Login
  • Bookmark
  • PDF
  • Share
  • CaseIQ

V.V Shunmugha Nadar And Brothers v. The Joint Chief Controller Of Imports And Exports, Madras.

Madras High Court
Aug 3, 1962
Important Paras
Please sign up to view Important Paras.
Smart Summary (Beta)

Case Summary — RAMACHANDRA IYER, CJ.

Factual and Procedural Background

The appellant was an established importer of pulses. Prior to September 1946, imports of pulse were allowed under an open general licence system. After that time certain restrictions were imposed and imports were permitted only under licences granted on the basis of quota certificates issued by the appropriate authority. For imports in the State of Madras the quota certificate and the licence had to be obtained from the office of the Joint Chief Controller of Imports and Exports, Madras.

The appellant applied to that authority for a quota certificate and for a licence. The office of the respondent forwarded the quota certificate directly to the appellant and did not attach it to his application for licence; consequently the application for licence remained unsupported until the appellant was able to forward the quota certificate himself. Meanwhile the Government revised policy regarding licences. The Assistant Chief Controller at Madras informed the appellant on 15th December 1957 that “as per the existing instructions,” no licence could be granted. The Joint Chief Controller, Madras, communicated a decision rejecting the application (letter dated 28th November 1957) stating that the decision had been taken “in consultation with the Chief Controller of Imports, New Delhi,” and informing the appellant of a right of appeal.

The appellant sought redress from the Chief Controller, New Delhi. On 16th September 1957 the Chief Controller wrote advising the appellant to contact the Joint Chief Controller, Madras, directly because the case was still under consideration in that office, and stated that if the appellant was not satisfied he could approach the Delhi office again without paying a separate fee. After the Joint Chief Controller again refused, the appellant appealed to the Chief Controller, New Delhi, who on 24th April 1958 communicated that the earlier decision communicated by the Joint Chief Controller of Madras dated 1st July 1957 could not be revised.

The appellant then applied to this Court for a writ of mandamus to compel the respondent (the Joint Chief Controller, Madras) to issue a licence for the relevant half year. Rajagopalan, J. rejected the application, and the appellant appealed to Ramachandra Iyer, CJ. The present opinion disposes of that appeal.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether this Court could issue a writ of mandamus compelling the Joint Chief Controller, Madras, to grant the appellant a licence when a superior authority (the Chief Controller, New Delhi) had communicated that the decision would not be revised.
  2. Whether an order of a subordinate quasi-judicial authority that was made “in consultation with” or at the dictation of a superior authority is void for violating the rules of natural justice, and if so whether an appellate order affirming such a void order could validate it (i.e., whether the doctrine of merger would apply).
  3. Whether the Chief Controller, New Delhi’s communication dated 24th April 1958 affirmed the Joint Chief Controller's order dated 28th November 1957 (which was alleged to be void) or the earlier order dated 1st July 1957, and what the legal consequences of that identification are.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments (as advanced by Mr. M.K. Nambiar)

  • The order of the Chief Controller dated 24th April 1958 merely affirmed the order dated 28th November 1957, not the earlier order dated 1st July 1957.
  • The order dated 28th November 1957 is void and of no legal effect because it did not reflect the independent judgment of the Joint Chief Controller, Madras, but rather the judgment of “somebody else” (i.e., it was made in consultation with or at the dictation of another authority), and thus violated the rules of natural justice.
  • Because the 28th November 1957 order is void, an appellate affirmation of it would not engage the doctrine of merger; consequently this Court could ignore both orders and issue a writ of mandamus as if those orders did not exist.

