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State Of Tamil Nadu v. Kannapiran Steel Re-Rolling Mills

Madras High Court
Mar 12, 1998
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Judgment Summary — Janarthanam, J. (Tax Case (Revision) No. 164 of 1994)

Factual and Procedural Background

Tvl. Kannapiran Steel Re-rolling Mills, Coimbatore (the assessee-dealers) were registered under the Tamil Nadu General Sales Tax Act, 1959 (TNGSTA) and the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956 (CSTA), and carried on intra- and inter-State business. For the assessment year 1986–87 they were assessed by the Additional Deputy Commercial Tax Officer on total turnover of Rs. 8,12,521 and taxable turnover originally determined at Rs. 5,55,931. During verification of accounts (4 December 1987) it was found they had claimed an exemption on sales of M.S. rods and rounds amounting to Rs. 2,56,590 as "second sales" under CSTA, on the basis that raw materials had been purchased before 17 March 1986.

The exemption claim was founded on a Government Notification dated 13 March 1982 (came into force 1 April 1982) granting inter-State tax exemption for specified end-products manufactured by steel re-rolling mills in Tamil Nadu subject to conditions. A subsequent Government notification dated 25 April 1986 purported to cancel that earlier exemption notification with retrospective effect from 17 March 1986.

As a result, the assessing officer revised the assessment disallowing the exemption of Rs. 2,56,590 so that taxable turnover became Rs. 8,12,521, and levied a penalty (one and a half times tax) quantified at Rs. 30,800. The assessee-dealers appealed to the Additional Appellate Assistant Commissioner (AAAC) (Appeal C.S.T. No. 297 of 1988), who dismissed the appeal on 14 December 1989. The assessee then appealed to the Tamil Nadu Sales Tax Appellate Tribunal (C.T.A. No. 219 of 1990), which allowed the appeal in toto, setting aside both assessments and the penalty. The Revenue filed the present revision (Tax Case (Revision) No. 164 of 1994).

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the order of the Tribunal, setting aside the assessment and penalty, is sustainable in law?
  2. Whether the State Government had the power to rescind the earlier exemption notification with retrospective effect (to 17 March 1986) by issuing the subsequent notification dated 25 April 1986?
  3. Whether, assuming the cancellation notification is invalid retrospectively, the assessee-dealers had already acquired a vested right to exemption in respect of end-products remaining unsold (in stock) after the effective cancellation date?

Arguments of the Parties

Revenue (Mr. K. Ravi Raja Pandian)

  • Contended that the Tribunal's rationale for setting aside the assessment and penalty was untenable and that the Tribunal's order should be set aside.
  • Essentially urged restoration of the assessing officer's order and the AAAC's confirmation.

Assessee-Dealers (Mr. C. Natarajan for Mr. N. Inbarajan)

  • Argued that the Government (as a delegate) lacked power under sub-section (5) of section 8 of CSTA to issue a cancellation notification with retrospective effect to 17 March 1986; thus cancellation, if valid, would be prospective only from publication (25 April 1986).
  • Alternatively contended that the assessee-dealers had acquired a vested right to the exemption before cancellation because all vestitive facts required by the earlier notification had been completed, so sales (even if effected after 25 April 1986) should enjoy the exemption.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Ananda Soap Factory v. State of Karnataka, [1978] 42 STC 356 (Kar) Held that a subordinate authority (Government) cannot issue a notification with retrospective effect in the absence of express statutory power to do so; executive cannot withdraw a benefit retrospectively unless statute expressly permits. The court agreed with the view in Ananda Soap Factory and relied on it to conclude that the cancellation notification purporting retrospective operation from 17 March 1986 was not sustainable in law.
India Sugars and Refineries Ltd. v. State of Mysore, AIR 1960 Mys. 326 Decision that subordinate legislative authority cannot exercise power to issue notifications with retrospective effect unless such power is expressly granted by the statute. Referred to as foundational authority supporting the principle that absence of express retrospective power bars retrospective executive action; used to support invalidity of retrospective cancellation.
Strawboard Manufacturing Co. Ltd. v. Gutta Mill Workers' Union, AIR 1953 SC 95 Supreme Court precedent relied upon in India Sugars to support restriction on retrospective subordinate action. Noted in the chain of authorities; contributes to the court's conclusion that retrospective cancellation by Government lacked statutory authority.
Dr. Indramani Pyarelal Gupta v. W.R. Natu, AIR 1963 SC 274 Supreme Court notice of India Sugars; reinforces principle limiting retrospective powers of subordinate authorities. Noted by the court as part of the authorities that collectively support the position that retrospective power must be expressly conferred.
Income-tax Officer, Alleppey v. M.C. Ponnoose, [1967] 64 ITR 117 (Ker) : AIR 1966 Ker 5 Kerala High Court followed India Sugars and Indramani, holding that Government could not act retrospectively absent express statutory power. Cited as consistent authority; court relied on the consistent judicial approach to conclude the retrospective cancellation was invalid.
Cannanore Spinning and Weaving Mills Ltd. v. Collector of Customs and Central Excise, (1969) 3 SCC 112 : AIR 1970 SC 1950 Held that rule-making authority lacked power to make rules with retrospective effect; retrospective effect purportedly given was beyond power of the authority. Applied as a Supreme Court authority reinforcing the proposition that subordinate rule-making/executive bodies cannot confer retrospective effect unless empowered by statute; used to support invalidity of the retrospective cancellation.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court began by examining the statutory source of the earlier exemption notification: sub-section (5) of section 8 of CSTA, which permits the State Government, by notification in the official Gazette and subject to conditions, to direct that no tax shall be payable or that tax be calculated at lower rates for specified inter-State sales. The court observed that subsection (5) authorises the Government to grant exemption or reduce tax and to specify conditions, but the subsection by itself does not expressly state whether the Government may rescind or cancel such notification with retrospective effect.

