Khatija Bi v. State Of Karnataka & Others

1. In this petition the constitutional validity of Secs. 48 and 48A of the Karnataka Land Reforms Act, 1961 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) as amended by Karnataka Land Reforms (Amendment) Act 1973 (Karnataka Act 1 of 1974) (hereinafter referred to as the Amending Act) arises for consideration. It is filed against the order of the Land Tribunal, Supa, District Karwar declaring that the 4th Respondent was the tenant entitled to be treated as the occupant of a land. The Petitioner was the owner of the land prior to 1-3-1974.

2. The Act received the assent of the President in the year 1962. It came into, force on 2-10-1965. It was included in the IX Sch of the Constn by the Constn (17th Amendment) Act. Therefore its validity was questioned before the Supreme Court in N. Krishna Bhat v. State of Mysore . WP. 202/1966 SC., which was heard and decided along with Golaknath v. State of Punjab . AIR. 1967 SC. 1643.. In the said decision Subba Rao, C.J upheld the constitutionality of the Act on the ground that it had been included in the IXth Sch after the amendment of the Constn. Hidayatullah, J. upheld it on the ground that it squarely fell within the scope of Art. 31A of the Constn and it could not therefore, be questioned on the ground that it was inconsistent with Arts. 14, 19 and 31 of the Constn. Thereafter by the Amending Act the Act was amended. The Amending Act introduced certain radical amendments into the Act, whereby among other changes the ceiling that had been imposed by the Act earlier on the extent of land that can be possessed by a person, or a family was reduced, provision was made for the constitution of the Tribunals for the purpose of performing the duties mentioned in Sec. 112B of the Act and the exemption accorded to religious institutions was taken away. Some of the provisions of the Amending Act were questioned before, this Court earlier. In Thippeswamy & Others… v. State Of Karnataka & Others… . 1974 2 Kar LJ. 518 and Bhaskar Krishnaji v. State of Karnataka . 1974 2 Kar LJ. 509, I upheld the constitutionality of the Act as amended by the Amending Act on the ground that it was fully protected by Art. 31A of the Constitution. In the meanwhile some petitions were admitted by another learned Judge of this Court. In some other petitions filed on behalf of certain Religious Institutions which came before me it was contended that the provisions of the Amending Act were open to question under Art. 26 of the Constn. I admitted them and referred them to a Division Bench for disposal. Those petitions have remained till this day, undisposed of.

3. After the decisions upholding the constitutionality of the Amending Act were rendered by me, two events happened. By the Constn (34th Amendment) Act 1974 which came into force on 7-9-1974 the Amending Act was included in the 9th Sch of the Constn, whereby it acquired the protection of Art. 31B of the Constn. In Acharya Maharajshri Narendra Prasadji Anandprasadji Maharaj v. State of Gujarat . 1975 1 SCC 11 (decided on 3-10-1974) the Supreme Court held that an Act containing provisions enacted in furtherance of agrarian reform was not hit by Art. 26 of the Constn, although it had the effect of depriving the religious institutions of agricultural lands possessed by them. The relevant portion of the decision of the Supreme Court at para 29 reads as follows:

“When we look at the object of the Act and of the various provisions enacted in furtherance of agrarian reform, the Act is squarely protected under the saving provision of Art. 31A. But it is then submitted that Art. 31A does not provide against the vice of contravention of Art. 26 while Arts. 14, 19 and 31 are expressly mentioned in Art. 31A. The question, therefore, arises whether the right under Art. 26(c) is an absolute and unqualified right to the extent that no agrarian reform can touch upon the lands owned by the religious denominations. No rights in an organised society can be absolute. Enjoyment of one's rights must be consistent with the enjoyment of rights also by others. Where in a free play of social forces it is not possible to bring about a voluntary harmony, the State has to step in to set right the imbalance between competing interests and there the Directive Principles of State Policy, although not enforceable in Courts, have a definite and positive role introducing an obligation upon the State under Art. 37 in making laws to regulate the conduct of men and their affairs. In doing so a distinction will have to be made between those laws which directly infringe the freedom of religion and others, although indirectly, affecting some secular activities of religious institutions or bodies. For example if a religious institution owns large areas of land far exceeding the ceiling under relevant laws and indulges in activities detrimental to the interests of the agricultural tenants, who are at their mercy, freedom of religion or freedom to manage religious affairs cannot be pleaded as a shield against regulatory remedial measures adopted by the State to put a stop to exploitation and unrest in other quarters in the interest of general social welfare. The core of religion is not interfered with in providing for amenities for sufferers of any kind. We take the view that the Act and its provisions do no violence to the rights guaranteed under Art. 26(c). In the view we have taken it is also not necessary to mention Art. 26 in Art. 31A and its omission therein is not at all of any consequence”

