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Cine India v. Muthu Enterprises, Madras.
Structured Summary of the Judgment (Mishra, J.)
Factual and Procedural Background
This opinion arises from O.S. Appeal No. 142 of 1991, which was preferred against an order in Application No. 416 of 1991 brought under Order 14 Rule 8 of the Original Side Rules of the High Court read with Order 39, Rules 1 and 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure (temporary injunction). The learned single Judge, after taking notice of the facts, concluded that a prima facie case for interim injunction had been made out and granted a temporary injunction restraining the defendants, their agents, servants, representatives and distributors from interfering with the plaintiff’s copyright in the cinematograph picture "Meenava Nanban" by telecasting, exhibiting through video cassettes or by producing video cassettes containing the picture during the pendency of the suit.
Material factual features expressly stated in the opinion include:
- The first defendant was the owner/author of the cinematograph film (as defined by S.2(d)(v) of the Copyright Act, 1957).
- An agreement dated 16-1-1978 (repeatedly described and its territorial/time clauses set out in detail) purported to lease extensive territorial and temporal rights in the picture to the plaintiff, including transfer of negatives and the right for the plaintiff to take any number of prints and enjoy complete realisations in the specified areas and periods.
- The first defendant later executed a letter dated 7-7-1989 stating receipt of Rs.7,500 as "royalty" and granting "Video Rights for Indian Territories ... for a perpetual period from this day" to the second defendant.
- The core contested issue was whether, under the earlier agreement between the first defendant and the plaintiff, the video rights were already assigned to the plaintiff and whether the subsequent grant to the second defendant infringed the plaintiff's copyright.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the plaintiff had established a prima facie case warranting the grant of an interim injunction restraining the defendants from telecasting, exhibiting or producing video cassettes of the film "Meenava Nanban".
- Whether the 16-1-1978 agreement from the first defendant to the plaintiff transferred ownership in the negatives and prints of the cinematograph film and whether that transfer also covered video rights.
- Whether the subsequent grant of "video rights" by the first defendant to the second defendant infringed any rights already vested in the plaintiff under the prior agreement.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant's Arguments
- The appellant (as represented by learned counsel) relied on precedent and statutory interpretation to contend that copyright in a cinematograph film is a bundle of exclusive rights which may be divided by assignment (citing S.14(1)(c) and S.18 of the Copyright Act, 1957).
- Reference was made to the judgment in Century Pictures v. V. Mohan (1983 T.L.N.J 354) to support the proposition that copyright comprises the exclusive right to make copies, to cause the film to be seen or heard in public, to make records of the soundtrack, and to communicate the film by radio-diffusion — and that these rights can be assigned wholly or partially, territorially or temporally.
- Effectively, the appellant urged that the court should examine what rights were assigned by the 16-1-1978 agreement and whether video rights remained with the first defendant such that they could be separately transferred to the second defendant.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| A.V. Meiyappan v. Commissioner of Commercial Taxes, 1969 1 M.L.J. 480 (Division Bench) | Explanation of rights of the producer/owner under the Copyright Act: definition of "author" (S.2(d)(v)), nature of copyright in cinematograph films, provisions on assignment (S.18), requirement that assignment be in writing (S.19), term of copyright (S.26), and availability of licences (S.30). | The Court extracted and relied on this passage to explain statutory concepts governing cinematic copyright and to frame the inquiry on what rights had been assigned by the first defendant to the plaintiff. |
| P. Thulasidas v. K. Vasanthakumari, 1991 1 L.W. 220 | Support for the proposition that video and television devices, when used to reproduce pre-recorded films, fall within the notion of cinematograph representation and thus engage copyright provisions applicable to films. | The single Judge relied on this decision (through discussion in the impugned order) to treat video/television exploitation as falling within the statutory scheme for cinematograph films. |
| Entertaining Enterprises v. State (case name cited in the impugned order) | Used in the impugned order to support the view that video and television are within the definition/operation of cinematograph laws (as appliances for representation of moving pictures). | The impugned order placed reliance on reasoning in this decision (as discussed by the single Judge) to reinforce that video exploitation amounts to use of a cinematograph medium and therefore engages copyright. |
| Century Pictures v. V. Mohan, 1983 T.L.N.J. 354 (Kader, J.) | Statement that copyright in a cinematograph film is a bundle of exclusive rights (to copy, to cause the film to be seen or heard in public, to make records of the soundtrack, and to communicate the film), and that copyright can be divided by assignment (S.18). | The appellant drew upon this judgment to emphasise that copyright can be apportioned by content, territory or time and that multiple concurrent owners of different parts of copyright may exist; the Court treated this statement as consistent with A.V. Meiyappan and the impugned order. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court proceeded through the following steps of analysis, as stated in the opinion:
- The Court recorded that the learned single Judge had examined the facts and concluded prima facie that an interim injunction was warranted; the single Judge's order was quoted in full (the temporary injunction restraining the defendants from telecasting, exhibiting or producing video cassettes of "Meenava Nanban").
