Rekha Pramodrao Deshmukh v. Gajanan Maharaj Sansthan, Shegaon And Others

In view of notice for final disposal issued earlier, the learned Counsel for the parties have been heard at length by issuing Rule and making the same returnable forthwith. The short question that arises for consideration in these writ petitions is whether provisions of section 24 of the Maharashtra Rent Control Act, 1999 (for short, the said Act) would entitle a landlord to recover possession of premises given for business purposes on expiry of the license granted in that regard.

2. Aforesaid question arises on the following facts. An agreement was entered into between each petitioner and respondent No. 1 by which each petitioner was granted license for a shop to conduct business of sale of prasad for a period of eleven months. Pursuant thereto each petitioner was put in possession of their respective shops. The possession of the respective shops were not handed over to respondent No. 1 after expiry of the licences. As the petitioners apprehended dispossession, suit for declaration that the agreement in question had been entered into by exercising undue influence and for permanent injunction to restrain respondent No. 1 from dispossessing the petitioners without following due process of law came to be filed. In said suit, the trial Court directed the parties to maintain status quo with regard to possession. The respondent No. 1 thereafter filed separate applications against each petitioner under section 24 read with section 42 of the said Act before the Competent Authority praying that the possession of the shop blocks be directed to be delivered on account of expiry of the respective licenses. In said proceedings, the petitioners filed applications for grant of leave to defend the proceedings. A ground was also raised that the proceedings were not maintainable as the premises were not granted for residential purpose. By the impugned order, the Competent Authority held that provisions of section 24 of the said Act were not restricted only to residential premises and as provisions of section 24(2) of the said Act were attracted, the objection raised by each petitioner were not maintainable. It, therefore, rejected the objection raised by the petitioners that it had no jurisdiction to entertain the proceedings. Being aggrieved, each petitioner has challenged said order.

3. Shri J.B Gandhi, learned Counsel for the petitioners submitted that provisions of section 24 of the said Act laying down a separate procedure for recovery of possession were not applicable to premises given for business purposes. Said provisions were applicable only in respect of premises given on license for residence. He referred to provisions of section 41 of the said Act in that regard. According to him, aforesaid provisions made it amply clear that the special procedure was applicable only to premises given on license for residence. He therefore submitted that the objections raised by the petitioners deserved to be allowed. In support of his submissions, the learned Counsel placed reliance on the following decisions:

[1] Surendra B. Agarwal v. AML Merchandising Pvt. Ltd., 2010 (1) Mh.LJ 223.

[2] Dinesh Jagannath Khandelwal v. Kundanlal s/o Perumal Chhabriya, 2010 (7) Mh.LJ 719 : 2010 (2) ALL MR 588.

[3] Sails India… v. Mrs. Rita M. Rupani…., 1997 (2) Mh.LJ 269.

[4] AMI Merchandising Pvt. Ltd. v. State of Maharashtra, 2014 (3) Mh.LJ 257.

[5] Mohd. Shaft v. Additional District and Sessions Judge (VII), Allahabad, (1977) 2 SCC 226.

[6] Dinkar Keshav Deshmukh… v. Vasantdada Sugar Institute, Pune…., Pune, 1997 (1) Mh.LJ 188.

[7] Philips India Ltd. v. Labour Court, Madras, (1985) 3 SCC 103.

4. Shri A.M Gordey, learned Senior Counsel for the respondents on the other hand supported the impugned order and submitted that even though the premises in question had been given on license for business purpose, on the expiry of the license, the possession could be sought under provisions of section 24 of the said Act. He referred to the provisions of section 7(3) of the said Act which define “landlord” and section 7(5) of the said Act which define “licensee.” He then submitted that as the petitioners had not handed over possession despite expiry of the period of license, they were liable to pay damages in terms of section 24(2) of the said Act and submitted that the respondents had rightly invoked said provisions while seeking possession. It was also urged that provisions of section 41 did not create any substantive right by itself and same was only procedural in nature. Definition of the term “landlord” in section 41(c) of the said Act could not be relied for holding that said procedure was applicable only to premises given for residence. It was, therefore, submitted that the Competent Authority had rightly come to the conclusion that the summary procedure as prescribed would be applicable and the applications filed under section 24 of the said Act were tenable.

5. I have given due consideration to the respective submissions and I have gone through the documents filed on record. Reference may be made to certain provisions of the said Act that are found relevant. Section 7(3) of the said Act defines the expression “landlord” to mean any person who for the time being is entitled to receive rent in respect of any premises. Section 7(5) of the said Act defines the term “licensee” which means a person in occupation of premises under a subsisting agreement for license. Section 7(9) of the said Act defines term “premises” to mean any building or part of building given on license. Section 24 of the said Act gives right to a landlord to recover possession of premises given on license after expiry of the period of license. Provisions of section 24 read thus:

“24. Landlord entitled to recover possession of premises given on license on expiry. — (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act, a licensee in possession or occupation of premises given to him on license for residence shall deliver possession of such premises to the landlord on expiry of the period of licence; and on the failure of the licensee to so deliver the possession of the licensed premises, a landlord shall be entitled to recover possession of such premises from a licensee, on the expiry of the period of licence, by making an application to the Competent Authority, and the Competent Authority, on being satisfied that the period of licence has expired, shall pass an order for eviction of a licensee.