The opinion does not set out detailed opposing arguments from the respondent or other parties in comparable detail.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Commissioner of Income-tax, Bombay v. Amritlal Bhogilal and Co., 1958 S.C.J. 1001 The appellate authority's decision is the operative decision in law; if an appeal is provided, the appellate decision is effective and can be enforced and, even if it merely confirms the tribunal's decision, it is the operative decision (doctrine of merger). Used to explain why ordinarily a High Court would lack jurisdiction to quash a subordinate order by certiorari once it has been merged in a final appellate order; supports the proposition that the appellate decision is the operative decision.
Speakmen v. Plumstead Board of Works, 10 A.C. 229 (at 240) A decision-maker must act honestly and impartially and not under the direction of some other person to whom the authority is not given by law; a decision taken under direction of another is contrary to natural justice. Relied upon to support the proposition that a decision given under the direction of, or after consultation with, some other person (without proper authority) is invalid for violating natural justice.
Mahadayal v. Commercial Tax Officer, 1958 S.C. 667 Where a person entrusted with a quasi-judicial act follows instructions conveyed by another without giving the affected party any opportunity to meet the points urged against him, the procedure is contrary to natural justice and the order can be impugned. Applied to reinforce that an order made without independent consideration by the statutory authority, and which did not afford an opportunity to meet the points, is liable to be set aside as contrary to natural justice.
Collector of Customs v. Rahiman (1957) 2 M.L.J. 41 = 70 L.W. 328 An order passed in violation of the rules of natural justice is a nullity and the doctrine of merger does not apply to validate such an order by later appellate affirmation. Invoked to show that if a subordinate order is non est in law (nullity) because of breach of natural justice, an appellate affirmation cannot cure that defect and the doctrine of merger will not apply.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court proceeded by first observing the ordinary limits of this Court's jurisdiction. It noted that if an appeal is provided against an order of a subordinate authority, the appellate authority's decision is the operative decision in law and would ordinarily preclude this Court from issuing certiorari against the subordinate order once it has been merged in the appellate decision (relying on Commissioner of Income-tax v. Amritlal Bhogilal).

The Court then considered whether the appellant's alternative route—seeking a writ of mandamus—could succeed despite those jurisdictional and merger considerations. The Court reasoned that it could not issue a writ of mandamus to compel the Joint Chief Controller, Madras, to disobey the directions of his superior authority (the Chief Controller, New Delhi) unless that superior authority was properly before the Court. A discretionary writ like mandamus will not be issued if it would force a subordinate officer to contravene an express order of a superior officer.

The Court addressed Mr. Nambiar's contention that the order dated 28th November 1957 was void because it reflected the judgment of another authority and therefore was non est in law; and that, consequently, an affirmation of that void order by the appellate authority would not trigger merger. The Court agreed with the legal principle that an order made under the direction of, or after consultation with, another person (without proper procedure) breaches the rules of natural justice (citing Speakmen and Mahadayal) and that such an order would be void. The Court also accepted the principle from Collector of Customs v. Rahiman that an order in violation of natural justice is a nullity and appellate affirmation cannot revive it.

However, the Court then examined whether the Chief Controller's order dated 24th April 1958 actually affirmed the 28th November 1957 order (the one alleged to be void) or some other order. The Chief Controller's 24th April 1958 communication expressly referred to and affirmed the Joint Chief Controller's order dated 1st July 1957; it made no reference to the 28th November 1957 order. The Court analysed the intermediate communication of 16th September 1957 (which advised the appellant to approach the Joint Chief Controller, Madras, and reserved the right to be approached again) and concluded that it did not finally dispose of the appeal from the 1st July 1957 order. Hence, the 1st July 1957 order remained properly before the Chief Controller.

Because the 24th April 1958 order affirmed the 1st July 1957 order (which was not shown to be void for breach of natural justice), the earlier operative decision was the appellate affirmation of a valid subordinate decision. Consequently the doctrine of merger applied to the 1st July 1957 order as affirmed on appeal, and the Court could not grant mandamus compelling the subordinate officer to act contrary to the appellate decision. The Court therefore agreed with the reasoning and conclusion of Rajagopalan, J., that mandamus could not issue under the circumstances.

Holding and Implications

APPEAL DISMISSED WITH COSTS.

