Login
  • Bookmark
  • PDF
  • Share
  • CaseIQ

K. Dhikpathy And Others v. Chairman, Chennai Port Trust, Chennai, And Another

Madras High Court
Feb 15, 2001
Smart Summary (Beta)

Structured Summary of the Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

The writ petitions challenge orders of the first respondent (Chennai Port Trust) placing three officers (Traffic Manager; Chief Mechanical Engineer; Financial Adviser & Chief Accounts Officer) under suspension by an impugned order dated 24 October 2000. The three petitions raise identical issues and were heard together.

Background facts in the opinion: a berth reservation scheme proposal prepared in 1994 was approved internally by the petitioners and the Chairman; tenders were invited and an evaluation committee (including the petitioners) recommended allotments to M/s. Bengal Tinger Lines and M/s. X-Press Container Lines; a sub-committee of the Board approved entrustment and the matter was communicated to the Ministry and implemented.

On 21 March 1996 the CBI registered R.C 15(A)/96; a chargesheet in C.C. No. 16 of 1999 (filed on 2 November 1999) named seven accused, including the Chairman and the three petitioners. The Chairman (1st accused) had been suspended on 23 September 1996; that suspension was later set aside by this Court. The petitioners were placed under suspension by order dated 24 October 2000 under Regulations 7(1)(b) and 7(1)(c) of the Madras Port Trust Employees (Classification, Control and Appeal) Regulations, 1988. The petitions seek to set aside those suspension orders.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the impugned orders amount to impermissible selective suspension (i.e., suspension of some accused but not others) and whether that makes the suspensions invalid.
  2. Whether the first respondent validly placed the petitioners under suspension where, under the Regulations and the Major Port Trust Act, approvals by the Central Government (second respondent) were required for officers covered by clause (a) of sub-section (1) of Section 24 of the Major Port Trust Act, 1963.
  3. Whether invoking both Regulation 7(1)(b) (disciplinary proceedings contemplated/pending) and Regulation 7(1)(c) (criminal investigation/trial pending) in the suspension orders was inconsistent or impermissible.
  4. Whether suspension orders can continue after retirement of the employees referred to in the petitions.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioners' Arguments (as presented by Sri N.R. Chandran, senior counsel)

  • Selective suspension: The petitioners argued that only some officers implicated in the chargesheet were suspended and others were not; such selective suspension is bad and cannot be sustained (relied upon K. Sukdhendar Reddy).
  • Appointing authority / approval: The petitioners contended that officers covered by Cl. (a) of sub-sec. (1) of S. 24 of the Major Port Trust Act can be placed under suspension only with approval of the Central Government; the appointing authority (Chairman/Board) must apply its mind and recommend suspension — an order merely at the direction of the Central Government without a proper proposal/recommendation is invalid (relied upon V.V. Shunmugha Nadar & Anirudhsinhji).
  • Inconsistency of grounds: The petitioners argued Regulation 7(1)(b) and 7(1)(c) grounds cannot co-exist in the same order and therefore the suspension orders are liable to be set aside.
  • Continuation after retirement: Two petitioners had retired and petitioners relied on authorities (N.M. Somasundaram; State of West Bengal v. Nripendra Nath Bagchi) to argue that continuing suspension post-retirement is impermissible.

First Respondent's Arguments (as presented by Sri A.L. Somayaji, senior counsel)

  • The petitioners were members of the tender-evaluation committee whose recommendations led to allotments; the Board constituted a sub-committee and approved the entrustments; chargesheet involved these petitioners and, following the chargesheet, the Port Trust considered suspension and sought approval from the second respondent.
  • The Chairman (1st accused) had earlier been suspended under All India Service Rules; that suspension was set aside by this Court; the Port Trust did not earlier suspend the petitioners but after the chargesheet the Port Trust placed the matter before the second respondent for approval.
  • The second respondent initially decided (in consultation with the CBI) not to place the petitioners under suspension but later, on reconsideration, directed suspension in terms of Regulation 7(1)(b) read with Regulation 7(2) and its proviso; the first respondent acted on that approval and issued suspension orders based on an approved draft.
  • Selective suspension principle does not apply here because only the three petitioners were officers of the Port Trust (the other accused were private persons/representatives) and thus only the Port Trust could suspend its own officers.
  • Both Regulation 7(1)(b) and 7(1)(c) apply as disciplinary proceedings were contemplated and criminal proceedings were pending; invoking both is appropriate.
  • The continuation-after-retirement argument falls outside the scope of the petitions challenging the suspension orders and cannot be a ground to set them aside in these petitions.