(1) Any licensee who does not deliver possession of the premises to the landlord on expiry of the period of licence and continues to be in possession of the licensed premises till he is dispossessed by the Competent Authority shall be liable to pay damages at double the rate of the license fee or charge of the premises fixed under the agreement of lilcence.

(2) The Competent Authority shall not entertain any claim of whatever nature from any other person who is not a licensee according to the agreement of license, (emphasis supplied on underlined portion)

Section 41 of the said Act defines “landlord” for the purposes of Chapter VIII of the said Act and section 41(c) states that a person who has given premises on license for residence or a successor in interest referred to in section 24 would be a landlord for the purposes of Chapter VIII.

6. Perusal of aforesaid provisions makes it clear that though the term “landlord” has been defined by section 7(3) of the said Act, for the purposes of Chapter VIII of the said Act, the term “landlord” has been defined by section 41(c) of the said Act to mean a person who has given premises on license for residence as referred to in section 24. Section 24(1) of the said Act also refers to a license given for residence and the duty of such licensee to deliver possession to the landlord on expiry of the period of license. Sub-section (2) of section 24 of the said Act contemplates the consequence of failure to deliver possession on the expiry of the period of license and makes the licensee liable to pay damages at double the rate of the license fee or charge as fixed under the agreement of license. It is thus clear that section 24 restricts its applicability only to premises given on license for residence. By defining the term “landlord” under section 41(c) of the said Act and restricting the same for the purposes of Chapter VIII under which such landlord is required to make an application for evicting a licencee, this position is made further clear. Even provisions of section 7 of the said Act stipulate that the terms defined would be subject to anything repugnant to the subject or context. Thus, the provisions of section 7(3) of the said Act that define “landlord” cannot be taken into consideration while considering the expression “landlord” under section 24 of the said Act. When provisions of section 24 and section 41(c) of the said Act are read together, it is crystal clear that the landlord for the purposes of section 24 of the said Act is a person who has given premises on license for residence and only such landlord can recover possession of premises given on license for residence under section 24(1) of the said Act. Provisions of section 24(2) of the said Act are only in aid of provisions of section 24(1) of the said Act and the same contemplate payment of damages for continuing in possession after expiry of the period of license. It is, therefore, held that provisions of section 24 of the said Act would be applicable only to premises given on license for residence.

7. In Dinkar Keshav Deshmukh (supra), provisions of section 13A(2) of the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rents Control Act, 1947 were considered which provisions are in para materia with provisions of section 24 of the said Act. It was observed that section 13A(2) of the said Act is restricted to premises given on residence. Very same provisions were also considered by learned Single Judge in Sails India (supra) and in para 13 of said judgment, it was observed that the premises in occupation must have been taken on license for residence. With regard to provisions of section 24 of the said Act, learned Single Judge in Surendra Agarwal (supra) in paras 10 and 11 has held that the premises in question given for license should be for residence. Similar observations can be found in judgment of learned Single Judge in Dinesh Jagannath Khandelwal (supra). In AMI Merchandising Pvt. Ltd. (supra) also the premises in question were given for residential purposes.

8. It was also submitted by the learned Counsel for the petitioners by relying upon the decision of the Supreme Court in Mohd. Shaft (supra) that if in a legislation that is intended to protect a tenant against unreasonable eviction an expression in the statute is susceptible to two interpretations, then the expression which enlarges the protection of the tenant should be preferred to the one which restricts it. It is, however, not necessary to undertake any exercise in the matter of interpretation on aforesaid principle as on a plain reading it is clear that the provisions of section 24(1) read with section 41 of the said Act would apply only to premises given on license for residence.

9. Thus, in the light of aforesaid conclusion, it is clear that the proceedings initiated by the respondents under provisions of section 24 of the said Act seeking possession of the premises that were admittedly given for conducting business were not tenable. The impugned order, therefore, cannot be sustained and the same is liable to be set aside.

10. Accordingly, the following order is passed:

(1) It is held that said proceedings initiated by the respondents under section 24 of the said Act are not maintainable. The impugned order dated 27-3-2015 passed by the Competent Authority holding that it has jurisdiction to entertain the proceedings initiated under section 24 of the said Act in each writ petition is set aside.

(2) It is open for the respondents to initiate appropriate proceedings in accordance with law for evicting the petitioners and seeking possession of the premises in question.

(3) Rule is made absolute in aforesaid terms in each writ petition with no order as to costs.

Rule made absolute.