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T.Palanisamy Gounder v. Sankara Ramanathan And Others
Judgment Summary — Civil Revision concerning O.S.No.671 of 1998 (Sub Court, Erode)
Factual and Procedural Background
This summary is drawn strictly from the supplied opinion text.
The revision petitioner (third defendant in O.S.No.671 of 1998) purchased a building at D.No.28, Pon Veethi, Erode on 15.7.1988 from S. Gowthaman (the vendor). At the time of purchase the property was under tenancy of A.V.G. Ponnuswamy Chettiar. After the purchase the petitioner sought attornment of tenancy.
On 11.8.1998 a plaint was presented under Section 92 CPC (seeking declaration and permanent injunction among other reliefs) by the vendor and others; the Subordinate Judge, Erode numbered that suit O.S.No.338 of 1998 after granting leave in I.A.No.496 of 1998 on 11.8.1998. The plaintiffs later endorsed a request to return the plaint with liberty to give notice and proceed, and the plaint was returned on 2.12.1988.
The petitioner initiated eviction proceedings (R.C.O.P.No.5 of 1989) against the tenant; the eviction was allowed by the Rent Controller on 4.11.1991 and confirmed in Civil Revision No.1082 of 1994 by this Court on 17.11.1998. While the rent proceedings and related revisions proceeded, the plaintiffs (including Sankararamanathan) instituted O.S.No.539 of 1990 after obtaining leave under Section 92 (I.A.No.1024 of 1998) and that matter resulted in Civil Revision Petition No.3368 of 1990 which was allowed by this Court on 23.8.1991; a subsequent Special Leave Petition was dismissed by the Supreme Court on 23.8.1996.
Soon after this Court's eviction decision (Civil Revision No.1082 of 1994) an Original Suit O.S.No.671 of 1998 was filed and Interlocutory Application No.1202 of 1998 was moved, which resulted in an interim injunction restraining the petitioner and his vendor from acting under the sale deed of 15.7.1988 (i.e., from executing the eviction order). The present civil revision petition challenges the interlocutory order in I.A.No.1202 of 1998 and seeks dismissal of the suit O.S.No.671 of 1998.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the interlocutory injunction granted in I.A.No.1202 of 1998 can be sustained in view of alleged non-compliance with Order 39, Rule 3, Code of Civil Procedure?
- Whether the plaint in O.S.No.671 of 1998 discloses any cause of action such that the suit should be permitted to proceed, or whether it is liable to be rejected under Order 7, Rule 11, C.P.C.?
- Whether the suit constitutes an abuse of the process of the court (including suppression of material facts and inaction by plaintiffs), warranting dismissal/striking off the plaint?
- Whether this Court should exercise its extraordinary jurisdiction (under Article 227) to interfere with the interlocutory order and the plaint, as opposed to leaving the issue to trial?
Arguments of the Parties
Revision Petitioner (represented by Mr. Gopalarathinam)
- The respondents wilfully suppressed earlier proceedings when filing O.S.No.671 of 1998, making the suit an abuse of process of court.
- The respondents (claiming to be worshippers) have no personal right to interfere with or participate in possession of the alleged trust property; they are outsiders and did not aver any act of avoidance of the sale by a competent person.
- The plaint fails to show any person with competence to avoid the sale deed or any averment that such avoidance was sought; thus the suit is not maintainable.
- No grounds exist for granting the interim order; the court below did not comply with the requirements of Order 39, Rule 3 CPC when granting the injunction.
Respondents (represented by Mr. S.V. Jayareaman)
- Conceded that the interlocutory order cannot be sustained because it violated Order 39, Rule 3 CPC.
- Contended that the suit itself is not liable to be dismissed under Article 227; the petitioner can raise maintainability at trial and the Court should not examine merits at this stage.
- Asserted that there exist sufficient grounds and averments to sustain the relief sought; the Court ought not to go into these questions in revision at this interlocutory stage.