Second Respondent's Arguments (as presented by Sri N. Kannadasan, standing counsel)

  • The second respondent is the competent authority to approve suspension orders for officers covered by the proviso to Regulation 7; there is no illegality in directing the first respondent to place the petitioners under suspension where chargesheet has been filed against them.
  • Procedurally, the first respondent sent a proposal on 10 October 2000 seeking approval; the second respondent's direction of 20 October 2000 flowed from that proposal, so it was not a case of the first respondent merely acting on direction without any proposal.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
K. Sukdhendar Reddy v. State of Andhra Pradesh, 1999 (4) L.L.N. 647 Principle that selective suspension (suspending some implicated officers but not others without justification) is bad. The Court considered the precedent but held it inapplicable: here only the three petitioners were Port Trust officers (others were private parties) and all three were suspended after the chargesheet — therefore the complaint of selective suspension was rejected.
V.V. Shanmugha Nadar & Bros. v. Joint Chief/Controller of Imports and Exports, Madras (1963) 76 L.W. 76 Decision of a judicial/quasi-judicial authority given under direction of or after consultation with a superior authority is invalid (failure to exercise independent discretion / natural justice point). The Court distinguished the case: that precedent concerned a quasi-judicial authority acting on instruction; in the present facts the second respondent has statutory power to approve suspension and the first respondent sought approval — the Court found the authorities relied upon did not apply.
Anirudhsinhji Karansinhji Jadela v. State of Gujarat, (1995) 5 SCC 302 Exercise of powers by a competent authority strictly in compliance with instruction of another may amount to failure to exercise discretion. The Court treated this principle as distinguishable: here the second respondent had statutory competency and power to review and approve; the first respondent sought approval and issued orders consistent with the approval process, so the precedent was not held applicable.
Jawahar College Staff Association v. Secretary, Jawahar Science College, 1994 W.L.R. 84 Distinguished the concepts of "approval" and "permission" and addressed reporting/approval procedures for appointments under university statute. The Court held the university statute context is not analogous: in the Regulations an order of suspension for the relevant officers becomes effective only upon Central Government approval; hence the Jawahar College ratio could not be equated with the proviso to Regulation 7.
N.M. Somasundaram v. Director General of Police, 1997 (2) L.L.N. 349 Authority cited by petitioners in support of the proposition that suspension cannot continue after retirement (as relied upon by the petitioners). The Court noted the petitioners relied on this authority for the retirement point but held the retirement-continuation issue was outside the scope of the present petitions and did not decide the point on merits.
State of West Bengal v. Nripendra Nath Bagchi, A.I.R. 1966 S.C. 447 Authority cited for the proposition concerning suspension and its relation to retirement. As with N.M. Somasundaram, the Court recorded reliance upon this authority by the petitioners but treated the continuation-after-retirement issue as not being in issue for decision in these petitions.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court considered the petitioners' contentions in sequence and applied the Regulations and facts as presented in the record.

1. Selective suspension: The Court observed that the chargesheet named seven accused but only accused 1 to 4 were officers of the Port Trust. The first accused (Acting Chairman, an IAS officer) had earlier been suspended (under All India Service Rules) and that suspension was set aside by the High Court; the remaining three petitioners were the only Port Trust officers implicated by the chargesheet. The Court therefore concluded that suspending these three officers could not be characterized as impermissible selective suspension on the facts of this case and rejected the petitioners' reliance on K. Sukdhendar Reddy.

2. Competency / approval requirement: The Court analysed Regulations 5 and 7 of the Madras Port Trust Regulations. It noted that officers covered by Clause (a) of sub-section (1) of Section 24 of the Major Port Trust Act fall within a special category: suspension orders affecting them take effect only after approval of the Central Government (the second respondent). The Court held that the second respondent is the competent authority to approve or refuse approval and that the second respondent may reconsider earlier decisions. The Court found that the first respondent had, on 10 October 2000, sought approval and that approval (in revised form) was communicated by the second respondent and a draft suspension order was provided; accordingly, the first respondent's issuance of suspension orders based on that approval was not an unlawful ministerial act done merely on instructions.

In distinguishing the precedents relied upon by the petitioners (V.V. Shanmugha Nadar; Anirudhsinhji; Jawahar College), the Court emphasised that those authorities dealt with contexts where a judicial/quasi-judicial or statutory authority simply acted on directions/instructions of others, thereby failing to exercise independent discretion. By contrast, in the present regulatory framework the Central Government's approval is statutorily required and the first respondent had submitted a requisition and acted after receiving the Central Government's approval and an approved draft.

3. Co-existence of Regulation 7(1)(b) and 7(1)(c): The Court noted that both disciplinary proceedings were contemplated and criminal proceedings were pending (chargesheet filed). Given those factual circumstances, the Court held that invoking both provisions in the suspension orders was not inconsistent and both grounds could be relied upon.

