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A. Muthukumaraswamy v. A. Devaraj
Factual and Procedural Background
The petitioner-landlord sought eviction of the tenant-respondent from two ground-floor shops at No. 75, Harris Road, Madras-2, by an application under S. 10(3)(c) of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960, on the ground that the landlord required additional accommodation for a non-residential purpose. The landlord resides in the same premises; members of his family (his wife and daughter) run an English medium nursery school (Saraswathi Nursery School) in the premises and the landlord alleged the accommodation was insufficient and that the two shops occupied by the tenant were required for the benefit of his family members. Evidence showed the petitioner himself was not running the school; his wife and daughter were. The tenant denied the claim and refused to vacate despite notice.
The Rent Controller found the landlord's claim to be bona fide, concluded no hardship would be caused to the tenant (who could shift to his own two-storey building nearby) and directed eviction. On appeal, the Rent Control Appellate Authority reversed, holding that S. 10(3)(c) cannot be used to obtain additional accommodation for a business which the landlord is not himself carrying on. The landlord challenged the Appellate Authority's order through the present Civil Revision Petition to this Court.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether, in an eviction application under S. 10(3)(c) of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960, a landlord who occupies part of a building can seek eviction of a tenant in order to obtain additional accommodation for the purpose of expanding a commercial activity carried on by the landlord's dependents (e.g., wife or daughter), when the landlord himself is not carrying on that commercial activity.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant (Landlord)'s Arguments
- Counsel for the landlord (Mr. O.K. Nambiar) relied on Saraswathi v. Vadivelu Chettiar (1967-II M.L.J. 81; 80 L.W. 408) to contend that a commercial activity of a dependent of the landlord can be relied upon for purposes of eviction under the relevant statutory provision—i.e., that the landlord could obtain additional accommodation to enable the dependent’s commercial activity and thereby evict a tenant occupying that accommodation.
Respondent (Tenant)'s Arguments
- Counsel for the tenant (Mr. W.S. Venkataramanujulu) distinguished the cited authority, submitting that Saraswathi v. Vadivelu Chettiar was decided under S. 10(3)(a)(iii) of the Act (a different statutory provision) and not under S. 10(3)(c); thus it should not be applied to extend the scope of S. 10(3)(c) to cover businesses carried on by the landlord’s dependents.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Saraswathi v. Vadivelu Chettiar, 1967-II M.L.J. 81; 80 L.W. 408 | Interpreted the word “landlord” in S. 10(3)(a)(iii) (Act 18 of 1960) liberally to include dependants and took a liberal view that expansion of the word should not exclude dependants from the benefit of the provision. | The Court noted this case was relied upon by the landlord but observed that Saraswathi was decided under S. 10(3)(a)(iii) (not S. 10(3)(c)); the legislature later amended S.10(3)(a)(iii) to substitute “any member of his family,” which the Court regarded as legislative acceptance of that liberal interpretation for that particular subsection—but the Court declined to extend that rationale to S. 10(3)(c) where the legislature had not made a similar amendment. |
| Kangu v. Ahmed Unnissa Begum, 1965-1 M.L.J. 97; 76 L.W. 194 | Interpreted S. 7(3)(c) of the 1949 Act: the phrase “if he requires” should be understood broadly; need need not be personal to the landlord and may include needs of close relations who live with the landlord, considering dependency, social customs and usage. | The Court cited this decision for the proposition that prior courts had construed similar language broadly in earlier enactments; nonetheless, the present Court emphasized that the legislature did not carry such an expansion into S. 10(3)(c) of the 1960 Act and therefore refused to adopt that broad interpretation for S. 10(3)(c). |
| Kolandalvelu Chettlar v. Koolayana Chetttar, 1961-1 M.L.J. 184; 74 L.W. 164 | The Court had previously expanded the meaning of the word “landlord” based on norms and standards of Indian society to include certain dependants/relations for the purposes of the relevant provision. | The opinion refers to this decision as part of a line of authorities that took a liberal approach to the meaning of “landlord” in some contexts; the present Court noted these decisions but pointed out that the Legislature, in amending other subsections, did not amend S. 10(3)(c), implying a deliberate choice not to expand that subsection in the same manner. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court's analysis proceeded by tracing the legislative history and prior judicial interpretations of related provisions to determine the correct scope of S. 10(3)(c) of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act.