- Relied upon a prior finding in Civil Revision Petition No.3368 of 1990 that the first defendant was a religious and charitable endowment trust under the Tamil Nadu legislation, arguing that the suit is maintainable on that basis.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Smt. Patasibai and others v. Ratanlal, J.T. (1993) 3 S.C. 68 | When no cause of action is disclosed, trial should not proceed; plaint averments not disclosing cause of action make the plaint liable to be rejected under O.7, R.11 C.P.C.; Court may adopt practical course of rejecting plaint to avoid delay. | The Court relied on this authority to support the conclusion that the plaint in O.S.No.671 of 1998 did not disclose a cause of action and therefore the practical course of striking off the plaint was appropriate to avoid needless delay. |
| Murugesan v. Sri Kundramadai Ayyanar Koil etc., (1997) 2 L.W. 780 (Division Bench) | It is the duty of a litigant invoking court jurisdiction to make full and true disclosure of all relevant facts; suppression of material facts can justify refusal to entertain the suit and dismissal of injunction application. | The Court applied this principle to find suppression of material facts (failure to disclose prior proceedings and inaction) and held that the suit and injunction application were liable to be dismissed on this ground as well. |
| T. Arivandandam v. T.V. Satyapal, (1997) 4 S.C.C. 467 | If on a mere reading the plaint is manifestly vexatious and meritless (not disclosing a clear right to sue), the Court should exercise power under O.7, R.11 C.P.C.; trial courts should consider Section 35-A C.P.C. for deterrent action against vexatious litigants. | The Court invoked this precedent to conclude that the plaint was vexatious/meritless and that Order 7 Rule 11 could be applied; the Court also noted the availability of deterrent action under Section 35-A C.P.C. though the primary relief was striking off the plaint. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court conducted a fact-sensitive analysis grounded solely on the pleadings and the earlier litigation history as recited in the opinion. The reasoning proceeded in these main steps:
- Chronology and contextual linkage: The Court observed that the first respondent had been a party to earlier proceedings (O.S.No.539 of 1990 and Civil Revision No.3368 of 1990, and a Special Leave Petition up to the Supreme Court) where issues relating to the same property and sale deed of 15.7.1988 were already before the courts. The new suit (O.S.No.671 of 1998) and the interlocutory application were filed immediately after this Court's eviction order was confirmed, indicating a temporal link to the eviction.
- Inaction and suppression: The Court emphasized that the first respondent made no attempt in the plaint or affidavit to explain a decade-long inaction or to disclose the earlier litigation candidly; the Court considered this a material non-disclosure. The Court treated such suppression, in light of the Murugesan principle, as a significant factor undermining the suit.
- Lack of personal interest / absence of enforceable obligation: Relying on Sections 2, 38 and 41(d) of the Specific Relief Act as cited in the opinion, the Court analyzed whether the plaintiffs had a personal obligation or enforceable right that would justify a perpetual injunction. The Court found that plaintiffs described themselves as worshippers and beneficiaries but failed to establish any personal legal obligation enforceable in their favour with respect to the property; thus they lacked requisite personal interest.
- Application of precedents on cause of action and vexatious suits: The Court applied Smt. Patasibai and T. Arivandandam, concluding that the plaint did not disclose a cause of action and appeared manifestly vexatious and meritless on its face. Given that precedent permits rejection under Order 7 Rule 11 CPC, the Court found it appropriate to adopt the "practical course" of striking off the plaint rather than remitting to the trial court for formality.
- Interlocutory injunction and procedural non-compliance: Both sides fairly conceded that the interlocutory order did not comply with Order 39, Rule 3 CPC. The Court held that the injunction could not be sustained for this reason, and more broadly because the underlying plaint lacked cause of action and was part of a collusive attempt to defeat eviction.
- Conclusion on abuse of process: Considering the inaction, suppression, lack of personal interest, and timing tied to eviction, the Court concluded the suit was a sham brought collusively (by worshippers at the instance of the tenant) to frustrate the eviction order, constituting an abuse of process. Accordingly, the Court determined that the plaint and interim injunction had no survival value.
Holding and Implications
Holding: The civil revision petition is allowed and the plaint in O.S.No.671 of 1998, pending on the file of the Sub Court, Erode, is struck off. No costs.
Implications:
- The interlocutory injunction granted in I.A.No.1202 of 1998 is held unsustainable (it violated Order 39, Rule 3 CPC and was founded on a plaint that did not disclose a cause of action).
- The plaint was struck off on grounds (i) inaction and suppression by the plaintiffs concerning prior proceedings, (ii) absence of disclosure of a personal enforceable interest in the property, and (iii) vexatious and collusive motive to defeat an eviction order.
- The decision directly affects the parties before the Court by terminating the present suit at the threshold; the opinion does not purport to lay down a new legal principle beyond applying existing precedents and statutory provisions.
Note: This summary is confined strictly to the content of the provided opinion and does not add extraneous facts or inferences beyond what the opinion itself states.
