P.N Mookerjee, J.:— The petitioner before us is an applicant under sec. 16(3) of the new West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act of 1956 (West Bengal Act XII of 1956). He claims to be a sub-tenant in respect of the disputed premises, comprising a portion of Municipal premises No. 7/1-B, Russa Road, Bhowanipore, renumbered as 44-B, Syamaprosad Mookerjee Road. On November 26, 1956, the petitioner applied to the Rent Controller, Calcutta, for, inter alia, a declaration of his direct tenancy under the above section. The application was registered as Case No. 2640B of 1956 and, in the said proceeding and pending the same, he applied for the issue of a temporary injunction, restraining opposite party No. 1, who is the owner of the disputed premises, from executing a decree for ejectment, obtained by him (opposite Party No. 1) against the predecessor-in-interest of opposite parties Nos. 2 to 5 (who, according to the petitioner, were his immediate landlords) as tenants under the said opposite party No. 1 and from ousting the petitioner thereby. That application, which was made on February 20, 1957, was rejected by the Rent Controller and, feeling aggrieved, the petitioner moved this Court and obtained the present Rule.

2. The relevant facts lie within a short compass and they are as follows:

Two persons, Sanat Kumar Chatterjee and Jnanendra Nath Chatterjee, who were the predecessors-in-interest of opposite parties Nos. 2 to 5, were the tenants of the disputed premises under the owner Debendra Nath Banerjee, predecessor of opposite party No. 1. In Title Suit No. 424 of 1941 of the Third Court of the Munsif at Alipore, the said Debendra Nath Banerjee obtained a decree for ejectment against his said two tenants. That decree was passed in August, 1942, and it was put into execution in Title Execution Case No. 46 of 1943 of the said court on April, 9, 1943. Execution was resisted by the judgment-debtors and, on their death, by their heirs, opposite parties Nos. 2 to 5, and, thereafter, by the present petitioner who claimed to be the sub-tenant under them, and the execution case is still pending. The objections of the judgment-debtors and their heirs have failed and the petitioner's initial attempt to have a declaration of direct tenancy under sec. 11 (3) of the West Bengal Premises Rent Control Act of 1948 in Title Suit No. 41 of 1949 of the First Court of the Subordinate Judge at Alipore has also failed. Thereafter, he has filed another Title Suit No. 100 of 1955 in the court of the Second Munsif at Alipore for declaration of his direct tenancy under sec. 12(2) of the Rent Control Act of 1950. That suit is still pending but his application for a temporary injunction, restraining opposite party No. 1 from proceeding with the above Title Execution Case Mo. 46 of 1943, was dismissed upto this Count. Meanwhile, however, as already stated, on November 26, 1956, the petitioner has applied to the Rent Controller, Calcutta, for declaration of a direct tenancy under opposite party No. 1 under sec. 16(3) of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act of 1956 (which came into force on 31st March, 1956) and pending the proceeding, started on that application, he has applied for a temporary injunction which, as stated above, has been rejected by the Rent Controller.

3. The Controller has taken the view that, as, under the new Act of 1956, a tenant, against whom a decree for ejectment has been obtained cannot be regarded as a tenant and as, without a tenant, there cannot be a sub-tenant, the petitioner cannot claim to be a subtenant and his application for temporary injunction would, therefore, fail for want of a prima facie case. The Controller was further of the opinion that he, as Rent Cnotroller, had no power to issue a temporary injunction, particularly to restrain execution of a decree for ejectment, validly obtained. On both these grounds, he has dismissed the petitioner's application. In arguing this Rule, Mr. Lala commented severely upon both the above grounds, given by the Rent Controller. He was particularly critical about the second ground which, according to him, was based on a wrong view of the statute and plainly involved a question of jurisdiction and, about the first also, he submitted that it was erroneous in law and this error led to a failure to exercise jurisdiction. He realised that his argument failing under either head, the Rule would fail, but he contended that his submissions were correct and ought to succeed.

4. The second ground (which goes apparently to the root of the matter) we shall take up first. It depends upon the view one takes of the scope and effect of sec. 29(5) of the 1956 West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, so far as it enacts that the Controller shall, in dealing with proceedings under that Act, be deemed to be a court for the exercise of powers under sec. 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. Mr. Lala has argued that the Court's powers under sec. 151 of the Code include the power to issue an interim or temporary injunction in appropriate cases and under the provision, quoted above, if the Controller is a court for the exercise of powers under that section, there is no reason why he would not be competent to issue temporary or ad interim injunction in appropriate cases. As at present advised, we are not inclined to throw out this argument and, having regard to the nature, scheme and purpose of this particular statute, namely, the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act. of 1956, and the phraseology of sec. 29(5), in the light of the well recognised inherent powers of the court to issue injunctions under sec. 151 of the Code to prevent irreparable injuries in cases where there is no other remedy, open to the aggrieved party, we feel that, subject to the above restriction, the Controller, as court under sec. 151 of the Code, may well have jurisdiction to issue injunction in appropriate cases. Such power must no doubt be exercised sparingly and only for securing justice, ex debito justitiae, but the existence of the power subject to the restriction, noted above, cannot possibly be denied. We would, therefore, be prepared to hold in favour of Mr. Lala on the first point.

