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Kuppusamy Gounder And Others v. Kannammal & Others
Judgment Summary
Factual and Procedural Background
The appellants were plaintiffs in O.S. No. 140 of 1984 (District Munsif's Court, Tindivanam) seeking declaration of title and permanent injunction in respect of property S. No. 4/1 (about 3.26 acres) at Meladayalam Village. The respondents (wife and son of Narayanasamy Gounder) were parties to a separate suit O.S. No. 154 of 1984 seeking declaration of title and injunction in respect of four items including S. No. 4/1.
Earlier, Narayanasamy Gounder (first defendant in O.S. No.140/1984) had filed O.S. No. 596 of 1979 for partition of a 1/3 share; that suit resulted in a decree. The plaintiffs in O.S. 140 alleged that a family partition had allotted properties to plaintiffs' father (Schedule A–D) and that Narayanasamy procured a collusive decree in O.S. 596/1979 without impleading the plaintiffs who were then of majority.
The trial Court (28.2.1991) decreed O.S. No. 140/1984 (plaintiffs' suit) and dismissed O.S. No. 154/1984 (first defendant's suit). The first defendant appealed; during appeal he died and his wife and son were brought on record as legal representatives (L.Rs.). The lower appellate Court (28.1.2000) allowed the appeals filed by the first defendant's successors, dismissed the plaintiffs' suit, and decreed the respondents' suit on multiple grounds (res judicata, lis pendens, insufficiency of partition proof, validity of customary divorce and legitimacy of the son). The appellants filed these second appeals against the lower appellate Court's judgment.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the decree in O.S. No. 596 of 1979 operates as res judicata against the appellants/plaintiffs in O.S. No. 140 of 1984.
- Whether the partition deed dated 22.2.1982 (Ex. A5) executed by the appellants is hit by lis pendens in view of the earlier decree and Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act.
- Whether there was a family partition between Narayanasamy and his brothers prior to O.S. No. 596 of 1979 (i.e., whether Exs. A1–A4 establish an earlier partition).
- Whether the respondents proved customary divorce of the first respondent's earlier marriage and the validity of her subsequent marriage to Narayanasamy (and consequently the legitimacy of the second respondent as heir).
- Whether the respondents had discharged the legal requirement to prove res judicata by producing pleadings/judgment of the earlier suit (and relatedly, the scope of proof necessary to invoke a bar under Order II Rule 2 CPC / Section 11 CPC).
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant's Arguments
- The decree in O.S. No. 596 of 1979 does not bind the appellants because the appellants (who were then majors) were not made parties; a decree against their father in his individual capacity does not bind other coparceners.
- Res judicata / lis pendens cannot be invoked merely by producing a final decree; the necessary ingredients (identity of parties, properties, issues) must be shown and pleadings/judgment from the earlier suit ought to be placed before the Court to establish identity of causes of action.
- There was a family partition among Natesa (father of plaintiffs) and his brothers prior to 1952; Exs. A1–A4 establish that partition and subsequent independent dealings; if partition was partial, law presumes total partition and burden shifts to respondents to prove partiality (relying on Kumarapaa Chetty v. Adaikkalam Chetty).
- The respondents failed to prove customary divorce (dissolution of the first respondent's earlier marriage) by acceptable evidence; the first respondent's sole testimony is insufficient to prove customary dissolution in caste Panchayat, and Section 29 of the Hindu Marriage Act requires the custom to have the force of law and to be properly proved.
Respondents' Arguments
- The partition decree in O.S. No. 596 of 1979 binds the plaintiffs because Natesa Gounder (plaintiffs' father) participated in the final decree as Karta of the family; individual coparceners need not be made parties. The plaintiffs were aware of that suit, and they neither pleaded fraud nor produced evidence to impeach the decree (relying on Amrit v. Sudesh).
- The partition registered on 22.2.1982 by the plaintiffs is hit by lis pendens (Section 52, Transfer of Property Act) because the final decree in the earlier suit was passed on 20.12.1982 (respondents relied on dates and the doctrine of lis pendens).
