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M.R Govindan v. The Director Of Government Examinations, College Road, Madras And Another
Factual and Procedural Background
The writ petitioner challenged the proceedings of the first respondent dated 10 December 1976 by which the petitioner's Secondary School Leaving Certificate (SSLC) was cancelled.
Relevant factual background as set out in the opinion: the petitioner appeared as a private teacher-candidate for the S.S.L.C. examinations in March 1950 and October 1950 and, based on marks from those sittings, was declared eligible for the T.S.L.C. (secondary grade). He later appeared for the T.S.L.C. between 1953 and 1955 and obtained pass marks. The petitioner entered service as a teacher under the Corporation of Madras on 2 September 1946, was promoted to Secondary Grade teacher on 22 October 1958 and upgraded to Headmaster on 22 July 1961, holding that post until 21 December 1976.
In or about 1970, police seized from the petitioner his SSLC and T.S.L.C. certificates in connection with criminal proceedings against conspirators who had fraudulently altered mark lists and issued bogus certificates. The petitioner was examined in those criminal proceedings as P.W. 89. The criminal judgment identified the petitioner's SSLC certificate as Exhibit P.243. Relying on that criminal proceeding and the evidence of tampering, the first respondent served a show-cause notice calling on the petitioner to explain why his SSLC certificate should not be cancelled.
The petitioner sought opportunities to peruse departmental records to prepare his response. He was permitted to peruse some records on 27 July 1976 and requested another opportunity. He did not attend when directed for a further perusal on 27 November 1976, sending a letter dated 25 November 1976 attributing his absence to heavy rains and dislocation of traffic. The respondent characterized this conduct as delaying tactics and passed the impugned order cancelling the SSLC certificate on 10 December 1976. The petitioner filed the present writ petition seeking to quash that cancellation.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the findings and material in the criminal court judgment (including identification of the petitioner's certificate as Ex. P.243 and findings of tampering in the tabulation register) could be relied upon in departmental proceedings to cancel the petitioner's SSLC certificate.
- Whether Rule VII(3) of the S.S.L.C. scheme applies to the petitioner’s case (in particular, whether it is necessary that the petitioner be directly responsible for the fraudulent alteration for the rule to apply).
- Whether the petitioner was denied adequate opportunity of perusal of departmental records and a fair chance to answer the show-cause notice, i.e., whether principles of natural justice were complied with.
Arguments of the Parties
Petitioner's Arguments (as advanced by learned counsel for the petitioner)
- The petitioner argued that there was no finding that he himself was responsible for the alteration; only in cases where the petitioner is responsible should Rule VII(3) be applied against him.
- The impugned order relied entirely on the criminal court judgment, which the petitioner contended could not constitute admissible legal evidence in the departmental enquiry.
- Even if the criminal judgment were usable, those who deposed in the criminal court should have been made available for cross-examination in the departmental enquiry before relying on their evidence.
- No adequate opportunity was given to the petitioner to peruse the records; his inability to attend on 26 November 1976 was pleaded on what he contended were valid grounds (heavy rains), and the enquiry should have been postponed to permit him to peruse the records.
Respondent's Arguments (as advanced by the Learned Government Pleader)
- The show-cause notice expressly referred to the evidence against the petitioner in the criminal court and identified the petitioner's certificate as Ex. P.243; there is no bar to relying on findings in a criminal court in departmental proceedings.
- Departmental proceedings are not governed by strict rules of evidence; hearsay evidence (which courts might reject) can be used in departmental matters — relying on State of Haryana v. Rattan Singh (A.I.R. 1977 S.C. 1512).
- It is not necessary in departmental proceedings to examine every person as a witness; the criminal court's findings could be relied upon and the petitioner was made aware of the basis of those findings in the show-cause notice.
