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Subbanna v. B. Seethamma
Structured Summary of the Opinion
Factual and Procedural Background
This is a tenant's second appeal under Section 100 read with Section 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure (CPC) challenging the decree confirmed by the Civil Judge at Kolar in Execution Appeal No. 9 of 1970, which in turn confirmed an execution order passed by the Munsiff in Execution C. No. 73 of 1970. The respondent (landlord) had originally instituted proceedings under S.21(1)(h) of the Mysore Rent Control Act, 1961 seeking eviction on the ground that he required the premises reasonably and bona fide for his personal occupation. The appellant (tenant) resisted.
On 21 February 1969 the parties filed a compromise in the rent control proceeding HRC No. 4 of 1967 before the Munsiff at Kolar, and the Munsiff recorded the compromise and passed a decree in terms of the compromise (observing the compromise to be lawful and allowing the petition in terms of an I.A. under Order 23 Rule 3 CPC, parties to bear their own costs).
The landlord sought execution of that compromise decree. The tenant resisted execution, producing a document said to show a fresh lease dated 6 February 1970; the landlord alleged that the document contained an interpolation. The executing Court accepted the landlord's contention of interpolation, overruled the tenant's objections, and directed execution to proceed. The tenant's appeal to the Civil Judge (Ex. A. No. 9 of 1970) was dismissed and the Civil Judge confirmed the executing Court's order. The tenant challenged the Civil Judge's decree in this second appeal under S.100 read with S.47 CPC.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether a decree for eviction passed by a Munsiff on the basis of a compromise (without the Munsiff recording satisfaction about the statutory grounds in S.21(1) and S.21(4) of the Mysore Rent Control Act, 1961) is a valid and executable decree.
- Whether an appeal against the order passed by the executing Court (in execution proceedings of an order under S.21 of the Act) lies to the Civil Judge or only to the District Judge (in light of S.48(1) of the Act).
- Whether a second appeal to this Court (under S.100 CPC) is competent against the appellate decree passed by the Civil Judge in the circumstances of execution proceedings under S.21 of the Act.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant's Arguments (Sri P. Subba Rao)
- The decree sought to be executed is a nullity because the Munsiff passed the eviction decree merely by recording the compromise and did not himself satisfy the statutory requirements of S.21(1)(h) (that the premises were reasonably and bona fide required by the landlord for personal occupation) and S.21(4) (that greater hardship would be caused to the landlord if eviction were refused).
- Relied on the Supreme Court decision in Ferozi Lal v. Man Mal (AIR 1970 SC 794) which, interpreting a provision (S.13 of the Delhi and Ajmer Rent Control Act) similar to S.21, held that where a Court proceeded solely on the basis of a compromise the Court was not competent to pass the decree and the decree must be held to be a nullity.
Respondent's Arguments (Sri H. R. Venkataramanaiah)
- Contended that the language of S.21 of the Mysore Rent Control Act is not identical to S.13(1) of the Delhi and Ajmer Rent Control Act and sought to distinguish the Supreme Court decision relied upon by the appellant.
- Argued that despite the compromise basis, the Munsiff was in fact satisfied of the statutory grounds because the Munsiff recorded that the compromise was "lawful" and other recitals in the compromise (concerning arrangements between landlord and tenant) provided material from which satisfaction could be inferred.