- The respondents proved through documents (a settlement deed and a will) and through witnesses that the first respondent was the legal wife of the deceased Narayanasamy and that the second respondent is his legitimate son; custom of divorce and marriage were proved by P.W.3 and P.W.4 and continuous living was admitted in deposition.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Kumarapaa Chetty v. Adaikkalam Chetty (I.L.R. IV Mad. 483) | Presumption that where a partition has taken place it is presumed to be complete; burden lies on the party alleging partial partition to show exclusion of particular property. | The Court applied this principle to hold that if the first defendant asserted a partial partition, the presumption favors appellants and the burden shifts to the defendant to prove partiality; this supported the trial Court's view that documents and admissions indicated partition/allotment. |
| Amrit v. Sudesh (A.I.R. 1970 S.C. 5) | The principle that where a Karta is a party to litigation the decree may bind other coparceners; used to argue that plaintiffs were represented by their Karta. | The respondents relied on this authority to contend the earlier decree bound the appellants. The Court noted the reliance but found that necessary pleadings and judgment from the earlier suit were not placed to invoke res judicata. |
| Subba Rao v. Subba Rao (A.I.R. 1936 Madras 689) | Requirements for establishing res judicata and the need for the party pleading it to establish ingredients. | The Court cited this case (along with Gurbux Singh) for the proposition that res judicata is a technical bar requiring proof of identity of causes and issues; used to conclude respondents failed to discharge burden by not producing pleadings/judgment of the earlier suit. |
| Gurbux Singh v. Bhooralal (A.I.R. 1964 S.C. 1810) | Clarification that to invoke the bar of res judicata (Order II Rule 2 CPC / Section 11 CPC), the precise cause of action in the earlier suit must be established and pleadings of the previous suit should be filed in evidence. | The Court relied on this authority to hold that simply producing the final decree (without pleadings/judgment) was insufficient to establish identity of causes of action; consequently res judicata was not proved by respondents. |
| Subbaraj v. Indirani (1999 (2) M.L.J. 579) | Principle that customary divorce must be proved by acceptable materials and that the custom which overrides statutory provisions must be clear, continuous and have the force of law. | The appellants cited this case; the Court considered it but distinguished the facts, finding that in the present case the evidence of P.Ws 1, 3 & 4 established the existence of the custom and the divorce in a caste Panchayat. |
| Chinnammal v. Elumali (2000 (III) C.T.C. 214) | Distinction between proof of marriage and validity of marriage where an earlier marriage subsists; mere proof of cohabitation does not validate a subsequent marriage if an earlier marriage subsists. | The Court acknowledged the proposition but found the decision factually distinguishable; here the Court accepted evidence of customary dissolution and subsequent valid marriage form ("Nadu Veetu Thali"). |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court reviewed the pleadings, evidence and documents (notably Exs. A1–A4, A5, A6–A13 and Ex. A4 recitals) and the findings of both the trial and lower appellate Courts. The analysis proceeded in sequential steps:
- On the existence of an earlier family partition: The Court examined Exs. A1–A4 and oral admissions (including D.W.1's cross-examination), and found that those documents and admissions indicated that the father (Natesa), Narayanasamy and Ramachandran had been dealing independently with properties allotted to them. The first defendant's stand was inconsistent (he admitted some allotments and possession by Natesa). Applying the presumption from Kumarapaa Chetty, the Court held that if the defendant alleged a partial partition, the presumption is in favor of a total partition and the burden shifts to the defendant to prove otherwise.
- On the plea of res judicata arising from O.S. No. 596 of 1979: The Court emphasized authorities (Subba Rao; Gurbux Singh) that a plea of res judicata is a technical bar and requires satisfactory proof—specifically the pleadings and judgment of the earlier suit to establish identity of causes and issues. The respondents had produced only the final decree; they did not place pleadings, issues or judgment of O.S. 596/1979 in evidence. Given this absence and the plaintiffs' specific plea that the earlier decree was collusive and procured by non-impleading of parties, the Court concluded res judicata had not been established. Thus the trial Court was correct in rejecting the res judicata bar.
