- Bookmark
- Share
- CaseIQ
Ved Pal Singh Rana v. State
Structured Summary of the Opinion (S.K. Agarwal, J.)
Factual and Procedural Background
The petitioner, a long-serving Delhi Police officer who joined in 1969 and became Inspector in 1987, filed a complaint on 5 June 1999 against respondent Nos. 2 to 4 (Special Commissioner (Ints.), the DCP (SB) and an ex-Inspector of Delhi Police). The complaint alleged a series of adverse administrative actions and mistreatment beginning in 1997, including an unlawful posting of an inspector under suspension to the complainant's section (Press Section), an alleged physical and verbal assault on 23 May 1997 by that inspector, delay and denial of leave, cancellation of a transfer, and other conduct by senior officers that caused him pain and agony.
A case was registered (FIR No. 263/99) and investigated by a senior officer (ACP). The investigating officer submitted a cancellation report stating the allegations were not substantiated. The magistrate accepted the cancellation report by order dated 2 September 1999, dismissing the complaint as false and frivolous and dropping proceedings against the accused. The petitioner challenged that order by petition under Sections 397/401 read with Section 482 CrPC.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the complaint against respondent police officers is barred by limitation under Section 140 of the Delhi Police Act, 1978 (bar to suits and prosecutions for acts done under colour of duty or authority).
- Whether prior sanction under Section 197 CrPC (and the related notification under Section 197(3)) was necessary before taking cognisance of alleged offences against the respondents.
- Whether the investigation and the magistrate's acceptance of the cancellation report were vitiated by lack of independence or inadequate inquiry (including whether further investigation under Section 173(8) CrPC or an opportunity to lead evidence should have been ordered).
- Whether the magistrate, in considering the cancellation report, erred in evaluating evidence beyond the permissible scope (i.e., whether the magistrate was entitled only to see if there was sufficient ground to proceed).
Arguments of the Parties
Petitioner's Arguments (as presented in the opinion)
- The posting of Inspector Dinesh Kumar (respondent No. 4), who was under suspension, to the Press Section by the Special Commissioner (respondent No. 2) was in violation of Delhi Police Rules (specifically Rule 26(3)(i)(ii) of the Delhi Police (Punishment and Appeal) Rules, 1980), and this administrative violation produced the subsequent harassment of the petitioner.
- Because the allegations implicated senior police officers (Special Commissioner and DCP), the investigation ought to have been conducted by an officer of rank superior to the Special Commissioner; an independent and higher-level investigation was necessary. Reliance was placed on a Division Bench decision in Devender Kumar & others v. The State & others (Crl. W.P. No. 968/2001).
- The statements recorded under Section 161 CrPC and entries in the police diary were not made by persons acquainted with the facts and therefore could not be relied upon for accepting the cancellation report; Section 2(h) CrPC defines "investigation" and the petitioner attacked the quality of investigation.
- The magistrate, when considering a cancellation report, should not have undertaken a detailed appreciation of evidence but should have confined himself to determining whether there were sufficient grounds to proceed; the petitioner cited Kunjukutty Sahib v. State of Kerala and Dalip Singh v. State of Punjab in support of that principle.
- The petitioner contended that his objections to the cancellation report were not dealt with and he should have been given an opportunity to lead evidence, or alternatively the court should have ordered further investigation under Section 173(8) CrPC.
Respondent/State's Arguments (as presented in the opinion)
- The State contended the allegations were wholly false and the complaint was filed after a delay of two years; the petitioner did not raise similar allegations previously (for example, in the petition before the Central Administrative Tribunal).