4. After the above decision was rendered by the Supreme Court and the Tribunals constituted under S. 48 of the Act commenced to function, two types of cases commenced to flow into this Court. The first type of cases are those in which the notices issued by the Tribunals under S. 48A of the Act are questioned. The cases belonging to other category are those, in which the orders passed by the Tribunals declaring the rights of the parties are questioned. The present case belongs to the latter category.

5. In this petition two: questions arise for consideration. The first question relates to the constitutional validity of Ss. 48 and 48A of the Act and the second question, relates to the correctness of the order passed by the Tribunal. For convenience, the relevant parts of Ss. 48 and 48A are set out below:

“48. Constitution of Tribunals: * * *”

“48A. Enquiry by the Tribunal etc. * * *”

6. The duties to be performed by the Tribunal are set out in S. 112B. of the Act which reads as follows:

“112. Duties of Tahsildar and Tribunal:

7. Rule 17 of the Karnataka Land Reforms Rules, 1974 reads as follows:

“17. Procedure to be followed by the Tribunal: The Tribunal shall in respect of applications made to it follow the same procedure as specified for a nummary enquiry under S. 34 of the Karnataka Land Revenue Act, 1964 subject to the condition that the records of the proceedings shall be maintained in a language understood by all its members.”

8. Sec. 34 of the Karnataka Land Revenue Act reads as follows:

“34. Summary inquiry: * * *”

9. It is seen from the provisions of the S. 48 of the Act that an Asst. Commr. is appointed as the Chairman of the Tribunal. The Asst. Commr. who is functioning under the Karnataka Land Revenue Act is entrusted with a number of Administrative and quasi Judicial powers under that Act. It has to be mentioned here that he is also a person on whom the powers of a Sub-Divisional Magistrate are conferred under the Code of Criminal Procedure. Rule 16 of the Rules requires that the Chairman has to be present at all meetings of the Tribunal as the Quorum prescribed for the meetings of the Tribunal (including an adjourned meeting) is three including the Chairman.

10. The principal contention urged in this case is that the State Legislature) had interfered with the basic structure of the Constn by associating layman with the Tribunal and that the State Legislature had taken away the powers of the Judiciary and entrusted them to persons who were not trained in law. It is contended that the Constn of the Tribunals was therefore opposed to the Constitution.

11. Reliance was placed on the decision of the Supreme Court in Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala . 1973 4 SCC 225 in support of the contention that the constitution of the Tribunals affected the basic features of the Constn. In order to understand the above contention it is necessary to analyse the decision of the Supreme Court in the above case. In that case the constitutionality of the Constn (24th Amendment) Act, Constn (25th Amendment) Act and Constn (29th Amendment) Act arose for consideration, while considering the validity of the amendment of Art. 368, introduction of Art. 310 and inclusion of two Kerala Acts in the 9th Sch of the Constn. Some of the learned Judges were of the opinion that certain basic features off the Constn were not amendable by the Parliament. In that connection, Sikri, C.J, observed at para 302 of the decision that the separation of powers between the Legislature, the executive and the judiciary was one of the basic features of the Constn and Shelat and Grover, JJ, observed in para 599 of the decision that the demarcation of power between the Legislature, the executive and the judiciary was one of the essential feature of the Constitution.

