judgment.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether a co-owner’s sale of specific khasra numbers out of an undivided khewat amounts to a sale of “share” in joint land, rendering the vendees mere co-owners with existing co-sharers.
  2. If the vendees do become co-owners, whether such a transaction is pre-emptible by another co-sharer under Section 15(1)(b) of the Punjab Pre-emption Act, 1913.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellants (Vendees)

  • The registered sale deed (Exhibit P-4) conveyed specified khasra numbers; hence the vendor sold a defined portion, not an undivided share.
  • Where a co-sharer sells a defined parcel, the purchasers do not become co-sharers, so Section 15(1)(b) is inapplicable.
  • Relied on Full Bench authority Lachhman Singh v. Pritam Chand, AIR 1970 P&H 304.

Respondent (Pre-emptor)

  • Contended that, irrespective of description by khasra numbers, the vendor conveyed only his undivided 400/3723 share, making the vendees co-sharers subject to pre-emption.
  • Relied on later Full Bench judgment Bhartu v. Ram Sarup, 1981 PLJ 204, which had distinguished Lachhman Singh.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Lachhman Singh v. Pritam Chand, AIR 1970 P&H 304 (FB) A purchaser of a specific portion in certain rectangles does not, by that purchase alone, become a co-sharer in the entire khewat. Distinguished on facts; held not decisive of the present controversy.
Bhartu v. Ram Sarup, 1981 PLJ 204 (FB) Sale by a co-sharer, even of a specified parcel, transfers only his undivided rights; vendees thus become co-sharers and the sale is pre-emptible under Section 15(1)(b). Accepted as laying down the governing principle; forms the basis of dismissal of the appeal.
Pokhar (Dead) by LRs v. Ram Singh, (2009) 16 SCC 625 Supreme Court approval of the ratio in Bhartu v. Ram Sarup. Cited to underscore that Bhartu has the imprimatur of the Supreme Court.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Supreme Court reviewed the two Full Bench judgments. It noted that Bhartu expressly distinguished Lachhman Singh and articulated settled principles of co-ownership:

  • Each co-owner has an interest in every parcel of the joint property.
  • Possession by one is, in law, possession for all unless there is clear ouster.
  • A co-owner in exclusive possession of a portion cannot convey better title than he holds; any transferee steps into the transferor’s shoes as a co-sharer.

Applying these principles, the Court found that the vendor’s deed explicitly referred to selling “400/3723 share” in the joint holding, and there was no evidence of a prior partition. Delivery of possession of certain khasra numbers did not alter the legal character of the interest transferred. Consequently, the vendees became co-sharers, making the sale pre-emptible by another co-sharer under Section 15(1)(b). The 1995 amendment to the Punjab Pre-emption Act was considered prospective and therefore irrelevant to the dispute.

Holding and Implications

Appeal Dismissed. The Supreme Court affirmed the High Court’s dismissal of the second appeal, thereby upholding the decree of pre-emption in favour of the respondent.

Implications: The decision re-affirms that a sale by a co-owner of specific khasra numbers from an undivided khewat is legally a sale of an undivided share, maintaining the pre-emptive rights of other co-sharers. The ruling does not create new law but reinforces the precedent established in Bhartu v. Ram Sarup as already approved by the Supreme Court.

Show all summary ...

Dr. Arijit Pasayat, J.— Leave granted. The challenge in this appeal is to the order passed by a learned Single Judge of the Punjab and Haryana High Court dismissing the second appeal filed by the appellant in terms of Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (in short “CPC”). The basic question considered by the High Court was whether sale of a specific portion of land described by particular khasra numbers by a co-owner out of the joint khewat would be a sale of shares out of the joint land or whether the vendees become co-owners with other co-sharers in the joint land; in the event of their becoming co-owners, the sale is pre-emptible under Section 15(1)(b) of the Punjab Pre-emption Act, 1913 (in short “the Act”).

2. Background facts essentially are as follows: Vendor (Bhartu) sold the land measuring 20 kanals, being 400/3723 share out of the total land measuring 186 kanals 3 marlas vide registered sale deed dated 11-4-1990 to the appellants for a consideration of Rs 1,80,000. Gurmej Singh, the respondent filed a suit for possession by way of pre-emption, wherein it was pleaded that the vendor had sold the land measuring 20 kanals out of the joint khewat. According to him, being the co-sharer he has a right to pre-empt the sale under Section 15(1)(b) of the Act. The said suit was contested by the vendees stating that the pre-emptor had no superior right of pre-emption. Firstly, the khewat containing the suit land had been partitioned between various co-sharers much prior to the sale through an oral partition, and secondly, the sale was out of the defined share of the vendor.

3. On the basis of the pleading of the parties various issues were framed. But only two issues were contested before the trial court which are to the following effect:

(1) Whether the plaintiff has superior right to pre-empt the land in dispute being a co-sharer?
(2) Whether the plaintiff is estopped from filing the present suit by his own act and conduct?

On both the issues the trial court returned its findings in favour of the pre-emptor holding that he had a superior right of pre-emption and that he was not guilty of any such act which could stop him for pre-empting the same. Appeal before the learned District Judge, Kurukshetra, did not bring any relief.