- The petitioner had multiple opportunities to peruse records and to be heard but either did not attend (directed through dailies to appear on 12 July 1976) or failed to avail himself of the opportunities granted (perused records on 27 July 1976 but sought further time and later wrote that heavy rains prevented attendance on 27 November 1976). The respondent alleged the petitioner was deliberately delaying the enquiry.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| State of Haryana v. Rattan Singh, A.I.R. 1977 S.C. 1512 | Principle that departmental enquiries are not bound by strict law of evidence and that even hearsay evidence may be accepted in such enquiries. | The court relied on this authority to hold that the findings of the criminal court and related evidence could be used in the departmental enquiry cancelling the certificate; strict rules of evidence need not be applied. |
| V. Krishnan v. Director of Secondary Education and Chairman of the Board of Examinations, Madras | Interpretation of Rule VII(3) of the S.S.L.C. scheme as sufficiently wide to cover cases of this character and that it is not necessary that the petitioner be directly responsible for fraudulent alterations. | The court held that the view in Krishnan applies to the present case and supports applying Rule VII(3) even without a direct finding that the petitioner personally made the alteration. |
| T. E. Vinthakasi v. Director of Govt. Examinations, Madras (W.P. 4365 of 1975, Ramanujam, J.) | Where an alteration in marks benefits the petitioner and there is no obvious third-party interest in making the false entry, an irresistible inference is that the petitioner was instrumental or responsible for the alteration. | The court relied on this judgment to support the conclusion that, given alterations in the tabulation register to the petitioner's advantage, the petitioner should be held responsible and falls within the mischief of Rule VII(3). |
| W.P. 3650 of 1976 (this Court) | The cited extract shows that an alteration detected by forensic examination and the petitioner's admitted payment/bribery in criminal proceedings brings the petitioner within the mischief of Rule VII(3). | The court found the facts of that case on all fours with the present matter and treated it as supporting the impugned order which relied on direct and substantial evidence. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court's legal analysis proceeded in a sequence grounded on facts established by the criminal proceedings, examination of departmental records, applicable statutory rule and precedents.
- Examination of criminal judgment and departmental record: The court referred specifically to paragraph 25 of the criminal judgment (C.C. 6 of 1965) which described a scheme of bribery and fraudulent alteration of certificates and recited circumstances in which the petitioner's certificate was associated with the fraudulent practice (Ex. P.243). The court also examined the Tabulation Register (Ex. P.404) and observed alterations advantageous to the petitioner.
- Use of criminal findings in departmental enquiry: Relying on the principle from State of Haryana v. Rattan Singh, the court treated departmental proceedings as not subject to the strict rules of evidence, permitting reliance on the criminal court's findings and related documentary or hearsay material as prima facie evidence in the departmental context.
- Application of Rule VII(3) of the S.S.L.C. scheme: The court interpreted Rule VII(3), which empowers the Director of Public Instruction to cancel certificates where evidence shows fraudulent alterations, to be applicable where there is evidence that certificates or tabulation records were tampered with. The court cited prior authorities (including V. Krishnan and W.P. 3650 of 1976) to support that it is not necessary to show direct proof that the petitioner himself physically effected the alteration for Rule VII(3) to apply.
- Inference of responsibility when alterations benefit the petitioner: The court adopted the reasoning in T. E. Vinthakasi v. Director of Govt. Examinations (W.P. 4365 of 1975) that when an alteration is for the benefit of the petitioner and there is no obvious third-party motive, the inescapable inference is that the petitioner was instrumental or responsible for the alteration. The court expressed agreement with the impugned order’s detailed description of how the alterations were effected.
- Procedural fairness and delay: On the procedural point, the court accepted the impugned order’s account that the petitioner was repeatedly given opportunities to be present and to peruse departmental records (directed to appear, permitted to peruse on 27 July 1976 and offered another date of 27 November 1976). The court treated the petitioner’s failure to attend the latter date (with a letter citing heavy rains) as evidence of delay tactics. Accordingly, the court concluded that the petitioner could not legitimately claim denial of natural justice where repeated opportunities were afforded and not availed.
- Synthesis and conclusion: Putting together the presence of tampering in the tabulation register, the criminal court’s findings linking the petitioner’s certificate to fraudulent practices, the precedents authorizing reliance on such material in departmental enquiries, and the petitioner’s conduct in the departmental process, the court concluded there was prima facie and substantial evidence justifying cancellation under Rule VII(3).