12. On the question whether Art. 310 of the Constn which precluded the Courts from examining the substance of an enactment for the purpose, of deciding whether it gave effect to the policy contained in Cls (b) and (c) of Art. 39 if there was declaration by the Legislature that it had been passed to give effect to such policy was valid, the opinion of the learned Judges of the Supreme Court was divided. Rut it is significant to note that even those learned Judges who were of the opinion that the basic features of the Constn were unamendable by the Parliament were of the view that an enactment which was intended to bring about agrarian reform received protection of Art. 31A of the Constn and there was no scope for examining whether it gave effect to the policy contained in Cls (b) and (c) of Art. 39 of the Constn. The reason for taking that view was that Art. 31A which was enacted in the year 1951, essentially dealt with agricultural holdings and the relationship between the landlords and tenants in the case of estates as explained in Art. 31A as it had been all along regarded that agrarian reform came within the scope of Cls (b) & (c) of Art. 39. That some of the learned Judges made a distinction between Acts which received protection of Art. 31A on the one hand and Acts which fell outside the scope of that Art. 31A but included in the 9th Sch and Acts falling under Art. 31C on the other is clear from the following observations. Sikri, J, observed at paragraph 442 as follows:

“442. In Art. 31A the subject matter of the legislation is clearly provided, namely, the acquisition by the State of any estate or any rights therein. (Art. 31A(a)). Similarly, the subject matter of legislation is specifically provided in Cls (b), (c) and (d) of Article 31A. But in Art. 31A the sky is the limit because it leaves to each State ta adopt measures towards securing the principles specified in Cls (b) and (c) of Art. 39. The wording of Arts. 39(b) and 39(c) is very wide. The expression “economic system” in Art. 39(c) may well include professional and other services. According to Encyclopeadia Americanna (1870 Ed. Vol. 9, P. 600) “economic systems are forms of social organisation for producing goods and services and determining how they will be distributed.” It would be difficult to resist the contention of the State that each provision in the law has been taken for the purpose of giving effect to the policy of the State.”

13. Shelat and Grover observed at paragraph 624 as follows:

“624. The main argument on behalf of the petitioners has been confined to the relationship between Arts. 31A and 31B. It has been contended that Art. 31B is intimately linked with Art. 31A and, therefore, only those legislative enactments which fall under Art. 31A can be included in the, 9th Sch under Art. 31B. This matter is no longer open to argument as the same stands settled by a series of decisions of this Court. See 1952 SCR 889 : (AIR 1952 SC 257); Visweshwar Rao v. State of MP, 1952 SCR 1020 : (AIR 1952 SC 252) and N.B Jcejabhoy v. Asst. Collector, Thana, (1965) 1 SCR 636 : (AIR 1965 SC 1096). In all these cases it was held that Art. 31B was independent of Art. 31A. A matter which has been settled for all these years cannot be re-opened now.”

14. Hegde and Mukherjee, JJ. observed at paragraph 740 as follows:

“740. The laws enacted under Art. 31A by their very nature can hardly abrogate the rights embodied in Arts. 14, 19 and 31. Those laws can encroach upon the rights guaranteed under Arts. 14, 19 and 31 only to the extent necessary for giving effect to them. The laws made must be those made under the topics of legislation mentioned in Art. 31A. Hence the encroachment of the rights guaranteed under Arts. 14, 19 and 31 must necessarily be incidental. If the encroachment is found to be excessive, the same can be struck down. In this connection reference may be usefully made to the decision of this Court in Akadasi Padhan v. State of Orissa ((1963) Supp. 3 SCR 691 : AIR 1963 SC 1047).

