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Subbiah Udayar v. Karuppiah Odayar Alias Pichai Odayar.
Factual and Procedural Background
This appeal arises under Section 51(1) of the Madras Act XXVI of 1948 concerning the apportionment of final compensation paid by the Government following the takeover of the inam Sholaganarvaya Village in Tanjore District. The dispute involves the appellant and the respondent, who are first cousins entitled jointly to a ten annas share out of the total twenty rupee shares of the village. The respondent's exclusive entitlement to a two anna share is undisputed; the controversy centers on the distribution of the remaining eight annas.
The eight annas share originated from property initially owned by one Salakshi, who created an usufructuary mortgage in 1908 and a simple mortgage in 1914 over the property in favor of the respondent's father. Both the respondent's and appellant's fathers, who were brothers, had rights in this mortgage property. A partition between the brothers in 1914 left the mortgage interest in common, with liabilities and debts shared proportionally. Subsequently, the equity of redemption was purchased by the respondent's father at a court auction, for the benefit of both brothers' families. However, no documents specify the exact shares each brother held in this equity of redemption.
In the absence of explicit evidence, the court applied the presumption of equal shares, supported by a 1947 partition decree (Ex. A.1) which recognized the fathers of the parties as entitled to moieties in the property. The Estates Abolition Tribunal had earlier apportioned shares based on the 1914 partition arrangement, a reasoning the court found unsatisfactory. The court concluded that the appellant and respondent should be presumed to hold equal halves of the eight annas share, resulting in a 0-4-0 share for the appellant and a 0-6-0 share for the respondent (including the respondent’s exclusive 0-2-0 share).
Procedurally, after the advance compensation was received, both parties filed separate applications claiming their shares. The Tribunal issued a common judgment awarding the respondent 0-8-6 share and the appellant 0-1-6 share. The appellant did not appeal against the respondent’s award, raising a question of res judicata which was contested in this appeal.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the appellant and respondent are entitled to equal shares in the eight annas portion of the compensation, given the lack of explicit evidence of their respective interests in the equity of redemption.
- Whether the appellant’s claim is barred by the principle of res judicata on account of not appealing against the Tribunal’s order in the respondent’s connected application.
Arguments of the Parties
Respondent's Arguments
- The respondent contended that the appellant’s claim is barred by res judicata because the appellant did not appeal against the Tribunal’s order in the respondent’s connected application (O.P. No. 331 of 1961) which granted the respondent an 0-8-6 share.
- Reliance was placed on the Supreme Court decision in Badri Narayan Singh v. Kamdeo Prasad Singh to support the res judicata plea.
Appellant's Arguments
- The appellant challenged the Tribunal’s common judgment in his own application (O.P. No. 322 of 1961) but did not appeal against the respondent’s application.
- The appellant objected to the respondent receiving more than a 0-6-0 share, asserting entitlement to a 0-4-0 share out of the 0-8-0 jointly owned share.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Badri Narayan Singh v. Kamdeo Prasad Singh | Res judicata operates when there are separate appeals from distinct decrees arising from the same proceeding; a finding in an unappealed decree may operate as res judicata. | The court considered this case but distinguished it, noting that when there is a single suit with multiple claims disposed of by a single judgment, res judicata does not apply to bar the appeal. |
| Narahari v. Sankar | Res judicata arises only when there are two suits; in a single suit with multiple decrees decided by the same judgment, separate appeals are not necessary and res judicata does not apply. | The court relied on this principle to hold that the separate applications filed under Section 42 of the Abolition Act should be treated as one proceeding and that res judicata does not bar the appellant’s appeal. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court first analyzed the origin and nature of the disputed eight annas share, noting the absence of explicit documents specifying the division of the equity of redemption purchased by the respondent's father. Applying the legal presumption that co-purchasers without evidence of unequal shares hold equal interests, the court held that the appellant and respondent should each be entitled to half of the eight annas share.
The court rejected the Estates Abolition Tribunal’s reasoning that relied on the 1914 partition arrangement for apportioning shares, as the equity of redemption arose only after that partition and its division must be determined independently.
Regarding the plea of res judicata, the court examined the procedural context where separate applications for compensation are common but consolidated for hearing and decided by a common judgment. The court distinguished the cited precedent and emphasized that these applications constitute a single proceeding. Therefore, the principle of res judicata does not apply to bar the appellant’s appeal despite no appeal being filed against the respondent’s application.