4. Continuation after retirement: The Court treated the submission about continuation of suspension after retirement as outside the subject-matter of the writ petitions and therefore declined to decide that point in these proceedings.

Holding and Implications

HOLDING: The Court dismissed all writ petitions challenging the suspension orders. In the Court's words, the impugned orders of suspension were valid and could not be set aside on the grounds urged by the petitioners.

DISPOSITION: DISMISSED. The petitions are dismissed. No costs. Consequentially, W.M.P. Nos. 26775, 26779 and 26780 were also dismissed.

Implications:

  • Direct effect on the parties: The suspension orders dated 24 October 2000 placed on the three petitioners remain in force as the Court found them valid; the writ petitions seeking to set them aside were dismissed.
  • Statutory-approval principle emphasised: For officers covered by Clause (a) of sub-sec. (1) of Section 24 of the Major Port Trust Act, a suspension order by the Port Trust requires Central Government approval to take effect; the Central Government may reconsider prior decisions to approve or not approve suspension.
  • No ruling was made on whether suspension may continue after retirement in other proceedings; the Court expressly declined to decide that issue here.
  • No broad new principle of law was declared by the Court beyond application and distinction of existing authorities to the facts before it; the Court applied established principles concerning statutory approval and the scope of suspension under Regulations 7(1)(b) and 7(1)(c).
Petitions dismissed.
Show all summary ...

JUDGMENT

1. In all the writ petitions the petitioners have challenged the respective impugned orders passed by the first respondent placing the petitioners under suspension. Since the issues involved are one and the same, all the writ petitions are dealt with together by a common order.

2. The petitioner in W.P No. 18507 of 2000 was working as Traffic Manager in the first respondent Port Trust when he was placed under suspension by the impugned order of the first respondent. The petitioner in W.P No. 18511 of 2000 was working as Chief Mechanical Engineer in the first respondent Port Trust when he was placed under suspension by the impugned order of the first respondent and the petitioner in W.P No. 18512 of 2000 was working as Financial Adviser and Chief Accounts Officer in the first respondent Port Trust when he was placed under suspension by the impugned order of the first respondent. The issues raised and the reliefs sought for in all the three writ petitions are one and the same and therefore the averments made in W.P No. 18507 of 2000 are dealt with as follows:

3. It is the case of the petitioners that in accordance with the decision taken by the Export Promotion Meet held in Madras Port Trust on 27 May, 1994 by the Cabinet Secretary, Government of India, to encourage berth reservation scheme implemented as is being done in Bombay and as directed by the Joint Secretary, Ministry of Surface Transport, a note was prepared for the said purpose by the Marketing Manager of the first respondent Port Trust on 4 July, 1994. The said note was approved by the Traffic Manager, Chief Mechanical Engineer and Financial Adviser and Chief Accounts Officer namely the petitioners in the writ petitions as well as by the Chairman of Chennai Port Trust on 14 July, 1994. Based upon the said note, a communication was sent to the Joint Secretary, Ministry of Surface Transport, seeking clearance for implementation of berth reservation scheme after the approval of the then Board in B.R No. 74, dated 27 July, 1994. Pursuant to the said note which got approved, a tender advertisement was also made in all leading newspapers on 21 September, 1994 mentioning the terms and conditions for private participation in the container terminal at Bharathi Dock (200 MTS berth length). In response to the said tender advertisement, five shipping lines submitted their tenders. However, three shipping lines agreed for the minimum guaranteed throughput per annum namely M/s. Bengal Tinger Line, M/s. Pacific International Lines and M/s. X-Press Container Lines. On the basis of the tenders, a comparative statement was prepared containing the offer of shipping lines. While M/s. Bengal Tinger Line and X-Press Container Lines submitted their proposal in line with the guidelines as per the advertisement, M/s. Pacific International Lines submitted their conditional offer that 24 hours carting should be permitted by the Port Trust for them. Based upon the proposals, an internal discussion was held on 26 October, 1994 on the various aspects of the offers received in which the Traffic Manager, Financial Adviser and Chief Accounts Officer, Chief Mechanical Engineer, Deput, Chief Traffic Manager, Deputy Manager (Legal) and the Convenor, Manager (M and ST participated. It was decided in the said meeting to ask the shipping lines to submit their firm proposals on or before 14 November, 1994. Pursuant to the above, four shipping lines responded namely M/s. Pacific International Lines, M/s. X-Press Container Lines, M/s. Shreyas Shipping Lines and M/s. Bengal Tinger Lines. The evaluation committee consisting of all the petitioners evaluated the four offers and recommended the offer of M/s. Bengal Tinger Lines for allotment of 200 M.T.S berth length in C.T.B.I (North) as their offer was the highest.

