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Kishanlal v. Jograj Bantia

Madras High Court
Jul 13, 1987
Smart Summary (Beta)

Structured Summary of the Opinion (Sivasubramaniam, J.)

Factual and Procedural Background

The appellant (the plaintiff in the trial court) appealed against the dismissal of O.S. 217 of 1976 by the Subordinate Judge, Vellore. The plaintiff sued for recovery of a sum of Rs. 46,000 on the basis of a promissory note (pronote) dated 27.10.1973 (marked Ex.A1), alleging that the defendant, for himself and as joint family manager, borrowed Rs. 34,000 from the plaintiff for a joint family necessity and executed Ex.A1 agreeing to repay with 15% interest per annum.

The defendant filed a written statement denying he executed Ex.A1 or borrowed any money, denying he carried on any joint family business, and asserting that the pronote was false and intended to bind his sons. The Trial Court framed issues, evaluated oral and documentary evidence, and dismissed the suit, concluding that the defendant did not execute the pronote and, even if valid, the sum recoverable would be Rs. 34 (words) rather than Rs. 34,000 (figures). The plaintiff appealed.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the defendant, as joint family manager, borrowed Rs. 34,000 from the plaintiff and executed the promissory note dated 27.10.1973 (Ex.A1).

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's (Plaintiff's) Arguments

  • The suit is founded on Ex.A1 (the pronote) under which the defendant borrowed Rs. 34,000 and promised repayment with interest; the plaintiff testified as P.W.1 and adduced P.W.2 as a witness of execution.
  • Counsel for the appellant relied on the presence of a 0-30 P. stamp on Ex.A1 to argue that the instrument must have been executed for an amount greater than Rs. 34 (i.e., that it supported an amount of Rs. 34,000 rather than Rs. 34).
  • As an alternative or in equity, counsel contended that even if technical objections exist, the defendant is bound to pay under Ex.A1 and a decree in equity should be granted.
  • At trial, P.W.1 asserted that he alone (besides the defendant) was present at the payment and execution of Ex.A1; P.W.2 stated he was present when Ex.A1 was written.

Respondent's (Defendant's) Arguments

  • The defendant denied executing Ex.A1 and denied borrowing any money from the plaintiff; he alleged the pronote is a forgery.
  • The defendant denied carrying on a joint family business and said the plaintiff's claim that the borrowing related to joint family necessity was false and designed to bind his sons.
  • Through cross-examination and evidence, the defence pointed to inconsistencies in the plaintiff's account, absence of transaction records, lack of attestation on Ex.A1 by the claimed witness, and discrepancies between the name as pleaded and the executant name on Ex.A1.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
The Jammu and Kashmir Bank Ltd. Qazi Taj Din (Full Bench decision) Affirmation of the principle (derived from S.18, Negotiable Instruments Act) that when an amount is stated differently in figures and in words on an instrument, the amount in words governs. The Court applied the Full Bench's articulation (and S.18) to hold that the amount stated in words ("thirty four") controls over the numerical "34,000", and therefore Ex.A1, if genuine, could be taken only for Rs. 34 (words) and not Rs. 34,000 (figures).

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court proceeded by addressing credibility, documentary inconsistencies, and statutory principle in a stepwise manner:

