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Aravan Servai v. Kamugan Servai And Others.
Structured Summary of the Opinion
Factual and Procedural Background
This opinion concerns Civil Revision Petition C.R.P. No. 190 of 1958 filed against an order of the Revenue Divisional Officer (RDO), Tiruchirappalli, made in R. A. No. 23 of 1957. R.A. No. 23 of 1957 was an application by Kamugan Servai under S. 4(5) of the Madras Cultivating Tenants Protection Act (Act XXV of 1955 as amended by Act XIV of 1956) seeking restoration of possession of certain lands allegedly evicted in May 1956.
The RDO allowed the application and ordered restoration in respect of items 1 and 3 (subject to harvesting of the existing Samba crops) and dismissed it in respect of item 2. Items 1 and 2 were held to belong to Aravan Servai and item 3 to Ramaswami Reddiar. Aravan Servai filed the present civil revision in respect of item 1.
The background includes earlier civil litigation: on 13 August 1956, Sevugan Servai (described in the opinion as a cultivating tenant for the land under Aravan Servai) filed O.S. No. 470 of 1956 in the District Munsif's Court, Kulitalai, seeking a permanent injunction against Kamugan Servai and an interlocutory application for temporary injunction (I.A. No. 1107 of 1956). A counter by Kamugan disputing Sevugan's claims was filed on 25 August 1956; a temporary injunction was granted on 5 September 1956.
Kamugan thereafter filed the petition before the Revenue Divisional Officer (R.A. No. 23 of 1957) on 30 November 1956. The landlord, Aravan Servai, on 30 January 1956 (the opinion records a counter pointing to the District Munsif's injunction), drew attention to the civil court proceedings. Despite that, the RDO directed restoration on 28 December 1957.
On 24 February 1958 the District Munsif's Court (in proceedings renumbered as O.S. No. 493 of 1957) decided the suit in favour of the plaintiff: it found that the defendant Kamugan Servai was not a cultivating tenant and that the plaintiff was in possession on the date of suit and entitled to injunction. The present Civil Revision was filed against the RDO's restoration order.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the Revenue Divisional Officer had jurisdiction to proceed with the restoration application when civil proceedings (for possession/injunction) between the same parties were pending and had resulted in an interlocutory order.
- Whether the relationship of landlord and cultivating tenant existed between the parties such as to confer jurisdiction on the Revenue Divisional Officer under the Madras Cultivating Tenants Protection Act (Act XXV of 1955) as amended by Act XIV of 1956.
- Whether, and to what extent, a civil court must transfer or stay proceedings under S. 6-A of Act XIV of 1956 (and how that interacts with S. 6 of Act XXV of 1955 and S. 10 of the Civil Procedure Code).
Arguments of the Parties
Kamugan Servai (Applicant before the Revenue Divisional Officer)
- Filed R.A. No. 23 of 1957 under S. 4(5) alleging eviction in May 1956 and claiming restoration as a cultivating tenant.
- Contested the title/possession issues with the landlord and maintained entitlement to restoration under the statute (as reflected by filing the R.A.).
Aravan Servai (Landlord / Appellant in the Civil Revision)
- Pointed out to the Revenue Divisional Officer and in pleadings that the District Munsif's Court had granted an injunction in O.S. No. 470 of 1956 (supporting a civil remedy and contesting the status asserted by Kamugan).
- Challenged the RDO's jurisdiction to proceed where civil proceedings related to possession/tenancy were pending and where a prima facie finding against cultivating tenant status had been made in the civil forum.