Therein the validity of a provision of a statute enacted under Art. 19(6)(ii) i.e, law providing for State monopoly in Kendu leaves, came up for consideration. The question for decision before the Court was whether that law can unreasonably encroach upon the right guaranteed under Art. 19(1)(g). That question was answered by Gajendragadkar, J. (as he then was) speaking for the Court, thus:

“‘A law relating to’ a State monopoly cannot, in the context Include all the provisions contained in the said law whether they have direct relation with the creation of the monopoly or not. In our opinion, the said expression should be construed to mean the law relating to the monopoly in its absolutely essential features. If a law is passed creating a State monopoly, the Court should enquire what are the, the provisions of the said law which are basically and essentially necessary for creating the State monopoly, It is only those essential and basic provisions which are protected by the latter part of Art. 19(6). If there are other provisions made by the Act which are subsidiary, incidental or helpful to the operation of the monopoly, they do not fall under the said part and their validity must be judged under the first part of Art. 19(6). In other words the effect of the, amendment made in Art. 19(6) is to protect the law relating to the creation of monopoly and that means that it is only the provisions of the law which are integrally and essentially connected with the creation of the monopoly that are protected. The rest of the provisions which may be incidental do not fall under the latter part of Art. 19(6) and would inevitably have to satisfy the test of the first part of Art. 19(6)…..””

15. Jaganmohan Reddy, J. observed at paragraph 1139:

“In so far as Art. 31A was concerned it authorised a law for the acquisition of an estate as defined in Cl. (2). Art. 31B as introduced by the First Amendment protected from challenge, on the ground of infringement of the rights in Part III certain Acts enacted for agrarian reforms which after very careful scrutiny that they pertain to agrarian reforms, were added to the Ninth Sch. Zamindari abolition and agrarian reform had become an article of faith of free India and in respect of which the Bills either were pending at the tune when the Constitution was being framed or they had been enacted into law after the commencement of the Constitution.”

16. He continued in para 1192:

“The impugned Art. 31C enables Parliament and the State Legislatures to make laws unfettered by Arts. 14, 19 and 31 in respect of the wide and undefined field of objectives indicated in Arts. 39(b) and (c).”

17. Khanna, J., who appears to have adopted a middle course observed at paragraph 1530 as follows:

“1530. It would appear from the above that while Art. 31A dealt with a law providing for the acquisition by the State of any estate or of any rights therein or the extinguishment or modification of such rights or other matters mentioned in Cls (b) to (e) of that. Article, Art. 31C relates to the securing of the objective that the ownership and control of the material resources of the community are so distributed as best to subserve the common good and that operation of the economic system does not result in the concentration of wealth and means of production to the common detriment. But for the difference in subjects, the language of the first clause of Art. 31A and that of the first part of Art. 31C is identical. Both Arts. 31A and 31C deal with rights to property. Art. 31A deal with certain kinds of property and its effect is broadly speaking, to take those kinds of property from the persona who have rights in the said property. The objective of Art. 31C is to prevent concentration of wealth and means of production and to ensure the distribution of ownership and control of the material resources of the community for the common good. Art. 31C is thus essentially an extension of the principle which was accepted in Art. 31A. The fact that the provisions of Art. 31C are more comprehensive and have greater width compared to those of Art. 31A would not make any material difference. Likewise, the fact that Article 31A deals with law providing for certain subjects, while Art. 31C deals with law giving effect to the policy towards securing the principles specified in Cl. (b) or Cl. (c) of Art. 39, would not detract from the conclusion that Art. 31C is an extension of the principle which was accepted in Art. 31A. Indeed, the legislature in making law giving effect to the policy of the State towards securing the principles specified in Cl. (b) or Cl. (c) of Art. 39 acts upon the mandate contained in Art. 37, according to which the Directive Principles are fundamental in the governance of the country and it shall be the duty of the State to apply those principles in making laws. If the amendment of the Constn by which Art. 31A was inserted was valid, I can see no ground as to how the 25th Amendment relating to the insertion of the first part of Art. 31C can be held to be invalid. The validity of the First Amendment which introduced Art. 31A was upheld by this Court as long ago as 1952 in the case of 1952 SCR 89 : (AIR 1971 SC 453) (Supra). Art. 31A having been held to be valid during all these years, its validity cannot now be questioned on account of the doctrine of stare decisis. Though the period for which Sarikari Prasad's case stood unchallenged was not very long, the effects which have followed in the passing of the State laws on the faith of that decision as observed by Wanchoo, J. in Golak Nath's case ((1967) 2 SCR 762 : AIR 1967 SC 1643) are so overwhelming that we should not disturb the decision in that case upholding the validity of the First Amendment. It cannot be disputed that millions acres of land have changed hands and millions of new titles in agricultural lands which have been created and the State laws dealing with agricultural land which have been passed in the course of the years after the decision in Sarikari Prasad's case have brought about an agrarian revolution. Agricultural population constitutes a vast majority of the population in this country. In these cricumstances, it would in my opinion be wrong to hold now that the decision upholding the First Amendment was not correct, and thus disturb all that has been done during these years and create choas into the lives of millions of our countrymen who have benefited by these laws relating to agrarian reforms. I would, therefore, hold that this is one of the fittest cases in which the principle of stare decisis should be applied. The ground which sustained the validity of Cl. (1) of Art. 31A, would equally sustain the validity of the first part of Art. 31C.”