Consequences for the parties:

  • The appellant's application for a writ of mandamus to compel the Joint Chief Controller, Madras, to issue a licence was refused.
  • The appellate decision of the Chief Controller, New Delhi, (24th April 1958) affirming the Joint Chief Controller's order dated 1st July 1957, was treated as the operative decision and constituted a bar to mandamus directed at the subordinate officer.

Broader implications:

The opinion applies established principles regarding the doctrine of merger and the invalidity of decisions made under the dictation of another authority for breach of natural justice. The Court found no basis in the record to treat the operative appellate order as an affirmation of a nullified subordinate order; accordingly, it did not issue a novel ruling altering those established principles. The decision's direct effect is confined to the parties and their respective appeals and applications in this matter.

Show all summary ...

RAMACHANDRA IYER, CJ.

This is an appeal against the judgment of Rajagopalan, J., rejecting the application filed by the appellant for the issue of a writ of mandamus on the ground that to do so would, in effect, be to compel the respondent, the Joint Chief Controller of Imports and Exports, Madras, to disobey the directions of his superior authority at New Delhi. The facts leading up to the case are these: The appellant was having a business in pulse. He was in the habit of importing the commodity from foreign countries. Prior to September 1946, there was no ban on the import of pulse from foreign countries, such imports being allowed under the system known as open general licence system. From that time, however, certain restrictions were imposed, and the import of pulse from foreign countries was permitted only under licences granted on the basis of quota certificates to be issued by the appropriate authority. The quota for each importer was fixed with reference to certain rules made in that behalf and, generally, on the basis of his previous years imports. For imports in the State of Madras, the quota certificate as well as the licence had to be obtained from the office of the Joint Chief Controller of Imports and Exports, Madras. The appellant, claiming to be an established importer, applied to that authority for a quota certificate and licence. In the application for the latter, he specifically referred to the application for quota certificate and requested the authority to obtain the same from the branch of the Department dealing with it. This request was ignored by the office of the respondent, who forwarded the quota certificate to the appellant direct. The application for licence, therefore, remained unsupported by the necessary quota certificate till the appellant was able to send it to the authority concerned after receipt of the quota certificate. By that time, the Government had revised their policy in the matter of the grant of licence. On 15th December 1957, the Assistant Chief Controller at Madras informed the appellant that “as per the existing instructions,” no licence could be granted. The appellant took up the matter with the Joint Chief Controller, Madras, but with no avail, as it was stated that, having regard to the non-availability of sufficient foreign exchange, the licence could not be granted. This order is dated 1st July 1957. We will have to refer to this order again at a later stage. The appellant then challenged that order and pressed his claim before the Chief Controller, New Delhi—a proceeding, which has been indifferently termed as a revision and appeal. By that time, the Government had been evidently reconsidering their policy with reference to cases similar to that of the appellant. If under any revised policy the merchants similarly situated were to obtain licence, the appellant too should get it and it would then really be unnecessary to decide the appeal before the Chief Controller, New Delhi. This, evidently, was behind in the mind of the Chief Controller, New Delhi, when he sent to the appellant the following communication, which is dated 16th September 1957:

"I write to say that you should contact the Joint Chief Controller of Imports, Madras, direct, as your case is still under consideration in his office along with other cases of same type. In case you do not feel satisfied with his decision thereon, you may approach this office again; for which no separate treasury receipt of Rs. 5 would be necessary."

It will be a matter for consideration whether this letter has the effect of finally disposing of the appeal against the order of the Joint Chief Controller, dated 1st July, 1957, or it merely left that appeal to be decided later, in case it became necessary to do so in the event of the appellant not being able to obtain what he wanted, as a result of the expected revision of policy in the matter of imports. The appellant took the advice of the Delhi authorities, and applied to the Joint Chief Controller. Madras, for a licence, but he did not succeed there. That officer communicated his decision to him by his letter dated 28th November, 1957, which runs thus:

"With reference to the above, I am directed to state that the decision to reject your application cited above has been taken in consultation with the Chief Controller of Imports, New Delhi, and that you may, if so desire, prefer an appeal to him within 30 days of the date of this letter in terms of paragraph 76 of the Red Book of October, 1957 March, 1958 period."