4. While calling the tenderers to submit their revised proposals, discussions were also held with the tenderers on 10 November, 1994 and 11 November, 1994 based on their original offer. During the internal discussions, the evaluation committee deliberated the possibilities of allotting 200 M.T.S berth length in West Quay 1 and 2 and C.T.B.I (North) without port equipments. Since only M/s. X-Press Container Lines informed their willingness to operate West Quay 1 and 2 without port equipments and also offered a guaranteed throughput of 50000 T.U.Es per annum, the same was recommended by the evaluation committee for consideration and approval by the first respondent initially and by the Board later on. The first respondent placed the recommendations of the evaluation committee before the Board. On receipt of the said recommendations, the Board in turn constituted a sub-committee consisting of few trustees of the Board of highest integrity. The said sub-committee went into the details of the proposal and based on the sub committee's recommendation the Board approved the entrustment of work to M/s. Bengal Tinger Lines in respect of C.T.B.I (North) and to M/s. X-Press Container Lines in respect of West Quay 1 and 2. The said decision of the Board was intimated to the Ministry which was approved by the second respondent and the work was allotted to the respective shipping lines and the work was also completed.

5. On 21 March, 1996, the Central Bureau of Investigation registered a case under R.C 15(A)/96 against the Chairman, Chennai Port Trust, Sri M. Kalaivanan and M/s. X-Press Container Lines under S. 120-B read with S. 420, I.P.C, S. 13(2) read with S. 13(1)(d) of Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. After investigation, chargesheet was filed before the Special Judge, C.B.I Cases, Chennai on 2 November, 1999 against seven persons, viz.:

(1) Sri M. Kalaivanan, Acting Chairman, Chennai Port Trust;

(2) Sri K. Dhikpathy, Traffic Manager, Chennai Port Trust;

(3) Sri V.S Ranganathan, Chief Mechanical Engineer, Chennai Port Trust;

(4) Sri S. Muthusrinivasan, Financial Adviser and Chief Accounts Officer, Chennai Port Trust;

(5) Sri K.C Raman, Senior Vice-President, M/s. Pat-Volk Limited, Chennai;

(6) Sri S.B Rao, Regional Representative, M/s. X-Press Container Liner, Chennai; and

(7) M/s. X-Press Container, Ltd., Chennai, represented by Sri S.B Rao which was taken on file in C.C No. 16 of 1999.

6. The first accused-in the said criminal case namely Sri M. Kalaivanan was placed under suspension in connection with this case and another case on 23 September, 1996. He challenged the order of suspension before the Central Administrative Tribunal and the same was rejected. However, the High Court in W.P No. 1382 of 1998 by order, dated 17 March, 1999, set aside the order of suspension. When the first accused was suspended on 23 September, 1996, the 1st respondent did not consider as necessary to place the petitioners namely accused 2 to 4 in the said case under suspension. However, by the impugned order, dated 24 October, 2000, the petitioners were placed under suspension by the first respondent by virtue of the powers conferred under Regulations 7(1)(b) and 7(1)(c) of the Madras Port Trust employees (Classification, Control and Appeal) Regulations, 1988. hereinafter called as “The Regulations”. The above orders of suspension are the subject matter in these writ petitions.

7. Sri N.R Chandran, learned senior counsel appearing for the petitioners, would raise the following contentions. Firstly, the learned senior counsel would contend that inasmuch as the petitioners and Sri M. Kalaivanan, Acting Chairman, Chennai Port Trust, at the relevant period were implicated in a criminal case in C.C No. 16 of 1999, even as early as on 2 November, 1999 when the chargesheet was filed, the first respondent has resorted to pass the impugned orders of suspension only against these petitioners and that too only on 24 October, 2000. Therefore, the order of the first respondent in placing the petitioners under suspension cannot be sustained on the ground that selective suspension of placing some of the officers involved in the case and leaving other officers without there being an order of suspension against them. Such orders of selective suspension is bad. In support of the said submission, the learned senior counsel relied upon a judgment of the Supreme Court reported in K. Sukdhendar Reddy v. State of Andhra Pradesh [1999 (4) L.L.N 647].