18. He proceeded to observe at para 1535 as follows:

“The second type of constitutional amendment specifies the subject in respect of which a law may be made by the Legislature and the amendment also provides that no law made in respect of that subject shall be deemed to be void on the ground that it is inconsistent with or takes away or abridges any of the rights conferred by Part III of the Constn. In such a case the law is protected even though it violates the provisions of Part III of the Constn. It is, however, open in such a case to the Court on being moved by an aggrieved party, to see whether the law has been made for the purpose for which there is constitutional protection. The law is thus subject to judicial review and can be struck down if it is not for the purpose for which protection has been afforded by the constitutional amendment. To this category belong the laws made under Art. 31A of the Constn which has specified the subjects for which laws might be made, and gives protection to those laws. It is always open to a party to assail the validity of such a law on the ground that it does not relate to any of the subjects mentioned in Art. 31A. It is only if the Court finds that the impugned law relates to a subject mentioned in Art. 31A that the protection contemplated by that Article would be afforded to the impugned law and not otherwise. Art. 31A was introduced by the Constn (First Amendment) Act, 1951 and as mentioned earlier, the validity of the First Amendment was upheld in Sankari Prasad's case (supra)”

19. It has to be stated here that the other learned Judges who decided the above case have not stated anything contrary to the observations of the learned Judges extracted above in so far as the nature of Acts having the protection of Art. 31A is concerned. Nowhere in the above decision has any of the learned Judges observed that the constitution of Tribunals consisting of laymen under an Act protected by Art. 31A would offend the basic structure or features of the Constn. In fact there was no occasion to say so. The observations made by some of the learned Judges to the effect that the basic structure of the Constitution could not be altered were made in connection with the power of the Parliament under Art. 368 and the validity of Article 31C.

20. When once it is held that the Act receives the protection of Art. 31A of the Constn, the next question that arises for consideration is whether by constituting the Tribunals under S. 48 of the Act, the State Legislature has interfered with the basic structure of the Constn. I am of the view that no such thing has been done in this case. Even now, it is open to a party who, is aggrieved by the decision of the Tribunal to contend that the subject matter of the proceedings before the Tribunal is not an agricultural land and would not come within the scope of the Act in a petition under Art. 226 of the Constn. When once it is held that the subject matter of the proceedings before the Tribunal is agricultural land it has to be dealt with in accordance with the scheme of the Act which provides for the imposition of a ceiling on the extent of agricultural holding of an individual or a family, conferment of title to the lands on the tenants who are cultivating them, and vesting of title to the lands with the Govt. when they are in excess of the ceiling prescribed by the statute. Wherever these features are present, as observed by me in Bhaskar Krishnaji v. State of Kar the legislation would be protected by Art. 31A of the Constn. It would not in any way affect the primacy of the judiciary.

21. Legislation concerning agricultural lands falls within the scope of Entry 18 in List II of the 7th Sch of the Constn and under Entry 65 of that List the State Legislature; can exclude the jurisdiction of Courts to deal with the disputes arising under it. When such exclusion is ordained by law, It cannot be said that either the independence of the judiciary is interfered with or any other basic feature of the Constn is obliterated.

