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A. Govindaswami Vanniar v. Smt. S. Mahalakshmi Ammal And Others.

Madras High Court
Mar 29, 1963
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Factual and Procedural Background

This second appeal arises from a suit in ejectment brought by respondents 1 and 2, who are the owners of land containing certain coconut topes that are the subject matter of the litigation. The appellant defended the suit on the basis that he was in occupation as a lessee under yearly leases beginning in August 1955, with renewals each year and the last renewal running from 13 August 1958. The appellant asserted that he was a cultivating tenant entitled to protection against eviction under the provisions of Madras Act XXV of 1955.

The parties' rights were governed by written agreements (Ex. A.4 being typical). The document granted rights in respect of trees standing on five specified topes; it required the appellant to preserve the land and make it fit for cultivation in respect of three of the topes, and it included an undertaking by the appellant not to cultivate any other crop on the land. The schedule to the document described the grant as being in respect of trees such as coconuts, mangoes and jackfruits. The Tamil term used in the document—“Guthagai”—was noted as generally indicative of rent but sometimes used to indicate a fee payable under a licence.

Both the trial court and the first appellate court found that the appellant was not a cultivating tenant and upheld respondents' claim for eviction. This second appeal challenges those conclusions.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the document and arrangements between the parties constituted a lease (demise) of the land in favour of the appellant.
  2. If there was a lease, whether such lease was a lease for agricultural purposes, thereby making the appellant a "cultivating tenant" entitled to protection under Madras Act XXV of 1955.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

  • The appellant claimed continuous occupation as a lessee since August 1955 under yearly leases, last renewed from 13 August 1958.
  • The appellant claimed status as a cultivating tenant entitled to protection against eviction under Madras Act XXV of 1955.
  • The written agreement (Ex. A.4) and similar agreements, it was argued, governed the parties' rights; these documents contained terms concerning the trees and certain obligations of the appellant (e.g., to preserve the land and render it fit for cultivation for three topes).