8. Secondly, the learned senior counsel would contend that in this case, the authority to place the petitioners under suspension is the appointing authority. In so far as the petitioners are concerned, they are the employees covered under Cl. (a) of Sub-sec. (1) of S. 24 of the Major Port Trust Act, 1963. In that event the petitioners cannot be placed under suspension without the approval of the second respondent. In the present case, the orders of suspension has been made at the directions of the second respondent itself without there being any recommendation by the Board and the statutory authority acting on the instruction of higher authorities is bad inasmuch as the appointing authority has not applied his mind and recommended the suspension of the petitioners to the second respondent. For the said purpose, the learned senior counsel would rely upon a judgment of this Court reported in V.V Shunmugha Nadar and Brothers v. Joint Chief/Controller of Imports and Exports, Madras [(1963) 76 L.W 76], and the judgment of the Apex Court reported in Anirudhsinhji Karansinhji Jadela v. State of Gujarat [(1995) 5 SCC 302]. The learned senior counsel would further rely upon a Division Bench judgment of this Court reported in Jawahar College Staff Association, 180-A. Block-6, Neyveli by its Secretary v. Secretary, Jawahar Science College, Block 14 Neyveli-3 [1994 W.L.R 84], to stress the difference between the word “approval” and “permission”. According to the learned senior counsel “approvar holds good until disapproved. In other case, it does not become effective until “permission” is granted. Therefore, the learned senior counsel would contend that the approval granted by the second respondent cannot be held to be valid so long as there is no proposal mooted out by the first respondent.

9. Thirdly, the learned senior counsel would contend that the impugned orders of suspension, made by the first respondent in exercise of the powers conferred under regulations 7(1)(b) and 7(1)(c) of the Regulations cannot co-exist inasmuch the powers conferred on the first respondent to place the officers under suspension, regulation 7(1)(b) relates to “if were any disciplinary proceedings against the officer is contemplated or is pending”. On the other hand, the said power conferred on the first respondent to place an officer under suspension under regulation 7(1)(c) relates to “where a case against an officer in respect of any criminal offences under investigation or trial”. The learned senior counsel would contend that admittedly the orders of suspension relying upon both regulations 7(1)(b) and 7(1)(c) cannot co-exist and therefore the orders of suspension are liable to be set aside.

10. Finally, the learned senior counsel would contend that there is no rule in the Port Trust to continue the order of suspension after the retirement of the employee who was placed under suspension as contained under rule 56 of the Fundamental Rules applicable to the Government servants. The petitioner in W.P No. 18507 of 2000 and the petitioner in W.P No. 18512 of 2000 are already retired and therefore the continuance of suspension is bad. In this connection, the learned senior counsel would rely upon a judgment of this Court reported in N.M Somasundaram v. Director General of Police, Government Estate, Madras, [1997 (2) L.L.N 349], and the judgment of the Apex Court reported in State of West Bengal v. Nripendra Nath Bagchi [A.I.R 1966 S.C 447].

11. Per contra, Sri A.L Somayaji, learned senior counsel appearing for the first respondent, would contend that the petitioners were the members of the tender committee constituted to evaluate the tenders. Only on their recommendations the Board accepted the proposals and the same was forwarded to the second respondent for approval. Even though a criminal case was registered against the petitioners as well as the then Acting Chairman who was implicated as the 1st accused, the Acting Chairman was alone suspended as early as on 23 September, 1996 and there was no decision taken by the Board. The said order of suspension was taken invoking rule 3(3) of All India Service (Discipline and Service) Rules, 1969. However, the said order of suspension was set aside by a Division Bench of this Court in W.P No. 13 82 of 1998 in order, dated 17 March, 1999. The authority competent to place the first accused namely the Acting Chairman under suspension vests with the second respondent since he being an I.A.S officer. The first respondent has no say in the order of suspension in so far as the first accused is concerned. However, the Board did not resort to place the petitioners, who were also implicated in the criminal case to place, under suspension at that time. However, when the chargesheet was filed on 2 November, 1999, the matter was considered by the Port Trust on 14 November, 1999 and the proposal was forwarded to the second respondent for placing the officers under suspension. The said proposal was considered by the second respondent and the Joint Secretary to the Government of India, Ministry of Surface Transport in his letter, dated 20 April, 2000, informed the first respondent Port Trust that:

“it has been decided in consultation with the C.B.I not to place the petitioners under suspension as the main accused has been reinstated into service.”

However, when the second respondent reconsidered the question of placing the petitioners under suspension on re-examination and on reconsideration, decided that the petitioners be placed under suspension in terms of regulation 7(1) (b) read with regulation 7(2) and proviso thereto of the Regulations. The said decision was communicated in the letter, dated 6 October, 2000, to the 1 st respondent with further direction to take action in terms of seeking approval of the second respondent under proviso to regulation 7(2) of the Regulations. Accordingly, on 10 October, 2000 the first respondent requested the approval of the second respondent to place the petitioners under suspension under regulation 7(2) of the Regulations. In response to the said request by the orders, dated 20 October, 2000, was passed and the same was communicated by letter, dated 19 October, 2000. However, the first respondent in his letter, dated 20 October, 2000, sought for a revised draft order for placing of officers under suspension and also the approval under, regulation 7(2) of the Regulations. By order, dated 20 October, 2000, while withdrawing the earlier letter, dated 19 October, 2000, the Joint Secretary and Chief Vigilance Officer, Ministry of Surface Transport, Government of India communicated the approval of the second respondent to place the officers under suspension enclosing a draft suspension order. Based upon the draft suspension order, the impugned orders of suspension, dated 24 October, 2000, were issued to the respective petitioners by the first respondent.