Holding and Implications
Holding: The court dismissed the writ petition and upheld the impugned order cancelling the petitioner's Secondary School Leaving Certificate. The judgment concludes there were no merits in the petition and orders dismissal with costs; counsel's fee was assessed at Rs. 150. The core ruling can be stated as: WRIT PETITION DISMISSED.
Implications: - Direct effect: The cancellation of the petitioner's SSLC certificate as effected by the first respondent on 10 December 1976 stands; the writ seeking to quash that cancellation was dismissed and the petitioner was ordered to pay costs and counsel fee as directed by the court.
The opinion applies and relies on established precedents to support the departmental use of criminal findings and the application of Rule VII(3); it does not purport to lay down any new legal test beyond those authorities and the statutory provision relied upon.
The writ petitioner seeks to quash the proceedings of the first respondent, dated 10th December 1976 in and by which the petitioner's Secondary School Leaving Ccertificate was cancelled.
2. The facts are as follows—The petitioner appeared as a private teacher-candidate for the S.S.L.C examination held in March 1950 and also in October 1950. According to the marks obtained by him in the said examinations he was declared eligible to appear for T.S.L.C (secondary grade). Subsequently, he appeared for the same examination between 1953 and 1955, and he obtained pass marks. He was also declared to have passed the T.S.L.C examination (secondary grade).
3. He entered service as a teacher under the service of the Corporation of Madras of 2nd September 1946. On 22nd October 1958 he was promoted as Secondary Grade teacher. Later he was upgraded as Headmaster on 22nd July 1961, and he was holding that post till 21st December 1976. In or about 1970, police seized from the petitioner his Secondary School Leaving certificate and T.S.L certificate in connection with the criminal proceedings taken against a number of conspirators who had fraudulently altered the mark list in the Secondary School leaving certificate and in the T.S.L Certificate and also issued bogus certificates. In that case, the petitioner was examined as P.W 89. Based on that judgment in the criminal case, wherein the Secondary School Leaving certificate of the petitioner was marked as Ex. P. 243, the petitioner was called upon to show cause as to why his Secondary School Leaving certificate should not be cancelled, in view of the tampering of the marks as shown below—
The petitioner wanted time to peruse the records available in the department. He was granted permission and he did peruse certain records on 27th July 1976. Then again he wanted a further opportunity. He was asked to come on 27th November 1976, but he would write a letter on 25th November 1976 stating that it was not possible for him to go over in view of the heavy rains and the dislocation of traffic. Finding that the petitioner was trying to prolong the enquiry, the impugned order came to be passed on 10th December 1976. This is how the present writ petition arises.
4. Learned counsel for the petitioner urges the following points before me: (1) that the petitioner was not responsible for the alteration, In fact, there is no finding to that effect. In such cases alone rule VII(3) of the S.S.L.C scheme could be used against the petitioner. (2) The order entirely relies upon the judgment in the criminal court, which cannot constitute legal evidence; (3) Even if that evidence were to be relied upon, persons who deposed so in the criminal court should have been made available for cross-examination in an enquiry conducted. Lastly, it is urged that no adequate opportunity was given to the petitioner to peruse the records. In fact, he had pleaded his inability on 26th November 1976 on a valid ground. Therefore, the matter should have been postponed, and the petitioner ought to have been permitted to peruse the records instead of concluding that the petitioner was trying to protract the proceedings.
5. Learned Government Pleader points out that the show cause notice itself clearly refers to the evidence against the petitioner tendered in the criminal court, and further states that the Secondary School Leaving Certificate forming the subject matter of writ petition issued in favour of the petitioner was marked as Ex. P. 243. There is no bar to rely upon the findings of the criminal court in departmental proceedings. Strict rule of law of evidence will not apply to departmental proceedings. As a matter of fact, even hearsay evidence, which the courts unhesitatingly reject, can be used as evidence in departmental proceedings. It has been so held in the case reported in State of Haryana v, Rattan Singh . A.I.R 977 S.C 1512.. It is not necessary to examine any person as a witness. The finding as rendered by the criminal court itself was relied upon, of which the petitioner was fully made aware in the show cause notice. Nothing prevented the petitioner from adducing his evidence. On the contrary, the conduct of the petitioner would clearly show that he did not want to utilise the the various opportunities afforded to him. In the first instance, he was directed through dailies to appear on 12th July 1976, and on that day he did not appear. He was permitted by the Office Memorandum of the first respondent dated 13th July 1976 to peruse the records on 27th July 1976. He did peruse the records on 27th July 1976, and wanted one more opportunity. He was granted such an opportunity to peruse the records on 27th November 1976, but he would merely write a letter pleading his inability to attend owing to heavy rains. On that date, i.e, 27th November 1976, there was no rain at all to disable the petitioner to come and attend the enquiry. Therefore, it was only the petitioner's fault not to have taken advantage of various opportunities. Hence, he cannot complain of violation of the principles of natural justice.