- The Court examined the contractual assignment of 16-1-1978 between the first defendant and the plaintiff. The terms showed an extensive grant of rights (territorial and temporal) and a provision that the first defendant would give a letter of transfer to the film centre to transfer negatives to the plaintiff, reserving only limited rights to enable the first defendant to supply prints to certain distributors for pre-existing agreements.
- Relying on statutory exposition from A.V. Meiyappan, the Court reiterated the statutory scheme: who is the "author" (owner at time of completion), what copyright in cinematograph films entails (S.14), and the statutory provisions for assignment (S.18) and requisites for assignment (S.19). The Court used these principles to frame the inquiry into what exactly had been assigned to the plaintiff.
- The Court identified the central factual-legal question: whether the 16-1-1978 transfer to the plaintiff included the video right, or whether any such right remained with the first defendant and could be transferred to the second defendant by the 7-7-1989 letter.
- The Court noted appellant's reliance on Century Pictures and the divisibility of copyright under S.18, but found this statement of law consistent with the A.V. Meiyappan exposition and not inconsistent with the single Judge's reasoning.
- On the merits of the interlocutory position, the Court found that the single Judge had correctly concluded, prima facie, that the plaintiff had been assigned ownership in the negatives and prints, and that any video right obtained by the second defendant from the first defendant appeared to be a right that had already vested in the plaintiff. The second defendant had apparently exploited that right and, according to the Court's view at the interim stage, had done so infringing the plaintiff's copyright.
- Applying the interlocutory balancing exercise, the Court held that the balance of convenience lay with the plaintiff; acts done under an invalid or ineffective grant could not be allowed to continue pending final adjudication. Thus, the grant of temporary injunction had a sound prima facie foundation.
- The Court expressly cautioned that observations made at the interlocutory stage (both by itself and by the learned single Judge) were not final adjudications and should not prejudice the parties' rights at the final hearing.
Holding and Implications
Holding: The Court dismissed O.S. Appeal No. 142 of 1991 (the appeal against the order granting temporary injunction) and, consequentially, dismissed O.S.A No. 143 of 1991. The appeals were dismissed without costs.
Implications:
- The temporary injunction granted by the learned single Judge (restraining the defendants from telecasting, exhibiting via video cassettes, or producing video cassettes of "Meenava Nanban" during the pendency of the suit) stands following dismissal of the appeal.
- The Court affirmed the interlocutory principle that a prima facie finding and balance of convenience may justify preservation of rights by injunction where a later grant purports to vest rights already assigned to another.
- The Court made clear that its interlocutory observations are not final determinations on the substantive dispute; no final adjudication on ownership or the ultimate validity of the assignments was made in this injunction appeal.
- No claim is made in the opinion that this decision establishes any new precedent beyond applying existing statutory principles and precedent to the interlocutory facts before the Court.
This summary is strictly limited to information contained in the provided opinion and does not add or infer facts beyond the text.
(The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Mishra, J.)
O.S Appeal No. 142 of 1991:
Heard learned counsel for the appellant as well as learned counsel for the second respondent.
2. This appeal is preferred against an order passed in an Application No. 416 of 1991 under Order 14 Rule 8 of the Original Side Rules of this Court read with Order 39, Rules 1 and 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The learned single Judge who heard the application took notice of the facts of the case and he came to the conclusion that a prima facie case warranting interim injunction had been made out. He has accordingly made an order of temporary injunction in these words:
“Therefore, I am of the firm view that the applicant/plaintiff has established his case and that consequently, he has succeeded in this application, with the result, both the defendants/respondents, their agents, servants, representatives and distributors or restrained from in anyway interfering with the copyright of the plaintiff in respect of the suit picture “Meenava Nanban” either by telecasting or by exhibiting the same through video cassettes or by producing the video cassettes containing the said picture during the pendency of the suit by means of a temporary injunction immediately and that accordingly, the application is allowed.”