  1. Burden of proof: As the defendant denied execution of Ex.A1, the burden lay on the plaintiff to prove execution of the pronote and the passing of consideration.
  2. Identity of executant and signatures: The Court noted discrepancies in names (plaintiff's pleading used "Jograj Bhantia", while Ex.A1 described the executant as "Bhantia Jograj Mathanlal") and a seemingly different signature on Ex.A1 compared with an admitted signature in Ex.A6. The Trial Court had found Ex.A1's signature was not that of the defendant but gave no reasons; as this was a first appeal, the Court compared the signatures itself.
  3. Signature comparison: On careful comparison the Court found material differences in important characteristics of the signatures (differences in formation of letters, presence/absence of certain curves, specific differences in Hindi letters for 'd' and 'ya', and other variations). The Court concluded the signatures were not identical and "could not have been signed by the same person."
  4. Oral testimony and attestation: There were material contradictions between P.W.1 and P.W.2 about who was present at execution. P.W.1 claimed he alone (apart from defendant) was present; P.W.2 claimed he was present. The Court found it improbable that P.W.2, if present, would not have attested the pronote, and improbable that an experienced businessman plaintiff would omit attestation by a present witness.
  5. Absence of records and explanation of funds: The plaintiff failed to produce records showing payment under Ex.A1 despite notice (Ex.B1). P.W.1 admitted the amount paid belonged to his deceased wife and had been with him between 1969 and 1973; there was no supporting evidence that such a large sum had been available. The Court regarded the explanation as an afterthought to cover absence of entries in accounts and noted absence of income-tax entries reflecting the transaction.
  6. Credibility and probability assessment: The Court found it highly improbable that P.W.1 would have advanced such a large sum to a stranger in the manner claimed; P.Ws.1 and 2 appeared to be strangers with no previous dealings. On these bases the Trial Court's rejection of P.Ws.1 and 2 was sustained; the appellate Court found no ground to interfere.
  7. Discrepancy between figures and words: Ex.A1 showed "Rs 34,000" in figures but the amount in words read only "thirty four" (the word "thousand" was absent). A translation (Ex.A2) inadvertently inserted "thousand", but the original lacked it and that mistake was acknowledged.
  8. Application of S.18, Negotiable Instruments Act and authority: The Court relied on S.18 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, and the Full Bench decision (The Jammu and Kashmir Bank Ltd. Qazi Taj Din) to conclude that where figures and words differ, the amount in words controls. Applying that rule, there was no scope to hold the amount as Rs. 34,000; at best the instrument, if genuine, would operate for Rs. 34 (words).
  9. Stamp argument and form of instrument: The appellant's reliance on the 0-30 P. stamp to infer a larger amount was rejected because S.18's mandatory rule must govern. The appellant's subsequent contention (raised before the Court) that Ex.A1 was not a promissory note but a letter ("rukha") was not entertained: the suit and the plaintiff's pleadings were framed on the basis that Ex.A1 was a pronote, and that contention could not be raised for the first time on appeal.
  10. Equity argument: The appellant's plea for an equitable decree was rejected: the Court held that equity does not supplant mandatory statutory provisions.

Holding and Implications

Holding:

The Court confirmed the judgment and decree of the Trial Court and dismissed the appeal with costs. The core ruling is therefore: Appeal dismissed; the Trial Court's decree and judgment are confirmed.

Implications:

  • The direct effect is that the plaintiff's suit remains dismissed and no recovery is granted beyond what the Trial Court held (the Trial Court had found the pronote, even if valid, was only for Rs. 34 under the words-figures rule).
  • The Court rejected the plaintiff's evidence on execution and consideration due to documentary and oral inconsistencies, doubts about signature genuineness, absence of contemporaneous records, and the mandatory operation of S.18 of the Negotiable Instruments Act (as interpreted by the cited Full Bench decision) resolving the words-versus-figures discrepancy in favour of the words.
  • No new legal precedent was announced by this judgment; the decision applied existing statutory rule (S.18) and an earlier Full Bench authority to the facts of the case. The Court explicitly declined to accept equitable intervention in the face of mandatory statutory provisions.
Show all summary ...

SIVASUBRAMANIAM, J. :—

1.The plaintiff who was unsuccessful in O.S. 217 of 1976 on the file of the Subordinate Judge, Vellore, is the appellant in this appeal.

2. The appellant plaintiff filed the said suit for recovery of a sum of Rs. 46,000 due on a pronote against the respondent contending that the defendant for himself and in his capacity as a joint family manager borrowed from the plaintiff Rs. 34,000 for his joint family necessity and executed the suit pronote dated 27.10.1973 agreeing to repay the same with interest at 15% per annum.

3. The defendant resisted the suit and filed a written statement raising the following contentions:— He denied the execution of the pronote dated 27.10.1973. According to him, he has never borrowed money from the plaintiff and the suit pronote was not executed by him. He is not doing any joint family business and the business that he has been carrying on, is his separate business. It is only with a view to bind the sons of the defendant, the plaintiff has come out with a false plea that the defendant has borrowed money from the family business.

