(1) THE writ petitioners have questioned the Notification dated July 21 st, 2006, declaration dated August 31st, 2006, and notice dated September 1st, 2006, published, made, and served under Sections 4, 6 and 9 (3) and (4) respectively of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. The proceedings were initiated by the Section 4 notification for acquiring more or less 41. 56 acres of land mentioned in the schedule thereto. It was stated that the land was likely to be needed by Government/government undertaking/development authorities at the public expense for a public purpose, viz. , employment generation and socio-economic development of the area by setting up

"tata Small Car Project"

(2) THE first petitioner submitted its Section 5a objection dated August 1,8th, 2006 claiming that in case of acquisition, it would be interested, in the capacity of owner, in compensation payable for 4. 28 acres of land mentioned in the schedule to the notification. It contended that the purpose stated in the notification could not be a public purpose, since the acquisition was for a private company, and that mandatory provisions of law, for acquiring land for a company, were not being followed. It sought release of its land stating that the project it was implementing by setting up an industry with a foreign collaboration was equally (if not more) important from the perspective of public purpose. The collector heard the objector and recorded his views on August 31 st, 2006. Noticing that it was possible to relocate the project of the first petitioner, conceived on an area of 4. 28 acres of land, and that the project in connection wherewith the notification had been issued could not be set up just anywhere, that being conceived on an area of more than one thousand acres, he recommended for acquisition of the land in question. On the same the day the declaration under Section 6 was made, and it was published in the official gazette on september 1st, 2006.

(3) THE Section 4 notification has been questioned on the ground that since the acquisition was for a company, the authorities were under the mandatory statutory obligation to follow the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, Part-VII, and the Land Acquisitions (Companies)Rules, 1963, but, admittedly, they were not followed. Counsel has contended that the decision of the State Government to acquire the land at public expense for the benefit of a private company, and not of the public at large, must be held to be vitiated by a colourable exercise of power; that provisions of the West Bengal Land Acquisition Manual, 1991 and the Government orders issued on June 6th, 2006, amending and modifying the provisions of the manual, having not been followed, though mandatory in view of Article 166 of the Constitution of India, it must be held that the acquisition proceedings, and in particular the notification and the declaration, stood incurably vitiated; and that by mentioning about all the stages, from Sections 4 to 11, in the notification the authority virtually left nothing for a due consideration of objections under Section 5a.

(4) IN support of his contention that the acquisition was in effect for one Tata Motors Limited, a private company, he has referred me to various paragraphs of the writ petition and the affidavits filed by the respondents. His argument is that since the acquisition was for a company, though for a public purpose, as was held by the Apex Court in Pratibha Nema and Ors. v. State of M. P. and Ors. , 2003 (10) SCC 626, the authorities were bound to follow the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, Part-VII, and the land Acquisition (Companies) Rules, 1963. In support of his contention that the Section 4 notification is liable to be quashed, since-on the facts it must be held that in colourable exercise of power the Government decided to acquire the land for a company, he has referred me to Smt Somawanti and Ors. v. The State of Punjab and Ors. , AIR 1963 SC 151. Regarding the mandatory requirement of following the provisions applicable to an acquisition for a company, he has cited to me General Govt. Servants coop, Housing Society Ltd. v. . Wahab Uddin and Ors. , AIR 1981 SC 866.

(5) THE Section 5a report and the Section 6 declaration have been questioned on the ground that the decision of the collector and the decision of the Government leading to the declaration, both are vitiated by total non-application of mind on the part of the collector and the Government respectively. Counsel's contention is that not only the objections raised by the petitioners were not considered by the collector with due application of mind, but the Government also in unusual haste reached and recorded, within a few hours from the moment of hearing the objector by the collector, its satisfaction regarding the need of the land for a public purpose, and that it did so without considering the record of the proceedings held by the collector who had sent to the Government only his report dated August 31st, 2006 through computer network.