To determine whether rescission with retrospective effect could be validly exercised, the court referred to section 21 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 (GCA), which provides that a power to issue notifications includes power to add, amend, vary or rescind those notifications in like manner and subject to like sanction and conditions. On this basis, the court concluded that the power to rescind the earlier notification does inhere in the State Government by virtue of section 21 GCA (i.e., rescission power exists in principle).

The pivotal question then became whether the Government could give retrospectivity to the rescission (i.e., make the cancellation effective from 17 March 1986). The court analysed authority from High Courts and the Supreme Court (Ananda Soap Factory; India Sugars and Refineries Ltd.; Strawboard Manufacturing; Dr. Indramani; Income-tax Officer, Alleppey; and Cannanore Spinning). Those authorities established the controlling proposition that, unless the statute expressly empowers a subordinate or delegated authority to act retrospectively (withdraw benefits or impose obligations with retrospective effect), the executive cannot exercise the power with retrospective effect.

Applying those precedents, the court concluded that the subsequent cancellation notification purporting to be effective from 17 March 1986 was beyond the power of the Government because sub-section (5) of section 8 did not expressly confer authority to issue cancellation with retrospective effect. Therefore, the cancellation could only operate prospectively from its publication date (25 April 1986), and the earlier exemption remained effective up to 25 April 1986.

The court then considered the assessee's alternative argument that a vested right to exemption had already accrued (because all vestitive facts were completed prior to cancellation) so that even sales effected after 25 April 1986 would be exempt. The court rejected that argument on the facts: although most vestitive facts under the earlier notification had been fulfilled, the decisive vestitive fact — the taxable event of sale — had not occurred in relation to goods remaining in stock. The court held that the right of exemption accrues only when the sale (the taxable event) takes place; as such, stock sold after 25 April 1986 did not attract the exemption.

Finally, regarding the penalty, the court agreed with the Tribunal's deletion of the penalty: turnover had been reflected in accounts and the assessee bona fide believed the turnover to be exempt. Therefore there was no suppression of turnover and no contravention of section 10(2) of TNGSTA read with section 9(2-A) of CSTA to justify penalty. The Tribunal's deletion of penalty was thus sustainable.

Holding and Implications

CORE RULING: The tax case (revision) is disposed of in the following manner.

Holdings:

  • The attempted retrospective cancellation of the earlier inter-State sales exemption notification (purporting to operate from 17 March 1986) is not sustainable in law; the cancellation operates prospectively from the date of publication, 25 April 1986.
  • End-products sold up to 25 April 1986 are exempt from tax under the earlier notification.
  • End-products remaining in stock and sold after 25 April 1986 are taxable at the appropriate rate (i.e., not entitled to exemption by virtue of the earlier notification once cancellation becomes operative prospectively).
  • The deletion of the penalty by the Tribunal is sustainable because the turnover was disclosed in the accounts and the assessee bona fide believed the turnover to be exempt; there was no suppression attracting penalty under the cited provisions.