Holding and Implications
The appeal is allowed.
The court held that the appellant and the respondent are each entitled to half of the eight annas share, resulting in the respondent receiving a 0-6-0 share (including his exclusive 0-2-0 share) and the appellant a 0-4-0 share. The advance compensation must be distributed accordingly.
The court also ruled that the appellant’s claim is not barred by the principle of res judicata despite the absence of an appeal against the respondent’s connected application, considering the applications as part of a single proceeding under the Abolition Act.
No new precedent was set; the decision directly affects the distribution of compensation between the parties.
(Delivered by the Chief Justice).
This appeal which is filed under S. 51 (1) of the Madras Act XXVI of 1948 raises a question relating to apportionment of final compensation paid by the Government while taking over the inam Sholaganarvaya Village in Tanjore District. The contesting claimants are the appellant and the respondent. The village was enjoyed in shares which were represented in terms of currency of the total value of Rs. 20. The appellant and the respondent who were first cousins were entitled to ten annas share out of this 20 Rupee shares. It is not disputed that the respondent was exclusively entitled to a two anna share out of the ten annas share possessed by the family. The controversy is in regard to the distribution of the other eight annas share. In order to appreciate the dispute between the parties, it is first necessary to set out the origin of the acquisition of the 8 annas share by the family. That extent of property was originally owned by one Salakshi. On 1st December, 1908, he created an usufructuary mortgage of that pangu to the father of the respondent. That mortgage was followed in the year 1914 by a second simple mortgage over the same extent of property by Salakshi's son. It is not disputed that although the mortgage stood in the name of the respondent's father, he as will as the appellant's father who was his brother were entitled to shares therein. There was a partition between the brothers on 28th February, 1914. The arrangement is evidenced by Ex. B. 1. Under that document the brothers divided various items of properties. So far as the particular mortgage interest in the 8 annas share was concerned, it was decided to leave it in common. C schedule to the document contains that property. As part of the arrangement of partition the two brothers apportioned between themselves the liabilities of the family. They took them in certain proportions likewise, they shared the outstandings including the mortgage debts due by Salakshi and her sons. Sometime thereafter in execution of a simple money decree against the mortgagors the equity of redemption in the property was purchased by the respondent's father. It has now been found, and this has not been challenged before us, that the purchaser bought the property not merely for his own benefit but for that of his brother's family as well. Apart from the fact that the outstandings due to the family were divided in a particular manner, there is no indication in any document as to what shares each one of the brothers got in the equity of redemption which on purchase merged with the mortgage right previously owned. Where two persons purchase a property and there is nothing in the document or the surrounding circumstances to indicate the extent of interest that each one possessed, the presumption will normally be that they share the property equally. If that presumption were to be applied here the appellant and the respondent would each be entitled to a four annas share out of the 8 annas share. This presumption gets added strength when we refer to Ex. A.1, the partition decree passed by the District Munsif, Pattukottai, in O. S. No. 122 of 1947 dated 12th December 1947 amongst the various shares of the village. Paragraph 10 of this judgment states that defendants 20 and 64 (who are respectively the fathers of the respondent and the appellant before us) are cousins entitled to moieties. A 0-2-0 pangu to the 20th defendant is admitted. 8 annas pangu was originally othied in favour of the 20th defendant's father in 1908 by Visalakshi. This is transferred to the 14th defendant's father. In the interval this othi right is partitioned between the two cousins on 20th February 1914. Later on the equity of redemption is purchased by his family in O. S. No. 270 of 1921. So the defendants 20 and 64 own the equity of redemption in half and half in a 0-8-0 pangu. The 20th defendant sets up a subsequent arrangement with the 64th defendant which is not, however, admitted, The dispute between defendants 20 and 64 is left open and they are together allottted a 0-10-0 share which would include a 0-8-0 pangu being only the equity of redemption.