Respondents' Arguments

  • Respondents contended that the document did not create a lease of the land but only rights in the trees (a usufruct or licence-like right) and therefore the appellant was not a cultivating tenant.
  • They further argued that even if a lease of the land were found, it would not be a lease for agricultural purposes because the coconut trees already existed when the lease was made; thus the lessee would only perform "subsequent operations" and not the essential "basic operations" that constitute agriculture, relying on the Supreme Court's decision in Commissioner of Income-tax v. Benoy Kumar Sahas Roy.
  • Mr. Ramamurthi Aiyar for the respondents specifically argued that because the trees pre-existed the lease, the appellant's expected or actual activities were limited to subsequent operations and therefore could not qualify as agricultural operations under the cited authorities.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Natesa Gramani (Defendant) v. Tangavelu Gramani (Plaintiff) Held that a document granting lease of palmyra trees was not a lease of immovable property and did not require registration. The decision was treated as a useful guide for construing the present document to show that a grant limited to trees may not effect a lease of the land.
Commissioner of Income-tax v. Yagappa Nadar Held that the petitioner obtained only a licence to top trees (no transfer of interest in land); income from toddy is agricultural only when received by the actual cultivator who produced the trees or did agricultural operations to raise them. The court referred to this decision when considering whether the right granted was an interest in land or merely a licence/usufruct and when addressing the question of agricultural income/operations for the second point.
P. Venugopala Pillai v. V. Thirunavukkarasu Held that a lease conferring right to enjoy toddy yield and to enter land for that purpose did not grant any right in the land; the lessee was a licencee as to the land and entry was limited to the yield's enjoyment. The court relied on this to support the distinction between a right to enjoy the trees' produce and a lease of the land itself, treating the appellant's rights as akin to a licence/usufruct.
Marshall v. Green Principle: if the purchaser is to derive benefit from further growth from the land (further vegetation), the contract is for an interest in land; if the thing sold is to be immediately withdrawn from the land, the land is merely a warehouse and the contract is for goods. The passage was cited as articulating the principle that distinguishes interests in land from contracts relating to the produce alone; used to analyze whether rights granted here meant a transfer of land.
Unreported: C.R.P. No. 696 of 1958 (Rajagopalan, J.) Held that a lease merely of the usufruct of coconut trees, without right to carry on horticultural or agricultural operations, does not make the lessee a "cultivating tenant" under Act XXV of 1955. Cited to support the proposition that usufruct-only grants may not attract tenant-protection under the Madras Act.
Muthuraja v. Rajarathinam (Anantanarayacan, J.) Expressed a different view: where a lease granted enjoyment of the usufruct of a cashewnut plantation, the lessee was regarded as a cultivating tenant (following Chacko, In re). Noted as representing a contrary view in the authorities; the court observed the divergence but did not adopt this view for the present facts.
Chacko, In re (Ramaswami, J.) Defined "agriculture" as the raising of valuable or useful products deriving nutriment and sustenance from the soil with the aid of human labour or skill. The definition informed the court's understanding of what constitutes agricultural activity though the court also later referred to more specific Supreme Court elaborations on basic and subsequent operations.
Commissioner of Income-tax v. Benoy Kumar Sahas Roy Supreme Court: "agriculture" comprises (1) basic operations (tilling, sowing, planting, etc.) and (2) subsequent operations (protecting, pruning, harvesting). If only subsequent operations exist (as in forest), there is no agriculture. Respondents relied on this decision to argue that a grant limited to tending pre-existing trees could not be an agricultural lease; the court considered and distinguished this authority.
Commissioner of Income-tax, Bihar and Orissa v. Sri Ramakrishna Deo Reiterated the principle that mere subsequent operations without basic operations do not constitute agricultural operations. Reinforced the respondents' argument drawn from Benoy Kumar Sahas Roy; the court treated these authorities as addressing forest/spontaneous growth situations rather than leases over planted crops where basic operations may have occurred earlier.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court began with the statutory definitions in Madras Act XXV of 1955: "cultivating tenant" means a person who carries on personal cultivation under a tenancy agreement (express or implied); "cultivation" means use of land for agriculture or horticulture; and "land" is defined as land used for agriculture or horticulture. Section 3 protects cultivating tenants against eviction except as provided in the Act.

From these definitions the court concluded that to obtain protection under the Act the appellant had to prove a transfer (demise) of the land to him under a tenancy agreement for agricultural purposes. The court noted that both lower courts had held the appellant was not a cultivating tenant.

The court analyzed the terms of the written agreement (Ex. A.4) and found several indicators that the instrument did not grant a lease of the land:

  • The document expressly granted rights only in respect of the trees; the preamble and schedule indicated the appellant's entitlement was to collect the produce from the trees.
  • A clause empowering the appellant to repair the land to render it useful for obtaining produce suggested a licence-like obligation rather than the grant of an interest in land; if a lease of the land had been intended, that clause would have been unnecessary.
  • The privilege to till the soil was confined to only three of the five topes, and there was an express undertaking by the appellant not to cultivate any other crop on the land—both points inconsistent with exclusive possession of land typical of a lease.
  • Taken together, the terms indicated a grant of usufruct in respect of trees, coupled with an implied licence to use the land to the limited extent necessary to obtain the trees' produce, rather than a demise of the land itself.

The court drew on the cited authorities (Natesa Gramani, P. Venugopala Pillai, Commissioner of Income-tax v. Yagappa Nadar and the Marshall v. Green principle) to distinguish between a transfer of an interest in immovable property and a transfer of the land. It accepted that the appellant's right to enjoy coconut yield might amount to an interest in immovable property in some contexts, but emphasized that an interest in the produce or usufruct of trees is not necessarily the same as a transfer of the land by way of lease.

On the secondary question—whether, assuming a lease of the land, the lease would be an agricultural lease—the court considered the Supreme Court authorities (Benoy Kumar Sahas Roy and Sri Ramakrishna Deo) on the distinction between "basic operations" (tilling, sowing, planting) and "subsequent operations" (tending, pruning, harvesting). The court rejected the respondents' submission that pre-existence of the trees necessarily meant only subsequent operations could be performed and therefore the lease could not be agricultural.