- Contended that the appeal against the executing Court's order should have lain only to the District Judge (relying on S.48(1) of the Act) and therefore the Civil Judge had no jurisdiction to entertain the tenant's appeal.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Ferozi Lal v. Man Mal, AIR 1970 SC 794 | The Court must be satisfied that one or more statutory grounds (analogous to S.21(1)) exist before passing an eviction decree; where a Court proceeds solely on compromise it is not competent to pass the decree and such a decree is a nullity. | The Court relied on this Supreme Court authority (dealing with S.13 of the Delhi & Ajmer Rent Control Act) to support the proposition that the principle applies equally to S.21 of the Mysore Rent Control Act, making a compromise-based decree passed without requisite satisfaction a nullity. |
| Pulakurthi Hussain v. S. Gururaja Rao, (1970) 2 Mys. L. J. 108 | Applied the Supreme Court's rule (in Kaushalya Devi v. K. L. Bansal) and considered whether the principle under S.13 of the Delhi & Ajmer Act is applicable to S.21 of the Mysore Act. | The Court cited this decision as demonstrating that this High Court has already held that the rule in respect of S.13 is equally applicable to S.21 of the Mysore Rent Control Act, thereby negativing the respondent's attempt to distinguish Ferozi Lal. |
| Kaushalya Devi v. K. L. Bansal, (1969) 2 SCJ 145 | Supreme Court authority relied upon in Pulakurthi Hussain to support the proposition concerning applicability of the Supreme Court's rule on rent control provisions. | Referenced indirectly via Pulakurthi Hussain; used as part of the chain of precedents establishing that the Supreme Court's principle applies to similar statutory provisions under the Mysore Act. |
| Meenakshamma v. Modur Rangamma, (1968) 2 Mys. L. J. 255 | Held that the Court functioning under Part V of the Mysore Rent Control Act (where S.21 occurs) functions as a Civil Court and can exercise jurisdiction and powers conferred by the CPC; orders under S.21 can be executed under CPC provisions. | The Court relied on this decision to conclude that decrees under S.21 are decrees of a Civil Court and hence execution and appeals arising from execution must follow the CPC and Mysore Civil Courts Act (e.g., S.47/CPC execution provisions and S.96 appeal provisions as read with S.20 of the Mysore Civil Courts Act). |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court proceeded through two distinct lines of analysis: (A) validity of the compromise decree under S.21 of the Mysore Rent Control Act, and (B) the competence of forums for appeal from the executing Court and the competence to entertain a second appeal.
A. On validity of the compromise decree under S.21
- The Court acknowledged the difference in literal wording between S.13(1) of the Delhi & Ajmer Rent Control Act and S.21 of the Mysore Rent Control Act but held that the substantive requirement is the same: a Court is precluded from passing an eviction order unless it is satisfied about the existence of the statutory grounds (here, S.21(1)(h) — bona fide and reasonable personal requirement — and S.21(4) — greater hardship test).
- Relying on the Supreme Court authority (Ferozi Lal) and on this Court's prior decision in Pulakurthi Hussain (which followed Kaushalya Devi), the Court concluded the principle is applicable to S.21 and is not res integra for this Court.
- The Court examined the Munsiff's recorded order. The Munsiff recorded that the compromise petition was "lawful" and allowed the petition in terms of the I.A. The Court held that the mere statement that the compromise was lawful does not equate to an express or implicit finding that the Munsiff was satisfied that the statutory grounds (S.21(1)(h) and S.21(4)) had been established.
- The Court analysed the terms of the compromise (recitals regarding payment of rent and arrangements) and found they merely indicated a mutual arrangement or contingent undertaking between parties; they did not constitute a judicial satisfaction about the landlord's bona fide and reasonable requirement or about the greater hardship test required by S.21(4).
- Consequently, because the Munsiff did not state that he was satisfied about the statutory grounds, and because the decree was passed on the basis of a compromise without the necessary judicial satisfaction, the Court held that the compromise decree is a nullity and therefore not executable.
B. On jurisdiction and competence of appellate fora
- The respondent contended that S.48(1) of the Mysore Rent Control Act confined appeals to the District Judge, and therefore the Civil Judge lacked jurisdiction to hear the tenant's appeal from the executing Court. The Court examined S.48(1) and found it deals only with appeals against orders passed under specific provisions of the Act (Ss. 14, 16, 17 and 21) by the Controller or Court, and does not apply to orders passed by an executing Court in execution proceedings.
- The Court reasoned that no special execution remedy is provided in the Act for orders under S.21; hence such decrees/orders must be executed as decrees of a Civil Court under the CPC. Execution orders fall under S.47 CPC and an appeal therefrom is provided by S.96 CPC. The appropriate appellate forum for a Munsiff's original decree (and for execution decrees emanating from a Munsiff) is determined by the Mysore Civil Courts Act (S.20) which provides appeal to the Civil Judge. The Court therefore held the Civil Judge had competence to entertain the tenant's appeal from the executing Court.
- Finally, the Court rejected the respondent's contention that a second appeal under S.100 CPC to this Court was not maintainable; S.100 is available against appellate decrees passed under S.96 CPC, and therefore the second appeal was competent.