- The State characterised the complaint as a gross abuse of the process of court and argued that the magistrate rightly accepted the cancellation report after investigation.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Devender Kumar & others v. The State & others (Crl. W.P. No. 968/2001) | Cited by petitioner to argue that investigation should be conducted by an officer superior to the Special Commissioner when senior officers are implicated. | The opinion records the petitioner's reliance on this decision but does not adopt it; the court did not accept petitioner's argument that investigation was required to be by a higher-level officer because it disposed the petition on other legal thresholds (limitation and sanction). |
| Baldin and ors. v. State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 1956 SC 181 | Relied on by petitioner to challenge reliance on statements under Section 161 CrPC and police diary entries. | The court noted the petitioner's reliance but found the challenge to investigation quality irrelevant after concluding the bar under Section 140 DP Act and protection under Section 197 applied; the court did not order further inquiry on this ground. |
| Mahavir & another v. State of U.P., 1990 Cri. LJ 1605 | Cited (with Baldin) regarding the probative value of Section 161 statements and police diary entries. | The court recorded the reliance but did not sustain petitioner's challenge to the magistrate's reliance on such material because it resolved the matter on limitation and sanction grounds. |
| Kunjukutty Sahib & others v. State of Kerala & others, AIR 1972 SC 2097 | Cited for the principle that while considering a cancellation report, the magistrate's role is limited to seeing whether there is sufficient evidence to proceed and not to conduct a full appreciation of evidence. | The court acknowledged the principle cited by the petitioner but proceeded to address threshold issues (limitation and Section 197) first; it did not find it necessary to remand for further fact-finding under this principle. |
| Dalip Singh v. State of Punjab, 1997 (3) Crimes 6 (SC) | Cited to support the limited scope of magistrate's scrutiny of a cancellation report. | The court noted the citation but declined to allow further proceedings because it found other bars (limitation and need for sanction). |
| Professor Sumer Chand v. Union of India, JT 1993 (V) SC 189 | Held that acts done by police officers under the colour of their office fall within the ambit of Section 140 of the Delhi Police Act and are barred by limitation if not instituted within prescribed time; cited to show administrative acts fall within "colour of duty." | The court relied on this case to conclude that the petitioner's allegations describing administrative decisions and transfers amounted to acts under the colour of office and were therefore time-barred under Section 140 DP Act, since the complaint was filed more than two years after the acts complained of. |
| Rizwan Ahmed Javed Shaikh v. Jammal Patel, AIR 2001 SC 2198 | Provides the test for applicability of Section 197(3) CrPC: whether the alleged offence was done by the public officer while acting in his official capacity (even if the act was not his duty or was in dereliction). | The court quoted and applied the test from this decision to hold that the alleged acts were done by the respondents while acting in their official capacity and therefore attracted the protection of Section 197 (requiring prior sanction). |
| R. Balakrishna Pillai v. State of Kerala, AIR 1996 SC 901 | Illustrates that even illegal acts attacking abuse of official position can be directly connected to official duties and attract Section 197 protection. | The court cited this decision to support its conclusion that the respondents' acts—relating to transfers, postings and administrative actions—were sufficiently connected to official duties to attract protection under Section 197. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court structured its analysis around two threshold legal hurdles which had to be cleared by the petitioner before other contentions could be entertained:
-
Limitation under Section 140 of the Delhi Police Act, 1978:
- The court reproduced Section 140, noting that it bars suits or prosecutions for acts done "under the colour of duty or authority or in excess of any such duty or authority" if instituted more than three months after the date of the act (subject to a one-year provision with prior sanction).
- Relying on Professor Sumer Chand v. Union of India, the court held that administrative acts committed by police officers—even if in excess of authority—fall within the colour of office and thereby attract the limitation bar of Section 140. The court characterized the respondents' actions (appointments, transfers, leave handling, cancellation of transfer) as administrative acts connected with their official functions.
- Because the petitioner alleged acts occurring between 23 May 1997 and 21 November 1997 but filed his complaint on 5 June 1999 (more than two years later), the court concluded on the face of the record that the complaint was time-barred under Section 140 DP Act.
-
Requirement of sanction under Section 197 CrPC:
- The court set out the purpose of Section 197 (to guard against institution of fictitious proceedings against public servants) and explained sub-sections (1)–(3) and their protective scope.
- The court applied the test from Rizwan Ahmed Javed Shaikh (that the real test is whether the public officer did the alleged act while acting in his official capacity, even if the act was wrongful or beyond duty) and the authority of R. Balakrishna Pillai (showing illegal acts may still be connected to official duty).
- Applying these principles to the petitioner's own allegations, the court found that the actions of respondent Nos. 2 and 3 (and the case of respondent No. 4 by notification) were performed in the course of official functions—appointments, transfers, leave and related personnel decisions—and thus attracted protection under Section 197. Consequently, cognisance could not be taken without the prior sanction of the State Government.
-
Other contentions (investigation quality, reliance on Section 161 statements, magistrate's scope in considering cancellation report, failure to deal with objections and to allow evidence or order further investigation):
- The court regarded these arguments as irrelevant and unnecessary to consider once it had concluded that the complaint was time-barred under Section 140 and that Section 197 protection applied. Thus, those contentions were rejected without detailed reliance on the evidence or investigative record.
- The court further pointed to factual conduct by the petitioner: he did not register an FIR or make entries in the daily diary, did not obtain a medical examination, and delayed filing the complaint by more than two years—which the court treated as indicia that the complaint was motivated by vengeance rather than timely pursuit of rights.