Implications:

  • The assessing officer is directed to compute and allow exemption in respect of end-products actually sold up to 25 April 1986.
  • Unsold stock of end-products as on 25 April 1986 that were sold thereafter shall be assessed to tax at the appropriate rate.
  • The Tribunal's deletion of the penalty is upheld; no penalty is leviable on the facts.
  • No new broad legal precedent shifting the law was established; the court applied established principles limiting retrospective exercise of delegated powers and applied them to the facts.

Disposition: The tax case (revision) is disposed of in accordance with the conclusions above. There shall be no order as to costs.

Show all summary ...

Janarthanam, J.:— Tvl. Kannapiran Steel Re-rolling Mills, 17/18, Mill Road, Coimbatore-1 are dealers registered under the Tamil Nadu General Sales Tax Act, 1959 (Tamil Nadu Act No. 1 of 1959—for short, “TNGSTA”) and under the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956 (Act 74 of 1956—for short “CSTA”). They effect business intra and inter-State.

2. They had been assessed on total and taxable turnover of Rs. 8,12,521 and Rs. 5,55,931 respectively for the assessment year 1986–87 under CSTA by the assessing officer—Additional Deputy Commercial Tax Officer, Oppanakkara Street Circle, Coimbatore. Their accounts were verified on December 4, 1987 by the officers of the Enforcement Wing, Coimbatore. Such verification revealed that they had claimed exemption on a turnover of Rs. 2,56,590, being the sales of M.S rods and rounds as second sales under CSTA. The explanation offered by them was that the goods were-manufactured out of raw materials purchased before March 17, 1986.

3. (i) The exemption so claimed was based upon the Notification No. 11(1)/CTRE/50/82, (G.O.P No. 311), dated 13th March, 1982 (published in the Tamil Nadu Government Gazette dated March 24, 1982, Part II, Section 1 at page 24). The said notification reads as under:

“In exercise of the powers conferred by sub-section (5) of section 8 of the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956 (Central Act 74 of 1956), the Governor of Tamil Nadu having been satisfied that it is necessary so to do in the public interest, hereby makes an exemption in respect of tax payable under the said Act in the course of inter-State trade or commerce in respect of the end-products coming under item 4 of the Second Schedule to the Tamil Nadu General Sales Tax Act, 1959 (Tamil Nadu Act 1 of 1959) manufactured by the steel re-rolling mills in Tamil Nadu subject to the conditions that the raw materials specified in item 4 of the said Schedule to the said Act out of which the end-products are manufactured have suffered tax under the Tamil Nadu General Sales Tax Act, 1959 (Tamil Nadu Act 1 of 1959) and that the dealers do not collect tax either directly or indirectly or make provision in the balance sheet to pay sales tax under outstanding expenses and get income-tax relief.

2. The notification hereby made shall come into force on and from 1st April, 1982.”

(ii) The Government of Tamil Nadu subsequently issued inter-State sales—Exemption—Cancellation—Notification in G.O.P No. 395, dated 25th April, 1986 [No. II(1)/CTRE/57(b)/86] and the notification so issued reads as under:

“In exercise of the powers conferred by sub-section (5) of section 8 of the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956 (Central Act 74 of 1956), the Governor of Tamil Nadu having been satisfied that it is necessary so to do in public interest hereby cancels the Notification No. II(1)/CTRE/50/82 dated the 13th March, 1982, published in Part II—Section 1 of Tamil Nadu Government Gazette, dated the 24th March, 1982, as subsequently amended.

2. The notification hereby made shall be deemed to have come into force on and from the 17th March, 1986.”

(This notification was published in the Tamil Nadu Government Gazette, Extraordinary No. 214, Part II, Section 1, dated April 25, 1986).

4. For the purpose of convenience, we may hereafter refer to the exemption notification as “earlier notification” and exemption cancellation notification as “subsequent notification”.

5. As per the earlier notification, raw materials were subjected to tax and the end-products made out of such raw materials were exempt from tax. The subsequent notification simply cancelled the earlier notification giving retrospective effect on and from March 17, 1986.

6. The assessment originally made was revised disallowing the claim of exemption to the tune of Rs. 2,56,590 and the total and taxable turnover had been determined as below:

Total turnover Taxable turnover Rs. Rs. Turnover determined by the assessing officer 8,12,521 5,55,931 Wrong exemption disallowed and assessed to tax … 2,56,590 Turnover now determined 8,12,521 8,12,521

7. A penalty of one and a half times the tax due on the alleged suppressed turnover was also levied and quantified in a sum of Rs. 30,800.