Holding and Implications
Core Ruling: THE APPEAL IS ALLOWED; THE DECREES PASSED BY THE MUNSIFF AND THE CIVIL JUDGE ARE SET ASIDE.
Direct consequences stated in the opinion:
- The execution petition filed by the respondent (landlord) is dismissed because the decree attempted to be executed is a nullity (having been passed on the basis of a compromise without the Munsiff satisfying himself of the statutory grounds under S.21).
- The decrees passed by the Civil Judge (in appeal) and by the Munsiff (in the original rent control proceeding) are set aside.
- The Court directed that the rent control proceedings pending before the learned Munsiff in HRC No. 4 of 1967 be continued and disposed of expeditiously on the basis that the compromise decree passed earlier is a nullity.
- There will be no order as to costs.
Broader implications:
The Court applied established Supreme Court and High Court authority to hold that a compromise-based eviction decree passed without express judicial satisfaction of the statutory grounds specified in the rent control statute is void and not executable. The opinion does not state that it is intended to create any novel precedent beyond applying existing authorities; it confines its directions to the affected proceedings in this case.
(1) THIS is a tenant's execution second appeal under S. 100 read with S. 47 cpc. against the decree passed by the Civil Judge at Kolar in Ex. A. No. 9 of 1970, confirming the decree passed by the Court of the Munsiff at kolar in Ex. C. No. 73 of 1970.
(2) THE respondent, who is the landlord of the suit premises, commenced proceedings under S. 21 (l) (h) of the Mysore Rent Control Act, 1961 (to be hereinafter referred to as the 'act'), against the appellant for eviction on the ground that he requires the premises reasonably and bona fide for his personal occupation. That application was resisted by the appellant-tenant in that proceeding. On 21st February 1969 the appellant and the respondent entered into a compromise and made an application in HRC, no. 4 of 1967, to the Court of the Munsiff at Kolar, before which the rent control proceeding was pending, to pass a decree in terms of the compromise. On the said application, the learned Munsiff passed the following order:
"both parties file a compromise petition. I. A. No. I under order 23 Rule 3 CPC. and admit its execution. Terms of I. A. No. I are lawful. Hence, petition is allowed in terms of I. A. No. I. Parties to bear their own costs."
(3) IT is the compromise decree thus passed by the learned Munsiff that the respondent-landlord sought to execute in the Court of the Munsiff at kolar. The execution was resisted by the appellant-judgment-debtor on the ground that the respondent-decree-holder has given the suit premises on a fresh lease to the appellant on 6th February, 1970. It is, therefore, contended that the respondent-decree-holder is not entitled to execute that compromise decree passed on 21st February 1969 in the rent control proceedings. In support of his case, the appellant relied upon a document said to have been executed by the respondent-decree-holder.
(4) THE respondent, however, took the stand that there is an interpolation in the document making it appear that the suit property has been given on fresh lease to the appellant-judgment-debtor. The executing Court after considering the material placed before it, accepted the contention of the respondent-decree-holder and came to the conclusion that there is an interpolation. Consequently it overruled the objections of the appellant and directed the execution to proceed.
(5) THE aforesaid decree passed by the executing Court was challenged by "the appellant-judgment-debtor in the Court of the Civil Judge, Kolar, in Ex. A. No. 9 of 1970. The learned Civil Judge after considering the material placed by the parties, confirmed the decree passed by the executing court and dismissed the appeal of the judgment-debtor.
(6) IT is the legality of the decree passed by the learned Civil Judge in appeal that is challenged by the judgment-debtor in this second appeal under s. 100 read with S. 47 CPC. Sri P. Subba Rao,. the learned Counsel for the appellant, contended that the decree sought to be executed is a nullity and as such not executable. He invited my, attention to the decree for eviction passed by the munsiff in the rent control proceedings on the basis of the compromise petition signed and filed by both the parties. The contention of Sri Subba rao is that the Munsiff could pass a decree for eviction against a tenant only if ho was satisfied about one of the grounds specified in S. 21 (1) of the Act. He urged that as the landlord came forward with an application for eviction on the ground that he required the premises reasonably and bonafide for his personal occupation, no decree could be passed by the munsiff unless he was satisfied that the premises in question was reasonably and bona fide required by the landlord for his personal occupation and further that greater hardship would be caused to the landlord if an order for eviction is refused. He urged that what has been done by the learned massif is simply to record the compromise arrived at between the parties and to pass a decree in terms thereof without satisfying himself that the requirement of the landlord is reasonable and bona fide and that greater hardship would be caused to the landlord if an order for eviction is refused in support of his contention Sri Subba Rao relied upon a decision of the Supreme Court reported in Ferozi Lal v. Man Mal , AIR 1970 SC. 794. The Supreme court, dealing with S. 13 of the Delhi and Ajmer Rent Control Act, 1952, which provision is similar to S. 21 of the Act, has laid down as follows:
"the jurisdiction of the Court to pass a decree for recovery of possession of any premises depends upon its satisfaction that one or more of the grounds mentioned in S. 13 (l) have been proved. Where the Court had proceeded solely on the basis of the compromise arrived at between the parties, the Court was not competent to pass the decree. Hence, the decree under execution must be held to be a nullity."