Sevugan Servai (Plaintiff in O.S. No. 470 of 1956)
- Maintained that he was the cultivating tenant in possession and sought (and obtained) a temporary injunction against Kamugan Servai; later succeeded at trial, with the court finding Kamugan not a cultivating tenant and the plaintiff in possession.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Surajnarain v. Jamil (1946 A.I.R. Pat. 385) | Illustration of the general rule that Civil Courts have jurisdiction to try suits of a civil nature subject to statutory bars (relating to S.9 Civil Procedure Code). | Used to support the statement that ordinarily civil courts retain jurisdiction unless expressly or impliedly barred by statute (context: Act XXV of 1955). |
| Jagannatha v. Kutumbaraydu (1916) 39 Mad. 21 | Authority cited for general principles about the jurisdiction of civil courts under S.9/C.P.C. | Referenced among authorities establishing that civil courts normally try civil suits unless statute provides otherwise. |
| State of Bombay v. Adamjee (1951 A.C. 147) | Supporting authority on the scope of civil court jurisdiction vis-à-vis statutory or special tribunals. | Relied upon in the set of cases showing limits to civil courts' jurisdiction where special Acts operate. |
| Valli v. Corporation of Madras (1915) 38 Mad. 41 | Another authority illustrating the general jurisdiction of civil courts subject to statutory exclusions. | Placed alongside other precedents to show the ordinary competence of civil courts absent a statutory bar. |
| S of S v. Mask (67 I.A. 222) | Principle that civil courts can examine cases where statutory tribunal procedures were not complied with or fundamental principles of judicial procedure were violated. | Invoked to qualify that civil courts can intervene if a tribunal has not acted in conformity with judicial procedure. |
| Noor Muhammad v. Sulaiman (49 C.W.N. 10 = (1947) 1 Cal.) | Same general point as S of S v. Mask: civil courts' ability to look into tribunal proceedings when statutory safeguards or procedures are not followed. | Used to show exceptions to the rule that civil matters are excluded from civil courts where tribunal jurisdiction exists. |
| Kuppuswami v. Subramaniaswami Devasthanam (1958) 1 M.L.J. 208 = 71 L.W. 303 | Held that before a civil court transfers a proceeding under S. 6-A, it must be satisfied not only that the person is a "cultivating tenant" as defined but also that he is entitled to some benefit(s) under the Act. | Applied to explain the limits of S.6-A transfers and to support the proposition that the civil court must be satisfied of both cultivating tenant status and entitlement to benefits before transfer; used in partitioning the respective domains of civil and revenue courts. |
| Narasimha Chettiar v. Muthuswami Gounder and others (71 L.W. 26) | Clarifies that, subject to S.6 of Act XXV of 1955, aggrieved landlords can sue for arrears of rent with specific limitations (e.g., registered leases, six-year recovery), and the Act provides alternative remedies for amounts covered by the Act. | Invoked to explain what remedies remain available to landlords in civil courts notwithstanding the bar created by Act XXV of 1955. |
| Chinmayanandaswamigal & others v. Sinangi Konar & others (70 L.W. 87) | Authority on voluntary surrender by a tenant terminating his character as a cultivating tenant. | Used to illustrate that a civil court may examine whether a tenant has voluntarily surrendered cultivating tenant status and thereby is no longer entitled to protection under the Act. |
| Kuppammal v. Vellingiri (70 L.W. 11) | Related authority concerning circumstances in which cultivating tenant status may cease or be examined by civil courts. | Referenced to support the proposition that civil courts can determine questions such as surrender of tenant status. |
| Sellathammal v. M. Ganesan (70 L.W. 119 JOUR. Sec. (C.R.P. No. 390 of 1957)) | Another authority on the circumstances where civil courts can adjudicate matters affecting cultivating tenant status. | Used to illustrate instances where civil courts may entertain issues that affect the jurisdictional boundary between civil and revenue fora. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court's analysis proceeded from the statutory framework and principles of comity between civil and revenue fora as follows:
- Statutory framework: The opinion set out relevant statutory provisions: S.6 of Act XXV of 1955 (bar on civil court jurisdiction in matters committed to revenue authorities and prohibition on injunctions in respect of actions taken under the Act) and S.6-A of Act XIV of 1956 (procedures for transfer of suits from civil courts to the Revenue Divisional Officer where the defendant is proved to be a cultivating tenant entitled to benefits of the Act). The court also relied on S.10 and S.9 of the Civil Procedure Code in describing the interaction of concurrent proceedings in different courts.