8. The aggrieved assessee-dealers filed an appeal in Ap. C.S.T No. 297 of 1988 before the Additional Appellate Assistant Commissioner (C.T), Coimbatore (for short, “AAAC”) and he, in turn, dismissed the appeal in toto, by his order dated 14th day of December, 1989.

9. The assessee-dealers made a further appeal in C.T.A No. 219 of 1990 before the Tamil Nadu Sales Tax Appellate Tribunal, Coimbatore-18 (for short, “Tribunal”) and the Tribunal, in turn, allowed the appeal in toto, in the sense of setting aside both the assessments as well as penalty levied, as had been done by the assessing officer and laterly confirmed by AAAC, giving rise to the present action—Tax Case (Revision) No. 164 of 1994, by the Revenue.

10. From the pith and submissions of Mr. K. Ravi Raja Pandian, learned Special Government Pleader (Taxes) representing the Revenue and Mr. C. Natarajan, learned Senior Counsel representing the assessee-dealers, the point that crops up for consideration in this action is as to—

Whether the order of the Tribunal, on the facts and circumstances of the case, is sustainable in law ?

11. The earlier exemption notification had admittedly been issued, in exercise of the powers conferred by sub-section (5) of section 8 of CSTA. There is no need for us to reproduce the said notification here, in view of the virtual reproduction of the same in the process of summation of the facts of the case. The said notification had been issued by the Governor of Tamil Nadu in public interest, granting exemption in respect of tax payable under CSTA, in the course of inter-State trade or commerce in respect of the end-products, coming under item 4 of the Second Schedule to TNGSTA. For such end-products to attract exemption, the same must have to be manufactured by steel re-rolling mills in Tamil Nadu. That apart, raw materials specified in item 4 of the Second Schedule to TNGSTA out of which the end-products were manufactured had suffered tax under TNGSTA. What is further required was that the dealers did not collect tax either directly or indirectly or make provision in the balance sheet to pay sales tax under “outstanding expenses” and get “income-tax relief’. Though the said notification is dated March 13, 1982, it had come into force on and from 1st April, 1982.

12. The subsequent inter-State sale exemption cancellation notification, as already indicated, though dated 25th April, 1986, was given retrospective effect on and from 17th March, 1986.

13. Mr. K. Ravi Raja Pandian, learned Special Government Pleader (Taxes) representing the Revenue would submit that the rationale or reasoning given by the Tribunal for setting aside the assessment as well as penalty, as had been done by the assessing officer and laterly confirmed by the AAAC are altogether untenable and therefore it is, the order of the Tribunal is liable to be set aside, by ordering restoration of the order of the assessing officer and laterly confirmed by the AAAC.

14. Mr. C. Natarajan, learned Senior Counsel representing Mr. N. Inbarajan, learned counsel appearing for the assessee would submit that the order of the Tribunal, in setting aside the assessment as well as penalty, as had been imposed by the assessing officer and laterly confirmed by the AAAC is sustainable in law, not on account of the rationale or reasoning, as had been adverted to by the Tribunal, but for different reasons. What he would say is that the Government— a delegate—have no power to issue a notification of subsequent inter-State sales cancellation of exemption notification with retrospectivity on and from a particular date, that is to say, 17th March, 1986, when especially the Legislature has not conferred such a power on the delegate—Government, while enacting subsection (5) of section 8 of CSTA and therefore, the cancellation notification, if at all, would be prospective on and from 25th April, 1986, the date on which the same had been published. He would alternatively state that under the earlier exemption notification, a right of exemption had accrued to the assessee-dealers in respect of end-products they had manufactured, inasmuch as all vestitive facts, as contemplated by the said notification had been completed, culminating in the right of exemption.

15. We shall now enter into the arena of discussion on the tenability or otherwise of the rival submissions of either counsel.

16. sub-section (5) of section 8 of the CSTA, on which the earlier notification had been issued, runs as under:

“8. Rates of tax on sales in the course of inter-State trade or commerce.—

………………………

(5) Notwithstanding anything contained in this section, the State Government may, if it is satisfied that it is necessary so to do in the public interest, by notification in the official Gazette, and subject to such conditions as may be specified therein, direct,—

(a) that no tax under this Act shall be payable by any dealer having his place of business in the State in respect of the sales by him, in the course of inter-State trade or commerce, from any such place of business of any such goods or classes of goods as may be specified in the notification, or that the tax on such sales shall be calculated at such lower rates than those specified in subsection (1) or sub-section (2) as may be mentioned in the notification;

(b) that in respect of all sales of goods or sales of such classes of goods as may be specified in the notification, which are made, in the course of interstate trade or commerce, by any dealer having his place of business in the State or by any class of such dealers as may be specified in the notification to any person or to such class of persons as may be specified in the notification, no tax under this Act shall be payable or the tax on such sales shall be calculated at such lower rates than those specified in sub-section (1) or sub-section (2) as may be mentioned in the notification.”