22. When a similar argument was addressed regarding Arts. 31A and 31B in Shankari Prasad's case 7 the Supreme Court observed at page 464 as follows:

“It will be seen that these articles do not either in terms or in effect seek to make any change in Art. 226 or in Arts. 132 and 136. Art. 31A aims at saving laws providing for the compulsory acquisition by the State of a certain kind of property from the operation of Art. 13 read with other relevant articles in Part III, while Art. 31B purports to validate certain specified Acts and Regulations already passed, which, but for such a provision, would be liable to be impugned under Art. 13. It is not correct to say that the powers of the High Court under Art. 226 to issue writs ‘for the enforcement of any of the rights conferred by Part III’ or of this Court under Arts. 132 and 136 to entertain appeals from orders issuing or refusing such writs are in any way affected. They remain just the same as they were before: only a certain class of cases has been excluded from the purview of Pt. III and the Courts could no longer Interfere, not because their powers are curtailed in any manner or to any extent, but because there would be no occasion hereafter for the exercise of their powers in such cases.”

23. It is, therefore, clear from the observations of the Supreme Court extracted above, that merely because, the investigation into the validity of a particular Act on the ground whether it is inconsistent with Arts. 14, 19 & 31 is taken away from the purview of the Courts it cannot be stated that there has been interference with the basic structure of the Constitution.

24. It is true that the Tribunals do consist of layman or men not trained in law. Can it be said that S. 48 which provides for constitution of such Tribunals is unconstitutional for that reason?

25. It is well settled that the provisions of the Constn have to be understood in the light of the circumstances that were prevailing immediately before the passing of the Constn and the circumstances that have come into existence since the Constn came into force. The Constn which is a living document should be expounded in the light of the changing times. It is significant that the Constn makes reference to the ‘tribunals’ both in Art. 136 and in Art. 227. Under Art. 136, it is provided that the Supreme Court may, in its discretion, grant special leave to appeal from any judgment, decree, determination, sentence or order in any cause or matter passed or made by any Court or tribunal in the territory of India. Similarly under Art. 227 of the Constn, the High Court has been given the power of superintendence over all Courts and tribunals throughout the territories in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction. The Constn makers were aware that Tribunals which could not be assimilated to ordinary Civil Courts, were functioning even when it was made. A review of the laws that are in force in India would show that there are a large number of Tribunals which are exercising quasi judicial powers affecting large sections of the peoples although they are not treated as integral parts of the judiciary. To illustrate, the following Tribunals may be mentioned. Revenue Appellate Tribunal, Co-operative Tribunals, Sales Tax Tribunals, Income, Tax Tribunals, Transport Appellate Tribunals, Industrial Tribunals and Labour Courts, Employees' Insurance Courts, authorities functioning under customs and excise laws, arbitrators functioning under the Indian Arbitration Act, Arbitrators functioning under the Defence of India Act etc. Many of these Tribunals do consist of persons who are not trained in law. It is well known that under the provisions of the Arbitration Act laymen are often appointed as Arbitrators. I know of no case where a decision of an Arbitrator is set aside on the sole ground that he is not a Lawyer or he does not possess a degree in law. Association of laymen with administration of justice is not foreign to British Jurisprudence. The Jury consisting of laymen are the judges of the fact in many countries. Till very recenty we had under the Criminal Procedure Code the system of trial with the aid of the Jury where in certain cases, the verdict of the Jury was binding on the Court. Hence, merely because laymen are associated with the decision making process of the Tribunal, it cannot be said that the very foundation of the Constn is shaken by the State Legislature.

26. As mentioned earlier any decision given by the Tribunal is open to correction at the hands of this Court under Arts 226 and 227 of the Const and by the Supreme Court under the powers vested in it under the Constitution.

27. The fact that laymen are associated with the decision making process of the Tribunals does not lead to the conclusion that the members of the Tribunal can decide cases without having regard to the principles of fairplay and justice. What these principles are, are well settled.