- On lis pendens under Section 52 T.P. Act: Because res judicata was not established (and therefore the earlier decree could not be treated as binding), the partition deed dated 22.2.1982 (Ex. A5) executed by the appellants was not hit by lis pendens. The Court therefore found respondents' reliance on Section 52 unavailing.
- On legitimacy/validity of customary divorce and subsequent marriage: The Court reviewed the evidence of P.W.1, P.W.3 and P.W.4 who described the customary divorce before a caste Panchayat and the subsequent "Nadu Veetu Thali" marriage. The Court found the lower appellate Court's reliance on these witnesses justified; the local custom was found to be longstanding and the divorce and later marriage were satisfactorily proved on the evidence. The Court distinguished the authorities cited by appellants (which turned on absence of proof of custom) and held that, on the facts here, customary divorce and the subsequent marriage were established.
- Overall assessment of lower appellate Court findings: The Court held that, except for the lower appellate Court's finding recognising the respondents as legal heirs (which the Court upheld), the other findings (res judicata, lis pendens, insufficiency of prior partition proof) were erroneous. For reasons above, those findings were set aside and the trial Court's judgments were restored.
Holding and Implications
Holding: Second Appeals allowed; the trial Court judgments in both suits are restored.
Direct implications and consequences:
- The trial Court's decree in O.S. No. 140 of 1984 in favour of the appellants (declaration of title and permanent injunction in respect of the suit schedule properties) is restored.
- The trial Court's dismissal of O.S. No. 154 of 1984 (filed by Narayanasamy/the respondents' predecessor) is restored.
- The lower appellate Court's findings that the earlier decree operated as res judicata and that the partition deed of 22.2.1982 was hit by lis pendens are set aside.
- The Court upheld the lower appellate Court's specific finding that respondents 1 and 2 are the legally wedded wife and son of Narayanasamy Gounder and that bringing them on record as L.Rs. was legal.
- No costs were awarded and miscellaneous civil petitions (C.M.P. Nos. 13193 and 13645 of 2000) are closed.
Broader implications: The opinion does not announce or rely upon any new broad principle of law; it applies existing authorities on (i) the presumption as to partition, (ii) the proof required to invoke res judicata (identity of causes and need to place pleadings/judgment), and (iii) proof of customary divorce and subsequent marriage. The decision's principal effect is the restoration of the trial Court's decrees between the parties in this litigation.
End of summary based exclusively on the provided opinion.
JUDGEMENT
The appellants in these appeals are the plaintiffs in suit in O.S No. 140 of 1984 on the file of the District Munsifs Court, Tindivanam, seeking for declaration of their title to the suit schedule properties and for permanent injunction in S. No. 4/1 measuring about 3.26 acres at Meladayalam Village. The respondents 1 and 2 are the wife and son of one Narayanasamy Gounder, the first defendant in the above suit, who filed a separate suit in O.S No. 154 of 1984 on the file of the District Munsif's Court, Tindivanam, for declaration of his title to the suit properties and for permanent injunction against the appellants in respect of four items including S. No. 4/1.
2. The trial Court decreed the suit in O.S No. 140 of 1984 filed by the appellants and dismissed the suit in O.S No. 154 of 1984 filed deed dated 22.2.1982 The properties allotted to the plaintiffs 1 to 4 were described as Schedule A, B, C, D. The father of the plaintiffs had not retained any share in the suit property. Narayanasamy Gounder, the first defendant taking advantage of the difference of opinion between the plaintiffs and their father, filed a suit in O.S No. 596 of 1979 against their father and brother and obtained a collusive decree for partition of 1/3 share in the suit property. In that suit, though the plaintiffs attained majority at the time of the suit, were not impleaded. The father of the plaintiffs also was not arrayed as a Karta of the family. Taking advantage of the decree in O.S No. 596 of 1979, the defendants were denying the title of the plaintiffs and interfering with their peaceful possession and enjoyment. Hence, the suit for declaration of title and permanent injunction.