(6) WITH respect to the supplementary opposition filed by the fourth respondent stating that record of the proceedings had been sent by the collector through a special messenger, and that the Government recorded its satisfaction only after considering the collector's report accompanied by the record of the proceedings held by him, his submission is that no cognizance thereof should be taken at all, since that is nothing but an afterthought, came to be filed at a grossly belated stage. His contention is that the question of releasing the first petitioner's land, keeping in view the public purpose that its industry is bound to serve, did not receive any conscious consideration of the authorities, and particularly of the government, though in view of provisions in sections 5a and 6 and the decisions in Dharampal Goel v. State of Haryana and Ors. , 1997 (4) SCC 186 (holding that land requirement must be examined), and Hindustan petroleum Corpn. Ltd. v. Darius Shapur Chennai and Ors. , 2005 (7) SCC 627, such consideration was mandatory before recording satisfaction on the basis whereof the Section 6 declaration was made.

(7) MR Advocate General, appearing for the fourth respondent, has led the arguments for the respondents who all are represented by their counsel as well. By referring me to the notification and the pleadings of the parties, he has contended that since the proceedings were initiated for acquiring land for a public purpose at public expense, the petitioners were simply not entitled to say that the acquisition was for a company. He has said that in the notification no reference was made to any company, though reference to a project, which was not a company, was made. By inviting my attention to the application of the requiring body, the fifth respondent, the West Bengal Industrial Development Corporation, a government company within the meaning of Section 617 of the Companies act, 1956, dated July 7th, 2006, and by reading out to me various provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, and in particular the ones in Sections 3 (cc), (e) and (f), 4 and 6, he has contended that there was no scope for the petitioners to say that the acquisition was for a company simpliciter, when the requiring body was a Government company, and the entire fund-needed for the acquisition was to come, and actually came, from it. To show that a mere "project" is not a company, he has read out to me the meaning of the expression given in Corpus Juris Secundum: Vol. LXXIII and Black's law Dictionary.

(8) IN support of his contention that the purpose stated in the notification being definitely a public purpose, even if it was to be achieved be engaging a private company, or even if the acquisition was for a company, since it was for a public purpose at public expense, there was no reason to apply the provisions of Part-VII of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 and the 1963 Rules, he has cited to me the decisions in Pandit Jhandu lal and Ors. v. The State of Punjab andanr. , AIR 1961 SC 343, Smt. Somawanti and Ors. v. The State of Punjab and Ors. , AIR 1963 SC 151, R. K. Agarwalla and ors. v. State of W. B. and Ors. . AIR 1965 SC 995, Jage Ram and Ors. v. State of haryana and Ors. , (1971)1 SCC 671, and Manubhai Jehtalal Patel and Anr. v. State of Gujarat and Ors. , 1983 (4) SCC 553. By giving me the decision in pratibha Nema and Ors. v. State of M. P. and Ors. , 2003 (10) SCC 626, he has commented that in that their Lordships of the Apex Court explained the existing position of law that will provide a complete answer to the challenges thro. wn by the petitioners to the Section 4 notification.

(9) TO show what the expression "public purpose" does mean, counsel for the first, second and third respondents has referred me to the decision in Daulat Singh Surana and Ors. v. First Land Acquisition Collector and Ors. , JT 2007 (1) SC 24. Counsel for the fifth respondent has said that there is absolutely no reason why one should say that the acquisition in question was for a company, viz. , Tata Motors or Tata Motors Limited, since it was the fifth respondent that had sent the requisite Application for acquisition of the land at its expense for implementing the "tata Small car Project". His contention is that when the project was conceived for generation of employment and socio-economic development of the area, and the land was to be acquired at public expense, there was no requirement of following the provisions of Part VII of the Act and the 1963 rules, even though the major industry in view might ultimately be set up by a private company. For this, he has also heavily relied on the Apex court decision in Pratibha Nema's case.

(10) WITH respect to the petitioners' challenges to the section 5a decision and the section 6 declaration, Mr Advocate General has said that in the absence of any grave error apparent on the face of the collector's report, or illegality in the making of the declaration, there is no scope for the writ Court to interfere in exercise of power of judicial review. His submission is that not only the collector, as is apparent from his report, considered the objections with due application of mind, but the Government also, as has been stated in the state's opposition and supplementary opposition, closely examined the matter before recording its satisfaction as required by the provisions in section 6. As to the question of following the procedures mentioned in the manual and the Government orders, his submission is that at the relevant point of time the manual was no longer to provide the guidance, since, making speed the essence of the whole thing, the Government had by then issued orders indicating the manner in which affairs connected with compulsory land acquisition were to be dealt with. He has said that in the present case the relevant procedures were followed. Counsel for the first, second and third respondents has read out to me the first petitioner's Section 5a objection and the collector's report on that to show that the allegation of non-application of mind on the part of the collector is wild and baseless.

