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Rajib Lochan Banerjee v. Anil Kumar Ghose Opposite Party.
Structured Summary of the Opinion
Factual and Procedural Background
This is an application for revision under section 115 of the Civil Procedure Code against orders of the Munsiff at Uluberia which struck out the defence of the defendant to an action for delivery of possession. The plaintiff (landlord) instituted a suit for ejectment on 29th April, 1959. On 1st May, 1959 the defendant deposited with the Rent Controller the rent for the period from Chaitra 1365 (14th March 1959) to Shraban 1366 B.S. Summons were served on the defendant on 20th May, 1959. No deposit was made in Court until 7th August, 1959 (about Shraban 1366). The central dispute in this application is whether the advance deposit of rent with the Rent Controller meant that the tenant was not a 'defaulter' within the meaning of section 17(1) of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1956, and therefore whether the defence should properly have been struck out by the Munsiff.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether an advance deposit of rent with the Rent Controller (made before or in relation to the period in question) prevents the tenant from being treated as a defaulter under section 17(1) of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1956.
- Whether, on the facts where rent was deposited in advance with the Rent Controller but not deposited in Court within the one-month period after service of summons, the defence of the tenant should be struck off under section 17(1) (and related provisions) of the Act.
Arguments of the Parties
The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the parties' legal arguments.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| (1) 62 Calcutta Weekly Notes, p. 555 (Division Bench of this High Court) | Holds that deposit in advance with the Rent Controller is of no assistance to the tenant (i.e., does not prevent being a defaulter under section 17). | The learned Munsiff followed this decision and struck out the defence. The present court distinguished that decision as not being applicable to cases of advance payment made before service of summons and did not follow it for such cases. |
| Commissioner of Agricultural Income-tax v. Keshab Mandal, 1950 S.C.R. 435 at 446 | Principle that hardship or inconvenience cannot alter the plain meaning of statutory language. | Cited to indicate that plain meaning, where clear, cannot be changed merely because the outcome may be harsh; used to frame the starting point of interpretation. |
| Rananjaya Singh v. Baijnath Singh & Others, 1955(1) S.C.R. 671 at 676 | Principle that the spirit of law cannot be applied in opposition to the plain language of a statute. | Cited to reinforce the rule that courts should ordinarily give effect to plain statutory language. |
| M.K. Ranganathan v. Government of Madras, 1955(2) S.C.R. 374 at 385 | Statement of objects and reasons may be referred to for the limited purpose of ascertaining conditions prevailing at the time of enactment. | Used to identify the remedial object of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act and the legislative intent to protect tenants in the context of housing shortage. |
| Hill v. Ram Taran Banerjee, A.I.R. 1949 F.R. 79 | Remedial statutes should be construed so as to enhance the remedy rather than to retard it. | Adopted to argue that the Act (being remedial) should be interpreted to afford tenant protection (i.e., avoid constructions that defeat remedial purpose). |
| Tirath Singh v. Bachittar Singh, 1955(2) S.C.R. 457 at 460 | Where ordinary grammatical construction leads to absurdity, hardship or injustice, a construction modifying the plain meaning may be adopted. | Relied on to justify departure from a strictly literal reading of section 17 where such a reading would produce absurd results inconsistent with the Act's purpose. |
| State of Punjab v. Ajaib Singh, 1953 S.C.R. 254 | If two constructions are possible, adopt the one that ensures smooth and harmonious working and avoid the construction that leads to absurdity or practical inconvenience. | Applied to choose between two possible readings of section 17, favouring the construction that harmonises sections 5 and 17 and avoids absurdity. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court proceeded through a step-by-step interpretive analysis grounded in the statutory text and judicial principles cited in the opinion:
- Statutory starting point: Section 17(1) of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act places on the tenant the duty to deposit arrears of rent in Court within one month from the date of service of summons. The learned Munsiff applied this literal rule to hold the tenant in default where rent was not deposited in Court within that period.
- Factual application of dates: The opinion maps the relevant rent due dates and the timing of deposits — the tenant deposited certain rents with the Rent Controller on 1st May 1959; summons were served 20th May 1959; no deposit in Court until 7th August 1959. On the literal reading, some months' rent (Jaistha and Ashar) were not deposited in Court within the one-month period.