Key steps in the Court's reasoning:
- Legislative background: The Court noted that since enactment of the 1949 statute, the law has maintained a distinction between (a) provisions that allow a landlord who occupies only part of a building to seek additional accommodation in the same premises for residential purposes or for a business he is carrying on, and (b) provisions that allow a landlord to seek a building in the occupation of the tenant when the landlord is not in occupation of a non-residential/residential building of his own. This distinction has persisted through later enactments and amendments.
- Judicial precedents: The Court reviewed earlier cases (including Kangu, Kolandalvelu and Saraswathi) in which courts expanded the meaning of “landlord” in particular statutory contexts (for example, to include dependants or to interpret “if he requires” broadly). Those cases were acknowledged as having influenced legislative amendments to some subsections—most notably S. 10(3)(a)(iii) where the Legislature replaced “his son” with “any member of his family” in 1973 (Act 23 of 1973), reflecting acceptance of a broader construction in that context.
- Textual and purposive analysis of S. 10(3)(c): The Court quoted S. 10(3)(c) (equivalent to S. 7(3)(c) of the 1949 Act) which allows a landlord occupying only part of a building to apply for possession of the remaining part if he requires additional accommodation “for residential purposes or for purposes of a business which he is carrying on, as the case may be.” The Court emphasized that, unlike S. 10(3)(a)(iii), the language of S. 10(3)(c) remained unchanged and the Legislature did not amend this subsection to expand the term “landlord” or otherwise make it elastic.
- Legislative intent inferred from amendments elsewhere: Because the Legislature amended S. 10(3)(a)(iii) to expand the class of persons who could seek relief (substituting “any member of his family”), but left S. 10(3)(c) untouched despite multiple opportunities, the Court inferred a deliberate legislative choice not to widen S. 10(3)(c). The Court held that it would be improper to read into S. 10(3)(c) the same liberal expansion applied by courts to other subsections when the Legislature had consciously refrained from making that change in S. 10(3)(c).
- Application to the facts: Applying this interpretation, the Court concluded that S. 10(3)(c) permits a landlord to seek additional accommodation only for a business which the landlord himself is carrying on. Therefore the landlord could not rely on the nursery school, which was run by his wife and daughter and not by him, to obtain eviction under S. 10(3)(c).
- Result: Given that the appellant-landlord did not himself carry on the business for which additional accommodation was sought, the Court agreed with the Appellate Authority that the petition for eviction under S. 10(3)(c) was not maintainable.
Holding and Implications
Holding:
The Civil Revision Petition is dismissed.
Implications:
- Direct effect: The landlord's challenge to the Appellate Authority's reversal of the Rent Controller's eviction order fails; the Appellate Authority's determination that S. 10(3)(c) does not permit a landlord to seek additional accommodation for a business not carried on by the landlord himself is upheld.
- Practical consequence for the parties: The landlord cannot obtain eviction under S. 10(3)(c) on the ground that additional accommodation is needed to expand a business run by his wife and daughter (the nursery school), because the landlord himself was not carrying on that business. The earlier eviction order in favour of the landlord (made by the Rent Controller) is thus set aside by the Appellate Authority and that outcome stands.
- Costs: There will be no order as to costs.
- Precedential effect: The Court's decision rests on the interpretation of the statutory text and the Legislature's choices in amending other subsections; the opinion does not purport to establish a novel general principle beyond the statutory interpretation applied to S. 10(3)(c).