(11) IN view of the petitioners' case before the collector and in the writ petition the first question for decision in the case would have been whether the acquisition was for a public purpose, or for a company simpliciter. But, in course of his submissions in reply, their Counsel has made it very clear that his case is that the acquisition was "for a company for a public purpose". His such stand clearly limits the scope of my examination; that is to say, I need not make any inquiry for ascertaining whether the purpose stated in the notification was a public purpose, though i have no hesitation in saying that it was. Generation of employment and socio-economic development of the area, the stated purpose of the acquisition, in my view, must be held to be a public purpose. The State in its affidavit has said that in the considered opinion of the Government industrialization is the crying need of the hour, if the State is to see economic growth and prosperity, and that having regard to its existing capacity and resources available at its command, it is unable to achieve the goal unless mother industries, e. g. an automobile industry, are set up by able industrialists or industrial houses, such as the Tatas.

(12) IN Jage Ram's case their Lordships of the Apex Court said (in para 8 of the report), "there is no denying the fact that starting of a new industry is in public interest. It is stated in the affidavit filed on behalf of the State Government that the new State of Haryana was lacking in industries and consequently it had become difficult to tackle the problem of unemployment. There is also no denying the fact that the industrialization of an area is in public interest. That apart, the question whether the starting of an industry is in public interest or not is essentially a question that has to be decided by the Government. That is a socio-economic question. This Court is not in a position to go into that question. " In Pratibha Nema's case, after considering the existing authorities, their Lordships said (in para 19 of the report), "these decisions establish that a public purpose is involved in the acquisition of land for setting up an industry in the private sector as it would ultimately benefit the people. However, we would like to add that any and every industry need not necessarily promote public purpose and there could be exceptions which negate the public purpose. But, it must be borne in mind that the satisfaction of the Government as to the existence of public purpose cannot be lightly faulted and it must remain uppermost in the mind of the Court. " In Daulat Singh's case their Lordships said (in para 74 of the report), "public purpose is not static. It also changes with the passage of time, need and requirement of the community. Broadly speaking, public purpose means the general interest of the community as opposed to the interest of an individual," their Lordships further said (in para. 75 of the report), "the concept of public purpose should include the matters, such as, safety, security, health, welfare and prosperity of the community or public at large. "

(13) THE real question for decision, however, is whether the acquisition was for a company for a public purpose. According to Counsel for the petitioners it was, and according to Counsel for the respondents it was not; according to them it was just for a public purpose. The basis of the case and contention of Counsel for the petitioners is the name Tata, true it is that the name is almost omnipresent; but that fact by itself, in my judgment, on the facts of the case, cannot lead to a conclusion that the acquisition was for a company that would work to achieve the stated public purpose. The Tatas are not to implement a scheme or project of the State aimed at generation of employment and socio-economic development of the area. This goal, a pure matter of policy, the State intends to achieve by making the Tatas set up an industry for manufacturing their small car, as the mother industry possessing potentiality of spawning numerous ancillary industries that collectively, as visualized by the State, will bring about the badly needed initial phase of industrial and economic change in the State. Here the State needs and wants the Tatas, and that is why the whole compensation is paid by a Government company, the requiring body, i, therefore, do not find any reason to hold that the acquisition in question was for a company for a public purpose; it was just for a public purpose at public expense.

(14) IF, however, it is assumed that the acquisition was for a company for a public purpose, then the question that needs decision is whether the authorities were under any statutory obligation to follow the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, Part-VII, and the land Acquisition (Companies) Rules, 1963. I think Mr. Advocate General is absolutely right in his submission that the Apex Court decision in Pratibha Nema's case provides a complete answer to the question. In that (in para 21 of the report) their Lordships said,

"thus, it is seen that even in a case of acquisition for a company, public purpose is not eschewed. It follows, therefore, that the existence or non-existence of a public purpose is not a primary distinguishing factor between the acquisition under Part-ll and acquisition under Part-VII. The real point of distinction seems to be the source of funds to cover the cost of acquisition. In other words, the second proviso to Section 6 (1) is the main dividing ground for the two types of acquisition."

