Manikyam, C. v. R. Thimmiah

1. This appeal by the plaintiff is directed against the judgment and decree dated 9-1-1975 passed by the Civil Judge, Bangalore City, in RA No. 158/73 on his file, dismissing the appeal of the plaintiff on confirming the judgment and decree dated 10-7-1973, passed by the I Addl. I Munsiff, Bangalore in OS No. 887/1969 on his file, dismissing the suit instituted by the plaintiff for declaration of his title and for possession of the schedule property.

2. Sy. No. 8 of Ranganathapur according to the plaintiff belonged to K. Shanmugam and the members of his family. Raghavappa and Chengalarayappa purchased the said survey number under a sale deed dt. 1-8-1955. They formed several sites and site Nos. 17 and 18 were purchased by one Manikya Mudaliar son of Narayanaswamy Mudaliar from them, under a registered sale deed dt. 20-7-1957. Manikya Mudaliar paid conversion charges in respect of site No. 17 on 23-7-1957. Thereafter the plaintiff purchased and constructed a shed on it and orally leased it to defendant on a monthly rent of Rs. 10. The defendant was in arrears of rent from 1-9-1965. The plaintiff filed an eviction petition against him on the grounds of arrears of rent and bona fide use and occupation. In the eviction petition, the defendant denied plaintiff's title and contended that he was a lessee under the previous owner and put the plaintiff to establish his title before the Civil Court and the plaintiff was ultimately directed by the Munsiff under the Rent Control Act to establish his title in a regular Civil Court and hence the plaintiff instituted the suit for declaration of his title and for possession. The defendant resisted the suit by taking up several contentions. He denied the title of the plaintiff. He further asserted that the Civil Court had no jurisdiction to decide the title of the plaintiff or defendant as that was the special jurisdiction of the Special Deputy Commissioner under the Inams Abolition Act; the jurisdiction of the Civil Court was ousted. He contended that there was no relationship as landlord and tenant between him and the plaintiff.

3. The trial Court raised the following issues as arising from the pleadings for its consideration:

(1) Whether the plaintiff proves that he is the owner of the suit schedule property?

(2) Whether the plaintiff proves that the defendant is a tenant in the suit schedule property under him on a monthly rent of Rs. 10?

(3) Whether the plaintiff's suit is barred by adverse possession?

(4) Whether the plaintiff is entitled to recover Rs. 360 by way of damages, compensation or mesne profits and also future mesne profits?

(5) Whether the plaintiff is entitled to the reliefs claimed?

Additional Issue:

(6) Whether this Court has no jurisdiction to try this suit as suit land forms part of Jodi Ranganathapura Village?

4. The trial Court, appreciating the evidence on record, held under Issue No. 6 that it had no jurisdiction to entertain and decide the question at issue regarding title as the suit land was vested under the provisions of the Inams Abolition Act. It also answered on the other material issues against the plaintiff and dismissed the suit of the plaintiff. Aggrieved by the said judgment and decree as stated above, the plaintiff went up in appeal before the Civil Judge, Bangalore in RA No. 158 of 1973 on his file.

5. The learned Civil Judge, raised the following preliminary point as arising for his consideration in the appeal;

(1) Whether the learned Munsiff was justified in dismissing the suit on ground of want of jurisdiction and perfection on title by adverse possession by defendant?

6. The learned Civil Judge, reassessing the evidence on record, held upholding the finding of the learned Munsiff that the Civil Court had no jurisdiction to decide the question of title with regard to the inam land which stood vested in Government and in that view he dismissed the appeal on confirming the judgment and decree of the trial Court. Aggrieved by the said judgment and decree, the plaintiff has come up with the above second appeal before this Court.

7. The learned Advocate appearing for the appellant strenuously urged before me that the Courts below were not justified in holding that the Civil Court ceased to have jurisdiction in view of the provisions contained in Ss. 10 and 28 of the Inams Abolition Act. He submitted that whatever the position may be with regard to the lands, the Civil Court would not lose its jurisdiction with regard to house situate in inam land. They are the two points that arise for my consideration in this appeal.