(7) SRI H. R. Venkataramaniah, the learned Counsel for the respondent, tried to distinguish this case by contending that the language of S. 21 of the Act is not identical with the language of S. 13 (1) of the Delhi and aimer Rent Control Act, 1952, which was considered by their Lordships of the Supreme Court. S. 13 (1) of the Delhi and Ajmer Rent control Act, 1952, reads as follows:
"13 (1). Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in any other law or any contract, no decree or order for the recovery of possession of any premises shall he passed by any Court in favour of the landlord against any tenant (including a tenant whose tenancy is terminated): provided that nothing in this sub-section shall apply to any suit or other proceeding for such recovery of possession if the Court is satisfied- (b) that the tenant without obtaining the consent of the landlord in writing has, after the commenctment of this Act,- (i) sub-let, assigned or otherwise parted with the possession of, the whole or any part of the premises; (e) that the premises let for residential purposes are required bonafide by the landlord who is the owner of such premises for occupation as a residence for himself or his family and that he has no other suitable accommodation;"
(8) THOUGH S. 13 of the Delhi and Ajmer Rent Control Act, 1952, is similar to s. 21 of the Act, what was pointed out by Sri Venkataramanaiah, the learned counsel for the respondent, is that S. 13 (1) of the Delhi and Ajmer Rent control Act requires the Court to be satisfied that one of the grounds mentioned in that section exists, before the Court can pass an order for eviction, whereas the language of S. 21 of the Act is not such as to indicate that the Court must be satisfied about the existence of one of the grounds mentioned in S. 21. Though exactly similar phraseology is not used in s. 21 of the Act, it is clear that the Court is precluded from passing an order for eviction unless it is satisfied that one of the grounds mentioned in S. 21 is established. A similar contention was raised in a case arising under the Act in the case in Pulakurthi Hussain v. S. Gururaja Rao , (1970) 2 Mys. L. J. 108:. This Court following- the judgment of the Supreme Court in Kaushalya devi v. K. L. Bansal , (1969) 2 SCJ 145 negatived a contention similar to the one advanced by sri Venkataramanaiah in this case. This Court has held that the rule laid down by the Supreme Court in respect of S. 13 (1) of the Delhi and Ajmer Rent control Act, 1952, is equally applicable to cases arising under S. 21 of the Act. The point urged by Sri Venkataramanaiah, is, therefore, no more res Integra so far as this Court is concerned. The point raised by Sri Venkataramanaiah is fully concluded by the decision of our own High Court in Pulakurthi Hussain's case, (1970) 2 Mys. L. J. 108:. There is, therefore, no substance in the contention urged by Sri Venkataramanaiah, the learned counsel for the respondent, that the principle laid down by the Supreme court cannot be applied to cases arising under the Mysore Rent Control Act, 1961. Sri Venkataramanaiah next urged that in this case though the order for eviction was passed on the basis of the compromise entered into between the parties, the Court was in fact satisfied that the ground mentioned in S. 21 (1) (h)of the Act was established in this case. In support of this submission, Sri Venkataramanaiah relied upon the statement of the learned Munsiff made while recording the compromise that the compromise is lawful.