The court explained that it is not necessary for the same person to have performed the basic operations; an agricultural lease could exist where the land had been planted earlier by someone else and the lessee was to carry on operations (basic or subsequent) necessary to obtain produce. The Supreme Court decisions relied upon dealt with forest produce or spontaneous growth where no basic operations had ever occurred; that factual situation differs from land where trees were planted and basic operations had occurred at some earlier date.

The court therefore held that if a lease of the land had been established, it could be regarded as agricultural and the lessee would be a cultivating tenant. However, because on the facts the court found there had been no demise of the land (only a grant of usufruct/license-like rights in respect of the trees), the appellant was not a cultivating tenant entitled to protection under Act XXV of 1955.

Holding and Implications

HOLDING: The second appeal is dismissed. The court agreed with the lower courts that there was no lease (demise) of the land in favour of the appellant; rather, the document granted rights in respect of the trees (usufruct/ licence-like rights). Consequently, the appellant is not a "cultivating tenant" within the meaning of Madras Act XXV of 1955 and is not entitled to the statutory protection against eviction.

Implications:

  • Direct effect on the parties: The respondents' right to eject the appellant was upheld by the courts below and the dismissal of this second appeal confirms that outcome; the appellant does not obtain protection under the Madras Act.
  • On the larger legal questions, the court clarified that a lease can be agricultural even where the basic operations were performed earlier by someone else; however, because no lease of the land was found on the facts, that principle did not afford relief to the appellant in this case.
  • The opinion does not purport to establish any new legal precedent beyond its application of existing principles to the present facts; the decision resolves the dispute on the particular terms of the agreement and their legal character.

Costs were awarded against the appellant (the appeal was dismissed with costs).

V.C.S
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(Delivered by the Chief Justice).

This second appeal arises out of a suit in ejectment filed by respondents 1 and 2, the owners of the land containing certain coconut topes, which form the subject matter of the litigation. The appellant resisted the suit claiming that he was in occupation of the land as a lessee since August, 1955 under an yearly lease, the same having been renewed every year, the last of such renewals being for a year from 13th August, 1958, and that he being a cultivating tenant was entitled to protection against eviction by reason of the provisions of Madras Act XXV of 1955. The agreement governing the rights of the parties is in writing. Ex. A.4 is typical of the preceding agreements. That says in effect that the appellant had taken on lease for a year coconut trees standing on the five topes specified in the schedule to the document and that in respect of three of the topes the appellant should preserve the land and make fit for cultivation at his own expenses. The appellant further agreed that he would not cultivate any kind of crop on the land in the tope. The schedule to the document expressly stated that the lease was in respect of the trees standing on the properties, namely, coconuts, mangoes, jack fruits etc. The document is in Tamil and the word is “Guthagai” which is generally indicative of rent. But the term is also used sometimes to indicate fee payable under a licence.

The question for consideration is whether the appellant is a cultivating tenant entitled to the protection under Act XXV of 1955. The term “cultivating tenant” in relation to any land is defined under the Act as meaning a person who carries on personal cultivation on such land under a tenancy agreement, express or implied. “Cultivation” under the Act means use of lands for the purpose of agriculture or horticulture. “Land” is defined as land used for purposes of agriculture or horticulture. S. 3 of the Act declares that no cultivating tenant shall be evicted from his holding during the continuance of the Act except in accordance with the provisions contained therein.

It will be plain from the definitions to which we have made reference that before the appellant can claim the protection of the Act, he should satisfy the Court that there has been a transfer of property in his favour under a tenancy agreement for agricultural purposes. Both the Courts below have held that the appellant could not be held to be a cultivating tenant and upheld the claim of respondents 1 and 2 for eviction.