5. The case of the first defendant in his written statement in the suit and the plaint in O.S No. 154 of 1984 is as follows: —
The suit properties were the joint family properties of himself and his brothers Natesa Gounder and Ramachandra Gounder. There was no partition taken place as alleged by the plaintiffs. In the year 1979, on refusal of the father of the plaintiffs to partition for his 1/3 share, the first defendant was constrained to file O.S No. 596 of 1979 for a decree for partition in the suit properties. In the suit, the preliminary decree was passed on 26.2.1980 Ultimately, final decree also was passed on 20.12.1982 In pursuance of the final decree, he took possession of his 1/3 share. As such, he is in peaceful possession and enjoyment of the suit properties. In view of the decree in O.S No. 596 of 1979, the suit filed by the plaintiffs, is not maintainable, as the decree would operate as res judicata against the plaintiffs, since the plaintiffs' father who was a Karta of the family was a party to the decree.
6. On the above pleadings, both the suits were tried together and a common judgment was delivered by the trial Court on 28.2.1991 wherein the trial Court decreed the suit in O.S No. 140 of 1984 filed by the plaintiffs as prayed for and dismissed the first defendant's suit in O.S No. 154 of 1984.
7. The findings given by the trial Court are a follows:
1) The documentary evidence filed by the plaintiffs in O.S No. 140 of 1984 had established that there was a partition between the first defendant in O.S No. 140 of 1984 and his brothers even before the filing of the suit by the defendant in O.S No. 596 of 1979.
2) The decree in O.S No. 596 of 1979 would not operate as res judicata against the plaintiffs in O.S No. 1984 as they were not made as parties in spite of having attained majority.
3) The defendant in O.S No. 140 of 1984 was not in possession of the suit properties.
8. Aggrieved by the judgment and decree of the trial Court, the first defendant filed two appeals before the lower appellate Court. During the pendency of the appeals, the first defendant died. Therefore, the wife and son of the first defendant were brought on record as L.Rs of the deceased Narayanasamy Gounder. The lower appellate Court by allowing their application allowed them to prosecute the appeals with observation that their title or heirship would be considered and decided at the time of the final disposal of the main appeals.
9. Thereafter, the respondents 1 and 2 adduced evidence to show that they are the legal heirs of the deceased Narayansamy Gounder. On the side of the respondents, Exs. B6 to B9 were marked and Kannammal and Kabali, the respondents 1 and 2 and Kuppusamy Nadar and Govindasamy, the local villagers also were examined to prove the marriage between the deceased and the first respondent. On the side of the appellants. Elumalai, the second appellant was examined to prove that the said marriage was not valid, since her marriage with one other Natesa Gounder was subsisting and there was no customary divorce.
10. The lower appellate Court by its common judgment dated 28.1.2000 allowed the appeals thereby dismissing the suit filed by the appellants and decreed the respondents' suit on the following grounds:
1) The judgment and decree passed in the earlier suit filed by Narayanasamy in O.S No. 596 of 1979 against the appellants father Natesa Gounder for partition of his 1/3 share would operate as res judicata.
2) The partition between the appellants on 22.2.1982 is hit by lis pendens.
3) The plaintiffs' did not prove that there was a partition between Narayanasamy and his brothers even prior to the partition suit in O.S No. 596 of 1979.
4) The customary divorce pleaded by Kannammal, the wife of the deceased Narayanasamy Gounder has been proved. Hence, she is the legally wedded wife of Narayansamy and Kabali being the son of the said Kannammal is the legitimate son of Narayanasamy and as such, the are entitled to the suit properties as heirs of Narayanasamy.
11. Aggrieved by the judgment and decree of the lower appellate court, the appellants herein have filed the above second appeals.
12. Even at the time of admission, the counsel for both the parties agreed for posting the matter for final disposal. Accordingly, the matter was pasted for final disposal on a future date. The counsel for both the parties were heard at length.
13. Ms. N. Mala, the learned counsel for the appellants, while challenging the judgment and decree passed by the lower appellate Court reversing the judgment of the trial Court, would make the following contentions: —
1) The suit filed by the appellants is not barred by res judicata on the basis of the decree passed in O.S No. 596 of 1979, since the appellants who were the majors at that time were not made as parties and as such, any decree passed against the father of the plaintiffs in his individual capacity is not binding on the other coparceners. Furthermore, the mere filing of the final decree in the earlier suit is not sufficient to raise the plea of res judicata as the necessary ingredients, such as the identity of the parties, identity of the properties, identity of the issues, etc. have not been shown. Unless the pleadings and the judgment in the earlier suit have been marked in the trial court to establish the said ingredients, the question of res judicata would not arise. Consequently, the lis pendens which is an extension of the rule of res judicata would not apply to this case.