In the schedule attached to the judgment we find the allotment of the 0-10-0 share in favour of defendants 20 and 64 jointly. Later in the judgment there is a reference to the claim of the 64th defendant for a 0 40 share but there was no specific allotment in respect thereto. Although it can be said that there has been no adjudication by the Court in O.S No. 122 of 1947 as to the extent of the rights possessed by the two parties, that judgment is useful in that it contains as assertion of right on the part of the appellant that he was entitled to a 0-4-0 share out of the 0 8-0 share jointly owned. We have already referred to the presumption of law under which the appellant would be entitled to the 0-4-0 share. The Estates Abolition Tribunal unfortunately on a line of reasoning which is not very clear has proceeded to decide the issue between the parties on the basis and in proportion to the distribution of the outstandings between the parties under the partition arrangement of 1914. We are unable to see how that can form a safe basis for adjudication inter se of the rights between the parties; it was only subsequent to that partition that the two cousins became entitled to the equity of redemption in the 0-8-0 share by purchase at the Court auction. What share each of them possessed on the date of the purchase of the equity of redemption, has to be ascertained from other evidence; but such evidence is lacking in the case. Under the circumstances we can only proceed on the presumption that each one of the two cousins got a one half share. That will mean that the respondent will have a 0-6-0 share (he being admittedly entitled to an extra 0-2-0 share in his own right) and the appellant will have a 0-4-0 share. The advance compensation will have to be distributed accordingly.
But Mr. T. R. Venkataraman appearing for the respondent has raised the contention that the claim of the appellant before us is barred by res judicata inasmuch as he did not file any appeal against the order of the Tribunal in a connected matter. The facts relevant to this plea are these: After the advance compensation amount was received by the lower Court, the appellant filed O. P. No. 322 of 1961 claiming 0 4-0 share out of Rs. 20 share in the compensation for himself. The respondent too filed a similar application O. P. No. 331 of 1961. While the appellant made the respondent a party to his application, the respondent did not do so. But the appellant appears to have objected to the grant of anything more than 0-6-0 share to the respondent. The Tribunal gave a common judgment accepting the title of the respondent to 0-8-6 share and that of the appellant to 0-1-6 share. No appeal has been filed by the appellant against this order in O. P. No. 331 of 1961. The appellant has however challenged the correctness of the common order in O. P. No. 322 of 1961. It is argued that inasmuch as no appeal has been filed from the order in O. P. No. 331 of 1961 which granted the respondent 0-8-6 share in the compensation, this appeal should be held barred by res judicata. Support for that contention is sought in the decision of the Supreme Court in Badri Narayan Singh v. Kamdeo Prasad Singh(1). The case related to two appeals arising out of one proceeding before an Election Tribunal, the subject matter of the appeals being different. Separate decrees were drawn. There was one further appeal against the order in one appeal only. It was held that the finding in the unappealed decree would operate as res judicata. The Supreme Court in that very decision has recognised that when there is a single suit, the question of res judicata does not arise when merely because there are two decrees based on the same judgment. We may in this connection refer to an earlier decision of the Supreme Court reported in Narahari v. Sankar(2). In that case, there was a suit in which the plaintiff claimed 2/3rd share in an estate. The two defendants opposed his claim, contending that they were each entitled to one-third share. The plaintiff's claim was accepted by the trial Court. Each one of the defendants filed separate appeals which were heard together and disposed of by a common judgment. The plaintiff who lost in the appeal, preferred an appeal from one of the decrees only claiming at the same time relief in respect of the entire subject matter in dispute. The Supreme Court held that inasmuch as the dispute arose out of the same suit end the appeals had been disposed of by the same judgment it was not necessary to file two separate appeals. The learned Judges observed at page 758:
“The question of res Judicata arises only when there are two suits. Even when there are two suits it has been held that a decision given simultaneously cannot be a decision in the former suit. When there is only one suit the question of res Judicata does not arise at all and in the present both the decrees are in the same case and based on the same judgment and the matter decided concerns the entire suit. As such there is no question of the application of the principle of res judicata.”
We are of the opinion that in the present case the subject matter in dispute between the parties in substance can be regarded as forming one lis only. By virtue of the peculiar procedure obtaining in regard to applications filed under S. 42 of the Abolition Act, it has been the practice for each claimant to compensation money to file separate applications. More often than not, the contesting claimant does not figure as a party. He files his own application making his claim for the same amount. In such a case, the applications are consolidated for the purpose of hearing, and a common judgment is given. Both the applications must be regarded therefore as comprising a single controversy and they should be regarded as constituting a single proceeding, as the subject matter is the same. On the principle of the decision of the Supreme Court, to which we have made reference earlier, we consider that there is no question of the application of the principle of res judicata to such a case. This appeal has therefore to be and is allowed, but there will be no order as to costs.
V.C.S
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