Bhaskar Bhattacharya, J.:— These two mandamus appeals were taken up for hearing analogously as those were interlinked to some extent.

2. The appeal, being A.P.O No. 397 of 2006 arises out of a writ application numbered as W.P No. 1592 of 2006 whereas the other one being A.P.O No. 396 of 2006 crops out of a different writ application marked as W.P No. 1590 of 2006. Both the aforesaid writ applications were moved before a learned Single Judge of this Court during the Puja vacation. By the first writ application, the writ petitioners, the respondent Nos. 1 and 2 before us, challenged an order dated 29th May, 2006 passed by the Debts Recovery Tribunal (hereinafter referred to as the Tribunal) by which the Tribunal passed an order of status quo on an application filed by the appellant before us for a limited period which was subsequently extended on different occasions and was continuing till the presentation of the writ application and 2nd November, 2006, was the next date fixed for hearing the application along with other applications after the Puja vacation before the Tribunal.

3. The learned Single Judge, on the very first date of moving the said application, i.e October 11, 2006, disposed of the same by directing the Tribunal not to extend the order of status quo before disposing of the application for condonation of delay in filing the stay application upon which such order of status quo was passed with further direction that both the applications i.e the application for condonation of delay and the main application should be disposed of by November 30, 2006 at the latest. His Lordship was informed by the parties that the interim order was subsisting till November 2, 2006, the next date fixed in the Tribunal. Although prayer for mandamus directing the Tribunal to recall the order dated May 29, 2006 and at the same time, a writ in the nature of prohibition asking the Tribunal not to give effect to the said order dated May 29, 2006 were prayed for, His Lordship did not issue those writs. A further prayer for writ in nature of certiorari was also made for transmitting the records of the Tribunal to this Court, but such prayer was not granted.

4. The second writ application was moved on October 13, 2006, thereby praying for a direction for taking effective step for completion of the sale of the property which was stayed by virtue of the existing order of status quo granted by the Tribunal.

5. The same learned Judge, sitting in the vacation, passed an interim order by directing the Receiver-cum-Chairman of the Asset Sale Committee, constituted by the Tribunal by order dated February 11, 2004, which had been stayed by the subsequent order of status quo, to take step to expeditiously complete the sale of the disputed property, and at any rate, within eight weeks from the date of that interim order. Such interim order was passed by the learned Single Judge knowing fully well that the order of status quo was subsisting at least till November 2, 2006 and that the Tribunal was required to decide whether the said order of status quo should be extended in the event the delay in filing the application was condoned. Moreover, by the said interim order, the learned Single Judge virtually granted the entire relief claimed in the second writ application before decision on merit.

6. Being dissatisfied with the aforesaid interim order passed in the second writ application, the other mandamus appeal being A.P.O No. 396 of 2006 was filed during the vacation before the Division Bench and the Division Bench consisting of Indira Banerjee and Biswanath Somadder, JJ. after entertaining the said appeal, on the application of the appellant, stayed the operation of the order impugned therein for a limited period till the opening of this Court after vacation.

7. The interim order, so granted by the Division Bench during the vacation, was extended by us after the reopening and we decided to hear out both the mandamus appeals analogously.

8. In the other appeal filed against the order dated October 11, 2000 passed in the first writ application moved against the order dated 29 May, 2006 passed by the Tribunal, this Court granted stay of operation of the order impugned herein for a limited period and proposed to hear out the appeal itself along with the other one.