- Jurisdictional test for the Revenue Divisional Officer: The opinion explained that the RDO's jurisdiction depends on two conditions: (a) the relationship of landlord and cultivating tenant must exist between the parties; and (b) the relief sought must be one of those specified in the Act. If the relationship is denied, the RDO may inquire into that fact to decide his jurisdiction; if he finds the relationship does not exist, he must dismiss the application.
-
Concurrent proceedings and comity: The court emphasised the mutual respect between civil courts and revenue courts. Under S.10 C.P.C., neither forum should proceed where the same matter is directly and substantially in issue in another pending suit between the same parties. The court described the following operational rules drawn from the authorities:
- If a civil court, in proceedings before it, gives a prima facie finding that the relationship of landlord and cultivating tenant does not exist, a revenue officer should await the decision of the civil court and ought not to proceed.
- If the civil court, on the other hand, finds the relationship does exist, it must transfer the proceedings to the revenue authority under S.6-A; if the civil court finds the relationship does not exist, the revenue officer must respect that finding and dismiss his application.
- If proceedings are pending before the revenue officer and an aggrieved party goes to the civil court, the civil court should stay its hand pending the revenue determination on the question of relationship and the competence to grant the relief sought.
- Application to the facts: Applying these principles to the facts, the court found that the RDO was not justified in proceeding with the restoration application because there were civil proceedings in which prima facie findings bearing directly on the cultivating-tenant issue and possession had been made. The RDO should have awaited the civil court's determination; further, the RDO's order contained observations which, the court said, he might well have abstained from making.
- Conclusion of analysis: In light of the statutory provisions, the authorities cited (notably Kuppuswami on the limits of S.6-A transfers and the tests for entitlement to benefits), and the comity required by S.10 C.P.C., the court concluded that the RDO's order was unsustainable.
Holding and Implications
Holding: The order of the Revenue Divisional Officer directing restoration (made in R. A. No. 23 of 1957) was set aside and the civil revision petition C.R.P. No. 190 of 1958 was allowed without costs.
The opinion also records that C.R.P. No. 241 of 1958, based on identical facts but concerning a different landlord (and O.S. No. 471 of 1956), received the same treatment: the RDO's order in that matter was set aside and the revision allowed without costs.
Implications:
- Direct effect: The immediate effect is that the restoration order made by the Revenue Divisional Officer is vacated; the civil revision(s) are allowed and the RDO's orders set aside (with no costs awarded).
- Jurisdictional clarity: The decision emphasises and applies the principle that revenue authorities must respect pending civil adjudications where the same question (notably, whether a cultivating-tenant relationship exists) is already directly and substantially in issue; conversely, civil courts must transfer or stay proceedings when the statutory tests for transfer under S.6-A are met. The court applied existing authorities to reinforce this comity rather than announcing a novel precedent.
- No new precedent announced: The opinion applies established principles and precedents to the facts and does not purport to lay down a novel rule beyond the existing statutory and case-law framework.
End of summary — prepared strictly from the contents of the provided opinion.
(Prayer: Petitions (disposed of on 13-5-1953) under S. 6 B of the Madras Act XXV of 1955 as amended by Act XIV of 1956 read with 8.115 of Act V of 1908 praying the High Court to revise the order of the Revenue Court of Tiruchirapapalli dated 28th December, 1957 and made in R. A. No. 23 of 1957.)
(1) The Civil Revision Petition (C. R. P. No. 190 of 1958) has been filed against the order made by the learned Revenue Divisional Officer, Tiruchirappalli in R. A. No. 23 of 1957.