- Question posed: If the pre-suit deposit with the Rent Controller was valid under the Act, then the tenant would not be a defaulter. The court examined whether the Munsiff was correct in treating an advance deposit with the Rent Controller as ineffective to prevent default.
- Interpretive rules invoked: The court acknowledged the ordinary rule that if statutory language is plain, hardship does not alter it (citing Keshab Mandal and Rananjaya Singh). However, it balanced that against other Supreme Court authorities that permit departure from a literal meaning where it produces absurdity or frustrates the purpose of a remedial statute (citing Tirath Singh and State of Punjab v. Ajaib Singh), and the rule that remedial statutes should be construed liberally to enhance, not retard, relief (Hill v. Ram Taran Banerjee).
- Harmonisation with section 5: The court noted that section 5(b) of the Act recognises payment in advance (with the Controller's permission) and that a literal reading of section 17(1) which compelled deposit in Court within one month in all circumstances would conflict with the statutory recognition of advance payment. The court regarded such a conflict as producing an absurdity.
- Availability of two constructions: The court concluded that section 17 is capable of two constructions — one that excludes advance payments/deposits and one that includes them. Given the remedial purpose of the Act and the duty to avoid absurd results and to harmonise provisions, the court opted for the construction that does not treat valid advance payment/advance deposit (at least where made before service of summons) as a ground for striking off the defence.
- On agency and modes of payment: The court observed (without deciding) that if section 17 can be complied with by the agency of the Central Government (money order) or by cheque, it is not apparent why the agency of the Rent Controller would not suffice as a discharge of the tenant's duty; but the court expressly refrained from expressing a definitive opinion as that was unnecessary for the decision.
- Distinguishing precedent: The court stated it was not differing from the Division Bench decision reported in 62 C.W.N. 555 generally, but distinguished that decision as not addressing the situation of advance payment made before service of summons. The court therefore did not consider that Division Bench decision determinative of the present case.
Holding and Implications
Holding: The court made the Rule absolute. In practical terms, the court held that section 17 should be construed so as not to include cases of advance payment or advance deposit (at least where the deposit was made before service of summons), and on the facts the tenant's advance deposit with the Rent Controller meant the tenant was not to be treated as a defaulter for the months in question. The court ordered that there would be no order as to costs.
Implications:
- Direct effect on parties: The tenant's advance deposit with the Rent Controller, as described in the opinion, prevented the tenant from being treated as a defaulter for the relevant months and thus the defence should not have been struck off on that basis.
- Interpretive consequence: The opinion adopts an interpretation of section 17 that excludes, at least in the circumstances described (advance payment/deposit before service of summons), treating such payments as defaults—thereby harmonising section 17 with section 5's recognition of advance payments and avoiding an absurd result.
- Scope and limits noted by the court: The court expressly distinguished an earlier Division Bench decision as inapplicable to advance-payment situations and relied on Supreme Court authorities to justify the interpretive approach. The court declined to express a general ruling on every mode or agency of payment (e.g., whether all agency payments are sufficient), noting that such questions were unnecessary to decide in this case.
- Precedential character: The opinion rests on applying and reconciling existing Supreme Court authorities; it distinguishes a local Division Bench decision on its facts rather than attacking its authority. The court's ruling thus clarifies application of section 17 in cases involving advance deposits with the Rent Controller as described, but the opinion itself limits broader pronouncements (for example, the court refrained from expressing opinions on all modes of agency of payment).
No other remedies, costs orders, or further directions were made beyond declaring the Rule absolute and that there would be no order as to costs.
Signed: S.K.B
1. This is an application for revision under section 115 of the Civil Procedure Code against the orders of the Munsiff at Uluberia by which he ordered the striking out of the defence of the defendant against the delivery of possession.