Against the above order, the appellant filed an appeal to the Chief Controller, New Delhi. On 24th April, 1958, the Chief Controller sent the following communication to the appellant:

"With reference to the correspondence resting with your letter dated 29th March, 1958, on the above subject, I write to say that your case has been carefully examined in this office, but it is regretted that the decision already communicated to you by the Joint Chief Controller of Imports, Madras, in his letter dated 1st July, 1957 cannot be revised."

Aggrieved by the final outcome of his efforts to secure a licence, the appellant filed an application to this Court for the issue of a writ of mandamus to compel the respondent to issue a licence for enabling him to import pulses for the half year in question. Rajagopalan, J. rejected the application, and hence this appeal.

If the appellant had applied for a writ of certiorari to quash the order of the Joint Chief Controller, Madras, this Court would, ordinarily speaking, have no jurisdiction over the matter, as such order should be deemed to have been merged in the final order of the Chief Controller, New Delhi, over whom this Court will have no jurisdiction. This principle is too well settled to merit any further discussion. In Commissioner of Income-tax, Bombay v. Amritlal Bhogilal and Co. 1958 S.C.J. 1001. Gajendragadkar, J. observed:

"There can be no doubt that, if an appeal is provided against an order passed by the Tribunal, the decision of the appellate authority is the operative decision in law. If the appellate authority modifies or reverses the decision of the Tribunal, it is obvious that it is the appellate decision that is effective and can be enforced. In law, the position could be just the same even if the appellate decision merely confirms the decision of the Tribunal."

Perhaps realising that an application for a writ of certiorari in this Court might not succeed, the appellant has applied for the issue of a writ of mandamus, ignoring the existence of all the orders so far made. But, in our opinion, the rule which we have stated above will not be different even in regard to the applications for the issue of a writ of mandamus. For one thing, this Court cannot, by issuing a writ, direct the Joint Chief Controller, Madras, to ignore the order of a superior authority dated 24th April, 1958, unless that authority is properly brought before us. Apart from this, the issue of such a writ will place the Joint Chief Controller, Madras, in an embarrassing situation as the effect of it will be to compel him to disobey the order of the superior officer. A discretionary writ like a writ of mandamus cannot be issued if it were to bring about that result.

Mr. M.K. Nambiar, however, tried to get ever this difficulty by contending that the order dated 24th April, 1958 of the Chief Controller, New Delhi, merely affirmed that of the Joint Chief Controller, Madras, dated 28th November, 1957, and that, as the order dated 28th November, 1957, is void and of no legal effect as it did not reflect the judgment of the Joint Chief Controller, Madras, but of somebody else, an affirmation of the same by the appellate authority would not bring into play the principle of merger and that this Court would have jurisdiction to ignore both of them and issue a writ of mandamus as if neither existed. The latter part of the submission, viz., that the order of the Joint Chief Controller, Madras, which expressly stated that it was made in consultation with some other authority, is non est in law, appears to be well founded. There can be little doubt that the decision of a judicial or quasi judicial authority given under the direction of, or after consultation with, some other person even if that person be a superior authority, will be invalid as being in violation of the rules of natural justice. This was so laid down in Speakmen v. Plumstead Board of Works 10 A.C. 229 at 240.. In the course of his speech, Earl of Selbourn, L.C. observed:

"No doubt in the absence of special provisions as to how the person who is to decide is to proceed, the law will imply no more than that the substantial requirements of justice shall not be violated. He is not a Judge in the proper sense of the word, but he must give the parties an opportunity of being heard before him and stating their case and their view. He must give notice when he will proceed with the matter, and he must act honestly and impartially and not under the direction of some other person or persons to whom the authority is not given by law."
(Italics not in the original).