2) The family partition among Natesa Gounder, the father of the plaintiffs and two other brothers including the first defendant had taken place even before 1952. Suppressing the said fact, Narayanasamy Gounder filed a collusive suit in O.S No. 596 of 1979 and obtained an ex parte decree. Exs. A1 to A4 would show that partition took place between the brothers long prior to 1952 and subsequently, various sale documents have been executed by both the father of the plaintiffs and other brothers including the first defendant in respect of the properties allotted to them. This aspect also has been admitted by the first defendant while he was deposing before the Court. When that being so, the law would raise a presumption in favour of the appellants and the burden is on the respondents to show that the earlier partition was a partial one. The lower appellate Court has not considered the recitals of Exs. A1 to A4 by proper construction and interpretation.
3) The first respondent herein claimed to be the legally wedded wife of the deceased Narayanasamy Gounder and the second respondent was said to be son born to her through Narayanasamy Gounder under the wedlock. The appellants contested the said claim of the respondents on the ground that the first respondent was already married to one Natesa Gounder of Theparumpattu and her marriage with the said Natesa Gounder was not dissolved and therefore, the second marriage with Narayanasamy Gounder was illegal. The respondents 1 and 2 pleaded customary divorce. When such is the plea stating that the marriage was dissolved in caste Panchayat, the respondents ought to have proved the same by examining some persons who were party to the said Panchayat. The evidence of the first respondent alone would not prove her case of dissolution of marriage before the caste Panchayat. As far as the legal aspect of the customary dissolution of marriage is concerned, Section 29 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 lays down that there can be a customary dissolution of marriage, but the custom to override the express provision of the Act, should be such that it should have the force of law. In other words, the custom for proving dissolution of marriage as well as the customary form should be properly proved. In this case, there is no such proof. The finding by the lower appellate Court with regard to the proof of customary divorce is against law and not on the basis of the acceptable evidence.
14. In reply to the above submissions, Mr. Maninarayanan the learned counsel for the respondents would make the following contentions:
1) The suit filed by the plaintiffs is not maintainable, in view of the partition decree passed in O.S No. 596 of 1979. The said partition suit was filed by the first defendant against his two brothers, one of them is Natesa Gounder, the father of the plaintiffs and another is Ramachandran. Ramachandran was set ex parte in that suit. But, Natesa Gounder had participated in the final decree. As such, the plaintiffs were represented by their Karta. In such a suit, individual coparceners need not be made parties. Further, the plaintiffs were aware of the said suit. In the plaint itself, they made it clear that they were aware of the suit. Therefore, the said decree is binding on the appellants, especially when they did not plead fraud or collusion or let in evidence to prove the same. Consequently, the suit is hit by Section 11 C.P.C
2) The pleadings and the judgment in the earlier suit need not be marked before the trial Court, since the plaintiffs were aware of the prior suit as admitted by them in the plaint. The plaintiffs” father was a party to the final decree proceeding. Admittedly, the said decree was passed on 20.12.1982 In the meantime, the partition among the plaintiffs being the sons of Natesa Gounder was registered on 22.2.1982 Therefore, as per Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act, it is a lis pendens, which bars the transfer of property pending suit.
3) The respondents 1 and 2 have not only proved through the documents that they are the wife and son of the deceased but also they were so recognized by the deceased himself which is evident from the settlement deed and Will. The defendant and his wife continuously lived as husband and wife from 1965 to 1993. The fact of continuous living has been admitted by the second plaintiff himself in his deposition. Further, custom of divorce by examination of two independent witnesses, viz., P.W.3 and P.W.4 examined before the lower appellate Court. They are aged and qualified enough to speak about custom. Therefore, the finding given by the lower appellate Court is perfectly justified. Consequently, the appeal are liable to be dismissed.