The substantial question that arises for consideration in this second appeal is whether there has been a lease of the land in favour of the appellant by respondents 1 and 2, and secondly, whether such a lease is for agricultural purposes. The document makes it clear that the right created under the document is only in respect of the trees. The preamble as well as the schedule indicate that the agreement entitled the appellant only to collect the produce from the trees. There is no doubt a clause in the agreement which says that the appellant would be entitled to repair the land so as to render it useful for obtaining the produce. However that would seem to imply that no interest in land was created for if such a right or interest was intended to be created under the document, there was no necessity for this clause at all. Further, it is significant that the privilege to till the soil is confined only to three of the five topes mentioned in the document. More significant than that is an undertaking on the part of the lessee not to cultivate any other crop on the land. These as well as the express terms in the tease stating that the trees above were granted would appear to show that what was granted was usufruct of the trees impliedly coupled with a licence to use the land.

In Natesa Gramani…(Defendant) v. Tangavelu Gramani…(Plaintiff) .*(1), a document stated that the lessee had.

“taken for lease for two years palmyra trees in a certain garden……that he would not cut the leaves of any of the trees except those whose leaves had to be cut out.”

It was held that it was not a lease of immoveable property and that the document containing the lease did not require registration. The decision, no doubt, turned on the definition of moveable property in the Registration Act which included juice in trees; but it is useful as a guide to the principle to be adopted in the construction of the document now in question.

In Commissioner of Incometax v. Yagappa Nadar(2), a question arose as to whether income derived from toddy, was agricultural income when it was received by the actual cultivator. On a construction of the document in that case it was held that no interest in the land had been transferred and what the petitioner obtained was a mere licence to top the trees and draw the juice. The learned Judges also held that the income derived from toddy would be agricultural income when it was received by the actual cultivator, whether owner or lessee of the land on which the trees grew. But if the income was received by a person who had not produced the trees from which toddy is tapped or had not done any agricultural operations whereby these trees had been raised, it would not be agricultural income. We will have to refer to this aspect of the, matter when we consider the second point.

In P. Venugopala Pillai v. V. Thirunavukkarasu(3), there was a lease of coconut trees for the purpose of drawing toddy. The document which was executed between the parties showed that the lessee obtained the right to enjoy the toddy yield from the trees and a right to enter upon the land for the said purpose. But it was equally clear from it that the lessee did not obtain any right in and to the land. It was held that so far as the land was concerned, the lessee was a mere licensee, and his right to enter the land was only so long as he had the right to enjoy the toddy yield from the trees. But there was a further question in the case, viz., that with which we are not now concerned, whether such right as was granted to the lessee, the right of drawing toddy would be “immoveable property” within the definition of that term in the Transfer of Property Act. The learned Judges cited with approval the following passage in Marshall v. Green:

“The principle of these decisions appears to be this, that wherever at the time of the contract it is contemplated that the purchaser should derive a benefit from the further growth of the thing sold, from further vegetation and from the nutriment to be afforded by the land, the contract is to be considered as for an interest in land; but where the process of vegetation is over, or the parties agree that the thing sold shall be immediately withdrawn from the land, the land is to be considered as a mere warehouse of the thing sold, and the contract is for goods.”

We are not however concerned in this case with any such provision of the Transfer of Property Act, or whether a lease of usufruct from trees will be immoveable property; what we have to see is whether there has been a lease of the land. There can be no doubt that the appellant's right was to enjoy only the coconut yield from the trees which derived their nutriment from the land. It may be that such a benefit amounts to an interest in immoveable property. But that is not the same thing as saying that there has been a transfer of the land itself. In the case cited above, the distinction that there could be a transfer of interest in immoveable property without there being a transfer of the land has been recognised.

