- Bookmark
- Share
- CaseIQ
Delhi State Industri... v. Integrated Techno Sy...
Structured Summary of the Opinion (Shiv Narayan Dhingra, J.)
Factual and Procedural Background
The petitioner filed this petition under Sections 14 and 15 of the Arbitration & Conciliation Act, 1996 seeking termination of the mandate of the arbitrator (respondent No. 2) and appointment of a new arbitrator under Clause 25 of the agreement. The dispute arose from respondent No. 1 making a claim in respect of the final bill initially for Rs. 20,87,570/-, which was rejected by the petitioner. Respondent No. 1 then wrote to the Chief Engineer seeking reference to arbitration and enhanced the claim to Rs. 21,55,757/-. The Chief Engineer referred the claim to the Arbitrator.
The petitioner contends that the arbitrator's scope of reference was limited to adjudicating the Rs. 21,55,757/- claim, but the arbitrator permitted amendments and enhancements of the claimant's claim to Rs. 47,50,774/- and later to Rs. 52,78,516/-. The petitioner made multiple objections and applications (including under Section 16 and Section 13(2) of the Act) challenging the arbitrator's authority to entertain such amendments after pleadings had been completed; those applications were rejected by the arbitrator. The petitioner also filed a counterclaim for Rs. 19,15,000/-. The petitioner alleged the arbitrator acted erratically, biasedly, and entertained repeated applications and documentary submissions by respondent No. 1 without proper procedural safeguards. The petitioner therefore prayed for termination of the arbitrator's mandate and appointment of a fresh arbitrator.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the court should terminate the mandate of the arbitrator under Sections 14 and 15 of the Arbitration & Conciliation Act, 1996 on the grounds that the arbitrator has become de jure or de facto unable to perform his functions, or is otherwise unfit to act.
- Whether the court may, in the circumstances alleged (bias, procedural irregularities, entertaining amendments/enhancements of claim after pleadings), appoint another independent and impartial arbitrator under the agreement (Clause 25) or the Act.
Arguments of the Parties
Petitioner's Arguments
- The arbitrator exceeded his jurisdiction by allowing respondent No. 1 to amend and enhance the claim from the amount referred by the Chief Engineer (Rs. 21,55,757/-) to substantially higher figures (first to Rs. 47,50,774/-, later to Rs. 52,78,516/-).
- The petitioner applied under Section 16 (and later Section 16(1) and 13(2)) challenging the arbitrator's authority to entertain amendments after completion of pleadings; those applications were dismissed by the arbitrator without adequate consideration.
- The arbitrator permitted respondent No. 1 to file documents at multiple stages (with statement of claim, with rejoinder, with successive applications for enhancement, and with written submissions) and did not require parties to admit or deny documents; petitioner alleged those documents were forged or fabricated.
- The arbitrator allowed respondent No. 1 to make repeated applications (dated 16 Aug 2006, 21 Nov 2006, 10 Feb 2007 and 12 Apr 2007) and did not dispose of them, yet allowed respondent to rely on documents filed with those applications.
- The arbitrator had earlier allowed an application by respondent No. 1 to inspect the petitioner's office records; respondent No. 1 did not comply, and when petitioner moved an application about that conduct, the arbitrator did not dispose of it, citing respondent's filing under the Right to Information Act.
- Overall, the arbitrator's conduct was alleged to be arbitrary, biased, lacking judicial discipline, and showing favouritism toward respondent No. 1 — thus justifying termination of his mandate and appointment of a new arbitrator.
- Counsel for the petitioner relied upon the decision in OPBK Construction Pvt. Ltd. v. Punjab Small Industries & Export (2008) (Punjab & Haryana HC), a decision upheld by the Supreme Court in SLP, as supporting termination where an arbitrator had effectively pre-judged the matter.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| OPBK Construction Pvt. Ltd. v. Punjab Small Industries & Export, 2008 (3) Arbitration Law Reporter 189 (Punjab & Haryana High Court); judgment upheld in Special Leave Petition No. 19998-19999 of 2008 (Supreme Court) | Termination of an arbitrator's mandate where a persona designata (a government officer acting as arbitrator) had written letters showing he had made up his mind and thus disqualified himself from acting impartially. | The Court considered and quoted the decision but distinguished it on the facts: in OPBK the arbitrator had expressed preconceived views in letters indicating he had made up his mind; in the present case there was no comparable evidence of pre-judgment in writing. |
| Newton Engineering & Chemicals Ltd. v. Indian Oil Corporation Ltd. Ors., 136 (2007) DLT-73 : 2007 (93) DRJ 127 | The Act contains no provision empowering a court to terminate the mandate of an arbitrator who has already entered upon the reference and to substitute another arbitrator appointed by the court; such challenges should be raised before the arbitral tribunal and ultimately, if necessary, under Section 34. | The Court relied on this authority to support the proposition that the present petition (seeking termination/substitution of the arbitrator while proceedings are ongoing) is not maintainable and that the appropriate route is to raise challenges before the tribunal or to challenge any award under Section 34. |
| Bharat Heavy Electricals Ltd. v. C.N. Garg & Ors., 2001 (2) Arb. LR 545 (SC) | Where a challenge is based on the arbitrator's bias, the remedy is to challenge the resulting award under Section 34 of the Act (i.e., challenge bias in an application under Section 34 after the award), rather than seeking termination of mandate mid-proceedings. | The Court cited this Supreme Court authority to reinforce that allegations of bias/unfairness are matters to be raised in a Section 34 challenge to an award and are not a ground for terminating the arbitrator's mandate during the arbitral proceedings. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court began by setting out the petitioner's factual complaints about the arbitrator's conduct: allowing successive enhancements of claim, permitting repeated filings of documents without formal admission/denial, rejecting the petitioner's procedural challenges, and failing to decide certain applications. The petitioner argued these acts showed partiality and incompetence.
