Gopal v. Kuppuswamy .

1. This is a revision petition filed by the landlord under Sec. 50 of the Mysore Rent Control Act, 1961, which is hereinafter referred to as the Act of 1961.

2. The landlord filed the petition for eviction of the tenant from the schedule premises on the ground that the same is required reasonably and bona fide for the occupation of his daughter who has no house of her own. She is married and is having a child. He, therefore, wants to accommodate the daughter and her family. The tenant resisted the petition on the ground that the requirement of the landlord is not bona fide. The daughter since married is living separately with her husband. The petition is the outcome of rivalry that exists between the landlord's family and himself. The petitioner was also warned at one time by the police on the complaint of the tenant. On these among other grounds, he prayed for dismissal of the petition.

3. The trial Court on a consideration of the evidence came to the conclusion that the landlord, at his disposal has an additional room measuring about 7 feet by 7 feet which has been recently vacated by its tenant. The landlord could make use of this accommodation for his requirement. It has also recorded a finding that it would cause greater hardship to the tenant if the eviction is ordered in the circumstances.

4. On appeal by the landlord, the learned District Judge has confirmed the findings of the trial Court. He has, however, held that the daughter of the petitioner since married, is neither a dependent on her father nor a member of his family, and that therefore, the landlord is not entitled to evict the tenant to provide accommodation for his married daughter. On merits he has found that in the event of the eviction of the tenant, it would cause greater hardship to him, since there is an alternate accommodation available to the landlord to provide for his daughter. He has also felt that the claim of the landlord is neither reasonable nor bona fide.

5. The unsuccessful landlord has filed the above revision petition.

6. Sri Raghavendra Rao, the learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner submitted that the view of the appellate Court that the landlord cannot seek eviction of his tenant to accommodate his married daughter is erroneous. He has further submitted that regard being had to the circumstances of the case, the landlord should get relief since his daughter is not having any accommodation of her own.

7. Clause (h) of S. 21(1) of the Act, 1961 reads as follows:

“21. Protection of tenants against eviction.—(1) Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in any other law or contract, no order or decree for the recovery of possession of any premises shall be made by any Court or other authority in favour of the landlord against the tenant:

Provided that the Court may on an application made to it, make an order for the recovery of possession of a premises on one or more of the following grounds only, namely:

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(h) that the premises are reasonably and bona fide required by the landlord for occupation by himself or any person for whose benefit the premises are held or where the landlord is a trustee of a public charitable trust, that the premises are required for occupation for the purpose of the trust; or

8. The scope of this section came for consideration before this Court in two decisions K.S Appremeya Iyengar v. H.S Ramaswamy(1) and K. Govindarajulu v. Savithramma(2).

9. In the first case in K.S Appremeya Iyengar, after comparing the relevant provisions of the Mysore House Rent and Accommodation Control Act, 1951 (which is hereinafter called the old Act) and those of the Act, 1961, it is held that though there in no enumeration of the members of the family in the new Act, the omission of it does not mean that a landlord cannot seek an order of eviction unless he wants the premises for his own personal occupation. At page 595 of the report, it is observed as follows:

“It is reasonable to think that the reference to the members of the landlord's family was omitted from the new Act so that the provisions of clause (h) of S. 21(1) of that Act may operate more comprehensively in the sense that a landlord could in an appropriate case seek an order of eviction even if the premises are not required by him personally, but, are required for the members of his family or of those who are economically dependent on him.”

10. Let me turn to the definition of the expressionn “members of his family” found in the old Act, S. 2(6a) defined that expression:

“2. Definitions—In this Act, unless there is anything repugnant in the subject or context—

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(6a) ‘member of his family’ when used with reference to a landlord means his son or daughter or father or mother and where the landlord is a member of a joint Hindu family also his undivided brother or such brother's widow who has not married.

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11. Though this enumeration is not found in the Act 1961, it is held that the scope of S. 21(1)(h) is sufficient to take within its fold not only the persons who are within the enumeration of the ‘member of the family’ contained in the definition of the old Act, but also those who are dependent on the landlord.

12. The same is the view taken in Govindarajulu v. Savithramma. It was a case where the landlady wanted the premises to accommodate her daughter about 41 years of age who resigned her job as House-Surgeon and the husband of the landlady who was a retired Doctor. The landlady wanted the premises in question for the purpose of running a nursing home by her said relations. While upholding the claim of the landlady, this is what Gopivallabha Iyengar, J. observed at page 60 of the report:

“The words ‘occupation by himself’ should be understood to mean not merely of the landlord or the landlady but also her husband or the wife or the children or other dependants. The corresponding provisions in the earlier Act included members of the landlord's family. In this connection my attention is drawn to the observations of Justice Somnath Iyer in Appremeya Iyengar v. Ramaswamy (1968 (1) Mys. L.J 592). With great respect I agree with the conclusion arrived at in that decision that the provisions of S. 21(1)(h) are in the words as they are now with a view to enlarge the scope of the words as they were originally in the corresponding provision in the earlier Act and not merely limit them to the members of the family. In this case the contention that the requirements must be of the landlady herself and does not include the occupation of her husband and daughter who are admittedly living with her appears to me to be very unreasonable and does not serve the intention of the legislation.”

13. It is now clear that the scope of S. 21(1)(h) is sufficiently large to take within its fold persons economically dependent on the landlord along with those who are within the enumeration of the members of the family contained in the definition in the old Act. As already seen, in the definition found in the old Act, a daughter is one of the members of the family. I see no reason why this daughter should be understood in a narrow sense to mean only an unmarried or widowed daughter or a daughter who is always dependent on her parents. The daughter may or may not be economically dependent on the father or the mother as the case may be. Still she may like to live with her parents. It is also not uncommon in our society that the parents, out of affection or other like considerations, would like to see their children reside either with them or in their premises. The expression ‘for occupation by himself’ as found in S. 21(1)(h) of the Act, 1961, must receive a liberal interpretation and it is certainly not necessary to bring within the ambit of the need that the daughter who requires the premises must be dependent on her father who is the landlord. In my opinion, therefore, the decision of the appellate Court on this issue cannot be supported. On a consideration of the evidence, both the Courts have recorded a finding that there is an alternative accommodation available at the disposal of the landlord even if he wants to accommodate his married daughter. It is also held that greater hardship would in the circumstances be caused to the tenant if the order of eviction is passed against, him. This finding cannot be said to be unreasonable, on a close scrutiny of the evidence on record. It is found that there are in all six rooms in the premises occupied by different tenants. The premises in occupation of the respondent consists of only two rooms. There is a vacant room which is at the disposal of the petitioner which could be conveniently used by him as an additional accommodation for his daughter. There is therefore, no case made out for my interference.

14. The revision petition is therefore, dismissed. In the circumstances, I make no order as to costs.