15. I have heard the counsel for the parties, perused the records and given my thoughtful consideration to various aspects pointed out by the counsel for the respective parties.
16. According to the appellants/plaintiffs, the suit properties were allotted to the father of the plaintiffs in the family partition took place long back and the final decree passed in the suit for partition filed by Narayanasamy Gounder would not bind them as they were made as parties and therefore, the question of res judicata and lis pendens would not arise.
17. The learned counsel for the respondents on the other hand would contend that there is no acceptable oral or documentary evidence to prove that there was a partition between Narayanasamy and his brothers even prior to the partition suit filed by Narayanasamy Gounder.
18. This argument is on the basis of the finding given by the lower appellate Court. The lower appellate Court would mainly hold that one of the documents, namely Ex. A4 would show that the properties mentioned in the said document were undivided properties. It is true that it is mentioned as . But, it is to be noticed that all the boundaries are mentioned in the said deed.
19. It may be true that Exs. A1 to A4 would not relate to the details of the partition took place earlier. But, the fact remains that Exs. A1 to A4 would show that Natesa Gounder the father of the plaintiffs, Narayanasamy Gounder, first defendant and Ramachandran Gounder were dealing with the properties, which were allotted to them, independently. The evidence of D.W.1 Narayanasamy Gounder would show that he admitted that the properties in the Jambothi village were allotted to him in the partition and further admitted that his joint family had properties not only in Mel Edayalam village where the suit properties situate, but also in Jambothi village.
20. According to the plaintiffs, there was a family partition long years back. On the other hand, it is the case of the first defendant that there was no family partition earlier. But, while he was confronted with Exs. A1 to A4 in the cross-examination, he stated that the partition was partial and Jambothi lands which were allotted to him also were the joint family properties. The stand of the first defendant as is evident from the cross-examination is not consistent.
21. If it is the case of the first defendant that it was a partial partition, it is settled law, as laid down in Kumarapaa Chetty v. Adaikkalam Chetty (I.L.R IV Mad. 483), that it would raise the presumption that there was a total partition of the entire joint family properties and the burden, therefore, shifts on the defendant to show that earlier partition was only a partial one. The relevant observation is as follows:
“Where a partition has taken place the presumption is that it was a complete partition and the burden lies upon him who alleges that a certain property was excluded from the partition to show that it was a partial partition.”
22. But, the case of the first defendant in the written statement and the finding of the lower appellate Court is that there was no partition at all in the family prior to the suit filed by the first defendant in O.S No. 596 of 1997.
23. Regarding the family partition, the trial Court considered Ex. A1, the sale deed executed by Narayanasamy Gounder in favour of one Ponnusamy on 3.10.1970 in respect of the suit properties, Ex. A2, the sale deed executed by Natesa Gounder in favour of Narayanasamy Gounder on 15.11.1954, Ex. A3, the sale deed executed by Narayanasamy Gounder in favour of Natesa Gounder in respect of suit properties on 9.12.1947 and Ex. A4, the sale deed executed by Ramachandra Gounder in respect of the suit properties in favour of Natesa Gounder and also the evidence of P.W.1 Elumalai, the second plaintiff and one Adimoolam who stated that there was a partition among the three brothers and the suit properties were enjoyed by the father of the plaintiffs and the plaintiffs.
24. The trial Court also considered the other documents, namely Exs. A6 to A13, which were filed to show that the patta was issued in favour of Natesa Gounder and kist receipts had been obtained in the name of P.W.1 the second plaintiff. As pointed out by the trial Court, the documents such as kist receipts produced by the first defendant before the Court would relate to the period subsequent to the filing of the suit.
25. Under those circumstances, the finding of the lower appellate Court, which is only on the basis of some portion of the recitals found in Ex. A4, is not proper.
26. Furthermore, D.W 1 himself would state that the properties were under the possession of Natesa Gounder from the beginning and when the partition was denied, he had to file a suit for partition.
27. The next aspect is regarding the effect of partition decree passed by the Civil Court in the suit filed by the first defendant in O.S No. 596 of 1979”. Admittedly, the plaintiffs were not the parties in the said suit. In the said suit filed by Narayanasamy Gounder, Natesa Gounder and Ramachandra Gounder alone were made as parties. On that score, it is contended that the decree is not binding on the plaintiffs/appellants.