2. The plaintiff landlord instituted a suit for ejectment against the defendant. The suit was instituted on the 29th of April, 1959. On May 1, 1959, the defendant deposited with the Rent Controller the rent for the period from Chaitra, 1365 (14th of March, 1959) to Shraban, 1366 B.S Summons were served on the defendant on the 20th May, 1959 and nothing was deposited in Court till 7th August, 1959, which will be about Shraban, 1366 B.S The question in this case is whether in spite of such deposit in advance with the Rent Controller the tenant is to be considered a defaulter within the meaning of section 17(1) of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1956, i.e, West Bengal Act 12 of 1956 and whether this defence would be struck off.
3. It was the duty of the tenant under Section 17(1) of the Act to deposit all arrears of rent within one month from the date of service of summons i.e within 20th June, 1959, in Court. Rent for the month of Chaitra would be due by 15th Baisakh and if that was deposited on May 1, 1959, no complaint can be made. Rent for Baisakh would be due on 15th Jaistha i.e, 1st June, after the service of summons on 20th May and should have been deposited in Court. Rent for Jaistha and Ashar were not deposited in Court. Hence this application for striking out of the defence.
4. It is not disputed that rents up to Shraban 1366 B.S were deposited in advance with the Rent Controller and rents for the subsequent period are still being deposited in Court. Therefore, if the deposit before the Rent Controller was valid, there would be no default.
5. The learned Munsiff referred to a decision of this High Court reported in (1) 62 Calcutta Weekly Notes page 555 and held that the deposit in advance with the Rent Controller is of no assistance to the tenant and accepting that view, he made the aforesaid orders, making an observation “however harsh it may be, there is no escape from this legal position”; the question evidently is: is this the correct legal position?
6. The literal meaning of the section would show that the learned Munsiff understood the correct meaning of the section. It is a well-known principle of interpretation that “hard-ship” or “inconvenience” cannot alter the meaning of the law. If the meaning is clear, “hard-ship” or “inconvenience” cannot alter that plain meaning of the language, as has been held in the case of The Commissioner of Agricultural, Income-tax v. Keshab Mandal (2) reported in 1950 S.C.R 435 at 446. It has also been held by the Supreme Court that the spirit of law cannot be given effect to in opposition to the plain language of the section of the Act in Rananjaya Singh v. Baijnath Singh & Others (3) 1955(1) S.C.R 671 at 676.
7. The learned Munsiff very probably depended on such rules of construction supported by the aforesaid decision of the Division Bench and came to the conclusion that the legal position is harsh; but yet it must be given effect to With regard to rent for Jaistha deposit would be necessary, if there was default. As the rent for Jaistha was already in deposit with the Rent Controller, it may be said that there was no default, but current rent after a month of the service of summons must be deposited in Court and that was not done. It is, therefore, suggested that the decision in (1) 62 Calcutta Weekly Notes applies.
8. The West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act of 1956 came in after the various Acts have been in force for various temporary periods for over a total period of about 10 years. The Supreme Court in the case of M.K Ranganathan v. 1. Government Of Madras (4) reported in 1955(2) S.C.R 374 at 385 held that the statement of objects and reasons can be referred to for the limited purpose of ascertaining the conditions prevailing at the time. The object of the Act is to “meet the situation brought about by acute shortage of house accommodation in urban areas in consequence of the last World War and to prevent racket renting and arbitrary eviction of tenants, etc.” Then the history of subsequent Acts has been given and it has been said that the permanent Act is being enacted and finally accordingly it is proposed to enact a permanent measure for the regulation of the incidents of tenancy in respect of premises in Calcutta….for the following matters:
“(2) Protection of tenants against eviction….
(3) Conditions under which the tenant should be entitled to get the benefit of protection……..”
9. Hence the Act is mainly remedial.
10. It has been held by the Federal Court in the case of Hill v. Ram Taran Banerjee (5) reported in A.I.R 1949 F.R 79 that remedial statutes should be construed so as to enhance the remedy rather than to retard it. The remedy here is prohibition from eviction on the condition of regular payment of rent. Therefore, order for the striking out the defence should be construed in cases of ambiguity in a manner so that on condition of regular payment, the tenants be protected.
11. Payment in the present context means not only actual payment but both direct and indirect, i.e, also by deposit before the Rent Controller, which again is authorised by the Act itself. Therefore, the striking out should be construed in such a manner as not to retard or to obstruct the protection of the tenant against eviction.