In his Book on Administration Law, M.W.R. Wade, while examining the meaning of the term “natural justice” says that it is the name given to certain fundamental rules which are so necessary to the proper exercise of power that they are projected from the judicial to the administrative sphere and that, in its narrower aspect, the rules of natural justice are merely a sub-department of the principle of ultra vires . But at the same time it must be noted that the principle, viz, the principle of natural justice, covers a wider field as well, namely, certain varieties of cross wrong procedure. It can not, therefore, be said that in every case there is a violation of the rules of natural justice, which will no doubt, expose the impugned order to be quashed by a superior Court, the order should be regarded as non est in law. But it is unnecessary for us to consider chese cases, for, here is a plain case where the officer entrusted with the duty of deciding about the issue of licence did not do so himself but merely carried out the directions of his superior. Such an order would obviously be void. In Mahadayal v. Commercial Tax Officer 1958 S.C. 667., the Supreme Court held that, where a person entrusted with the performance of a quasi-judicial act did not exercise his own judgment, but followed the instructions conveyed to him by another without giving the party affected any opportunity to meet the points urged against him, the whole procedure was contrary to the principles of natural justice, and, therefore, could be successfully impugned in appropriate proceedings. The principle so recognised will apply with greater force to a case where the statutory authority practically closes his mind and acts at the dictation of another authority, however superior that authority might be. That would be a void order and to such a case, the rule laid down in Collector of Customs v. Rahiman (1957) 2 M.L.J. 41=70 L.W 328., will apply. It was held in that case that an order passed in violation of the rules of natural justice would be a nullify and the doctrine of merger of that order in an appellate order that affirmed it would not apply, for the simple reason that, as the first order was non est in law, the second could not make it any the more valid.

If the order of the Chief Controller dated 24th April 1958 is to be regarded as passed on the appeal against the order dated 28th November 1957 there can be no doubt that what we have stated above will apply.

That takes us to the first aspect of the contention urged by Mr. Nambiar. The question there is whether the order of the Chief Controller dated 24th April 1958 affirms the invalid order dated 28th November 1957 or some other order. That expressly refers to and affirms the order of the Joint-Chief Collector, Madras, dated 1st July, 1957. Indeed, there is no reference in that order to the order dated 28th November, 1957. It is not the case of the appellant that the order dated 1st July 1957 is a void order like the one dated 28th November 1957. The only challenge made against the order of the Joint Chief Collector, Madras, dated 1st July 1957 is that it is incorrect and unjust.

Mr. Nambiar argues that when the order of the Chief Controller, New Delhi, dated 24th April 1958 referred to the order dated 1st July 1957, there was a mistake it must be taken that what was meant was the order dated 28th Nov. 1957. The reason given in support of the argument is that, the order dated 1st July 1957 was set aside by the appellate authority on 16th September 1957. The question is, has it been so done? In terms, that order does not say that the order of the Joint Chief Controller, Madras, dated 1st July 1957 is either affirmed or set aside. As we indicated earlier, it only suggests to the appellant to go back to the Joint Chief Controller, Madras, as there is an opportunity for him to obtain a licence in case there is a revision of policy by the Government with regard to merchants similarly situated. More significant than this is the reference in that order, enabling the appellant to approach the Chief Controller again in case he did not get the relief with the Joint Chief Controller, Madras, without even paying the usual fees for an appeal to be filed. From these circumstances, it is clear that the order dated 16th September 1957 did not finally dispose of the appeal from the order of the Joint Chief Controller, Madras, dated 1st July 1957. It is no doubt true that, in the order dated 28th November 1957 there is a mention of the right of the appellant to approach the Chief Controller by way of appeal. But that is the usual form. The fact that be subsequently filed an appeal will not militate against the order dated 1st July 1957 being still with the Chief Controller for being disposed of. When, therefore, that authority by his order dated 24th April 1958, disposed of the appeal, it only amounted to an affirmation of the order dated 1st July 1957. That order declining to grant licence by the authority at Madras was not vitiated like the one dated 28th November 1957 and thus non est in law and on being affirmed by the Chief Controller, New Delhi, on 28th November 1957, became merged with the latter order. We agree with Rajagopalan J. that under the circumstances no writ of mandamus could issue.

The appeal fails and is dismissed with costs.