17. A cursory perusal of what has been extracted above reveals that the State Government is clothed with the power to issue a notification in the official Gazette, if it is satisfied that it is necessary so to do in public interest, of course, subject to such conditions as may be specified therein. The power is there for the State Government to reduce the tax or completely grant exemption from tax, in the course of inter-State sales effected by any dealer or in respect of certain classes of goods. Nothing is traceable in the said sub-section as to whether the Government issuing any notification thereunder has any power to issue a further notification either to add or amend or vary or rescind the earlier notification issued. It is not as if the Government, which issued the exemption notification under the said sub-section is not having any power to add or amend or vary or rescind the earlier exemption notification on the ground of there being no power traceable in this sub-section itself.

18. Section 21 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 (Act No. 10 of 1897— for short, “GCA”) provides the answer. The said section reads as under:

“21. Power to make to include power to add, to amend, vary or rescind orders, rules or by-laws.—Where by any Central Act or Regulation, a power to issue notifications, orders, rules or by-laws is conferred, then that power includes a power exercisable in the like manner and subject to the like sanction and conditions (if any), to add, to amend, vary or rescind any notifications, orders, rules or bye-laws so issued.”

19. It is thus crystal clear that though the power to rescind the earlier exemption notification is not traceable to sub-section (5) of section 8 of the CSTA, yet the power inheres in favour of the State Government, pursuant to the salient provisions adumbrated under section 21 of GCA.

20. The moot question that arises for consideration is as to whether the State Government is having the necessary and requisite power to rescind the earlier exemption notification with retrospectivity. Axiomatic a proposition of law it is that a competent Legislature may make a law, even on matters relating to taxation, with retrospective effect. The question, however, is whether the Government—a delegate—is having the requisite and necessary power to give retrospectivity in a cancellation notification, as had been done in the instant case, in the absence of such a power having been engrafted in its favour under subsection (5) of section 8 of CSTA.

21. It is not as if such a question did never arise for consideration, before superior courts of jurisdiction and the plain fact is that such an issue came to be canvassed in Ananda Soap Factory v. State of Karnataka, [1978] 42 STC 356 (Kar) and what their Lordships—E.S Venkataramiah (as he then was) and M.K Srinivasa Iyengar, JJ., of the Karnataka High Court said in paragraph 4 (at page 360) is relevant and the same reads as under:

“4………………………

There is no provision in the Act which confers power on the State Government to issue a notification under section 8-A with retrospective effect. It is beyond dispute that a competent Legislature may make a law even on matters relating to taxation with retrospective effect. The question, however, is whether the executive authority, to which the power to modify a law as delegated by a Legislature under a statute, can withdraw a benefit already given in the absence of an express provision in the statute itself, enabling it to exercise that power with retrospective effect. The question is no longer res Integra. In India Sugars and Refineries Ltd. v. State of Mysore, AIR 1960 Mys. 326, the question which arose for consideration was whether the power conferred by a Legislature on a subordinate legislative body like Government to issue notification having the force of law under a statute could be exercised retrospectively unless the power to issue such a notification with retrospective effect had been conferred expressly by the statute itself. This Court, relying upon the decision of the Supreme Court in Strawboard Manufacturing Co. Ltd. v. Gutta Mill Workers' Union, AIR 1953 SC 95, held that in the absence of a legislative provision conferring power to issue a notification retrospectively, it was not open to the State Government to issue such a notification. In Dr. Indramani Pyarelal Gupta v. W.R Natu, AIR 1963 SC 274, the decision in the case of India Sugars and Refineries Ltd., AIR 1960 Mys. 326 was noticed by the Supreme Court. In Income-tax Officer, Alleppey v. M.C Ponnoose, [1967] 64 ITR 117 (Ker) : AIR 1966 Ker 5, following the decision of this Court in India Sugars and Refineries Ltd., AIR 1960 Mys 326 and the decision of the Supreme Court in Indramani's case, AIR 1963 SC 274, the Kerala High Court held that unless the power to act retrospectively had been expressly conferred by the Legislature on the Government exercising subordinate and delegated legislative powers, the Government could not act retrospectively. No decision which takes a contrary view has been cited before us. We are of the opinion that in the absence of express power granted by the Legislature to act retrospectively it is not open to a subordinate legislative body like the State Government to issue a notification either taking away vested rights or imposing obligations with retrospective effect.”