12. The learned senior counsel for the first respondent based upon the above factual position would submit that the contention of the learned senior counsel for the petitioners that the impugned orders of suspension are hit by the principles of selective suspension is not correct. Admittedly, in the charge-sheet only seven persons were implicated. Out of the seven persons, the first accused was then Acting Chairman, an I.A.S Officer. He was placed under suspension on 23 September, 1996 even before the chargesheet was filed on 2 November, 1999 invoking rule 3(3) of All India Service (Discipline and Service) Rules, 1969. However, the said order of suspension was set aside by a Division Bench of this Court. Out of the remaining six accused, all the three petitioners who were cited as accused 2 to 4 were alone the officers of the first respondent Port Trust. The remaining three accused are the Senior Vice-President of Pat-Volk, Ltd., Chennai, Regional Representative of M/s. X-Press Container Lines, Chennai, and M/s. X-Press Container Lines, Chennai, represented by Sri S.B Rao namely the sixth accused. They are all not the officers of the Port Trust and therefore there is no question of placing these three persons under suspension at the instance of the first respondent since the three petitioners are alone the officers of the first respondent-Port Trust, all the three petitioners were placed under suspension. Therefore, on the facts of this case, the principles of selective suspension is not applicable.

13. In so far as the second contention of the learned senior counsel for the petitioners, the learned senior counsel for the first respondent would contend that the competent authority to place the petitioners under suspension is the second respondent. Therefore, the impugned orders placing the petitioners under suspension passed by the First respondent on the directions of the second respondent cannot be in any way said to be in violation of any of the regulations.

14. In so far as the third contention of the learned senior counsel for the petitioners, the learned senior counsel for the 1st respondent would contend that the orders of suspension were made in exercise of powers under regulations 7(1)(b) and 7(1)(c) of the Regulations. Admittedly, the criminal cases are pending trial against the petitioners in C.C No. 16 of 1999 before the Special Judge, C.B.I cases, Chennai, and the disciplinary proceedings are also contemplated against the petitioners. In that view of the matter, placing the petitioners under suspension in exercising the powers cannot in any way be said that they are not co-existent and therefore the learned senior counsel submitted that the said contention of the learned senior counsel for the petitioners is also liable to be rejected.

15. In so far as the last contention of the learned senior counsel for the petitioners, the learned senior counsel for the first respondent would contend that in the writ petitions, the impugned order of suspension have been challenged only on the above grounds and whether to continue the suspension after the retirement in the absence of any rule for the said purpose cannot be considered and consequently the same cannot be a ground for setting aside the orders of suspension issued pursuant to the directions of the competent authority. Therefore, for all the above reasons, the learned senior counsel submitted that the writ petitions are liable to be rejected.

16. Sri N. Kannadasan, learned standing counsel appearing for the second respondent contended that inasmuch as the second respondent is the competent authority to accord approval for placing the petitions under suspension by virtue of the proviso to regulation 7 of the Regulations, there is no illegality in directing the first respondent to place the petitioners under suspension in View of the fact that all the petitioners had been implicated in a criminal case and chargesheet has also been filed against them. Further, the learned standing counsel contended that factually the first respondent sent his proposal for approval of the second respondent for placing the petitioners under suspension in letter, dated 10 October, 2000. Only on the basis of the said proposal, the direction was issued by the second respondent in the letter, dated 20 October, 2000. Therefore, the contention of the learned senior counsel for the petitioners that the first respondent has acted only on the directions of the second respondent is not correct. Therefore, the learned standing counsel for the second respondent submitted that the contention of the learned senior counsel for the petitioners in challenging the impugned orders of suspension are liable to be rejected.

17. Coming to the first contention of the learned senior counsel for the petitioners, it is to be noted that in the chargesheet filed on 2 November, 1999 before the Special Court, C.B.I Cases, Chennai, seven accused were implicated. Out of the seven accused, only 1 to 4 are the officers of the first respondent Port Trust. Admittedly, the first respondent who being an I.A.S officer was placed under suspension by competent authority by virtue of the powers conferred under rule 3(3) of the All India Service (Discipline and Service) Rules, 1969. However, the said order of suspension was set aside by the Division Bench of this Court. By the impugned orders of suspension, all the remaining three officers have been placed under suspension. Therefore, it cannot be called as selective suspension as contended by the learned senior counsel for the petitioners when factually all me three petitioners who were the members of the evaluation committee and on whose recommendations only the proposal were approved by the Chairman and the Board have been placed under suspension only after chargesheet was filed against them on 2 November, 1999. Therefore, the judgment relied upon by the learned senior counsel for the petitioners reported in K. Sukdhendar Reddy v. State of Andhra Pradesh [1999 (4) L.L.N 647] (vide supra), holding that the selective suspension is bad is not applicable to the facts of the present case. Accordingly, I reject the said submission of the learned senior counsel for the petitioners.