6. This court has taken the view in—V Krishnan v. Director of Secondary Education and Chairman of the Board of Examinations Madras, that rule VII (3) of the S.S.L.C scheme is wide enough to cover cases of this character, and it is not necessary that the petitioner must be directly responsible or the fraudulent alterations. That judgment will squarely apply to this case.
7. I may straightway refer to the judgement of the criminal court in so far as it relates to the certificate of the petitioner. In paragraph 25 of the judgment in C.C 6 of 1965 on the fileof the Special Judge, Madras, it is stated—
“M. R. Govindan (P.W 89), another school teacher of a Corporation School had also appeared for the said examination in that year. The two persons, namely, Sabapathi and Govindan, were not sure about their success in the examination. Govindan informed Sabapathi about Selvaraj (A.6) and that the said Selvaraj had influence in the office of the Director of Public Instruction and might help him in getting the required marks in the examination. Then the two persons met Selvaraj (A6) and enquired him whether he would help. A6 told them that he had known a clerk in the D.P.I's office and through him he can get the required marks entered in the certificates and for that purpose he must be paid a sum of Rs. 150 for each certificate. Ultimately it was agreed that Sabapathi and Govindan would pay Rs. 100/- each Ex. to A-6 Sabapathi paid the said amount to A 6 through Govindan a day later after the abovesaid meeting. This was in November 1956. In December next A.6 called one Sabapathi and gave him the certificate. Ex. P. 403 is the certificate which shows pass marks in the October 1950 examination for Sabapathi. The relevant entry in the tabulation register is Ex. P-404-a, which shows that the marks given in the certificate are false, Sabapathi having really obtained low marks and failed. After the above success in getting pass marks at the hands of A-6, Sabapathi had become an inter mediary for brining customers to A-6. He introduced Rajamanikkam (A-13) to A-6 and since then A-13 used to be seen with A-6. When A-14 who had appeared for the S.S.L.C as a teacher candidate approached Sabapathi for help saying that Rajamanickam of Cuddalore, A-13 was also doing the business of entering required marks in the certificates but A-14 had no confidence in him and that he learnt that some person in Madras was doing the same work. A-14 enquired Sabapathi whether he knew that person at Madras who would help. Sabapathi undertook to make the necessary arrangements and asked for a sum of Rs. 125 for that purpose. A. 14 paid that amount two days later. His S.S.L.C mark sheet was also handed over to Sabapathi. He took a sum of Rs. 26 out of the same and paid Rs. 100 to A-6 and also passed on the certificate to him for entering the required marks. About a week thereafter, A-14 brought his brother A-15 for a similar purpose. In this case also Sabapathi took a sum of Rs. 125 and the certificate and taking for himself a sum of Rs. 25, gave Rs. 100 and the certificate to A-6. About a week later A-6 gave back the certificate after entering the required marks. He also represented that these marks had been duly entered in the records of the D.P.I's office. The certificates were finally handed over to A-14.”
8. Item No. 87 of the chart, found at page 41 of the said judgment, relates to a certificate issued in favour of the petitioner, marked as Ex. P-243 therein. The entries are—
S. No. Ex. No. of the certificate of the entry in T. Register No. given by expert Handwriting expert opinion about the authorship of handwriting Other witnesses who speak about handwrittng Whose hand writing according to the witnesses Remarks. 37 100-a 100-b & c — — — T. register Ex. P.404 relating to this certificate tampered with facsimile signature of Ranganayakulu made by the stamp used for producing the same signature in Ex. P. 403.