Third defendant in suit O.S.No.671 of 1998 and third respondent in I.A.No.1202 of 1998 on the file of the Sub Judge, Erode is the revision petitioner.
2. Briefly stated the facts are as follows: The revision petitioner had purchased a building at No.D.No.28, Pon Veethi, Erode on 15.7.1998 from one Thiru S.Gowthaman, fifth respondent. The said property was under the tenancy of one Thiru. A.V.G. Ponnuswamy Chettiar. After the purchase, a request was made for the attornment of tenancy. Without conceding the tenancy along with his three sons as also a partnership firm, consisting of himself and his sons presented a plaint in an original suit on 11.8.1998, on the file of Subordinate Judge, Erode against three defendants viz., the petitioner's vendor, petitioner and one Mandi Venkata Naicker Dharmam under Sec.92 of Code of Civil Procedure. They had prayed for a declaration and permanent injunction to declare the alienation of plaint schedule properties is null and void and not binding on Mandi Venkata Naicker Dharmam and to frame a proper scheme for the enforcement and smooth running of the trust and for a permanent injunction from interference.
The Sub Court numbered the suit and taken it on the file as O.S.No.338 of 1998, after granting leave under Sec.92 of Code of Civil Procedure in I.A.No.496 of 1998 on 11.8.1998. The revision petitioner and his vendor applied to the Sub Court to set aside the said order, granting leave and to dismiss the same. In the meanwhile, the plaintiffs in the suit made an endorsement, requesting for the return of the plaint with liberty to give notice and to proceed. Accordingly, the plaint was returned on 2.12.1988.
3. On 5.12.1988, the petitioner initiated proceedings to vacate the tenant Thiru A.V.G. Ponnusamy Chettiar by issuing a legal notice and thereafter filing an application in R.C.O.P.No.5 of 1989, before the Rent Controller Erode for eviction. The plaintiff in the aborted suit, O.S.No.338 of 1998 along with two more individuals, one R.Sankararamanathan and another C.Balasubramanian presented a suit before the Sub Court, Erode praying for almost the same relief for a declaration and for certain directions in reference to the same property. The Sub Court granted the leave under Sec.92 of Code of Civil Procedure in I.A.No.1024 of 1998 to institute the suit on 21.9.1990, which thereupon came to be numbered as O.S.No.539 of 1990. As against granting of leave the petitioner herein preferred a Civil Revision Petition No.3368 of 1990 before this Court. The revision was allowed on 23.8.1991. The Special Leave Petition filed against this was dismissed by the Supreme Court on 23.8.1996. While the civil revision petition was pending the rent control proceedings initiated by the petitioner were taken up. On 4.11.1991, the Rent Controller, Erode allowed the R.C.O.P.No.5 of 1989 and ordered eviction of the tenant, as prayed for. The said eviction order was confirmed by this Court in Civil Revision Petition No.1082 of 1994, dated 17.11.1998. After pronouncing the judgment in the said civil revision petition, this Court at the request of the tenants granted six months time to them to vacate the premises on condition that the respondent therein should file an affidavit of undertaking. Whileso, the first respondent herein who was the sixth plaintiff in the earlier suit O.S.No.539 of 1990 filed another suit before Sub Court, Erode, O.S.No.671 of 1998 and also filed an Interlocutory Application No.1202 of 1998 and obtained an interim injunction, restraining the petitioner herein and his vendor not to take any further action in pursuance of the sale deed dated 15.7.1988, in other words not to execute the eviction order against the tenant.
4. The present civil revision petition is filed to set aside the orders passed by the court below in the said interlocutory application as well as to dismiss the suit.
5. Learned senior counsel Mr.Gopalarathinam, appearing for the revision petitioner submitted that the respondents have wilfully suppressed all the earlier proceedings at the time of filing of the latter suit and that therefore the filing of the present suit by the respondents is only an abuse of process of court. The respondents, claiming to be the worshipers have no right to interfere or in any manner to participate with the possession of the alleged trust, especially when the allegation in the plaint itself is that there was in existence a trustee. If the sale was an alleged to be voidable it could be avoided only by a person competent to avoid the same and in the absence of even in averment as to any avoidance by any one at any point of time in the body of the plaint, the same was not at all maintainable. Excepting such plaint averment no suit by an outsider can lie, in which the prayer is directed against the trustee. According to learned counsel no grounds are made out for the grant of the interim order and the court below has failed to comply with the requirements of 39, Rule 3 of Code of Civil Procedure, in granting the order.