4. The Trial Court framed necessary issues and after considering the entire evidence on record, dismissed the suit holding that the defendant did not execute the pronote and even if the pronote is valid, plaintiff can recover only a sura of Rs. 34. Aggrieved against this decision, plaintiff has riled the above appeal.

5. The only point that arises for consideration in this appeal is whether the defendant as the joint family manager borrowed Rs. 34,000 from the plaintiff and executed the suit pronote on 27.10.1973.

6. The plaintiff has come forward with the suit on the basis of pronote dated 27.10.1973 marked as Ex.A1 in this case. He examined himself as P.W.1 and according to his evidence, the defendant borrowed from him Rs. 34,000 and executed the suit pronote. The defendant used to sign only in Hindi earlier as is seen from the copy of the plaint in O.S. 16 of 1941, Ex.A6, which was a suit filed by the defendant against his brother and his wife. P.W.2 has stated that he was also present when Ex.A1 was written. However, he has not attested Ex.A1. As the defendant has denied the execution of the pronote, the burden is on the plaintiff to prove the execution of the pronote and passing of consideration for the same. In the plaint, the name of the defendant is given as Jograj Bhantia. Even according to the defendant, it is not his correct name. The name given by him in Ex A6 tallies with his name. Therefore, we can take it for granted that the correct name of the defendant is Jograj Bhantia. However, the name of the executant of Ex.A1 is described as Bhantia Jograj Mathanlal. Strangely, the signature of the executant reads as Jograj Bhantia. Therefore, there is considerable doubt about the identity of the person who had actually executed Ex.A1. The defendant has categorically denied the signature and according to him, it is a rank forgery. Therefore, we have to find whether Ex.A1 contains his signature or not. Even though the Lower Court has held that the signature found in Ex.A1 is not that of the defendant, it has not set out reasons for coming to the conclusion. Therefore, this being the first appeal, we have carefully compared the signature found in Ex.A1 with that of the admitted signature found in Ex.A6. On a careful examination of these two signatures, we find that they are not identical and they could not have been signed by the same person. The two signatures-are found to vary in important characteristics. The formation of the letters is found to be different. On examination of these two signatures, we find that the curve ‘’ found in the signature in Ex.A1 at the starting point of the signature, is not found in the admitted signature in Ex.A6. Again, there is a glaring difference in the Hindi letter for the letter ‘d’ in the two signatures. The manner of curve found in the admitted signature is quite different from the curve found in Ex.A1. Again, there is distinct difference between the Hindi letter for ‘ya’ in Ex.A1 and the admitted signature in Ex.A6. Apart from that, there are other minor variati ons which throw considerable doubt about the genuineness of the signature. In so far as oral evidence is concerned, there is material contradiction bet ween the evidence of P.Ws.1 and 2 about the persons present at the time of execution of Ex.A1. According to P.W.1, no one else witnessed the payment and that apart from the defendant, he was alone present. But it is seen from the evidence of P. W.2, he claims to have been present at the time of execution. If really P.W.2 was there, certainly, he would have attested the pronote. The plaintiff being an experienced businessman, would not have omitted to get the signature of P.W.2 as an attesting witness in Ex.A1.

7. Another aspect which throws considerable doubt in the execution of Ex.A1 is that P.W.1 was not able to produce any records to show that any payment was made under Ex.A1. Even though the defendant gave notice under Ex.B1 to P.W.1 to produce his accounts, the plaintiff had failed to do so. He admitted in cross-examination that the amount paid under Ex.A1 belonged to his wife and the same was with him after the death of his wife during the period from 1969 to 1973. There is no record to show that such a huge sum was available with the plaintiff during the relevant period. Moreover, the said fact was not mentioned by him either in the notice Ex. A3 or in the plaint. He has come forward with this explanation only as an afterthought. Evidently, this has been thought of only as an explanation for the absence of any entries in his accounts regarding the suit transaction. P.Ws.1 and 2 are strangers and it appears that they have no previous dealings between them. It is highly improbable that P.W.1 would have advanced such a huge sum in the manner he has done. The suit transaction has not been shown in the income-tax returns of the plaintiff. The learned counsel for the plaintiff urges that it is admitted that D.W.1 celebrated the marriage of his daughter, in 1974 and therefore, it is probable that he would have borrowed the amount under Ex A1. It is only a too remote possibility which cannot be taken as the circumstance to prove the execution of Ex.A1. For all these reasons, the Trial Court has rightly rejected the evidence of P.Ws.1 and 2 and held that the pronote was not executed by the defendant. We do not find any ground to interfere with the said findings, as we have come to the same conclusion as that of the Trial Court.