This clearly shows that the Tabulation Register, Ex.P 404 relating to the certificates had been tampered with. I have myself perused the Tabulation register. It does contain alterations. Those alterations are to the advantage of the petitioner. Under these circumstances, the judgment of Ramanujam, J. rendered in W.P 4365 of 1975 T. E. Vinthakasi v. Director of Govt. Examinations, Madras, of this court, would squarely apply. Therein, the learned judge held—
“Having regard to the fact that the alteration is for the benefit of the petitioner and nobody else is interested in making such a false entry, the conclusion is irresistible that the petitioner should have been instrumental or responsible for making the alteration in the marks”.
In fact, how cleverly the alterations have been carried out is set out in a very detailed fashion in the impugned order. I am in entire agreement with this finding.
8. It is well settled under law that in departmental enquiries the principles of ‘Law of evidence’ have no application. That is why in State of Haryana v. Rattan Singh . A.I.R 1977 S.C 1512. their Lordships of the Supreme Court are of the view that even hearsay evidence could be accepted in a departmental enquiry. Therefore, the nature of the admissibility of a judgment rendered in criminal proceedings cannot be pressed much. There is prima facie evidence against the petitioner.
9. Turning to Rule VII(3) of the S.S.L.C scheme, it reads as follows:—
“Where evidence is laid before the Director of Public Instruction showing that any person to whom a certificate has been or is proposed to be given under the rule, has been guilty of malpractice at the Public examination or convicted by a court of law at what in his opinion is a serious offence, or that any person to whom certificate has been given has made erasures or unauthorised or fraudulent alterations in the certificate, the Director may himself cancel or withhold or suspend the certificate with due regard to the offence”.
Concerning this rule I found in W.P 3650 of 1976 of this Court, thus:—
“This is a case in which it is clear beyond doubt, that the marks obtained by the petitioner in English viz., 20 has been altered to 39. In fact, in the criminal proceedings, the petitioner's certificate was also one of the Exhibits which was sent for chemical examination to the State Forensic Laboratory and from there the expert opinion was obtained that it was clearly an alteration. This alone would be sufficient to bring the petitioner within the mischief of rule VII(3). Added to that, the learned Special Judge had also occasion to note the evidence of the petitioner that he had bribed the second accused in that case and paid a sum of Rs. 100 for causing this alteration. This again, would mean that the petitioner, to whom a certificate has been given, has made unauthorised or fraudulent alteration in the certificate. Therefore, there is absolutely no escape for the petitioner from this rule”.
the case is on all fours to the one on hand. Therefore, the impugned order which relies upon direct as well as substantial evidence, is fully supported in law.
10. The impugned order itself clearly states as to how repeated opportunities were granted in favour of the petitioner, and yet he would not avail of the same. The said portion reads—
“In the first instance, he was directed through dailies to appear on 12th July 1974 for an enquiry before the Secretary to the Board of Secondary Education, Madras 6, but he did not turn up for the enquiry on 12th July 1976. Then there were no rains. He was again permitted in this office Memorandum of even No. dated 13th July 1976 to peruse this office records on 27th July 1976 with a view to giving him an opportunity for the personal enquiry. He came and perused this office records on 27th July 1976 and he again wanted one more opportunity which was given but he did not avail.
This is a clear case of adopting delay tactics by the teacher with a view to gain time for what purpose known only to himself. Thus, he has been given full and complete opportunities to peruse this office records in person.
It is therefore evident that he is simply adopting unwarranted delay tactics probably with an ulterior motive to stultify the proceedings of this office to the effect that no orders against him can be passed merely because he does not allow it to be passed by requesting permission to peruse this office records again and again or to protract the issue to evade punishment”.
Accepting this finding, I should necessarily hold that the petitioner alone has to be blamed for his own laches and the complaint based on lack of opportunity is an invested one.
11. In the result, I conclude there are no merits in this writ petition, which is hereby dismissed with costs. Counsel's fee Rs. 150.
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