4. The stand of the appellants before the High Court was that the sale deed, Ext. P-4 clearly indicated that specific khasra numbers had been sold by the vendor and defined portion of the joint land has been sold and the vendees have been put into possession of the specific khasra numbers. The appellants who are vendees argued that where a co-sharer sells his share as a specified part of joint land the vendees do not become co-sharers, the sale being not a share out of the joint land. It was, therefore, submitted that the respondent-plaintiff does not become a co-sharer in the property in dispute and as such has no preferential right of pre-emption with regard to sale of specific part of the vendor's share. Reliance was placed on a decision of the Full Bench of the High Court in Lachhman Singh v. Pritam Chand AIR 1970 P&H 304. On the other hand, the respondent relied on a later Full Bench judgment of the High Court in Bhartu v. Ram Sarup 1981 PLJ 204 to support the view of the lower courts.

5. The High Court noted that the latter decision had taken into consideration Lachhman Singh case AIR 1970 P&H 304 and observed that the question involved in Lachhman Singh case AIR 1970 P&H 304 was as to whether the purchaser of a specific portion of some killa numbers in two rectangles would become a co-sharer in the khewat consisting of several other rectangles and would be entitled to pre-empt the sale out of the rectangles other than in which he became owner by the said purchase and on these facts it was held that such a purchaser does not become a co-sharer in the khewat and therefore, has no right to pre-empt the sale.

6. The High Court observed that the principles laid down in Lachhman Singh case AIR 1970 P&H 304 had no direct bearing on the question whether the sale of a specific khasra number out of a khewat would be a sale of a share out of the joint land or not. According to the High Court, answer to the above question depends on inter se rights of the co-sharers in the joint khewat and the nature of the sale of a specified portion of the joint holding. Accordingly, the High Court held that when a co-sharer sells his share in the joint holding or in part thereof and puts the vendees into possession of the land in his possession what he transfers is his right as co-sharer in the said land and that right would remain in his exclusive possession till the joint holding is partitioned amongst all the co-sharers. The transferee gets the same right as that of a transferor to joint possession and has further right to enforce the partition of the same irrespective of the fact whether the property sold is fractional share or specified portion exclusively in possession of the transferor.

7. After referring to the sale deed the High Court noticed that the vendor had sold the land of his share of 400/3723 measuring 20 kanals out of the total land. It was mentioned in the sale deed that the possession of the land comprised in the specified khasra numbers was delivered to the vendees. However, it was nowhere mentioned in the sale deed that the land was ever partitioned or was out of the defined part of the land. On the contrary, it was clearly mentioned that the vendor was selling his 400/3723 share out of the total holding. The High Court turned down the plea based on repeal of the right of a co-sharer by the amending Act of 1995. It was observed that the right of co-sharers has been held to be prospective in operation and does not affect the right of the parties to the litigation on the date of adjudication of the pre-emption suit and the appellate court is not required to take into account or give effect to the substituted Section 15 introduced by the amending Act. Accordingly, the second appeal was dismissed.

8. Learned counsel for the appellants reiterated the stand taken before the High Court and submitted that the ratio of the decision of the Full Bench in Lachhman Singh case AIR 1970 P&H 304 has full application to the facts of the case. In response, learned counsel for the respondent supported the judgment of the High Court.

9. It is to be noted that in the subsequent Full Bench judgment in Bhartu case 1981 PLJ 204, the earlier decision in Lachhman Singh case AIR 1970 P&H 304 was distinguished on facts. The principles relating to the inter se rights and liabilities of co-sharers are as follows:

(1) A co-owner has an interest in the whole property and also in every parcel of it.
(2) Possession of joint property by one co-owner is in the eye of the law, possession of all even if all but one are actually out of possession.
(3) A mere occupation of a larger portion or even of an entire joint property does not necessarily amount to ouster as the possession of one is deemed to be on behalf of all.
(4) The above rule admits of an exception when there is ouster of a co-owner by another. But in order to negative the presumption of joint possession on behalf of all, on the ground of ouster, the possession of a co-owner must not only be exclusive but also hostile to the knowledge of the other as, when a co-owner openly asserts his own title and denies, that of the other.
(5) Passage of time does not extinguish the right of the co-owner who has been out of possession of the joint property except in the event of ouster or abandonment.
(6) Every co-owner has a right to use the joint property in a husband like manner not inconsistent with similar rights of other co-owners.
(7) Where a co-owner is in possession of separate parcels under an arrangement consented by the other co-owners, it is not open to anybody to disturb the arrangement without the consent of others except by filing a suit for partition.

10. It is thus evident that when a co-sharer is in exclusive possession of some portion of the joint holding he is in possession thereof as a co-sharer and is entitled to continue in its possession if it is not more than his share till the joint holding is partitioned. A vendor cannot sell any property with better rights than himself. As a necessary corollary when a co-sharer sells his share in the joint holding or any portion thereof and puts the vendee into possession of the land in his possession what he transfers is his right as a co-sharer in the said land and the right to remain in its exclusive possession till the joint holding is partitioned amongst all co-sharers.

11. Sale of subsequent portion of the land out of the joint holding by one of the co-owners is nothing but a sale of a share out of the joint holding and is pre-emptible under Section 15(1)(b) of the Act. It is to be noted that the judgment in Bhartu case 1981 PLJ 204 had the seal of approval of this Court in Pokhar v. Ram Singh (2009) 16 SCC 625, Civil Appeal No. 4418 of 1986.

12. Above being the position, we find no merit in this appeal which is dismissed accordingly.