28. No decision affecting a party can be made without giving him notice to Show cause why such decision should not be rendered against him. The party appearing before the Tribunal should be given reasonable opportunity to defend himself and to urge all his contentions. The Tribunal should give reasons in support of its order. The members of the Tribunal should be free from external influence and their decision should not be based on extraneous considerations. They should not fetter their decision by following a self-created policy. The decision should be based on materials placed becore them. The members of the Tribunal should not have any bias, either in favour or against any party appearing before them. The power should not be exercised by them to achieve any improper purpose or to satisfy any ulterior motive. Bad faith and dishonesty on their part would vitiate a decision of the Tribunal. If the Tribunals keep before them these principles then there would be hardly any ground to complain against their decision.

29. I, therefore, hold that Ss. 48 and 48A of the Act providing for the constitution of the Tribunals and the procedure to be followed by them do not in any way interfere with the basic features of the Constn. The first contention, therefore fails. Now I proceed to consider whether there is any ground to interfere with the impugned order in this Writ Petition under Arts. 226 and 227. The scope of interference under Art. 227 of the Constn is set out in para 8 of the decision of the Supreme Court in Babhutmal v. Laxmibai . 1975 1 SCC 858 as follows:

“Here, when we turn to the judgment of the High Court, we find the High Court has clearly misconceived the scope and extent of its power under Art. 227 and overstepped the limits of its jurisdiction under that Article. It has proceeded to reappreciate the evidence for the purpose of correcting errors of fact supposed to have been committed by the Dist. Court. That was clearly impermissible to the High Court in the exercise of its jurisdiction under Art. 227. The Dist. Court was the final Court of fact and there being no appeal provided against the findings of fact reached by the Dist. Court, it was not open to the High Court to question the propriety or reasonableness of the conclusions drawn from the evidence by the Dist. Court. The High Court could not convert itself into a Court of appeal and examine the correctness of the findings of fact arrived at by the Dist. Court. The limited power of interference which the High Court possessed under the Art. 227 was to see that the Dist. Court functions within the limits of its authority and so far as that was concerned, there was no complaint against the Dist. Court that it transgressed the limits of its authority. It is true that the High Court claimed to interfere with the findings of the fact reached by the Dist. Court on the ground that the, Dist. Court had misread a part of the evidence and ignored another part of it but that was clearly outside the jurisdiction of the High Court to do under Article 227.”

30. If the order passed by the Tribunal examined in the light of the observation of the Supreme Court extracted above, I am of the view that there is no substance in this writ petition. The 4th respondent claimed before the Tribunal that he should be declared as a tenant on the relevant date of the land mentioned in the order. The petitioner claimed that she was the owner of the land and that the 4th respondent was not entitled to the declaration prayed for by him. The case of the 4th respondent was that he was cultivating the lands in question for about 5 years prior to the date of the hearing of the case before the Tribunal and that he was cultivating it with the aid of the members of his family. The petitioner, however, contended that she had given the lands to the 4th respondent on cooly wages for one year and that she had paid a sum of Rs. 1000 to 4th respondent in advance for his expenditure. She did not produce before the Tribunal any receipt to show that she had advanced Rs. 1000 towards his expenses. On the other hand, she had admitted before the Tribunal that the 4th respondent had satisfied the levy demand and paid the land revenue also. The levy demand is ordinarly satisfied by a person who has grown agricultural crops either as owner or as tenant. The petitioner further admitted that she had made use of the bullocks belonging to the petitioner to plough the land. It is no doubt true that in the course of her statement she has stated that she had spent money on the seedlings and it was not true that she was not keeping watch over the field. It is seen from the statement made by the petitioner and the 4th respondent that the 4th respondent was actually working on the land. The only point of difference between the petitioner and 4th respondent related to the question whether he was cultivating the land as a cooly or as a tenant. If the Tribunal on the consideration of the evidence placed before it and I should say in this case not without any basis, has held that the 4th respondent's case that he was a tenant entitled to the land was acceptable there is no ground for interference under Art. 227 of the Constn. There is neither any error of jurisdiction nor any other error calling for interference u/Art. 226 also.

31. In the result, this writ petition fails and it is dismissed.