(9) THE fact that the learned Munsiff has recorded that the compromise is lawful does not amount to his holding that he, was satisfied that the ground mentioned in S. 21 (1) (h) of the Act was established in the case. The learned Munsiff has nowhere stated in the order that he was satisfied that the premises was reasonably and bona fide required by the landlord for his personal occupation. The learned Munsiff has also not recorded any finding to the effect that greater hardship would be caused to the landlord as required by S. 21 (4) of the Act. When the learned Munsiff observed that the agreement is lawful, it only conveyed that the agreement, by itself, is not opposed to any law. It is difficult to construe that observation that in the appeal filed by the landlord in the District Court, it is decided that if the premises occupied by the landlord, belonging to one Srinivas, is nut required to be vacated or if the landlord is not required to vacate that premises for some other reason, the landlord agreed to continue the tenant of the suit premises.
(10) THE other recitals in the compromise pertain to the payment of rent, with which we are not concerned. From the recitals of the compromise as summarised above sri Venkataramanaiah, the learned Counsel for the respondent, contended that there was material before the Court to satisfy itself that the requirement of the landlord is reasonable and bona fide. As the learned Munsiff has stated that the agreement is lawful, it is contended that it must be assumed that the learned Munsiff came to the conclusion that the requirement of the landlord is reasonable and bona fide, on the; basis of the compromise petition signed by both the parties. From the terms of the compromise all that one can infer is. that there was some sort of an arrangement arrived at between the landlord and the tenant for their mutual convenience. The tenant agreed to vacate the premises before 31st December 1969, if the other contingencies favourable to the tenant did not occur as contemplated in the compromise. What is really important for consideration is as to whether the learned Munsiff was satisfied that the requirement of the landlord was reasonable and bona fide and that greater hardship would be caused to the landlord if an order for eviction is refused. The learned Munsiff has not stated that he was satisfied about these matters. He has only come to the conclusion that the agreement is lawful. The terms of the compromise coupled with the order of the learned Munsiff that the agreement is lawful, are not at all sufficient' to draw an inference that the Munsiff satisfied himself that the requirement of the landlord is reasonable and bona fide and that greater hardship would be caused to the landlord if an order for eviction is refused it is, therefore, difficult to accede to the contention of Sri Venkataramanaiah, the learned Counsel for the respondent, that in this case the learned munsiff was satisfied about the grounds mentioned in S. 21 (1) (h) and s. 21 (4) of the Act.
(11) SRI Venkataramanaiah next contended that the appeal filed by the appellant in the Court of the Civil Judge at Kolar, was not maintainable he submitted that the only competent Court, to which the appellant could have preferred an appeal against the order passed by the executing Court in this case, was the Court of the District Judge. It was, therefore, cose' forded that the decree passed by the learned Civil Judge in this case is wihout jurisdiction. In support of his contention Sri Venkataramanaiah rebed upon the provisions of S. 48 (1) of the Act, which provide for appeals against the orders passed by the Court under the Act, to the Court of the district Judge. S. 48 (1) of the Act reads as follows;
"notwithstanding anything contained in any law for the time being in force, every person aggrieved by an order under Ss. 14,. 16, 1. 7 or s. 21, passed by the Controller or the Court, may within thirty days from the date of the order, prefer an appeal in writing to the 'district judge having jurisdiction over the area in which the premises are situate."
(12) IT is clear that S. 48 (1) of the Act is not of any assistance to Sri Venkataramanaiah, inasmuch as S. 48 (1) of the Act does not deal with" appeals against the orders passed by the executing Court for the execution of orders passed under S. 21 of the Act. S. 48 (1) of the Act provides for appeals against orders passed under specific provisions of the Act, viz. , Ss. 17, and 21. It cannot be said that the order passed by the executing Court in this case is an order passed under any one of the sections mentioned in s. 48 (1) of the Act. The order was passed by the executing Court before which an execution petition was pending to execute the order already passed by the Court constituted under the Act, under S. 21 of the Act. As the order of the executing Court in this case is not one passed under any one of the provisions mentioned in S. 48 (1) of the Act, it is clear that no assistance can be taken from this section to contend that an appeal, against the order passed by the executing Court in this case, could only have been filed before the Court of the District Judge and not before the Court of the civil Judge, as was done in this case. Sri Venkaatramanaiah, the learned Counsel for the respondent, fairly conceded that there is no other provision in the Act or the rules framed thereunder which he can depend upon in support of his contention that an appeal could be filed only in the Court of the District Judge against the order passed by the executing Court.