In the unreported judgment in C.R.P No. 696 of 1958, Rajagopalan, J. has held that where a lease was merely of the usufruct of coconut trees on land, the lessee who had the right to collect the usufruct of the trees already standing on the land without any right to carry on operations, horticultural or agricultural, would not be a cultivating tenant within the meaning of Act XXV of 1955. A slightly different view has however been expressed by Anantanarayacan, J. in Muthuraja v. Rajarathinam where a lease was granted for the enjoyment of the usufruct of cashewnut plantation Standing on the land. The learned Judge follosyirtg thejugment of Ramaswami, J. in Chacko, In re held that the lessee would be a cultivating tenant. It is not very dear from the judgment of the learned Judge in the former case as to what exactly were the terms of the lease in that case whether there had been a transfer of the land by way of lease, express or implied, for agricultural purposes. In Chacko, In re Ramaswami, J. was concerned with the meaning of the term “agriculture”. The learned Judge after the full analysis of the judicial decisions held that the word agriculture denoted the raising of valuable or useful products deriving nutriment and sustenance from the soil with the aid of human labour or skill. We shall presently refer to two decisions of the Supreme Court which have given a somewhat narrow interpretation of the term.

The question to be considered in the present case as we said earlier is whether there had been a lease of the tope as such or of the trees alone. That question would depend mainly on the terms of the agreement. It is evident from the contents of the document which we have set out above that it cannot be said that exclusive possession of the land was given to the appellant. On the other hand, he is prohibited from doing anything on the land. In the case of three of the topes he was specifically given a power to render the soil fit, to facilitate presumably the irrigation of the trees etc. We are, therefore, of opinion that there has been no lease of the land.

It is argued for the respondents that even if that question were to be answered in the affirmative, the lease should not be regarded as one for agricultural purposes. Support for the argument is sought from the decision of the Supreme Court in Commissioner of Income-tax v. Benoy Kumar Sahas Roy(4). The question in that case concerned whether the profits realised from sale of forest trees would constitute agricultural income within the meaning of the Income-tax Act. The Supreme Court pointed out that the term “agriculture” would comprise within it (1) basic operations like tilling of the land, sowing seeds, planting etc., such basic operations requiring expenditure of human skill and labour on the land itself, and (2) other operations which have to be resorted to by the agriculturist and which are absolutely necessary for the purpose of effectively raising the produce from the land, referred to as subsequent operatic like protecting the crops, pruning, cutting, harvrsxing etc. It was held that where there had been no sowing or planting but only subsequent tending and protection of the produce as in the case of a forest, it would not be agriculture. This view was reiterated in Commissioner of Income-tax, Bihar and Orissa v. Sri Ramakrishna Deo. What is therefore essential to constitute an agricultural operation is the tilling of the land, sowing seeds, planting and similar operations on the land. The mere presence of subsequent operations without there being the basic operations referred to above, as in the case of forest produce and spontaneous growth, could not be agricultural operations. In other words, if there are no basic operations as referred to above, there cannot be an agricultural operation.

Mr. Ramamurthi Aiyar appearing for the respondents contends that as the coconut trees had already been in existence when the lease was made to the appellant, what he did or was expected to do in relation to them during the period of the lease could only constitute subsequent operations and the lease granted in favour of the appellant could not therefore be an agricultural one. We are, however, unable to agree with the contention. It is net necessary for the purpose of an agricultural lease that the lessee should do both the basic as well as the subsequent operations. It would be sufficient if the basic operations has been done by somebody else even years earlier; let us illustrate what we say. For example, suppose a piece of paddy land has been leased out to X who, after tilling and sowing the seeds, abandons the land, and the landlord is thereupon obliged to lease it out to Y for conducting the further agricultural operations, it cannot be said that the lease in favour of Y is not agricultural lease. The decisions referred to above were concerned with forest produce and there was no question of tilling the soil or planting by anybody at any time. It was held that as there could be an agricultural operation only if two things co-exisited, namely, basic and subsequent operations the mere existence of the latter alone would not make the operation an agricultural one. That does not mean that both sets of operations should be done by the same individual or within a specified period of time There can be an agricultural lease in regard to coconut trees planted already and existing on the land at the time the lessee takes the property on lease. Therefore if there had been a transfer of the land in favour of the appellant by way of lease, he would be entitled to protection as cultivating tenant as the case should be regarded as one for agricultural purposes. But as we have held earlier that there was no demise of the land, the view taken by the Courts below is correct. The second appeal fails and is dismissed with costs.

V.C.S