Holding and Implications
Holding: The petition is dismissed. The court concluded that (1) the complaint is barred by limitation under Section 140 of the Delhi Police Act; and (2) the alleged acts fall within the scope of official duty and attract protection under Section 197 CrPC (including the notification under Section 197(3)), so cognisance could not be taken without prior sanction of the State Government.
Implications:
- The direct effect is that the petition challenging the magistrate's order accepting the cancellation report is rejected and the petition stands dismissed.
- The court treated the petition as time-barred and barred by required sanction; consequently, the other substantive complaints about investigation quality and the magistrate's handling were not entertained on merits.
- The opinion does not purport to lay down any novel legal principle beyond its application of existing authorities (the court applied established precedents to conclude limitation and sanction issues). The judgment does not discuss broader policy implications beyond the rulings on limitation and necessity of sanction.
This summary faithfully synthesizes only the information contained in the provided opinion. No additional facts or inferences beyond the text of the opinion have been introduced.
S.K. AGARWAL, J.
(1) THIS petition under Sections 397/401 read with Section 482 of the Code of Criminal procedure/1973 (for short. "cr. P. C") is directed against the order dated 2nd september, "1999 passed by Metropolitan magistrate, Delhi accepting the cancellation report submitted by the Investigating Officer in case FIR No. 263/99 under Sections 186/ 189/341/353/332/500/504/506/34. and 120-B IPC, P. S. I. Estate, New Delhi registered on the complaint filed by the petitioner against special Commissioner (Inst), Deputy commissioner, Police (for short, "dcp") and ex-Inspector of Delhi Police, respondent Nos. 2 to 4 respectively.
in brief are that petitioner joined delhi Police as Sub-Inspector in the year 1969; he was promoted as an Inspector in 1987; he served as SHO at different Police stations. On 5th June, 1999, he filed a complaint against the respondent Nos. 2 to 4 alleging that:
(i) On 22nd April, 1997, the, complaint was posted to the Press Section (Special branch), in place of Inspector Dinesh kumar, respondent No. 4, who was placed under suspension;
(ii) On 23rd Hay, 1997, said Inspector entered his office and told him that he was verbally ordered by Special commissioner (respondent No. 2), to take charge from him. On his refusal to give charge without a written order, the Inspector became violent, used filthy language, dragged him our of the chair insulted and humiliated. The conduct of the Inspector was without any authority of law. The complainant rushed to the office of Special commissioner to apprise him of the incident, but no action was taken against the Inspector, and he was shielded for his unlawful and corrupt activities by respondent Nos. 2 and 3;
(iii) On 26th May, 1997, the complainant applied for 90 days leave which was held in abeyance; he was neither served with any relieving order nor was allowed to work nor. was he assigned any other work, the DCP (respondent No. 3), kept his application pending any only on the intervention of S. k. Chaudhary, then addl. Commissioner of Police, he was granted thirty clays leave with effect from 9th July, 1997;
(iv) Inspector (respondent No. 4), was dismissed from service of Delhi Police on 28th June, 1997, On 28th May, -1997 detailed information regarding signing and working from the: chair of the complainant uhauthorisedly and illegally was given against him by the complainant. It is pleaded that atmosphere was made suffocating, creating problems for the complainant in discharging his official duties properly, between 29. 5. 97 to 8. 7. 97;
(v) The Special Commissioner conspired with DCP/sb to harm the complainant by way of initiating departmental enquiry for minor lapses and he was transferred from the Press Section to Hindu Section on 11th August, 1997; and was given additional charge of control room. On 28th October, 1997, he requested in writing that he should be transferred from Special Branch to some other unit;
(vi) On 7. 11. 97 he was transferred from the Special Branch to the Crime and Railway branch, where he joined on S. 11,97 and he was posted in the CBI Section of the Crime Branch on 10. 11. 97. It is alleged that at the instance of the special Commissioner and the DCP (respondent Nos. 2 and 3) transfer order dated 5. 11. 97 was cancelled by the commissioner on 21. 11. 97. The complainant had to approach the Central administrative Tribunal; his petition was allowed on 2. 1. 98 and transfer order dated 21st November, 1997, was quashed. Then he was allowed to work in the Crime and. Railway Branch. It is alleged that the complainant was relieved from there on 12. 12. 98, at instance of Respondent Nos. 2 and 3 and that
(vii) The complainant suffered pain and agony by conduct of Special commissioner of Police, DCP and the ex-Inspector, respondents 2 to 4, prayed for registration of the case against them.