(2) R. A. No. 23 of 1957 was an application by Kamugan Servai against Aravan Servai and Ramaswami Reddiar for restoration of possession of lands under S. 4 (5) of the Madras Cultivating Tenants Protection Act XXV of 1955 as amended by Madras Act XIV of 1956.
(3) This application has been allowed and restoration ordered in respect of items 1 and 3 after the existing Samba Crops on them are harvested and the application has been dismissed in respect of item 2.
(4) Items 1 and 2 belong to Aravan Servai and item 3 to Ramaswami Reddiar. This Civil Revision Petition has been filed by Aravan Servai in regard to item 1.
(5) On the foot that one Sevugan Servai was a cultivating tenant for this land under Aravan Servai and that Kamugan Servai was interfering with the possession and enjoyment of the suit properties by Sevugan Servai, O. S. No. 470 of 1956 was filed in the Court of the District Munsif of Kulitalai by Sevugan Servai for a permanent injunction against Kamugan Servai, on 13th August, 1956. On the same day, in I. A. No. 1107 of 1956 in O.S. No. 470 of 1956, District Munsif's Court Kulitalai, an application was made for a temporary injunction. On 25th August, 1956 a counter was filed by Kamugan Servai disputing the claims of Sevugan Servai. On 5th September, 1956 a temporary injunction was granted against Kamugan Servai.
(6) Thereupon Kamugan Servai appeared before the Revenue Divisional Officer, and, filed a petition on 30th November, 1956 under S-4 (5) of Act XXV of 1955 giving the date of eviction as May, 1956 for restoration and possession and which was numbered as R. A. No. 23 of 1957. On 30th January, 1956, the landlord Aravan Servai filed a counter specifically pointing out that the District Munsif has granted him an injunction in O.S. No. 470 of 1956. On 28th December, 1957, restoration was ordered by the Revenue Divisional Officer finding that this Kamugan Servan was a cultivating tenant.
(7) On 24th February, 1958, O. S. No. 470 of 1956 was decided in the District Munsif's Court of Turaiyur numbered as O. S. No. 493 of 1957. The suit was decreed. Issue (2) there was whether the plaintiff was in possession on the date of suit, and, issue (1) was whether the defendant was a cultivating tenant and whether the suit was barred under Act XXV of 1955. The finding on issue (1) was that the defendant Kamugan Servai was not a cultivating tenant and that the suit was not barred under Act XXV of 1956. The finding on issue (2) was that the plaintiff was in possession on the date of suit and that he was entitled to an injunction as prayed for.
(8) The present civil revision petition has been filed against the decision of the learned Revenue Divisional Officer directing restoration.
(9) The relevant provisions of Madras Act I of 1955, Act XXV of 1955 and Act XIV of 1956 are as follows:
Section 6 of the Act XXV of 1955 runs as follows:—
“No civil Court shall, except to the extent specified in S. 3 (3), have jurisdiction in respect of any matter which the Revenue Divisional Officer is empowered by or under this Act to determine and no injunction shall be granted by any Court in respect of any action taken or to be taken in pursuance of any power conferred by or under this Act.”
Section 6-A of Act XIV of 1956 provides for transfer of certain suits to the Revenue Divisional Officer by Civil Courts.
“If in any suit before any Court for possession of, or injunction in relation to, any land, it is proved by affidavit or otherwise that the defendant is a cultivating tenant entitled to the benefits of this Act, the Court shall not proceed with the trial of the suit but shall transfer it to the Revenue Divisional Officer who shall thereupon deal with and dispose of it as though it were an application under this Act and all the provisions of this Act shall apply to such an application and the applicant.”
(10) Both these provisions are naturally governed by S. 10, C. P. C., which states:
“No Court shall proceed with the trial of any suit in which the matter in issue is also directly and substantially in issue in a previously instituted suit between the same parties, or between parties under whom they or any of them claim litigating under the same title where such suit is pending in the same or any other Court in India having jurisdiction to grant the relief claimed, or in any Court beyond the limits of India established or continued by the Central Government and having like jurisdiction, or before the Supreme Court.”