(15) HAVING said so, their Lordships held (in para. 22 of the report),

"thus the distinction between public purpose acquisition and Part-VII acquisition has got blurred under the impact of judicial interpretation of relevant provisions. The main and perhaps the decisive distinction lies in the fact whether the cost of acquisition comes out of public funds wholly or partly. Here again, even a token or nominal contribution by the government was held to be sufficient compliance with the second proviso to Section 6 as held in a catena of decisions. The net result is that by contributing even a trifling sum, the character and pattern of acquisition could be changed by the Government. In ultimate analysis, what is considered to be an acquisition for facilitating the setting up of an industry in the private sector could get imbued with the character of public purpose acquisition if only the Government comes forward to sanction the payment of a nominal sum towards compensation. In the present State of law, that seems to be the real position."

(16) THOUGH in view of this clear pronouncement of the law by the highest Court of the country there is no scope for anyone to raise a question such as the one raised in this case, I hope it will not be considered prolix, if a very brief reference to two more Apex Court decisions is made in this context. In Srinivasa Co-operative Housing Building Society v. Madam gurumurthy Sastry, 1994 (4) SCC 675, their Lordships said (in para 12 of the report), "in the case of an acquisition for a company simpliciter, the declaration cannot be made without satisfying the requirement of part-VII. But, that does not necessarily mean that an acquisition for a company for a public purpose cannot be made otherwise than under the provisions of Part-VII, if the cost or a portion of the cost of acquisition is to come out of public funds. " In R. L. Arora v. State of U. P. , AIR 1962 SC 764, it was held (in para. 5 of the report), "it is only where the acquisition is for a company and its cost is to be met entirely by the company itself that the provisions of Part-VII apply. "

(17) I think a longer discussion on the question is unnecessary, since the law explained by their Lordships of the Apex Court, as I have read and understood the authorities, is absolutely clear that even if the acquisition is for a company, there will be no requirement of complying with the provisions of Part-VII of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, when it is at once for a notified public purpose and at the public expense. In the present case, the public purpose was clearly stated in the notification, and the undisputed position is that the acquisition is wholly funded by a government company that is the requiring body. The whole acquired land is to vest in the Government company in the first instance, and it is to deal with it in whole or parts or part for achieving the public purpose. It is therefore absolutely clear that in the present case the authorities were under no obligation to apply the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, Part-VII, and the Land Acquisition (Companies) Rules, 1963; and that non-application thereof did not void the declaration or the notification.

(18) I do not find any substance in the contention that the Government initiated the acquisition proceedings in colourable exercise of its power. As will appear from the affidavits filed by the respondents the project was being considered by the requiring body and the Government for a long time, and the proposal of the requiring body was duly examined, approved, and accepted by the Cabinet. The project, to be spearheaded by setting up an automobile industry by a private industrial house, as visualized by the Government and the requiring body, is needed for achieving the public purpose stated in the notification. As their Lordships of the Apex Court said in Jage Rami's case,

". . . the question whether the starting of an industry is in public interest or not is essentially a question that has to be decided by the Government. That is a socio-economic question."

(19) IN the present case, I do not see any reason to hold that employing a public purpose ploy the Government intended to gather benefits for a particular industrial house. It is true that in the project an industrial house has almost the principal role to play, but in so far as the state Government is concerned, it has decided to ensure setting up of the automobile industry with a view to rejuvenating the economic growth of the State through industrialization. I do not see any reason why in exercise of writ powers I should make an attempt to substitute my foresight for that of the Government regarding the possibility of success in its attempt. There is no reason for me to be skeptical, by doing so, I think, I would transgress the limits of my jurisdiction, while examining the question whether the government acted in colourable exercise of power. In my judgment, no case of colourable exercise of power by the Government has been made out by the petitioners.

(20) I am unable to appreciate how, even if it is assumed that procedures mentioned in the land acquisition manual of the State government and in its orders issued in the month of June 2006 modifying and amending the provisions of the manual were not followed to the letter, it can be said that the non-compliance would make the notification or the declaration void. The procedures mentioned in the manual and the government orders have no statutory force, they are executive instructions, issued for ensuring expeditious disposal of land acquisition cases. In my opinion, even if they were not followed, the effect definitely will not be on the Section 4 notification or the Section 6 declaration published in compliance with the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. I, however, do not find any reason to say that provisions of the manual and the Government orders were not followed by the Government departments, the requiring body, and the collector, though Counsel for the petitioners has strenuously urged me to hold otherwise. It cannot be overlooked that no less a body than the Cabinet had closely examined the matter before the proceedings were initiated. In my opinion, reference to provisions in Article 166, in connection with the executive instructions contained in the manual, has no relevance. Validity of the notification and the declaration is not to be judged on the basis whether while publishing and making them the authorities concerned properly followed the executive instructions; for even in case of non-compliance with them, the notification and the declaration would not be bad, they shall remain valid. As a result, i do not find any reason to interfere with the Section 4 notification.