2. The first defendant in the suit, it is not in dispute, was the owner, i.e, author as defined in S. 2(d)(v) of the Copyright Act, 1957 of the Cinematograph film concerned. He executed an agreement on 16-1-1978 with the plaintiff (second respondent herein) stating therein that the picture comprised in the agreement of lease was leased to the plaintiff on the following terms and conditions:
The area and period of lease are as follows:—
(a) North Arcot, South Arcot, Chingleput, Chittoor Districts including Pondicherry for a period of 86 years from 18-8-1982:
(b) Coimbatore and Nilgris Districts for a period of 86 years from 18-8-1982;
(c) Trichy, Tanjore and Pudukkottai Districts including Karaikal for a period of 86 years from 18-8-1982;
(d) Maduraiand Ramnad Districts for a period of 86 years from 18-8-1982;
(e) Madras City for a period of 86 years from 18-6-1982
(f) Salem and Dharmapuri Districts for a period of 86 years from 18-8-1982;
(g) Tirunelveli and Kanniyakumari Districts for ape nod of 86 years from 18-8-1982;
(h) Kerala and Karnataka States for a period of 86 years from 18-8-1982;
(i) North India for a period of 86 years from 15-10-1982;
(j) Andhra Pradesh Tamil Rights for a period of 86 years from 15-2-1983;
(k) do dubbing rights in Telegu for a period of 86 years from this date;
(l) Complete Overseas excent Ceylon for a period of 81 years from 18-10-1992
(m) Ceylon for a period of 86 years from this date”.
It also stated that in view of the negative lease rights being granted to the party of the Second part by the party of the first part for the entire area and period granted as above, the party of the second part shall pay the party of the First part a consolidated consideration of Rs. 1,75,001/- only and that the party of the First part shall give a letter of transfer to Measra. Film Center, Virugambakkam, Madras-92, intimating the lease and instructing them to transfer the negatives of the said picture to the party of the Second part, reserving the rights for them to take any number of prints to enable them to supply to the Distributors, with whom the party of the First part have already entered into agreements for the period prior to what has been mentioned in clause 1 of the agreement, and that the party of the Second part is at liberty to deal in any manner they like regarding the areas and period granted to them under the agreement arid that the party of the Second part is entitled to take any number of prints at their cost, and the complete realisations of the said picture in the areas and during the period mentioned in the agreement shall only belong to them and the party of the first part shall not have any claim over the same since they are being paid a consolidated consideration.
3. Thus in the terms as above, the first defendant transferred every right in the negative of the film for taking out any number of positives for the purpose of exhibition of the picture because the first defendant had received a consolidated consideration from the plaintiff and reserved only one condition that the plaintiff would supply prints of the film to the Distributors, with whom the first defendant had already entered into agreements for the period prior to the agreement.
4. The Copyright Act contains specific provisions with respect to the cinematograph films. We may profitably extract a passage from a Division Bench Judgment of this Court cited by the learned counsel for the appellant to understand as to what happens to the ownership right in the film in the event of any lease or assignment of this kind. In A.V Meiyappan v. Commissioner of Commercial Taxes 19691 M.L.J 480 at page 490 it is stated,
“We feel it necessary to examine the rights which the producer of a film gets under the law.
It is well recognised that such rights in relation to cinematograph productions are governed by the statute at the present time, in whatever manner they may have been characterised in the past. S. 2(d)(v) of the Copyright Act XIV of 1957, defines “author” to mean in relation to a cinematograph film that the owner of the film at the time of its completion. A cinematograph film includes the sound track. The further parts of this section define what an “exclusive licenses”, and an “infringing copy” or a performance” mean in relation to cinematograph films. Under S. 13 of the Act copyright is declared to exist throughout India in words, such as cinematograph films and records. S. 14 lays down what is meant by copyright. It means in the case of literary, dramatical or musical work the exclusive right by virtue of the provisions of the Act to make any cinematograph film or a record in respect of the work. In this case of the copyright in a cinematograph film, it means the exclusive right to cause a film, in so far as it consists of visual images, to be seen in public and in so far as it consists of sound to be heard in public. There are other rights comprehended in the copyright in the case of a cinematograph film, which find place in S. 14(1)(c) and (d), to which we shall refer later in due course. S. 17 states that the author of a work shall be the first owner of the copy right, “work” in this connection meaning the cinematograph film. There is no doubt that in the circumstances of this case, the less assesses; is the author of the work, viz., the cinematograph film in question. S. 18 provides for assignment of copyright. The owner of the copyright in an existing work may assign to any person the copyright either wholly or partially and either generally or subject to limitations and either for the whole term of the copyright or any part thereof. Upon such assignment being made, under S. 18(2) the assignee continues to be the owner in respect of the rights not assigned. S. 19 requires an assignment of copyright in any work to be in writing signed by the assignor. S. 26 provides the life time of the copyright to be fifty years. Apart from assignment of copyright which is provided by S. 18, S. 30 enables the owners of the copyright to grant any interest in the right of licence in the work.”
5. The first owner, that is to say, the first defendant thus transferred certain rights in property, i.e, the film to the plaintiff under the agreement quoted above and made him the owner to the extent assigned to him.