5. That, however, would be of no assistance to the petitioner as the Rule must fail on the other ground, given by the Rent Controller, and two additional grounds which we shall presently indicate, and one of which is sufficient to exclude the prima facie case, which is essential to entitle a party to an order of temporary injunction.

6. The present proceeding, it must be remembered, is under the new West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act of 1956 and the relevant status of a party therein for purposes of the said proceeding would have to be determined on and in the light of the provisions of that statute. His status under the previous Rent Control legislation or under the general law, however much they may be relevant for proceedings under the said laws, would not be directly relevant for the purpose of proceedings under the new statute where, in the new statute, the particular status has been defined and given a particular definition. Neither the relative sections under the General Clauses Act nor any general principle would make the old status relevant for the purpose of proceedings under the new Act unless it can be attracted by reason of anything in this particular statute. The amended section 40 of the new Act does not affect the position as it is not concerned with proceedings under the new Act. It only saves old rights and old proceedings and does not apply to new rights and| or new proceedings which are creatures of the 1956 Act.

7. In the above context and in the light of the foregoing discussion, let us now consider the status of the petitioner, relevant for purposes of proceedings under sec. 16(3) of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act of 1956. He claims to be a sub-tenant for the purposes of that section, but a subtenant must have the tenant as his immediate landlord. A sub-tenancy cannot exist without and except under a tenancy. The tenants, under whom the petitioner claims to be a sub-tenant, were not tenants under the new Act in view of the ejectment decree, passed against them, and, accordingly, they must be held to have ceased to be tenants for purposes of this statute, as soon as the Act came into force, under the express terms of the relevant definition clause (h) of sec. 2, there being, in our opinion, no repugnancy in the subject or context to exclude the said terms of the definition of tenant. The Rent Controller's finding that the petitioner is not a sub-tenant for the purpose of the Act of 1956 seems, therefore, to be well-founded and we would not disturb it.

8. Even apart from what we have stated above, the petitioner's application for temporary injunction must Jail. On the petitioner's own allegation it is difficult to hold that he has any prima facie case under sec. 16(3) of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act of 1956, which applies only where there is no consent of the landlord in writing and the landlord denies that he gave oral consent. The petitioner's case, on his own showing, does not seem to be of that type. In the original application he merely stated that he was a tenant, without any mention of the landlord's consent or otherwise. But, in the amendment petition, filed by him at the time of applying for temporary injunction, he definitely stated it to be a case of consent in writing. To such a case, sec. 16(3) cannot obviously apply in view of its own express terms and no proceeding under that section can be maintained on such allegation, whatever other remedies may be open to the petitioner. This is enough to show that the petitioner has no prima facie case in his favour which will entitle him to an order of temporary injunction.

9. There is a further obstacle in the petitioner's way. What sec. 16(3) appears to contemplate is the cessation of the tenant's interest to the extent of the sub-tenancy, that is, to the extent of the sub-letting by the tenant, by virtue of the Controller's order; or, in other words, cessation of the tenancy by reason of the Controller's order to the extent of and conterminous with the interest of the sub-tenant who becomes a direct tenant under the landlord by virtue of the said order. It does not appear to contemplate cessation of tenancy in any other manner or to any other extent and cannot, therefore, apply where the tenancy has ceased otherwise, that is, without and even before the Controller's order or declaration. The present case, therefore, would not come within sec. 16(3).

10. The position, as explained in the preceding paragraph, also supports the first ground, given by the Rent Controller, which we have already affirmed above.

11. Lastly, we would like to add that this is not a case for interference under the revisional powers of this Court, having regard, particularly, to its history and the context, in which it has arisen and which we have sufficiently set out above.

12. The petitioner's remedy, if any, seems to be in the suit (Title Suit No. 100 of 1955) which has been already filed and which is pending before the second Court of the Munsif at Alipore, but, as therein his application for temporary injunction, restraining further proceedings in execution of the ejectment decree in Title Execution Case No. 46 of 1943, has been refused, he is not, in our opinion, entitled to it in the present proceeding.

13. In the above view, we discharge this Rule with costs. The Rent Controller is directed to expedite the hearing of the application under sec. 16(3) of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act of 1956 and to dispose of it as quickly as possible.

14. Let the records go down at the earliest opportunity.

Arkar, J.:— I agree.

S.K.B