9. Consequently, both the appeals were taken up for hearing.

10. Mr. Dev, the learned senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant of both the appeals who was the respondent No. 4 in the writ applications has vehemently contended before us that the learned Single Judge acted without jurisdiction in entertaining the first writ application against the order dated 29 May, 2006 passed by the Tribunal by which it passed an order of status quo on the application filed by his client for a limited period and subsequently, such order of status quo was extended from time to time and was continuing. Mr. Deb contends that the order dated 29 May, 2006 had already spent its force in view of subsequent eight different orders by which the original order of status quo was extended on contested hearing but the writ petitioners did not challenge those subsequent orders of which the last one was subsisting at the time of moving the writ application. Mr. Deb contends that any order passed by the Tribunal can be challenged by way of appeal before the Appellate Tribunal constituted for that purpose and if a party is dissatisfied even with the order passed by the Appellate Tribunal, he can move this Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. According to Mr. Dev, an application under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, at any rate, is not maintainable against the order passed by the Tribunal. Mr. Deb complains that although his client specifically took the point of maintainability of the writ application before the learned Vacation Judge, His Lordship did not consider such question and decided to dispose of the said writ application. Mr. Dev points out that curiously enough, the learned Single Judge kept the question of maintainability of the writ application open as it appears from the order impugned itself but in the same breath, disposed of the writ application. Mr. Dev, therefore, prays for setting aside the order impugned in the first writ application which was filed challenging the order dated 29 May, 2006 passed by the Tribunal on the aforesaid ground alone.

11. As regards the other appeal preferred against the grant of interim order passed in the subsequently filed pending writ application, Mr. Dev submits that if his client becomes successful in the above mandamus appeal preferred against disposal of the first writ application, the other writ application will automatically become infructuous and consequently, the interim order passed therein, which is the subject-matter of the other mandamus appeal, should be set aside. Moreover, Mr. Dev contends that in view of the existing order of status quo passed by the Tribunal which was not even challenged in the earlier writ application, there was no scope of passing an interim order directing completion of sale.

12. Mr. Kundu, the learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents Nos. 1 and 2 who were the writ petitioners in both the matters has opposed the aforesaid contention advanced by Mr. Dev on the question of maintainability of the first writ application preferred against the order dated 29 May, 2006 passed by the Tribunal. According to Mr. Kundu, there is practically no difference between the scope of Article 226 and Article 227 of the Constitution of India and in such a situation, there was no bar in moving an application under Article 226 of the Constitution of India against the order passed by the Tribunal. According to Mr. Kundu, mere existence of an alternative remedy of appeal is no bar in entertaining a writ application under Article 226 of the Constitution of India and as such, the learned Single Judge did not commit any illegality in deciding the writ application notwithstanding existence of the alternative remedy before the Appellate Tribunal. In support of his contention, Mr. Kundu relied upon the decision of the supreme Court in the case of Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chandra Rai reported in AIR 2003 SC 3044.

13. Mr. Kundu tried to impress upon us on the merit of the writ application preferred against the order dated 29 May, 2006 but as we thought it fit first to answer the question of jurisdiction raised by Mr. Dev, we have decided not to enter into the merit before reacting on the question of jurisdiction.

14. Mr. Kundu, however, submitted that he had specific instruction not to press the second writ application filed by his clients in which an interim order was passed and against which the other appeal has been preferred. Mr. Kundu, therefore, fairly submitted that he had no objection if the appeal preferred against the interim order granted in the second writ application was allowed as his clients did not intend to press the second writ application.

15. Therefore, the first question that arises for determination in A.P.O No. 397 of 2006 is whether the first of the two writ applications filed by the respondent No. 1 being W.P No. 1592 of 2006 could be legally entertained by the learned Single Judge in exercise of the power conferred under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.

16. After hearing the learned Counsel for the parties and after going through the provisions contained in Article 226 as well as Article 227 of the Constitution of India, we are of the firm view that the extents of those two provisions are definitely different. It is preposterous to suggest that the makers of our Constitution were ignorant of the scope of the two provisions and after incorporating Article 226 in the Constitution of India, inserted the next Article covering the self-same subject.

17. A plain reading of the two Articles makes it abundantly clear that by the former, a High Court has been given the power throughout the territories in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction, to issue to any person or authority, including in appropriate cases, any Government, within those territories directions, orders, or writs, including writs in the nature of habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition, quo warranto and certiorari, or any of them, for the enforcement of any of the rights conferred by Part III of the Constitution and for any other purpose. Such power can be exercised by High Court even if part of the cause of action arises within the territorial limit of jurisdiction of the High Court notwithstanding the fact that the office of the respondent is situated beyond such territorial limit; whereas by virtue of Article 227 of the Constitution of India, the High Courts have been vested with the power of superintendence over all Courts and Tribunals throughout the territories in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction and in the process, it may call for returns, make and issue general rules and prescribe forms for regulating the practice and proceedings of such Courts and Tribunals. However, by virtue of such power, the High Court cannot exercise its power of superintendence over any Court or Tribunal constituted by or under any law relating to the Armed Forces.