(11) That both the civil and revenue Courts are subordinate to the High Court is provided by the Civil Procedure Code as well as by S. 6-B of Act XIV of 1956.
(12) To sum up, under S. 9, C.P.C., Civil Courts have jurisdiction to try all suits of a civil nature excepting suits of which their cognizance is either expressly or impliedly barred. Surajnarain v. Jamil (1946 A.I.R. Pat. 385), Jagannatha v. Kutumbaraydu (1916) 39 Mad. 21), State of Bombay v. Adamjee (1951 A.C. 147), Valli v. Corporation of Madras (1915) 38 Mad. 41). But even in such cases Civil Courts have jurisdiction to examine into cases where the provisions of the statute have not been complied with or the Tribunal has not acted in conformity with the fundamental principles of Judicial Procedure: S of S v. Mask (67 I. A. 222), Noor Muhammad v. Sulaiman (49 C. W. N. 10=(1947) 1 Cal). Ordinarily suits for possession, injunction, for ejectment, arrears of rent, will be filed in the civil Courts. But, by virtue of these Special Acts, a class of civil suits has been withdrawn from the purview of civil Courts in specified circumstances.
(13) The jurisdiction of the Revenue Divisional Officer is dependent upon two factors, viz., that the relationship of landlord and cultivating tenant must exist between the parties coming before him and it must be for one of those reliefs specified in the Act.
(14) In regard to the first condition it will of course be open to the Revenue Divisional Officer in case the relationship is denied to go into the question to decide that the has got jurisdiction viz,, whether the relationship of landlord and cultivating tenant exists in the particular circumstances of the case. If the answer is in the affirmative he can proceed with the application. If the answer is in the negative he has got to dismiss the application.
(15) This does not mean that in cases where the relationship of landlord and cultivating tenant is alleged not to exist it is not open to a landlord or the landlord's lessee to go to the civil Court in the first instance for one or more reliefs which the civil Court can give. The civil Court has got jurisdiction to enquire into the matter unless it is found that the relationship of landlord and cultivating tenant exists and the relief asked for is one which the Revenue Divisional Officer is empowered to give. In such a case it is provided for under S. 6-A of Act XXV of 1955 as amended by Act XIV of 1956 for the transfer of certain suits from the civil Courts to the revenue Courts established under the Act.
(16) It has been recently held by Balakrishna Ayyar, J., in Kuppuswami v. Subramaniaswami Devasthanam (1958) 1 M.L.J. 208=71 L.W. 303), that
“Having regard to the scheme of the Act and the language of the section before a civil Court can transfer a proceeding under S. 6-A of the Act, it must be satisfied that the tenant is not only a cultivating tenant as defined by the Act; he should also be entitled to some benefit or other under the Act. If both these conditions are not satisfied, no question of any transfer under S. 6-A of the Act will arise. It may be that in coming to a conclusion whether a suit has to be transferred or not the civil Court may have to determine certain questions which are exclusively within the jurisdiction of the Revenue Courts under the Act. But this cannot affect the interpretation of the specific words of the section, viz., “cultivating tenants entitled to the benefits of the Act.”
“ Quaere : Whether in view of the expression ‘benefits of the Act’ used in the plural, it is necessary that the tenant should be entitled to all the benefits of the Act before he could seek a transfer under S. 6-A?”
In fact, subject to the bar contained in S. 6 of the Act an aggrieved landlord can even sue for arrears of rent as pointed out by me in Narasimha Chettiar v. Muthuswami Gounder and others 71 L.W. 26 (Jour. Sec.), which reads:
“Subject to the bar contained in S. 6 of Madras Act XXV of 1955 aggrieved landlords can file suits for arrears of rent, and subject, however, to the following limitations. A suit can be filed for arrears of rent not covered by the provisions of Madras Act XXV of 1955. Thus, for instance, in the case of a registered lease, suits can be filed for recovery of arrears of rent for a maximum period of six years and which cannot be the case under the Act. In regard to the lease years covered by the Act and in regard to which deposit of arrears had been directed and had not been complied with, under the Act the remedy of the landlord is only to get the tenant evicted. With regard to the arrears of rent itself not deposited, the landlord can file a suit in the civil Court for recovery of such arrears and on obtaining a decree he can execute it in the manner provided by the Code of Civil Procedure.