1. The landlord, who lost before the Rent Control Appellate Authority, in the matter of eviction of the tenant-respondent in an Application filed under S. 10(3)(c) of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960 on the ground that he needed additional accommodation, has come up to this court. The landlord's case is that the respondent is a tenant under the petitioner occupying two shops in the ground floor of premises No. 75, Harris Road, Madras-2, and Is carrying on a non-residential activity. The landlord is residing in the same premises with his family and the members of his family are running an English Medium School known as Saraswathi Nursery School in the same premises and the accommodation for running the said school is not sufficient for them and, therefore, he requires the two shops in the occupation of the tenant for the benefit of his family members. The petitioner would say that the respondent has constructed a two storey building in the same road and it would not be inconvenient for him to shift his spare parts shop to his new premises. As the tenant-respondent failed to vacate in spite of notice, and as the accommodation provided to the school run by the members of the family of the landlord is not sufficient, the present petition was filed for eviction of the tenant. The respondent-tenant denied the landlord's case and opposed the application. It is brought out in the evidence that the petitioner is not actually running the Nursery School, but it is being run by his wife and daughter. The Rent Controller found that the claim of the landlord was bona fide and that no hardship would be caused to the tenant by his vacating the premises, in as much as he could easily shift his business to his own building in the same road. He would not agree with the legal objection raised by the tenant that as the petitioner-landlord was not carrying on a non-residential activity in the premise, he is not entitled to additional accommodation in the same building under S. 10(3)(c) of the Act. The Rent Controller directed eviction. On appeal, the Appellate Authority reversed the same. The Appellate Court's view was that S. 10(3)(c) of the Act cannot enable a landlord to seek for additional accommodation for the purpose of a business which he is not carrying on. Relying upon the clear distinction made In the language used in S. 10(3)(c) of the Act, and S. 10(3)(a) the Appellate Authority held that the petition for eviction was not maintainable and be allowed the appeal. It is as against this, the present Civil Revision Petition hat been filed.
2. Mr. O.K. Nambiar, learned counsel for the landlord relied upon a decision of our Court in Saraswathi v. Vadlvelu Chettlar 1967-II-M.L.J. 81; 80 L.W. 408 and would urge that a commercial activity of a dependent of the landlord can also be taken advantage of for the purposes of eviction under S. 10(3)(c) of the Act for securing additional accommodation in the same premises resulting in the eviction of a tenant in charge of such accommodation. But, Mr. W.S. Venkataramanujulu, learned counsel for the tenant would distinguish the cited report on the ground that was a case decided under S. 10(3)(a)(iii) of the Act and not under S. 10(3)(c) of the Act. The question for consideration it, whether in an application for eviction under S. 10(3)(c) of the Act, the landlord can seek for eviction of the tenant in the same premises on the ground he wants additional accommodation of that portion occupied by the tenant for the purpose of expanding the commercial activity indulged in by his dependents.