(13) THE decree passed on the basis of the compromise entered into between the parties in this case, is a decree passed by the Court as defined in S. 3 (d) of the Act. The Court under the Act is a Civil Court. As no special provision has been made in the Act for executing the decrees or orders passed under S. 21, they have to be executed as decrees passed by a Civil Court. This Court in the case in Meenakshamma v. Modur Rangamma , (1968) 2 Mys. L. J. 255 has laid down that the Court, functioning' for the purpose of part V of the Mysore Rent Control Act, in which S. 21 occurs, functions as a Civil Court, that it is open to such Court to exercise 'jurisdiction and all the powers conferred by the CPC. and that an order passed by the court under S. 21 of the Act can be executed by the Court under the provisions of the CPC. As an order or decree passed under S. 21 of the Act is one passed by a Civil Court and as no special remedy has been provided under the Act for execution of such orders and decrees, it is clear that the provisions of the CPC. , in regard to execution of such orders and decrees, are attracted by virtue of the provisions of S. 141 of the CPC. The order passed by the 'executing Court in this case, is one relating to execution which clearly falls under S. 47 CPC. It is, therefore, a 'decree' within the meaning of that expression as defined in S. 2 (2) CPC. An appeal against such a decree is provided by S. 96 CPC. But, S. 96 (1) does not speak of the forum to which an appeal under S. 96 lies. S. 96 (1) states that an appeal lies to the Court authorised to hear appeals from the decisions of such Courts exercising original jurisdiction. In order to determine the forum to which an appeal under S. 96 CPC. can be preferred, one has to look into the provisions of the Mysore Civil Courts Act, 1964. S. 20 of the mysore Civil Courts Act, which is the relevant provision for our purpose, provides for appeals from decrees and orders passed by a Munsiff in original suits and proceedings of a civil nature, when an appeal is allowed by law, to the Court of the Civil Judge. As already mentioned, an appeal is provided against the decree passed by the executing Court by virtue of s. 96 CPC. If the decree is one passed by the Muhsiff, an appeal against that decree lies to the Court of the Civil Judge under S. 20 of the Mysore civil Courts Act, 1964. An appeal, against the decree passed by the executing Court executing an order or decree passed under S. 21 of the Act by a Munsiff, therefore, lies to the Court of the Civil Judge by virtue of S. 20 of the Mysore Civil Courts Act, 1964, There is, therefore, no substance in the contention of Sri Venkataramanaiah, that the learned Civil Judge had no competence to entertain and dispose of the appeal filed by the appellant in this case.
(14) THE further contention of Sri Venkataramanaiah is that a second appeal is not maintainable against the decree passed by the Civil Judge in this case, to this Court. This contention was also based on S. 48 of the Act. I have already held that S. 48 of the Act provides for appeals only against orders passed by the Court under Ss. 14, 16, 17 and 21 of the Act and not against orders passed by the executing Court in proceedings for execution of orders and decrees passed under the aforesaid provisions. S. 100 of CPC, provides for a second appeal against the appellate decree passed by the court under S. 96 of CPC, There is, therefore, no substance in the contention of Sri Venkataramanaiah, the learned Counsel for the respondent, that no second appeal was competent to this Court, in this case, against the appellate decree passed by the Civil Judge.
(15) AS the decree passed in this case, on the basis of the compromise arrived at between the parties, is one passed without the Munsiff satisfying himself about the existence of the grounds mentioned in Si21 (1) of the Act, it is clear that the decree passed by him is a nullity. The respondent is, therefore, not entitled to execute a decree which is a nullity. But, Sri Venkataramanaiah, the learned Counsel for the respondent, requested me to make a direction similar to the one made by this Court in a similar case in Pulakurthi Hussain's case (2), directing the Munsiff to hear and dispose of the rent control proceedings before him expeditiously on the basis that the decree passed by him on the basis of a compromise, is a nullity. Sri Subba Rao, the learned Counsel for the appellant, has no objection for issuing such a direction.
(16) FOR the reasons stated above, I allow this appeal and set aside the decrees passed by the Civil Judge and the Munsiff. The execution petition, filed by the respondent, is dismissed. I further direct that the proceedings on the file of the learned Munsiff at HRC. No. 4 of 1967 be continued and the case be disposed of expeditiously on the basis that the decree ' passed by him on the basis of the compromise is a nullity. In the circumstances of the case, there will be no order as to costs.
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