8. The question whether the Civil Court loses its jurisdiction after vesting of inam land in the Government to decide the question of title came up for consideration before this Court at least in two reported cases earlier. First it came up for consideration in the case Kempamma v. S. Kempanna(1). A Division Bench of this Court consisting of Justice Somnath Iyer (as be then was) and Justice Chandrashekhar has observed that:

“Where after the vesting in Government of the inam village, plaintiff sued for a declaration that he was a permanent tenant of certain lands in the village immediately before the vesting of the inam village and for possession, held, the Civil Court could grant neither the relief for declaration nor the one for possession”.

that being the exclusive jurisdiction of the Spl. Dy. Commissioner created under the statute.

9. The question came up again for consideration before a Division Bench of this Court in the case Rangappa v. Chinnappaiah(2) wherein the same Judges who decided the earlier case have confirmed the position. Justice Somnath Iyer who spoke for the Bench reviewed the case law on the point and has laid down, after analysing the different sections and considering the decision of the Supreme Court on the point, that the Civil Court has no jurisdiction to entertain and decide the question of title with regard to the lands vested in the Government as a result of the provisions of the Inams Abolition Act after the vesting. Speaking on this aspect he has observed:

“It seems to me that the provisions of sub-sec. (1) of S. 28 are by themselves sufficient to support the view that the only Tribunal which could make an adjudication on the question whether a person is entitled to be registered under Ss. 4 or 5, as the case may be, is the Dy. Commissioner on whom that power of adjudication is conferred by the Act. S. 4 authorises a person who was a Kadim tenant immediately before the date of vesting, to make an application for registration as an occupant, while S. 5 authorises a person who was a permanent tenant immediately before the date of vesting, to make an application for such registration. S. 10 empowers the Dy. Commissioner to make an adjudication on such claim. Sub-sec. (1) of S. 28 provides for an appeal from that decision of the Dy. Commissioner, and further provides that the decision in appeal by the prescribed authority shall be final”.

“It is manifest from the provisions of Ss. 4 to 10, although the provisions of Ss. 4 and 5 are the only relevant provisions for the purpose of the revision petition before us, and also from those of Sub-sec. (1) of S. 28 that the Inams Abolition Act is a complete and exhaustive code on the matters referred to in those sections which include the presentation of a claim for registration as an occupant, an adjudication thereupon and an appeal from that adjudication. If this fascicle of sections provides for a complete and full investigation on the claim and for a decision on it, and in addition, for an appeal from such decision, the very fact that the Act provides for a hierarchy of authorities for an adjudication. In that way, is normally sufficient to justify the deduction that the adjudication by the Dy. Commissioner or by the prescribed authority in appeal is not open to challenge in a Civil Court, subject to the well known exceptions pointed out by the Supreme Court in Desikacharyulu v. State of A.P (AIR 1964 SC 806 at p. 809)”.

10. Thus, it is laid down by the Division Bench of this Court that the Civil Court ceases to have jurisdiction to decide the question of title when once the land vested in the Government under the provisions of the Inams Abolition Act. All such questions shall be decided only by the special forum created under the statute. There is no substance in the submission made before me that though that is so in the case of lands, the proposition would not apply in the case of houses. Here again my attention was invited to Ss. 9 and 12 of the Inams Abolition Act. Sub-sec. (2) of S. 9 of the Inams Abolition Act reads:

“Every building situated within the limits of the inam which was owned immediately before the date of vesting by the inamdar shall, with effect on and from such date, vest in the Government”.

11. In the case of a building which was not owned by the Inamdar on the date of vesting, sub-sec. (1) (iii) of S. 9 reads:

“Land upon which have been erected buildings owned by any person other than the inamdar”.

12. Thus, it is clear that provisions are made for vesting in the case of building also and the lands on which the buildings are situate. Hence, there is no force in the argument that houses are exempted from the provisions of vesting under the Inams Abolition Act. That being so, I am satisfied that the Courts below were justified in holding that the Civil Court has no jurisdiction to decide the question of title with regard to the suit property which obviously stands vested in the Government by the provisions of Inams Abolition Act.

13. In the result, the appeal fails and is dismissed. The findings on other issues would not loom large because findings are given without jurisdiction.

14. On the peculiar facts of the case I make no order as to costs of this appeal.