3. Ever since the Act to regulate the letting of residential and non-residential buildings was passed by our State Legislature in order to prevent unreasonable eviction of tenants there from, there was a provision enabling the landlord to apply to the Controller for an order directing the tenant to put the landlord in possession of the building, if he is occupying only a part of a building whether residential or non-residential and request the Controller to direct the tenant occupying the whole or any portion of the reaming part of the building to put the landlord in possession thereof, if be requires additional accommodation for residential purposes or for purposes of a business which he is carrying on as the case may be. There was also contemporaneously another provision which would enable a landlord for a similar order for eviction, when he is not in occupation of a residential building of his own or a non-residential building belonging to him We shall consider those provisions in detail later. But the point is that ever since the Special Act to prevent unreasonable eviction of tenants was introduced in 1949, a distinction was maintained between the provisions whereby a landlord would ask for addition a accommodation from a tenant in the same premises, from the provision where under a landlord could ask for a building in the occupation of his tenant, if he is himself not occupying a building of his own whether residential or non-residential in the same city, town or village. This distinction which has been maintained throughout by the Legislature has to be borne in mind, not only to understand the significance of such a definite classification, but also in the matter of the invocation of those sections for directing the eviction of tenants. In the 1949 Act (Act 25 of 1949) S. 7(3)(a)(iii) enabled the landlord to seek for eviction of a non-residential building from his tenant, if the landlord did not occupy for purposes of a business which he was carrying on, a non-residential building in the city, town or village concerned which is his own or to the possession of which he is entitled. At some point of time later, the landlord under a similar provision under act 18 of 1960, could seek eviction, if the non residential building is required by him or by his son. Again, this provision was amended in 1973, which entitled the landlord under such circumstances to ask for the premises for his own occupation or for the benefit of any member of his family for the purpose of the business which he or any member of his family is carrying on. In the wake of those provisions, a decision rendered by our Court by Veeraswami, J. as he then was, was referred to by Mr. Nambiar before me in Kangu v. Ahmed Unnissa Begum 1965-1 M.L.J. 97; 76 L.W. 194. The learned Judge was dealing with the case of eviction under S. 7(3)(c) of the 1949 Act, That clause read;
“A Landlord who is occupying a part of a building, whether residential or non-residential, may notwithstanding anything contained in Cl. (a) apply to the Controller for an order directing any tenant occupying the whole or any portion of the remaining part of the building to put the landlord in possession thereof, if he requires additional accommodation for residential purposes or for the purposes of a business which he is carrying on, as the case may be”
Sub-Cl. (i) of Cl. (a) of sub-S. 3 of the S. 7 of the Act, 1949, pertained to the ground of requirement of the premises for owner's occupation under which a tenant in a residential building may be evicted there from provided the other conditions of the clause are satisfied After noting the distinction between the words used in both the above clauses and in particular, interpreting the expression “for his own occupation”, the learned Judge observed as follows:
“The words “if he requires” occurring in S. 7(3)(c) of the Madras Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1049, should be understood in the same liberal sense as the words “his own occupation” in S. 7(3)(a) of the Act have been understood What is meant by the words “his own occupation” or “if he requires” is that the requirement is not that of a stranger.” It is not necessary to attract these words that the need should be personal to the landlord. The need of close relations who happen to live with the landlord or landlady may well satisfy the words “his own occupation” or “if ha requires”. Dependency, social customs and habits, usage, practice of a particular community and like consideration may well be taken into account in determining whether the requirement of those words satisfied,”