22. We are in complete agreement with the view expressed by Their Lordships of the Karnataka High Court.

23. In this context, we may also usefully refer to the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Cannanore Spinning and Weaving Mills Ltd. v. Collector of Customs and Central Excise, (1969) 3 SCC 112 : AIR 1970 SC 1950. What Their Lordships of the Supreme Court, namely, J.C Shah and K.S Hegde, JJ., said in that decision in paragraph 6 (at page 1953) is relevant and it reads as under:

“………The rule-making authority had not been vested with the power under the Central Excises and Salt Act to make rules with retrospective effect. Therefore the retrospective effect purported to be given under exhibit P12 was beyond the power of the rule-making authority.”

24. In view of the ratio or dictum laid down by the superior courts of jurisdiction, as referred to above, it goes without saying that the subsequent interstate sales—exemption—cancellation notification issued by the Government giving retrospectivity from 17th March, 1986 is not sustainable in law and if at all the said notification can be stated to operate prospectively on and from 25th April, 1986, the date on which it has been published in the Tamil Nadu Government Gazette. That being the legal position, the sales of end-products of the assessee-dealers till up to 25th April, 1986 have to be exempted from tax.

25. The next question that arises for consideration is as to what is to happen to the end-products manufactured out of raw materials, on which tax had already been paid, remaining unsold in stock, even subsequent to the targeted date, 25th April, 1986.

26. We have to recapitulate here, in the process of answering this question, the argument advanced by learned Senior Counsel Mr. C. Natarajan. According to him, the right of exemption had accrued to the assessee-dealers, before ever the exemption notification was cancelled by a subsequent notification by the Government, in the sense of all vestitive facts having been completed culminating in the accrual of the right of exemption and therefore it is, that the end-products would have the benefit of exemption, even if such products came to be sold long subsequent to 25th April, 1986.

27. The argument so projected, of course, wears a credible look of tenability. But, if a deep probe is made into such an argument, what would emerge to the surface is that, to such an argument, we cannot affix our seal or approval, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case. It is not as if that all vestitive facts had been completed culminating in the accrual of the right of exemption in favour of the assessee-dealers, as per the earlier exemption notification issued. No doubt true it is that all the vestitive facts prescribed in the earlier exemption notification had been fulfilled, de hors one fact as contemplated by the said notification. The right of exemption would accrue to the assessee-dealers only when the taxable event of sale of the end-products happen and not until then. The sale of end-products remained as an end-product without culminating in a sale during the currency of the notification. Therefore, the one vital vestitive fact of sale not happening did not culminate in the right of accrual of exemption in favour of the assessee-dealers. Such being the case, we are of the view that the assessee-dealers were not entitled to exemption in respect of the end-products remaining in their possession as stock beyond the targeted date, 25th April, 1986.

28. We may now advert to the order of the Tribunal relatable to the deletion of the penalty levied by the assessing officer and laterly confirmed by AAAC. It is not as if the turnover had been suppressed by the assessee-dealers. The turnover had actually been reflected in the accounts. The assessee-dealers bona fide believed that the said turnover was exempt from tax. In such state of affairs, it cannot at all be stated that the assessee-dealers had refracted or violated section 10(2) of TNGSTA read with section 9(2-A) of CSTA. We are therefore of the view that the order of the Tribunal in deleting the penalty cannot at all be stated to be not sustainable in law.

29. The resultant product of the discussion as above, leads to the following conclusions:

(i) The retrospectivity given by the subsequent inter-State sales—exemption— cancellation notification is not sustainable in law;

(ii) The end-products of the assessee-dealers sold up to 25th April, 1986 shall not at all be subjected to tax;

(iii) The end-products remaining in stock, subsequent to the targeted date, 25th April, 1986 shall be subjected to tax at the appropriate rate; and

(iv) The deletion of penalty, as ordered by the Tribunal cannot at all be stated to be not sustainable in law.

30. In view of the conclusions as above, the assessing officer has to work out the end-products sold up to 25th April, 1986 and give the relief of exemption therefor. Likewise, if there is any unsold stock of end-products beyond the targeted date of 25th April, 1986, such stock of end-products shall be subjected to appropriate tax. The tax case (revision) is thus disposed of. There shall, however, be no order as to costs, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case.

31. Petition disposed of accordingly.