8. There is one other vital defect in the promissory note Ex A1. It is seen from Ex. A1 that Rs 34,000 is mentioned in numerical numbers but while writing the amount in words, it is only mentioned as thirty four, and not as thirty four thousand’. D.W.2 who has translated Ex.A1 from Marvari into English under Ex. A 2, has inadvertantly committed a mistake by adding the words ‘thousand’ after the words ‘Rupees thirty four’ which is not Found in the original Ex.A1. He has explained this mistake in his evidence. However, there is no dispute on this aspect and it is admitted that the word ‘thousand’ is not found in the original after the words ‘Rupees Thirty Four’. Therefore, there is apparent difference between the words shown in numerical and in words. The question is when there is such a difference in describing the amount lent under the promissory note which figure has to be taken as the correct one, the answer is found in S.18 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, which says as follows:—

"Where amount is stated differently in figures and words:— If the amount undertaken or ordered to be paid is stated differently in figures and in words, the amount stated in words shall be the amount undertaken or ordered to be paid."

The above rule is founded on common sense and experience that a man is more apt to commit an error with his pen in writing in figure than in writing in words. This aspect has been directly considered by a Full Bench in the decision reported in The Jammu and Kashmir Bank Ltd. Qazi Taj Din 1 wherein the following principle has been laid down.

"When a difference arises between the sum expressed in words in the body of the instrument (pronote) and that mentioned in figures on the top in one corner, the amount mentioned in words will be taken to be the sum for which the instrument was made payable. The mandatory nature of S.18 (Negotiable Instruments Act) gives no choice to the Courts to give preference to the sum mentioned in figures over the amount mentioned in words."

Applying these principles, there is no scope for holding that the amount lent under Ex.A1 is Rs. 34,000. It is only on this basis the trial Court has come to the conclusion that even if the promissory note is true, it would be valid only for Rs. 34.

9. Learned counsel for the appellant made a strong reliance on the fact that in the suit promissory note Ex.A1, 0-30 P. stamp is affixed indicating that the amount should be more than Rs. 34. According to him, if the promissory note is executed only for Rs. 34, there is no need to affix 0-30 P. stamp since 0-10 P. is sufficient. But such a contention cannot be accepted in view of the mandatory provision of S.18 of the Negotiable Instruments Act. For these reasons, we do not find any ground to interfere with the findings of the trial Court on this aspect.

10. It is argued on behalf of the appellant that the suit document Ex. A1 is not a promissory note in the strict sense of the term. It is only in the form of a letter which is customarily known as “rukha” According to the learned counsel for the appellant, the language found in Ex.A1 does not satisfy the requirements of a promissory note as defined under the Negotiable Instruments Act. We are unable to appreciate this contention. It is significant to note that the suit itself is filed on the basis that Ex. A1 is a promissory note as is seen from the averments in the plaint filed by the appellant and the evidence of the plaintiff also is to the same effect. Therefore, it is not open to the appellant to raise this new plea before this Court for the first time. Lastly, learned counsel for the appellant submitted that in any event, the defendant is bound to pay the amount under Ex.A1 and, therefore, in equity a decree should be granted in favour of the appellant. We feel that the question of equity does not come into picture in a matter like this where the statutory provisions are found to be mandatory.

11. In the result, the decree and judgment of the trial Court are confirmed and this appeal is dismissed with costs.