18. Therefore, the powers conferred upon a High Court by those two Articles are distinctly separate. It may be argued that there is similarity in the nature of jurisdiction exercised by a High Court by virtue of those two provisions but there is no doubt that the sphere of jurisdiction is unquestionably different.

19. In the case before us, the moment it is established that the writ petitioners wanted to challenge a judicial order passed by the Tribunal over which this High Court has power of superintendence, the appropriate provision applicable is Article 227 of the Constitution of India. Whether in view of existence of alternative remedy by way of appeal before the Appellate Tribunal, a High Court exercising jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution will entertain the application in a given case, is a different question but in such a situation, there is no scope of moving an application under Article 226 of the Constitution of India for the purpose of disputing the correctness of the interlocutory judicial order of the Tribunal. We are, however, quite conscious that administrative orders passed by any Subordinate Court or Tribunal e.g orders taking disciplinary action against an employee of such Courts or Tribunal are amenable to writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. We are also not unmindful of the fact that as pointed out by the Apex Court in the case of Surya Dev Rai (supra), in exceptional cases where the order of a judicial authority is without jurisdiction, the Writ Court can issue certiorari and quash the proceedings; but in the case before us, His Lordship did not quash the proceedings by issuing a writ in the nature of certiorari but simply passed direction upon the Tribunal not to extend the status quo without disposing of the application for condonation of delay. Even in the aforesaid case of Surya Dev Rai (supra), relied upon by Mr Kundu, the Apex Court accepted the position that the scopes of Article 226 and Article 227 are different as would appear from the following observations:

“Upon a review of decided cases and a survey of the occasions wherein the High Courts have exercised jurisdiction to command a writ of certiorari or to exercise supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 in the given facts and circumstances in a variety of cases, it seems that the distinction between the two jurisdictions stands almost obliterated in practice. Probably, this is the reason why it has become customary with the lawyers labelling their petitions as one common under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution, though such practice has been deprecated in some judicial pronouncement. Without entering into niceties and technicality of the subject, we venture to state the broad general difference between the two jurisdictions. Firstly, the writ of certiorari is an exercise of its original jurisdiction by the High Court; exercise of supervisory jurisdiction is not an original jurisdiction and in this sense it is akin to appellate revisional or corrective jurisdiction. Secondly, in a writ of certiorari, the record of the proceedings having been certified and sent up by the Inferior Court or Tribunal to the High Court, the High Court if inclined to exercise its jurisdiction may simply annul or quash the proceedings and then do no more. In exercise of supervisory jurisdiction the High Court may not only quash or set aside the impugned proceedings, judgment or order but it may also make such directions as the facts and circumstances of the case may warrant, may be by way of guiding the Inferior Court or Tribunal as to the manner in which it would now proceed further or afresh as commended to or guided by the High Court. In appropriate cases the High Court, while exercising supervisory jurisdiction, may substitute such a decision of its own in place of the impugned decision, as the Inferior Court or Tribunal should have made. Lastly, the jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution is capable of being exercised on a prayer made by or on behalf of the party aggrieved; the supervisory jurisdiction is capable of being exercised suo motu as well.”

(Emphasis supplied by us)

20. Moreover, in the rules framed by this Court for the exercise of its jurisdiction, separate provisions have been made governing the mode of exercise of power under Article 226 and Article 227 of the Constitution of India. According to those rules, exercise of power under Article 227 of the Constitution is part of the civil or criminal revisional jurisdiction of the Appellate Side of this Court, and a litigant, if dissatisfied with any order passed by a Judge in exercise of power under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, should approach the Supreme Court of India direct whereas in case of an order passed by a learned Single Judge exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution, remedy lies before a Division Bench of this Court. Therefore, merely because in some of the High Courts, combined applications under Article 226/227 of the Constitution of India are entertained in accordance with the rules framed by those High Courts, such fact cannot enable a learned Judge of this Court who is bound by the Appellate Side Rules and the Writ Rules framed by this Court to entertain an application under Article 226 of the Constitution of India against an interlocutory judicial order passed by a Tribunal. The Supreme Court, in the case of Surya Dev Rai (supra), as pointed out above, has accepted the position that the practice of entertaining combined application under those two Articles has been deprecated by various authorities. Even the Court-fees payable on an application under Article 226 of the Constitution of India varies according to nature of writs prayed for or the nature, of the order impugned while a fixed Court-fee is payable on the application under Article 227 of the Constitution of India according to the West Bengal Court-fees Act.