True, the owner, i.e, the author or the producer continued to enjoy only such rights which were not assigned to the plaintiffs; he nonetheless decided to transfer the video rights to the second defendant as shown in a letter dated 7-7-1989, to the following affect;
“This day I have received a sum of Rs. 7,500/- (Rupees seven thousand five hundred only) by cheque on State Bank of India dated 7.7.1989, being royalty amount in full settlement for my Tamil 35 mm colour picture “Meenava Nanban” Video Rights for Indian Territories granted to you for a perpetual period from this day”
Learned single Judge in his order has so clearly stated the law that it is possible without any hesitation to say that it was necessary to find out as to what had been assigned to the plaintiff by first defendant and whether any video right in the film continue with him which he could transfer to the second defendant. He has said;
“Thus, it was made clear that the copyright means all the rights conferred by the Act upon its owner, viz., the applicant herein in respect of his literary, dramatic, musical and artistic work of the suit picture which squarely comes under the definition of cinematograph films and that it does not essentially mean a right to do something, but only the right to exclude others from doing such of the acts which are expressly mentioned in the section. This position of law has not been disputed by the learned counsel appearing for the respondent herein. It was the well established principles of case laws that both the video and televisions are cinematograph and that both are jointly and severally become the apparatus for the representation of moving pictures or series of pictures and that the, video is an appliance capable of use for the reception of signs, signala, images and sounds. When a video cassette recorder is used for playing prerecorded cassettes, of movies on the television screen, it is certainly used as an apparatus for the representation of moving pictures or series of pictures and comes within the definition of cinematograph as defined under the Cinematograph Act. Placing reliance upon a decision held by the Division Bench of this Court reported in Entertaining Enterprises v. State my learned brother Thiru Lakshmanan, J. has also held in affect that the video of a cinema picture and the television were all perfectly come within the definition of cinematograph after elaborately discussing various case laws and the said judgment was reported, in P. Thulasidas v. K. Vasanthakumari 1991 1 L.W 220. In the context enunciated by this Court as well as other High Courts, there is no need for me again to make an emphasis on the question of law as per the specific provisions of the Copyright Act, 1957, as hereinbefore referred”.
6. Learned counsel for the appellant has drawn our attention to a judgment by Kader, J. in the case of Century Pictures v. V. Mohan 1983 T.L.N.J 354 to suggest that ‘copyright’ which consists of a bundle of rights in respect of a cinematograph film means the exclusive right to do or authorise the doing of any of the following acts, i.e, *i) to make a copy of the film; (ii) to cause the film, in so far as it consists of visual images, to be seen in public and, in so far as it consists of sounds, to be heard in public; (iii) to make any record embodying to recording in any part of the sound track associated with the film by utilising such sound track; (iv) to communicate the film by a radio-diffusion (S. 14(1)(c) of the Copyright Act, 1957). He referred to S. 18 of the Copyright Act which deals with the assignment of copyright to say “By virtue of this section, the owner of a copyright in any work may assign the right (a) either wholly or partially; (b) either generally or subject to limitations; and (c) either for the whole term of the copyright or for any part thereof. Copyright may therefore be regarded as divisible as to content, territory or time and in case the assignee is to be regarded as the owner of the part assigned and the assignee is the owner of the part not assigned. The effect of the Act is to render it possible that there shall be within the meaning of the Act two or more owners of the copyright in any work at one and the same time.”
7. The above statement of law is in the same terms as in the case of A.V Meiyappan and certainly not in conflict with the statement made by the learned single Judge in the impugned order. All that had to be seen for finding out whether the plaintiff made out a prima facie case or not was whether under the agreement dated 16-1-1979 the first defendant had transferred the cinematograph ownership in the negative as well as prints to the plaintiff or not and whether such transfer by him also covered the video right or not. Learned single Judge has prima facie found in favour of the plaintiff.
8. It is a case in our opinion in which the Court must hold that balance of convenience is in favour of the plaintiff. The second defendant obtained from the first defendant a certain right which had already vested in the plaintiff. He exploited, it is asserted before us, for some time the said right and only by the impugned order has been denied the same. Whatever he exploited he did so infringing the copyright of the plaintiff. Any such act under an invalid agreement cannot be allowed to continue. The learned single Judge has rightly held that the plaintiff has made out a prima facie case for temporary injunction.
9. While disposing of this appeal, at the admission stage, we make it clear that any observations made by us in this judgment or even by the learned single Judge while disposing of the application for temporary injunction shall not be taken to prejudice the case of any of the parties because any prima facie determination for the purpose of injunction cannot be said to be a final adjudication of the dispute between the parties.
10. In the result, this appeal is dismissed but without costs.
11. O.S.A No. 143 of 1991:
In view of the dismissal of O.S.A No. 142 of 1991 this appeal also is dismissed. No costs.
RR/VCS.
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