28. On the other hand, it is contended by the counsel for the respondents, as laid down by the Supreme Court in Amrit v. Sudesh (A.I.R 1970 S.C 5), that Natesa Gounder was made a party defendant as a Karta of the family and though the cause title in the suit does not disclose that he was a Karta, the decree or finding given in the suit is binding on the plaintiffs, the other coparceners. On the basis of the said principle, the learned counsel for the respondents would submit that the present suit is barred by the principle of res judicata.
29. In reply to the said submission, it is stated that it is the specific case of the plaintiffs that the decree obtained by Narayanasamy Gounder was a collusive decree and the same was obtained by playing fraud on the plaintiffs by not impleading the plaintiffs in spite of their having attained majority and as such, it is not binding, even though they are the coparceners.
30. It is further contended that even assuming that the suit had been filed against Natesa Gounder as the Karta of the family, the mere filing of the final decree in the earlier suit would not be sufficient to raise the plea of res judicata.
31. This submission, in my view, has some force. In this suit, the only document filed to prove the earlier decree is the final decree. There are no other documents such as pleadings, judgment and other records to show the important ingredient so as to invoke the plea of res judicata.
32. As laid down in Subba Rao v. Subba Rao (A.I.R 1936 Madras 689) and Gurbux Singh v. Bhooralal (A.I.R 1964 S.C 1810), the party who pleads res judicata has establish three important ingredients, viz., (1) identity of the issues.
33. The relevant observation made by the Supreme Court in A.I.R 1964 S.C 1810 is this:
“From this analysis it would he seen that the defendant would have to establish primarily and to start with, the precise cause of action upon which the previous suit was filed, for unless there is identity between the cause of action on which earlier suit was filed and that on which the claim in the later suit is based there would be no scope for the application of the bar. No doubt, a relief which is sought in a plaint could ordinarily the traceable to a particular cause of action but this might by no means, be the universal rule. As the plea is a technical bar it has to be established satisfactorily and cannot be presumed merely on basis of inferential reasoning. It is for this reason that a plea of a bar under O. 2 R. 2. Civil Procedure Code can be established only if the defendant files in evidence the pleadings in the previous suit and thereby proves to the Court the identify of the causes of action in the two suits. The cause of action in the previous suit would be the facts, which the plaintiff had then alleged to support the right to the relief that he claimed. Without placing before the Court the plaint in which those facts were alleged, the defendant cannot invite the Court to speculate or infer by a process of deduction what those facts might be with reference to the reliefs which were then claimed.”
34. Admittedly, neither the pleadings in the previous suit regarding the identity of the cause of action nor the judgment rendered in the earlier suit filed by the first defendant had been placed. So, the trial Court was not able to see whether the issues that have to be decided are the same.
35. Furthermore, it is noticed, one of the defendants, viz.. Ramachandra Gounder was set ex parte. It is the case of the appellants/plaintiffs that there was a misunderstanding between the plaintiffs and their father Natesa Gounder and that was the reason why the suit for partition was filed and the same was not seriously contested by the said Natesa Gounder and ultimately, they obtained final decree.
36. When such a plea had been raised by the plaintiffs, it is all the more reason that the defendants had to place all the necessary documents such as pleadings, judgment and records to decide the said question. This aspect has not been correctly dealt with by the lower appellate Court.
37. So, in the absence of proof regarding the pleadings and issues in order to invoke the plea of res judicata, I am of the view that the trial Court is correct in holding that the defendant cannot be allowed to contend that the suit is barred on the plea of res judicata. Therefore, the finding by appellate Court with reference to the res judicata also is not legally valid and the contention urged by the counsel for the respondents in regard to the same is not tenable.
38. In view of the above conclusion, it would automatically reveal that Ex. A5, which is a partition deed executed by the appellants inter as dated 22.2.1982 is not hit by lis pendens, through the final decree was passed on 22.1.2.1982, in view of the fact that the earlier decree is not binding on the appellants. Therefore, the submission regarding Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act would not help the respondents.