(21) I find that the collector, while disposing of the first petitioner's objection under Section 5a, substantially dealt with its contentions. He heard its lawyer, noted the contentions, and recorded his views on them. That in the process he did not specifically deal with each and every contention raised in the objection, or that regarding registration of the first petitioner he recorded a wrong finding of fact (saying it was still to be registered), in my opinion, is of no significance. He was not supposed to make a judicial order. The objections were: the project of the first petitioner possessed the potentiality of generating better employment opportunity and foreign exchange; since the acquisition was for a company, the government was required to follow the appropriate procedure; the acquisition was not for a public purpose; and the objector's industry, nearing completion, would be seriously affected, unless the land was released. Submissions made before him were specifically recorded by the collector. It is not the case that any submission made was not noted down. In my opinion, my views on the objections, even if are otherwise, which, however, are not, cannot be substituted for his. I find no reason to interfere with his decision and report.

(22) I do not think the allegation that the Government recorded its satisfaction under Section 6 without looking into record of the proceedings held by the collector can be accepted to be correct. It is just a question of fact; and incidentally a disputed one; and I have to give my decision on it on the basis of the aflidavits filed by the parties. In the writ petition it was alleged that the Government recorded its satisfaction without considering the record of the proceedings, since record had not been sent earlier in the day by the collector who had sent only his report through computer network sometime after 12. 30 p. m. In its main opposition the State stated that the requisite satisfaction was recorded by the Government after considering the report of the collector, and as Mr. Advocate General has rightly pointed out, that is the requirement of Section 6; that is to say, the government was to record its satisfaction on the basis of the report of the collector, if any.

(23) SINCE the question whether record of the proceedings was before the Government assumed significance in course of hearing of the matter, i allowed the prayer of the State to file a supplementary opposition stating the fact. It accordingly filed an affidavit dated February 5th, 2007 stating that after recording his views on the Section 5a objection of the first petitioner and feeding his report in the computer for immediate onward transmission to the Government, the collector also took simultaneous steps for sending record of the proceedings, which was received by the government through special messenger in the afternoon, and before it recorded its satisfaction required by Section 6. Counsel for the petitioners has urged me not to take cognizance of the facts stated in the supplementary opposition. I find no reason to accept his suggestion. Facts stated by the parties in their affidavits (record considered by the government was made available for inspection by the petitioners' lawyer)lead me to the only conclusion that the Government recorded its satisfaction after considering the collector's report an integral part whereof was the record of the proceedings, containing, inter alia, the objection filed by the first petitioner under Section 5a.

(24) ON the ground that land of some other owner was released from the fold of acquisition, I do not think I can hold that the decision of the government that the land was needed for public purpose calls for any interference. It was for the Government to decide whether it was possible to release the land of the first petitioner from the fold of acquisition. It agreed with the views of the collector who had recommend for acquisition. The facts that recording of the required satisfaction in terms of provisions in section 6 by the Government, making of the Section 6 declaration and publication thereof in the official gazette, these all were done at lightning speed, in my opinion, should not be viewed cynically. Things lawfully done do not become bad for speed at which they are done. I also put my opinion. on record that the exhaustive nature of the Section 4 notification had nothing to do with its validity. That indications were given in it about the various steps to be taken at different stages from Sections 4 to 11, to my mind, was not indicative of any arbitrariness on the part of the Government and the authorities. The fact remains that all Section 5 objections were duly considered. Hence, I hold that the Section 6 declaration does not call for any interference as well. Nothing has been said why the Section 9 (3)and (4) notice, as such calls for interference.

(25) FOR these reasons the writ petition is dismissed. As a result, nothing remains to be decided in the application taken out by the petitioners for interim order. Hence, that shall be deemed to be dismissed. There shall be no order for costs in the case.