6. On the other hand, Mr.S.V.Jayareaman, learned senior counsel for the respondents fairly submitted that the interim order granted by the court below cannot be sustained, as it was made in violation of the provisions of 39, Rule 3 of Code of Civil Procedure. However, learned counsel for the respondents submit that the suit is not liable to be dismissed by invoking the extraordinary Jurisdiction under Art.227 of Constitution of India. It is always open to the petitioner to raise the maintainability of the suit at the time of trial. According to him, there are sufficient grounds and averments to sustain the relief sought for in the suit and it is beyond the scope of this Court to go into that question at this stage. It is further submitted that the findings of this Court in Civil Revision Petition No.3368 of 1990 was that the first defendant is the religious and charitable endowment trust within the meaning of Tamil Nadu Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Trust Act and that therefore, the suit is maintainable.
7. I have heard the counsel appearing on either side and considered the matter carefully.
8. It is seen that the first respondent, Thiru Sankara Ramanathan was the sixth plaintiff in O.S.No.539 of 1999 with reference to the same property. The prayer in the said suit was for a declaration that the alienation by the vendor Gowthaman to the petitioner herein is void, to frame a scheme for funning the trust, to appoint a fit person and to restore the suit property to the trust (while the relief for permanent injunction was prayed in O.S.No.339 of 1998 the same was omitted in O.S.No.539 of 1990). In Civil Revision Petition No.3368 of 1990, Srinivasan, J. (as he then was) dismissed the suit, Consequent on the dismissal of leave, the Supreme Court confirmed the order in Special Leave Petition No.17529 of 1991. Thiru Sankara Ramanathan, who had sworn to an affidavit in the application in I.A.No.1202 of 1998 in O.S.No.671 of 1998 was a party in Civil Revision Petition No.3368 of 1990 as well as in Special Leave Petition No.17529 of 1991. The proximity in date viz., on 17.11.1998 when the Civil Revision Petition No.1082 of 1994 was allowed directing eviction and 4.12.1998, the date of filing O.S.No.1082 of 1994 and obtaining injunction from eviction would obviously establish that the action of the respondents is at the instance of the tenant, who was directed to be evicted. Thiru Sankara Ramanathan in Original Suit No.539 of 1990 was aware by December, 1989, when he joined his co-plaintiff in filing the petition for the grant of leave to institute O.S.No.539 of 1990 of the sale deed executed on 15.7.1988 by Gowtham in favour of the petitioner. The first respondent has made no attempt in the plaint in O.S.No.671 of 1998 nor has he sworn to an affidavit, explaining his total inaction for the past ten years.
9. I find much force in the submissions of learned senior counsel for the petitioner that in the plaint allegations, the plaintiffs have not pleaded any personal interest to be protected by the Court. Sec.38 of the Specific Relief Act provides the contingencies under which perpetual injunction can be granted. As per this provision, perpetual injunction can be granted to the plaintiff to prevent the breach of an obligation existing in his favour. The word obligation is defined under Sec.2 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 as obligation including every duty enforceable by law. As per Sec.41(d) of the said Act, injunction cannot be granted, when the plaintiff has no personal interest in the matter.
10. In paragraph 4 of the plaint in O.S.No.671 of 1998, it is averred that they are ardent devotees and faithful followers of Lord Sri Vigneswara at EF.No.1075/A in front of the choultry built by the founder of the Trust at Erode. They are the worshippers and beneficiaries of the regular poojas performed thereof. So, they are interested in the trust. The trustee in violation of interdicts of trust deed and contrary to the provisions of law alienated the plaint described the trust property on 15.7.1988 in favour of the third defendant. On the other hand, the case of the petitioner is that the property was purchased only as a private personal property of his vendor Gowtham and did not belong to any trust, whereas the plaintiff in O.S.No.671 of 1998 as he did not bother to question some twenty-three instances of alienations, which were claimed to be the property of the trust and even in reference to this property they were aware of the sale in the year 1988 and waited till eviction was ordered finally by the High Court to move the present suit. Though the petitioner has succeeded in the eviction proceedings ultimately on 17.11.1998 and even after the lapse of ten years from the date of purchase he is yet to get the fruits of it. During this period he had to fight two civil suits viz., Civil Revision Petition No.3368 of 1990 and Special Leave Petition.