(3) ON the above allegations, contained in the complaint case was registered. Investigations were carried out by a senior level officer/acp, After completion of investigation, a cancellation report was submitted stating that the allegations were not substantiated. The petitioner filed objections. The learned trial court by the impugned judgment and order dated 2nd september, 1999 accepted the cancellation report, observing:
"from the statement of above witness it becomes crystal clear that no incident as alleged by the complainant ever took place. Had there been any such incident, being a police officer with 30 years of service at his credit it was his first and foremost duty to have taken recourse to legal action by immediately approaching the local police station who could have recorded his complaint in the daily diary kept at the P. S. It appears no incident took place and accused who is feeling aggrieved due to Dept. action, taken against him by the senior officers is trying to wreak vengeance by resorting to the present complaint. On a dose scrutiny of the statement of the witnesses and on the perusal of the facts stated in the complaint I find that the allegations made in the complaint are false, and frivolous. The complainant is trying to make an attempt to browbeat accused no. 1 and 2 who happened to be his senior/ officers. None of the witnesses examined has said a word about the incident which means that the allegations are nothing but a product of imagination on part of the complainant who has tried to give colour of a scuffle/ assault while on duty on a public servant. In the absence of any evidence on the record I am of the considered opinion that there are no sufficient grounds for proceeding against accused persons, I therefore, dismiss the complaint filed by the complainant and hereby drop the proceedings against the accused persons. File be consigned to record room."
(4) THE above order is under challenge. I have heard Mr,b,s. Rana, learned counsel for complainant, learned APR for State and have been taken through the record.
(5) LEARNED counsel for the petitioner argued
(i) that Inspector Dinesh Kumar (respondent no. 4), who was then under suspension could not be posted in the Press Section by the special Commissioner of Police; his posting was made in violation of Delhi Police Rules;
(ii) that investigation in the case was not carried out by any independent agency, as there were allegations of abetment and conspiracy against Special Commissioner of Police and dcp/sb, investigations ought to have been carried out by an officer superior to the rank of Special Commissioner of Police, Delhi. Reliance was placed on the decision of the division Bench of this Court in Devender kumar and others v. The State and others, crl. W. P. No. 968/2001 decided on 6th september, 2001;
(iii) that investigations were not fair as the statements of witnesses recorded under Section 161 Cr. P. C. were not of the persons, who were acquainted with the facts of the case. Section 2 (h) Cr. P. C. defines "investigation" and includes all the proceedings under this Code for the collection of evidence conducted by a police officer or by any person (other than a Magistrate) who is authorised by a Magistrate in this behalf;
(iv) that the statements under Section 161 Cr. P. C. and the. police diary could not be relied upon by the trial Court while accepting the cancellation report. Reliance was placed on Supreme Court decision in Baldin and ors. Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 1956 SC 181 and Mahavir and another Vs. State of U. P. , 1990 Cri. LJ. 1605;
(v) that while considering the cancellation report, the magistrate was not required to appreciate the evidence and was only required to the see whether there is sufficient evidence to proceed with the case. Reliance was placed upon the supreme Court decision in Kunjukutty sahib and others Vs. The State of Kerala and others, AIR 1972 SC 2097 and Dalip singh Vs. State Of Punjab, 1997 (3) Crimes 6 (SC); and
(vi) that the objections filed by the petitioner were not dealt with by the court and he should have been provided an opportunity to lead evidence in support of his complaint to substantiate the allegations or in the alternative the court should have ordered further investigation in the case under section 173 (8) Cr. P. C. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the State argued to the contrary. He submitted that the allegations are totally false; the complaint was filed after two years; the complainant did not make any such allegations earlier even in the petition filed before the Central Administrative Tribunal and that it is an gross abuse of the process of the court.
(6) THE arguments raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner would be relevant and require consideration only after the petitioner crosses two basis hurdles in the case. One, assuming the allegations are to be true, whether the complaint is barred by limitation provided under Section 140 of The delhi POLICE ACT, 1978 (for short "d. P. Act"), 1978 and whether the sanction as envisaged under section 197 Cr. P. C. was necessary?