The Court considered the petitioner's reliance on OPBK Construction, but observed the facts in that case were substantially different: there the arbitrator had written letters that demonstrated a pre-judgment and clear disqualification; the present case did not exhibit analogous written expressions of pre-judgment by the arbitrator.
The Court then examined the statutory framework. It noted Section 5's broad principle restricting judicial interference in arbitral proceedings and carefully set out Sections 14 and 15 of the Arbitration & Conciliation Act, 1996, which govern termination of an arbitrator’s mandate and substitution. From those provisions the Court concluded that termination of an arbitrator's mandate is permissible in limited, statutorily-specified circumstances (e.g., where the arbitrator becomes de jure or de facto unable to act), and where controversy exists the matter can be referred to the court as provided by Section 14(2).
The Court held that allegations such as acting in a biased manner, conducting proceedings improperly, showing lack of judicial discipline, acting arbitrarily in entertaining amendments, or transgressing jurisdiction may be grounds to challenge an eventual award but do not, by themselves, entitle the court to terminate the arbitrator's mandate while proceedings are ongoing. The Court relied on Newton Engineering to underscore that the Act does not empower the court to terminate the mandate of an arbitrator who has entered upon the reference and to appoint a substitute mid-proceedings; instead such challenges must be raised before the arbitral tribunal and, if unsuccessful, by challenging the award under Section 34. The Court also cited Bharat Heavy Electricals Ltd. v. C.N. Garg & Ors. for the proposition that bias is a ground to challenge an award under Section 34.
On this statutory and precedential basis, the Court concluded that, even if the petitioner's grievances about the arbitrator's conduct were justified, they did not give the Court jurisdiction to terminate the arbitrator’s mandate at the present stage.
Holding and Implications
Holding: The petition is not maintainable and is hereby dismissed. No orders as to costs.
Implications:
- Direct effect on the parties: The court refused to terminate the arbitrator's mandate and did not appoint a substitute arbitrator. The arbitral proceedings must continue before the existing arbitrator unless the parties agree otherwise or a ground within Sections 14/15 is shown and decided according to the Act.
- Procedural consequence for petitioner: Allegations of bias, procedural irregularity, or excess of jurisdiction by the arbitrator should be raised before the arbitral tribunal itself; if the petitioner is aggrieved by any final award, the appropriate remedy is to challenge the award under Section 34 of the Act.
- Precedential scope: The opinion applies existing authorities (including Newton Engineering and BHEL v. C.N. Garg) and distinguishes OPBK on its facts. The Court did not purport to lay down a novel rule expanding judicial intervention; it adhered to the statutory restrictions on court interference in ongoing arbitral proceedings.
Note: This summary is based exclusively on the content of the provided opinion and does not add or infer facts beyond the text.
Shiv Narayan Dhingra, J.— This petition under Sections 14 and 15 of the Arbitration & Conciliation Act, 1996 (for short, “the Act”) has been made by the petitioner with a prayer that the mandate of the Arbitrator viz. respondent No. 2 be terminated by the Court and the Court should hold that the Arbitrator has become de-facto and de-jure unable to perform and conduct the arbitral proceedings pending between the petitioner and the respondent No. 1. It is also prayed that this Court should appoint another independent and impartial Arbitrator in terms of Clause 25 of the agreement to adjudicate the disputes pending between the parties.