18. In so far as the second submission of the learned senior counsel for the petitioners, it is to be seen that the competent authority to place the officers under suspension is the second respondent. For convenience, regulations 5 and 7 of the Regulations are extracted as follows:

“5. Appointing authority.— (1) The power to make appointments to Class I posts other than those covered by Cl. (a) of Sub-sec. (i) of S. 24 of the Act shall be exercised by the Chairman.

(2) The power to make appointments to Class II posts shall be exercised by the Deputy Chairman.

(3) The power to make appointments to Classes III and IV posts shall be exercised by the Head of the Department concerned.

7. Suspension.— (1) An employee may be placed under suspension:

(a) Where in the opinion of the Chairman, he has engaged himself in activities prejudicial to the interest of the security of the State; or

(b) where a disciplinary proceedings against him is contemplated or is pending; or

(c) where a case against him in respect of any criminal offence is under investigation or trial.

(2) The order of suspension shall be made:

(a) in the case of an employee referred to in Cl. (a) of Sub-sec. (1) of S. 24 of the Act by the Chairman; and

(b) in the case of any other employee by the appointing authority;

Provided that no such order relating to an employee referred to in Cl. (a) of Sub-sec. (1) of S. 24 of the Act shall have effect until it is approved by the Central Government.”

19. A reading of the said Regulations would clearly indicate that the Chairman of the Port Trust is the appointing authority in so far as the Class I posts other than those covered by Cl. (a) of Sub-sec. (i) of S. 24 of the Act. Admittedly, even as per the averments made in the affidavits filed in support of the writ petitions, the petitioners are the employees covered under Cl. (a) of Sub-sec. (i) of S. 24 of Major Port Trust Act, 1963. In so far as the officers governed under Cl. (a) of Sub-sec. (i) of S. 24 they can be placed under suspension by the Chairman as per proviso to regulation 7. However, such orders of suspension shall have the effect only after the approval by the second respondent. Therefore, the competent authority to either approve or refuse to approve any order of suspension is the second respondent. The grievance of the petitioners are that when such power has not been exercised by the first respondent in recommending their case for suspension, the second respondent cannot suo motu direct the first respondent to place the petitioners under suspension. This contention of the petitioners has no legs to stand inasmuch as the second respondent is the competent authority to approve the order of suspension. Of course, in an earlier occasion the second respondent had decided not to place the petitioners under suspension in view of the fact that the 1st accused in the ease namely the Acting Chairman who was placed under suspension was reinstated by virtue of the orders of the Court. That does not mean that the competent authority cannot reconsider the said decision and decide to place the petitioners under suspension. It is well-settled principle in law that an authority who has the power to take a decision, has equally the power to review the said decision also. The competent authority has after reconsidering the matter and in view of the fact that the petitioners who were the members of the evaluation committee were alone responsible for the recommendations and especially they were also when implicated in the criminal case by C.B.I have taken a decision to place the petitioners under suspension. In my considered view, the second respondent is empowered to reconsider its own decision when the second respondent is of the opinion that the petitioners shall be placed under suspension in view of the pendency of criminal case against them and such action cannot be in any way said to be bad in the eye of law. The judgments relied upon by the learned senior counsel for the petitioners to support his submission that the authority competent to place the petitioners under suspension namely the Chairman cannot act on the instruction of the higher authorities. In the judgment reported in V.V Shanmugha Nadar and Bros. v. Joint Chief Controller of Imports [(1963) 76 L.W 76] (vide supra), it has been held that the decision of judicial or quasi-judicial authority given under the direction of, or after consultation with some other person, even if that person be a superior authority, will be invalid as being in violation of the rules of natural justice. That was a case when the quasi-judicial authority was deciding an appeal, passed orders on the instruction of the higher authority. Therefore, the Court came to the conclusion that such an order was bad. Similarly, in the judgment reported in Anirudhsinhji Karansinhji Jadela v. State of Gujarat [(1995) 5 SCC 302], the Apex Court had an occasion to consider a case where the exercise of the powers by the competent authority under directions are in compliance with the instruction of some other person or authority amounts to failure to exercise the discretion altogether. That was also a case of the exercise of power by a statutory authority vested with jurisdiction passed orders on the instruction of the higher authority. In the judgment relied upon by the learned senior counsel for the petitioners reported in Jawahar College Staff Association v. Secretary Jawahar Science College [1994 W.L.R 84], a Division Bench of this Court considered the scope of Statute 27 of Chap. XXVI of the Laws of the University of Madras. According to the said statute,

“Appointments to the teaching staff of a college shall be made only after the Principal has been given an opportunity of expressing his views. All appointments shall be reported to the Syndicate which shall satisfy itself that they meet the requirements of the University.”