39. Thirdly, while challenging thejudgment and decree of the lower appellate Court, the learned counsel for the appellants would submit that the respondents 1 and 2 who claimed to be wife and son of the first defendant Narayanasamy Gounder, have not proved that the marriage between the said Narayanasamy Gounder and the first respondent was valid and the second respondent was said to be the legitimate son born to her through Narayanasamy Gounder under the wedlock.
40. The learned counsel for the respondents would empthatically submit that the first respondent examined herself as P.W.1 in the application filed by her to bring the respondents 1 and 2 as L.Rs on record and would state in the chief examination itself that she was married to one Natesa Gounder of Themarumpattu and after some years, due to misunderstanding, the marriage was dissolved through the customary divorce and subsequently, the marriage was held with Narayanasamy Gounder in the “Nadu Veetu Thali” form and as such, the respondents 1 and 2 are competent enough to be legal representatives to prosecute the appeals filed before the lower appellate Court.
41. The learned counsel for the appellants would cite 1999 (2) M.L.J 579 (Subbaraj v. Indirani) to show that the customary divorce has to be proved by the acceptable materials in order to show that the custom which will have the force of law is clear, continuous and immemorial in time. She would also cite 2000 (III) C.T.C 214 (Chinnammal v. Elumali), in which it is held that mere proof of marriage will not validate the said marriage when the earlier marriage was subsisting.
42. There is no dispute in these propositions. As held in the later decision, there is a distinction between the proof of marriage and validity of marriage. The proof of marriage can be achieved, by direct evidence of the marriage ceremony or registration of marriage or by circumstantial evidence, one of the circumstance being long cohabitation and living together. But, a marriage which is questioned on the ground of being subsequent to and during the subsistence of an earlier marriage, could not, by any stretch of argument or imagination, be sanctified or validated by any length of cohabitation or living together.
43. Keeping in mind the above principles, if we look at the facts of the case, it is clear, in my view, that both the factors, namely divorce of the earlier marriage through custom and the second marriage in the form of “Nadu Veetu Thali” have been proved by adducing evidence by P.W.1, P.W.3 and P.W.4
44. The lower appellate Court would consider the evidence of not only the first defendant's wife P.W.1 but also P.W.3 and P.W.4 who speak about the divorce and the marriage between Narayanasamy Gounder and the first respondent in the “Nadu Veetu Thali” form and found that the said custom in the Gounders' caste was prevailing for long number of years and under the custom in a caste Panchayat, the marriage was divorced and thereafter, the divorce, the first respondent got married to the first defendant Narayanasamy Gounder.
45. On going through the evidence of P.Ws 1 to 4, it is clear that “Nadu Veetu Thali” marriage form would be conducted only for a widow or a divorcee. So, in that context, it cannot be contended that the customary divorce has not been proved, even though there are materials to show that marriage ceremony was solemnized between Narayanasamy Gounder and the first respondent Kannammal.
46. The decisions referred to above would not be applicable to the present facts of the case, since in those cases, the finding given by this Court is that there was no material to show that the custom was prevailing there and the same was proved. But, in this case, in my view, the evidence of P.Ws 1 to 4 clearly show that under the custom prevailing in the area for long number of years, the marriage was dissolved in a caste Panchayat and the same is spoken to by P.W.1 even in the chief examination and the form of marriage, namely, “Nadu Veetu Thali” form has been clearly spoken to by the other witnesses examined on her behalf.
47. Under those circumstances, I am of the view that the respondents 1 and 2 are the legally wedded wife and son of the said Narayanasamy Gound and as such, the finding of the lower appellate Court observing that they are legal heirs of the said Narayanasamy Gounder and the order bringing them on record as L. Rs. is legal.
48. So, except the above finding, the other findings rendered by the lower appellate Court, as noted above, are not justified and as such, the same are liable to be set aside and accordingly set aside. Consequently, the judgment and decree passed by the trial Court in both the suits are restored. Thus, the Second Appeals are allowed. No costs. Consequently, C.M.P Nos. 13193 and 13645 of 2000 are closed.
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