11. From these averments, it is obvious that there is no obligation relatable and that could be enforceable in law in reference to the property. It is alleged that the trustee is acting in violation and prejudicial to the interest of the trust. According to them the idol installed in front of the choultry founded by Mandi Venkata Naicker. The main object of the trust was performance pooja of the idol Sri Vigneswarasamy and other temples. Thus, the plaintiff is a worshipper and outsider to the trust. When the defendant is the trustee, there should be an obligation enforceable in law to maintain a prayer for injunction. Admittedly, the petitioner has no personal interest in the matter, as according to him he is a mere workshipper.
12. The Supreme Court in the case reported in Smt.Patasibai and others v. Ratanlal Smt.Patasibai and others v. Ratanlal Smt.Patasibai and others v. Ratanlal , J.T. (1993)3 S.C. 68, held that when no cause of action is disclosed, the trial should not be allowed to be proceeded with since no triable issue has arisen. The Supreme Court has further held in the said decision as the plaint averments do not disclose a cause of action, the plaint is liable to be rejected under O.7, Rule 11, C.P.C. Hence, it is not necessary to adopt the technical course of directing the trial court to make the consequential order of rejecting the plaint and instead practical course of making that order in those proceedings should be adopted to avoid any needless delay in conclusion of this litigation.
13. A Division Bench of this Court in Murugesan v. Sri Kundramadai Ayyanar Koil etc. ,
(1997)2 L.W. 780, has held that it is a settled proposition of law that it is the duty of the person invoking the jurisdiction of the Court to make a full and true disclosure of all relevant facts. He should not suppress any fact. If he makes a statement, which is false, or conceals something from the court, which is relevant, the Court will refuse to go into the matter. It was further held that the suit as well as the injunction application are liable to be dismissed, not only on the ground that there is suppression of material fact but also on the ground that the very basis of the suit does not exist.
14. In the decision reported in T.Arivandandam v. T.V.Satyapal T.Arivandandam v. T.V.Satyapal T.Arivandandam v. T.V.Satyapal , (1997)4 S.C.C. 467, the Supreme Court has held that if on a mere reading of the plaint it is manifestly vexatious and meritless in the sense of not disclosing a dear right to sue, it should exercise its power under O.7, Rule 11 of Code of Civil Procedure taking care to see that the grounds mentioned therein is fulfilled. The trial court will remind itself of Sec.35-A of Code of Civil Procedure and take deterrent action, if it is satisfied that the litigation was inspired by vexatious motives and altogether groundless litigation. Applying the ratio laid down in the aforesaid decision, it is clear that the averments made in the plaint do not disclose the cause of action, besides the plea raised by them are not maintainable. Therefore, the suit and the application are liable to be dismissed for
(a) inaction of the plaintiff after having been a party to the suit O.S.No.539 of 1990 and Civil Revision Petition No.3368 of 1990 and Special Leave Petition Civil No.17529 of 1991 who were fully aware of the sale deed executed on 15.7.1988;
(b) The plaintiff did not disclose the full facts, particularly of the suit O.S.No.539 of 1990 and the Special Leave Petition candidly and to explain the action initiated by the plaintiff either in the plaint or in the affidavit filed in support of the petition for injunction in the present suit; and
(c) The fact that the first respondent has admitted that he had no personal interest or obligation in law to be protected coupled with the failure to avoid the sale all these years will only lead to the irresistible conclusion that the present is filed at the instance of his co-plaintiff/tenant in O.S.No.539 of 1990 to set at naught the order of eviction, confirmed by this Court and in abuse the process of court. It is true that under normal circumstances this Court will not entertain any revision against an ad-interim ex parte order under which notice is directed to the opposite party. But in cases of gross injustice and patent violation of elementary principles of law this Court will not hesitate to interfere with such orders.
15. In the above circumstances, the order of ad interim injunction in I.A.No.1202 of 1999 cannot be sustained and on consideration of the matter further it is clear that the plaint does not disclose any cause of action, but appears to me a sham litigation brought about in collusion with the erstwhile co-plaintiff in O.S.No.539 of 1990 and tenant to avoid the eviction from the property in the guise of a mere worshipper . Having come to this conclusion, the plaint and the suit have no survival value and the practical course is to avoid and needless delay in the conclusion of this vexatious litigation.
16. For all the foregoing reasons, this civil revision petition is allowed and the plaint in O.S.No.671 of 1998, pending on the file of the Sub Court, Erode is struck off. No costs.
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