2. Brief facts relevant for the purpose of deciding this petition are that the respondent No. 1 raised disputes regarding final bill against the petitioner for a sum of Rs. 20,87,570/-. This claim was rejected by the petitioner. The respondent No. 1 then wrote to Chief Engineer for referring his claim to arbitration, however, in this letter he enhanced his claim to Rs. 21,55,757/-. In terms of the arbitration clause, this claim was referred to the Arbitrator. It is contended by the counsel for the petitioner that the scope of reference of the arbitrator was adjudication of this claim of Rs. 21,55,757/- as referred to him by the Chief Engineer. The learned Arbitrator however exceeded his jurisdiction by allowing the respondent to amend his statement of claim and raise the claim to the tune of Rs. 47,50,774/-. The petitioner raised objections against entertaining additional claim and filed an application under Section 16 of the Act. This application was dismissed by the Arbitrator. The petitioner also filed counter claim to the tune of Rs. 19,15,000/- against respondent. The respondent after completion of pleadings made another application under Section 23 for amending claim statement and enhancing his claim to the tune of Rs. 52,78,516/-. The learned Arbitrator took this application also on record and without deciding this application of the respondent of seeking enhancement of claim, fixed a schedule for filing written arguments on the claims made by claimant, reply arguments by respondent and rejoinder thereto by the claimant. The petitioner again moved an application under Section 16(1) and 13(2) of the Act before the Arbitrator questioning the authority of the Arbitrator in entertaining application for amendment of claim at the stage when pleadings had already been completed. The learned Arbitrator rejected the application of the petitioner. It is submitted that the Arbitrator in this case was acting in an erratic manner and contrary to Section 25 of the agreement between the parties. The agreement was unambiguous and gave authority to Arbitrator to decide only those clams as are referred to him. It is further submitted that the conduct of the arbitrator raised justifiable doubts in the mind of the petitioner about impartiality and independence of the arbitrator. The Arbitrator did not even consider the contentions raised by the petitioner in its application and allowed enhancement of the claim by the respondent even after pleadings were completed. It is also submitted that the learned Arbitrator had been allowing respondent to file documents at every stage and the documents had been filed by the respondent along with statement of claims, subsequently with rejoinder, then with the application for enhancement of the counter claim, again with the second application for enhancement of the claim and then with the written submissions. The learned Arbitrator had not even asked the parties to admit and deny document filed by each other. It was pointed out by the petitioner that the documents filed by respondent No. 1 were not mentioned by the respondent No. 1 in any of the earlier proceedings and they were all forged and fabricated documents. It is further submitted that the Arbitrator had earlier allowed an application of respondent No. 1 for going to the office of the petitioner and directed petitioner to show its records to respondent No. 1. However, respondent No. 1 did not comply with the order passed by the Arbitrator of visiting the office and inspecting the record. The petitioner filed an application before the Arbitrator about this conduct and the Arbitrator did not dispose of the application on the ground that respondent No. 1 had filed an application under the provisions of the Rights to Information Act. It is contended that Respondent No. 1 had been filing one application after another, deliberately and malafidely in order to mislead the Arbitrator and had been adding documents along with each application. It is submitted that the petitioner received four applications moved by respondent No. 1 on 16th August 2006, 21st November 2006, 10th February 2007 and 12th April 2007 and the Arbitrator did not pass any order on these applications but had been allowing respondent to rely on the documents which have been filed along with these applications.
3. In the application, the petitioner gave several similar instances to show conduct of the proceedings by the Arbitrator in a haphazard manner and a lack of judicial discipline, and to plead incompetency. It is submitted that the Arbitrator had been conducting the arbitral proceedings in an arbitrary and biased manner showing favoritism to respondent No. 1. The petitioner had lost faith in him, therefore, the mandate of the Arbitrator be terminated.
4. Counsel for the petitioner relied upon OPBK Construction Pvt. Ltd. v. Punjab Small Industries & Export, 2008 (3) Arbitration Law Reporter 189, a judgment of Hon'ble High Court of Punjab & Haryana and also placed on record a copy of order passed in Special Leave Petition No. 19998-19999 of 2008 whereby the judgment rendered by the Punjab & Haryana High Court was upheld by the Supreme Court.
5. In the judgment above referred, the mandate of the Arbitrator was terminated by the Court observing as under:—
“18. In contract between the parties, when one party is a private person and the other party is either government or instrumentality of the State, normally the persona designata is the government officer. But once a persona designata who happens to be a government officer, enters the role of an arbitrator, parties to the contract would like such person to be fair and impartial. The letters written by the Chief Engineer who was the arbitrator could have been justified if the same were written by him prior to entering of the reference. After he has entered the reference, the kind of views expressed by him are not only sweeping but gives an expression, particularly with reference to pages 101 and 103 of the paper book that he has made up his mind that any independent arbitrator would go against the respondent-Corporation, I would have still justified his continuation as an arbitrator but for the impugned order passed by him. Normally people functioning under fiduciary capacity by virtue of their official responsibilities have to take decisions. But when a person is acting as an Arbitrator and an application has been placed before him confronting his order questioning his bias and he does not record in the order that these observations contained in letters written by him will not prejudice his mind in his role as an arbitrator, except saying that he will remain impartial, to my mind, has made him unfit to act as an arbitrator. He has disqualified himself to act as an arbitrator in given facts. In this regard, court will not be powerless and silent spectator for travesty of justice. Parties cannot be left at the mercy of such an arbitrator whose mind is pre-set. It will be unnecessarily continuing the proceedings. Under these circumstances, it would be appropriate for this court to appoint another arbitrator.”