A Receiver under O. 40, R. 1, Civil Procedure Code, can exercise all the powers except that of dispossessing a cultivating tenant. It will be open to him, for instance, in the management of the estate for which he is appointed Receiver by Court on behalf of both parties and which property he holds in custodial legist , to get that cultivating tenant at torn to him in as much as he has stepped into the shoes of the landlord for the time being. But he cannot dispossess him in contravention of the provisions of Madras Act XXV of 1955 and if he has to evict that cultivating tenant in pursuance of his management of the estate, he must do so only under the provisions of that Act.
If the cultivating tenant refuses to at torn to the Receiver, denying the title of the landlord, the cultivating tenant would cease to be a cultivating tenant and cannot invoke the protection of the Revenue Divisional Officer.”
It will thus be open to the civil Court to go into the question for instance whether there has been a voluntary surrender by the tenant terminating his character as a cultivating tenant as laid down in Chinmayanandaswamigal and others v. Sinangi Konar and others (70 L.W. 87 : Jour. Sec. (W. P. No. 699 of 1956), Kuppammal v. Vellingiri (70 L.W. 11) and Sellathammal v. M. Ganesan (70 L.W. 119 JOUR. Sec. (C. R. P. No. 390 1957).
It is obvious under S. 10. Civil Procedure Code, that the Civil Courts and the Revenue Courts are not rivals trying to obtain custom. On the other hand, the comity of Courts will be observed by both of them. If there are pending proceedings in a civil Court where a prima facie decision has been given that the relationship of landlord and cultivating tenant does not exist and the opposite party rushes to the revenue Court in order to obtain a decision to the contrary the Revenue Divisional Officer will hold his hand and await the decision of the civil Court. The moment the civil Court finds that the relationship of landlord and cultivating tenant exists it will transfer the proceedings. The moment it is found that the relationship of landlord and tenant does not exist the Revenue Divisional Officer must respect the finding of the civil Court and dismiss the application before himself. In the same way, if there are pending procedings before the Revenue Divisional Officer and the opposite party runs to the civil Court, a civil Court will stay its hands and await the decision whether the relationship of landlord and cultivating tenant exists, and, if the answer is in the affirmative and the remedy asked for before it are those which can be granted by the Revenue Divisional Officer the civil Court will not proceed with the suit. On the other hand, if the Revenue Divisional Officer finds that the relationship of landlord and tenant does not exist or that the reliefs asked for before him are not those which can be granted by him it will be open to the civil Court to proceed. In other words, each must respect the jurisdiction of the other, and, as I have said, both these Courts are subordinate to the High Court and are not rivals going out and scouring the highways and bye-ways touting as it were for custom. On the other hand both will be governed by the salutary principles laid down in S. 10, Civil Procedure Code.
Bearing these principles in mind, if we examine the facts of this case we will find that the Revenue Divisional Officer was not justified in proceeding with the application, and, what is more, he might well have abstained from the several observations he has made in his order. The order of the Revenue Divisional Officer is set aside and the civil revision petition is allowed in the circumstances, without costs.
C. R. P. No. 241 of 1958. This Revision is based on identical facts as C. R. P. No. 190 of 1958 but is in regard to O. S. No. 471 of 1956, District Munsif Court, Kulitalai in which the tenant is the same, though the landlord is different. The same order as in C. R. P. No. 190 of 1958 is made viz., that the order of the Revenue Divisional Officer is set aside and this C. R. P. is allowed in the circumstances without costs.
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