While considering the said statute, the Division Bench held that the appointments made by a private college will become effective as per the terms contained in the order of appointment, and in the event of those appointments are not approved by the Syndicate or University, they cease to be effective from the date, of they are disapproved. The Division Bench came to the conclusion that, all that the statute requires is that the appointments made shall be reported to the Syndicate and there is no question of prior approval before the appointments are made. However, in the present case, the orders of suspension can be passed by the first respondent but the same will not become effective until it is approved by the second respondent. Therefore, unless there is an approval by the second respondent, there cannot be a valid order of suspension. In that context, the powers of the Syndicate to satisfy itself as to the appointments by virtue of Statute 27 of Chap. XXVI of the Laws of the University of Madras cannot be in any way equated with the powers of the second respondent under proviso to regulation 7. Therefore, the ratio laid down in the Division Bench judgment reported in Jawahar College Staff Association v. The Secretary, Jawahar Science College (vide supra), is not applicable with the facts of the case and I do not agree with the submission of the learned senior counsel for the petitioners. In the present case, admittedly the approval of the orders of suspension shall be made by the Central Government namely the second respondent. Therefore, the second respondent cannot be in any way considered as an authority without any say in the matter since the orders of suspension will not be given effect to until the same is approved by the second respondent. Further, from the files produced by the 1st respondent, it is seen that the first respondent on 10 October, 2000 has addressed a requisition to the second respondent seeking for approval of the second respondent as required under Regulations. Based upon the said requisition only, the second respondent in the letter, dated 19 October, 2000, approved the said proposal to suspend the petitioners. However, the said letter was withdrawn on 20 October, 2000 and a revised letter was sent by the second respondent to the first respondent approving the suspension of the petitioners enclosing copy of the draft suspension order. However, the learned senior counsel for the petitioners would contend that the said letter, dated 10 October, 2000, cannot be in any way considered as a proposal for suspension of the petitioners inasmuch as the said proposal has been mooted out by the first respondent after the communication of the second respondent, dated 6 October, 2000, directing the first respondent to take action to seek approval of the second respondent under proviso to regulation 7(2) of the Regulations. Therefore, the learned senior counsel would contend that the authority competent to exercise the power of placing the petitioners under suspension cannot act on the directions of the second respondent without independently applying his mind. It is true that by letter, dated 6 October, 2000, the second respondent has directed the first respondent to seek approval under proviso to regulation 7(2) of the Regulations for placing the petitioners under suspension. The said direction was-considered by the first respondent and thereafter only a proposal has been mooted out by the first respondent in letter, dated 10 October, 2000. Merely because the proposal has been mooted out by the first respondent to place the petitioners under suspension on the directions of the approving authority in its letter, dated 6 October, 2000, the subsequent approval granted by the second respondent for placing the petitioners under suspension cannot be held to be invalid. Therefore, I do not find any illegality in the first respondent in passing the impugned orders of suspension against the petitioners on the directions of the second respondent who is the competent authority to approve any orders of suspension that may be passed by the first respondent. Therefore, the judgments relied upon by the learned senior counsel for the petitioners are not applicable to the facts of the present case. Accordingly, I do not find any merit in the said submissions.

20. The last submission of the learned senior counsel for the petitioners is that the two petitioners in W.P Nos. 18507 and 18512 of 2000, suspension orders issued in respect of them cannot continue in view of their retirement. In my considered view those matters are not the subject-matter in the writ petitions and the said submission would fall outside the scope of orders of suspension challenged in the impugned orders. Therefore, I do not find any merit in the said submission also.

21. Accordingly, I hold that the impugned orders of suspension are valid and cannot be set aside on the ground of selective suspension as alleged by the petitioners and there is no inconsistency in the impugned orders of suspension when the orders refer to both regulations 7(1)(b) and 7(1) (c) of the Regulations and the impugned orders passed by the first respondent at the directions of the second respondent cannot be also held to be bad on the ground that the first respondent had acted on the directions of the second respondent.

22. For the foregoing findings, I am unable to accept all the contentions raised on behalf of the petitioners and accordingly I reject the same. In view of my above findings, I do not find any grounds to interfere with the orders of suspension as there are no merits in the writ petitions. Accordingly, all the writ petitions are dismissed. No costs. Consequently, W.M.P Nos. 26775, 26779 and 26780 are also dismissed.

Petitions dismissed.