(7) IN order to appreciate the contention with regard to the bar of limitation, it is necessary to refer to Section 140 of D. P. Act, which provides limitation, to institution of suits or prosecution, in case offence alleged was committed by the Police officer "under the colour of duty or authority or in excess of any such duty or authority". It reads as under:
"section 140 - Bar to suits and prosecutions - (1) In any case of alleged offence by a police officer or other person, or of a wrong alleged to have been done by such police officer or other person, by any act done under colour of duty or authority or in excess of any such duty or authority, or wherein it shall appear to the court that the offence or wrong if committed or done was of the character aforesaid, the prosecution or suit shall not be entertained and if entertained shall be dismissed if it instituted, more than three months after the date of the act complained of: provided that any such prosecution against a police officer or other person may be entertained by the court, if instituted with the previous sanction of the Administrator, within one year from the date of the offence. (2) in the case of an intended suit on account of a wrong as aforesaid, the person intending to sue shall give to the alleged wrongdoer not less than one month's notice of the intended suit with sufficient description of the wrong complained of and if no such notice has been given before the institution of the suit, it shall be dismissed. (3) The plaint shall set forth that a notice as aforesaid has been served on the defendant and the date of such service and shall state what tender of amends, if any, has made by the defendant and a copy of the said notice shall be annexed to the plaint endorsed or accompanied with a declaration by the plaintiff of the time and manner of service thereof."
(8) BARE perusal of the above section shows, if an act is done under the colour of duty or authority or in excess of any such duty or authority, no prosecution or suit, could be entertained after the period of three months. Learned counsel for the petitioner in reply argued that the limitation of three months as provided in the Section 140 of D. P. Act is not applicable, as it relates to the acts done "under the colour of duty or authority or in excess of any such duty or authority"; he argued that Rule 26 (3) (i) (ii) of the Delhi Police (Punishment and Appeal) Rules, 1980 forbids any suspended police officer being detailed to perform any duty entitling him to exercise the powers or functions involving responsibility; that respondent No. 4 was under suspension and was permitted by the respondent No. 2 to perform duty in violation of the Delhi Police rules to which the petitioner had objected and thus became a target of tyranny and tirade of continued mental and physical trauma at the hands of respondents.
(9) I find no merit in the above contention. The Supreme Court in Professor Sumer chand Vs. Union of India, JT 1993 (V) SC 189, after noticing its earlier decision under section 161 91) of Bombay Police Act, 1951, which is similar to Section 140 (1) of the DP act, quashed the suit for defamation against the in-charge, Police Post Mayapuri and SHO p. S. Narayana (Delhi), for having registered a false, fictitious and malicious report and for filing the challan in the court against the plaintiff therein. It was held that the acts complained of were done under "the colour of their office by the Police officers" and that same fell within the ambit of Section 140 (1) of the DP act. The suit was held to be barred by limitation. The case of the respondents is on better footing. As per the allegations noticed above, respondent No. 2 appointed respondent No. 4 (who was under suspension), to perform certain duties in violation of Police Rules. It would, at best be some administrative lapse. It would be an act performed in excess of authority vested in him in law and nothing more. Any administrative authority would be required to perform administrative functions concerning its employees regarding their appointments, transfers, appraisals, leave, promotions, disciplinary actions etc. AH such acts would fall well within the colour of his duties even though such acts may be in excess of the duty or in the absence of such duty or in de-reliction of the duty. Petitioner's case is that these acts were committed between 23rd May, 1997 to 21st November, 1997. The complaint was filed on 5th June, 1999 i. e. after a lapse of two years which on the face of it is barred by limitation prescribed under Section 140 of the D. P. Act.
(10) section 197 Cr. P. C. guards against the institution of fictitious proceedings against public servants; sub-section (1) provides protection to certain public servants for having committed offences while acting or purporting to act in discharge of their official duties. It requires before a cognisance can be taken of. any such offence, a sanction by an appropriate government is necessary. Sub-section (2)prohibits the court for taking cognisance for an offence allegedly committed by any member of the Armed Forces of the Union, while acting or purporting to act in the discharge of his official duty, except with the previous sanction of the Central Government and Sub-section (3) permits the State government by notification to provide similar protection to other members of the forces charged with the maintenance of public order in a State.