12. In the present case we find that the tenant deposited rent for the months in question before the Rent Controller. The Rent Controller was authorised to accept such rent and it was on his permission that rent was so deposited. Section 5(b) of the Act may be referred to which provides that no person shall, in consideration of the grant, renewal or continuation of a tenancy of any premises, except with the previous permission of the Controller, can pay or receive the payment of any sum exceeding one month's rent. Hence the payment of rent in advance is recognised by the Act. But so far as the direct payment of rent is concerned, it cannot be for more than a month except with the previous permission of the Controller. Therefore, the landlord could have accepted the rent for all the months with the previous permission of the Rent Controller. Supposing that the landlord had accepted rent for a whole year with the permission of the Rent Controller and the landlord after such acceptance instituted a suit for ejectment and the tenant on the basis of advance payment did not make further payments, under section 17 of the Act, he would still be liable to penalty, under section 17(3) of the Act, the defence would be struck off for not depositing the rent, even though the rent had been actually paid to the landlord. The second part of section 17, relating to current rent, is unconditional and compulsory for tenant and he is to pay in Court within the 15th of every succeeding month, without reference to default. Therefore, even though the landlord had accepted rent with the permission of the Controller and even though the tenants had paid rent with the permission of the Controller, the defence of the defendants must be struck off on plain meaning of the section.
13. Such plain meaning of the section is absurd. I must refer to the Supreme Court decision, Tirath Singh v. Bachittar Singh, (6) reported in 1955(2) S.C.R 457 at 460 where the Supreme Court accepted “where the language of a statute in its ordinary and grammatical construction leads to a manifest contradiction of the apparent purpose of the enactment, or to some inconvenience or absurdity, hardship or injustice presumbly not intended, a construction may be put upon it which modifies the meaning of the word and even the structure of the sentence.” The Supreme Court has also held in an earlier case, if two constructions are possible, then the Court must adopt that which ensures smooth and harmonious working of the “Constitution” and eschew the other which leads to absurdity or gives rise to practical inconvenience or makes well established provisions of the existing law nugatory in State of Punjab v. Ajaib Singh (7) 1953 S.C.R Page 254.
14. Now we have to consider whether the meaning of section 17 is capable of two constructions or not. If it is not capable of two meanings, it is impossible to hold that the plain meaning would not apply.
15. Section 5 contains provision by which rent can be paid in advance or deposited in advance. If such deposit is a legal discharge of the tenant's duties, then any other construction by which that deposit is affected, must be contradictory to section 5 of the Act. The provision relating to current rent in section 17(1) is an absolute provision where the deposit must be made whether the tenant defaulted or not. Even if it be held that the tenant had not defaulted, current rent must be deposited. This, as I have already shown, is an absurdity. Hence section 17 may be construed in two ways—one by including the cases of advance payment or advance deposit and another by excluding the cases of advance payment or advance deposit.
16. Now, therefore, applying the principles in the aforesaid decisions, two constructions being possible, we would not take that construction, which would obstruct the harmonious working of the Act and of section 17 and section 5 in particular. Therefore, section 17 must be construed as not to include the cases of advance payment, payment in advance of the suit or at least, in advance of the service of summons.
17. I must add that I am not in any way differing from the decision of the Division Bench reported in (1) 62 C.W.N, at page 555. On the other hand, I am merely following the decisions of the Supreme Court respectfully and distinguishing the case of Division Bench of this High Court as not being applicable to cases of advance payment and this aspect of the matter was not before Das Gupta and Guha, JJ. when they decided the case reported in (1) 62 C.W.N 555.
18. However, I may just note that, it section 17 is complied with by sending the money by money order, which means, if section 17 can be complied with by the agency of the Central Government and if again provision of section 17 can be complied with by payment of a cheque i.e, by the agency of a third person, I do not find any reason why the agency of the West Bengal Government through the Rent Controller would not be a sufficient discharge of the tenant's duty. By this agency as well as by any other agency the landlord may get the money within the stipulated time. However, 1 am not expressing any opinion on this matter as it is thoroughly unnecessary for me.
19. In this view, the Rule is made absolute and there will be no order for costs.
S.K.B
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