6. It is apparent that the circumstances brought out before the Court in the above case are altogether different from the circumstances brought out in the present case. The Arbitrator in that case had already expressed his view showing that he had made up his mind by writing letters. His views were not only sweeping but showed that he had made up his mind. The Court observed that he had disqualified himself to act as an Arbitrator. In the present case, there is no such situation. The petitioner is aggrieved by the way in which proceedings are being conducted by the arbitrator and because of entertainment of applications for enhancement of claim by the Claimant.
7. It may be that the grievance of the petitioner was justified or it may be that the Arbitrator was acting beyond the scope of reference or he was not conducting the proceedings in a proper manner and was acting arbitrarily and was entertaining applications for enhancement of claim which he could not have. However, all these happenings do not give a right to the Court to interfere in the arbitral proceedings. Section 5 puts a blanket injunction on the Courts in interfering in the arbitral proceedings except in those circumstances which have been provided in Part-I of the Arbitration & Conciliation Act, 1996. The mandate of an Arbitrator can be terminated under Section 14 and 15. Sections 14 and 15 read as under:
14. Failure or impossibility to act.—
(1) The mandate of an arbitrator shall terminate if-
(a) He becomes de jure or de facto unable to perform his functions or for other reasons fails to act without undue delay; and (b) He withdraws from his office or the parties agree to the termination of his mandate.
(2) If a controversy remains concerning any of the grounds refer-red to in clause (a) of sub-section (1), a party may, unless otherwise agreed by the parties, apply to the court to decide on the termination of the mandate.
(3) If, under this section or sub-section (3) of section 13, an arbitrator withdraws from his office or a party agrees to the termination of the mandate of an arbitrator, it shall not imply acceptance of the validity of any ground referred to in this section or sub-section (3) of section 12.
15. Termination of mandate and substitution of arbitrator.—
(1) In addition to the circumstances referred to in section 13 or section 14, the mandate of an arbitrator shall terminate
(a) Where he withdraws from office for any reason; or
(b) By or pursuant to agreement of the parties.
(2) Where the mandate of an arbitrator terminates, a substitute arbitrator shall be appointed according to the rules that were applicable to the appointment of the arbitrator being replaced.
(3) Unless otherwise agreed by the parties, where an arbitrator is replaced under subsection (2), any hearings previously held may be repeated at the discretion of the arbitral tribunal.
(4) Unless otherwise agreed by the parties, an order or ruling of the arbitral tribunal made prior to the replacement of an arbitrator under this section shall not be invalid solely because there has been a change in the composition of the arbitral tribunal.”
8. It is apparent from the provisions of Sections 14 and 15 that the mandate of an Arbitrator cannot be terminated on the ground that he was acting in a biased manner or he was not conducting proceedings in an improper manner or that he was not following the judicial discipline or he was acting arbitrarily by allowing an application for amendment of the claim or amendment of the written statement or the arbitrator was acting in a biased manner and transgressing his jurisdiction. These may be good grounds for challenging an award but these cannot be the grounds for interfering during arbitral proceedings by the Court.
9. This Court in Newton Engineering & Chemicals Ltd. v. Indian Oil Corporation Ltd. Ors., 136 (2007) DLT-73 : 2007 (93) DRJ 127, held as under:
“To conclude, I have no hesitation in holding that there is no provision in the Act empowering this Court to terminate the mandate of the Arbitrator who has entered upon the reference and/or to substitute the same with an Arbitrator appointed by this Court. The necessary corollary is that the challenge to the appointment of the Arbitrator must be raised by the petitioner before the Arbitral Tribunal itself. If such challenge succeeds, the petitioner shall have no cause for grievance left. If, however, the petitioner is unable to succeed before the Arbitral Tribunal, it shall have no option except to participate in the arbitral proceedings and if aggrieved by the arbitral award, to challenge the same in accordance with the provisions of section 34 of the Act.”
10. In Bharat Heavy Electricals Ltd. v. C.N Garg & Ors., 2001 (2) Arb. LR 545 (SC) the challenge was made to the continuation of arbitrator on the ground of his being biased. The Supreme Court observed that the remedy available to the petitioner was to file a petition under Section 34, including his challenge to the award on the ground of biasness and unfairness, if he is aggrieved by the arbitral award which may be pronounced by the arbitrator after completing arbitral proceedings before him.
11. In view of foregoing discussion, I consider that this petition is not maintainable and is hereby dismissed as such. No orders as to costs.
Alert