In fact, be relied upon a similar decision of our Court in Kolandalvelu Chettlar v. Koolayana Chetttar 1961-1 M.L.J. 184; 74 L.W. 164. In Saraswathi v. Vadivelui Chettiar 1967-2 M.L.J. 81; 80 L.W. 408 this Court interpreted the word ‘landlord’ in S. 10(3)(a)(iii) of Act 18 of 1960, as a word, which cannot be treated as rigid or inelastic. By that time, the 1949 Act was amended and the provision of S. 10(3)(a)(iii) of Act 18 of 1960 enabled the landlord or his son to apply for relief and for eviction of the tenant, if either of them was not occupying for purposes of a business which he or his on is carrying on a non-residential building in the city, which is his own. The improvement, if such an expression could be used, is, the Legislature added the alternative expression landlord or his son in the Act of 1960 whereas in the Act of 1949, it left the entitlement only to the landlord. In Saraswathi v. Vadivelu Chettlar 1967-2 M.L.J. 81; 80 L.W. 408 this Court, having regard to the expansion of the word “landlord” took a liberal view of the matter and said: The mere addition of the word “son” after the word “landlord” in the Section and the explosion of the enumeration of other dependant or relatives cannot lead to the conclusion that the Legisature by necessary implication intended to exclude such dependants from obtaining the benefit of that provision. Here again, a reference was made to the decisions in Kolandaivelu Chettiar v. Koolavana Chettiar 1961-1 M.L.J. 184; 74 L.W. 164 and Kangu v. Ahmed Unnissa Begum 1965-1 M.L.J. 97; 76 L.W. 194. After the decision in Saraswati v. Vadielu Chettiar 1967-2 M.L.J. 81; 80 L.W. 408 the Section was amended in 1973 by Act 23 of 1973. There, is S. 10(3)(a)(iii) with which we are concerned, for the words, “his son”, the word “any member of his family” were substituted. Apparently, the legislature was taking note of the interpretation given by the courts on the expression “landlord” or “landlord or his son” which occurred in the Act of 1949 and in the Act of 1960. By 1973, therefore, in S. 10(3)(a)(iii), we have the provision whereby, in case it is a common non-residential building, if the landlord or any member of his family is not occupying for purposes of a business which he or any member of his family is carrying on in a non- residential building in he city, town or village concerned, which is his own, then he can apply for eviction of the tenant in the occupation of his building provided the other conditions in the section are satisfied. Whilst this is the position, the Legislature did not think it fit at all to make such a concurrent and simultaneous amendment to S. 7(3)(a) of the Act, 1949, or S. 10(3)(o) of the Act 1960, the language of the relevant section enabling the landlord to secure additional accommodation remained practically the same. At this stage, it is convenient to quote it for the purpose of ready reference: S. 10(3)(c) which is equal to S. 7(3)(c) of the 1949 Act reads as under:
“A landlord, who is occupying only a part of a building, whether residential, or non-residential, may, notwithstanding anything contained in clause (a), apply to the Controller for an order directing any tenant occupying the whole or any portion of the remaining part of the building to put the landlord in possession thereof if be requires additional accommodation for residential purposes or for purposes of a business which he is carrying on, as the case may be”.
If, therefore, the legislature maintained the text of this part of S. 10 of the new Act and S. 7 of the old Act without expanding the meaning of the word, “landlord” as they did to the same word appearing in S. 10(3)(a)(iii), then it should be assumed that the Legislature deliberately did not want to make the word ‘landlord’ in S. 10(3)(c) an elastic expression which could take into its fold not only the landlord but also by member of his family. It is no doubt true that in Kolandavelu Chettiar v. Koolayona Chettiar 1961-I M.L.J. 184; 74 L.W. 164 Kangu v. Ahmed Unnissa Begum 1963-I M.L.J. 87: 76 L.W. 194 and Saraswathi v. Vadielu Chettiar 1967-II M.L.J. 81; 80 L.W. 408 the court, on the basis of the norms and standards of an Indian Society, expanded the meaning of the word ‘landlord’ which was afterwards accepted by the Legislature as well. But, it cannot be said that when the Legislature did amend S. 10(3)(a)(iii), it was not aware of the need to expand the word “landlord” appearing in S. 10(3)(c); the Legislature twice had an opportunity to consider this aspect. They would only amend S. 10(3)(a)(iii) but would not touch upon the language of S. 10(3)(c). This deliberate avoidance on the part of the Legislature appears to be significant and therefore, it would not be within the compass of propriety, if the expression “landlord” appearing in S. 10(3)(c) should be liberally interpreted notwithstanding the deliberateness on the part of the Legislature not to make it elastic or not to expand it at all, though it had two such opportunities to do so.
4. If, therefore, under S. 10(3)(c), the landlord could seek for additional accommodation only for the purpose of a business which he is carrying on, then it would be difficult to accept Mr. O.K. Nambiar's argument that the landlord's wife's business or his daughter's business would also be covered by the expression “his business” in S. 10(3)(c) of the Act. The petitioner-landlord cannot, on the ground that the accommodation with the tenant is required for expanding a Nursery School conducted by his wife and daughter, ask for such accommodation under S. 10(3)(c) of the Act and seek for eviction of the tenant. The Order of the Appellate court is right.
5. The Civil revision petition is dismissed, but there will be no order as to costs.
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