(11) LEARNED counsel for the petitioner argued the respondents cannot claim protection of section 197 Cr. P. C. as their actions got translated into penal offences and the same cannot be said to be related with their official duties. He argued that respondents abused and mis-used their powers merely to humiliate and harass the petitioner who became helpless victim for objecting to their commission of illegal acts. The question which again arises for consideration is, whether the acts alleged were performed by the respondents while acting or purporting to act in discharge of i their official duties. The law in their regard is well settled. As this stage, it will be useful to refer to following Supreme Court decisions: (i) In Rizwan Ahmed Javed Shaikh vs. Jammal Patel, AIR 2001 SC 2198, a notification issued by the State government under Sub-section (3) of section 197 Cr. P. C. providing protection of all police officials was challenged on the ground that police officials performing law and order duty cannot be said to be employed in the maintenance of public order in the State, therefore, could be protected by a notification under Sub-section (3) of section 197 Cr. P. C. The Supreme Court repelled this contention and after referring to its earlier decisions held that the phrase maintenance of public order used in this sub-section need not be assigned a narrow meaning and the police officers performing law and order duties would also be entitled to the protection, if the alleged acts were done in discharge or purporting to act in discharge of their official duties. The test to be applied for attracting applicability of this provision was also laid down. It was held:
"15. The real test to be applied to attract the applicability of Section 197 (3)is whether the act which is done by a public officer and is alleged to constitute an offence was done by the public officer whilst acting in his official capacity though what he did was neither his duty nor is right to do as such public officer. The act complained of may be in exercise of the duty or in the absence of such duty or in dereliction of the duty, if the act complained of is done while acting as a public officer and in the course of the same transaction in which the official duty was performed or purports to be performed, the public officer would be protected."
(emphasis supplied) (it) In R. Balakrishna Pillai Vs. State of Kerala AIR 1996 SC 901 the act of the Minister abusing official position and illegally selling electricity to the private party was held to be in discharge of his official duty to attract the protection of section 197 (1) Cr. P. C. It was held:
"7. In the present case the appellant is charged with having entered into a criminal conspiracy with the co-accused while functioning as a Minister. The criminal conspiracy alleged is that he sold electricity to an industry in the state of Karnataka 'without the consent of the Government of Kerala which is an illegal act' under the provisions of the Electricity (Supply) Act, 1948 and the Kerala Electricity Board Rules framed thereunder. The allegation is that he in pursuance of the said alleged conspiracy abused his official position and illegally sold certain units to the private Industry in Bangalore (Karnataka) which profited the private industry to the tun of Rs. 19,58,630. 40 or more and it is, therefore, obvious that the criminal conspiracy alleged against the appellant is that while functioning as the Minister for Electricity he without the consent of the Government of Kerala supplied certain units of electricity to a private industry in Karnataka. Obviously, he did this in the discharge of his duties as a minister. The allegations is that it was an illegal act inasmuch as the consent of the Government of Kerala was not obtained before this arrangement was entered into and the supply was effected. For that reason, it is said that he had committed an illegality and hence he was liable to be punished for criminal conspiracy under Section 120-B I. P. C. It is, therefore, clear from the charge that the act alleged is directly and reasonably connected with his official duty as a Minister and would, therefore, attract the protection of Section 197 (1) of the Act."
(emphasis supplied)
(12) APPLYING above principles to the facts of this case, as per petitioner's own case, respondent No. 2 as a Special Commissioner of Police (Ints.) and respondent No. 3 was dcp, they directed respondent No. 4, an inspector under suspension, to work at the place where the complainant was posted, in violation of Delhi Police Rules. On objection being raised, the complainant was harassed, his application for leave was kept pending for quite sometime and he was granted leave only for 30 days instead of 90 days. When he got himself transferred to the Department of Crimes and Railways, the same was got cancelled by respondent No. 2. The petitioner had to approach the Central Administrative tribunal for getting the same quashed. All these acts, in my considered view, would clearly falls within the ambit of the official duties of the respondent Nos. 2 and 3 and attract protection of 197 (1). And in view of the notification, case of respondents 2 to 4 would also be covered under Section 197 (3)Cr. P. C. and cognisance of the complaint could not be taken without the previous sanction of the State Government against them.
(13) IN view of the above conclusions, other contentions raised by petitioner, merit no consideration, being irrelevant and the same are rejected.
(14) THE alleged incident happened on 23rd may, 1997. Petitioner has been working in the Police Department for the last about 30 years; he has also been functioning as SHO of the different Police Stations earlier; he did not care to record the FIR or even make any entry in the Daily Diary Register; he did not sent any report in writing as envisaged under section 154 (3) Cr. P. C. and he never got himself medically examined. The complaint with regard to the incident of 23rd May, 1997 was filed on 5th 3une, 1999 i. e. after a lapse of more than two years. It is obvious that the complaint was filed by the petitioner after two years a view to wreak vengeance, which is not sustainable in law. For the foregoing reasons, the petition is without merit and the same is dismissed.
Alert