21. We enquired from the Registry as regards the determination conferred by the Hon'ble Chief Justice upon the Judges during the Puja Vacation. We are informed that on October 11, 2006 and October 13, 2006, the two days on which those writ applications were moved before the learned Single Judge, the learned Single Judge was not conferred with the determination under Article 227 of the Constitution of India and such determination was given to Hon'ble Justice P.K Dev. Therefore, there is even no scope of argument that the point taken by Mr. Deb was a technical one and the said application should be treated as one under Article 227 of the Constitution because His Lordship had inherent lack of jurisdiction to entertain an application under Article 227 of the Constitution of India in the absence of conferment of such power by the Hon'ble Chief Justice. Apart from the aforesaid fact, according to the Rules framed by this Court, there is no scope of exercising power under Article 227 by a Judge sitting in Original Side. Only against orders passed by the Tribunals constituted under Article 323A/323B of the Constitution, there is scope of moving a combined application under Article 226/227 of the Constitution of India in view of the decision of the Apex Court in the case of L. Chandra Kumar v. Union of India reported in AIR 1997 SC 1125 and in appropriate cases, such application can be moved before a Division Bench in the original side but the Debt Recovery Tribunal is not such a Tribunal. Be that as it may, since the Hon'ble Chief Justice did not confer any determination upon the learned Single Judge to take up an application under Article 227 and such determination was given to a different Judge, His Lordship was even legally unauthorised to convert the application under Article 226 of the Constitution of India filed before His Lordship to one under Article 227 for the purpose of deciding the same by himself.

22. Over and above, in the case before us, although writs in the nature of Mandamus, Prohibition and Certiorari were prayed for, His Lordship did not issue any of those writs and simply passed a guiding direction upon the Tribunal and thus, it is apparent that His Lordship exercised power of superintendence by exercising authority under Article 227 of the Constitution.

23. We have already pointed out that although the question of jurisdiction was specifically raised, the learned Single Judge kept that question open and nevertheless, allowed the purported writ application. We are unable to approve the order passed by the learned Single Judge in such circumstances and accordingly, set aside the order only on the ground that an application under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is not maintainable against a judicial order of the Tribunal within the scope of the rules framed by this Court and at the same time, His Lordship was not even authorised by the Hon'ble Chief Justice to entertain an application under Article 227 and as such, His Lordship had inherent lack of jurisdiction to entertain the same after converting the same to an application under Article 227.

24. We make it clear that we have otherwise not gone into the merit of the order impugned in the said application. We, accordingly, set aside the order passed by the learned Single Judge and direct the Tribunal to proceed in accordance with law as if no order has been passed by this Court. We have already pointed out that subsequent orders extending the order of status quo by the Tribunal were not challenged in the first writ application.

25. In view of the submission made by Mr. Kundu that he has instruction not to press the other writ application wherein interim order was granted keeping the writ application pending, we also allow the other mandamus appeal by setting aside the order impugned and dismissing the writ application as not pressed. Even if Mr. Kundu had instruction to press the other writ application, in view of the fact that the earlier writ application has been found to be not maintainable, there was no scope of grant of any interim relief to the writ petitioners in the second writ application inasmuch as so long the order of status quo was subsisting, there was no occasion of entertaining the second writ application and granting the full relief claimed with the aid of interim relief by directing the authority to proceed with the sale in violation of the existing order of status quo granted by the Tribunal.

26. Both the mandamus appeals are, thus, allowed with costs which we assess at 500 Gms. each to be paid by the writ petitioners to the appellant for abusing the process of law.

P.S Banerjee, J.: I agree.

Appeals allowed.

S.B.A