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State Of Karnataka v. R.S Naik
Structured Summary of the Legal Opinion
Factual and Procedural Background
The respondent, R.S. Naik, a District Judge in the Karnataka Judicial Services, was alleged to have been involved in a drunken brawl while travelling in a passenger bus. A complaint was lodged with the police. The Court, on the administrative side, placed the respondent under suspension by order No. HPS. 60/1980 dated 3-6-1980 and directed payment of subsistence allowances as per rules.
As the respondent neared retirement, he made a representation and, with the recommendation of the Court and in exercise of Rule 285 of the Karnataka Civil Services Rules, the Government issued a notification dated 22-10-1980 permitting him to voluntarily retire with immediate effect. The respondent retired effective 22-10-1980.
After retirement the respondent requested that the period of suspension from 4-6-1980 to 21-10-1980 be treated as on duty and that pension/terminal benefits be settled accordingly. The Registrar had requested the State Government to make payment of subsistence allowance for that period, but the respondent insisted the period be treated as on duty irrespective of the pending criminal prosecution. When this relief was not granted administratively, the respondent filed Writ Petition No. 14128 of 1981 under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution.
The State Government (appellant) resisted the petition, contending that Rule 101 of the Karnataka Civil Services Rules applied and prohibited grant of the claimed benefit so long as criminal proceedings were pending or until the civil servant was acquitted.
The learned single Judge allowed the writ petition, holding that Rule 101 did not apply to a case where a government servant had been permitted to retire while under suspension and that the period of suspension must be treated as on duty for regulation of terminal benefits. The State of Karnataka appealed.
The appellate court heard counsel for both sides and delivered the impugned judgment dismissing the appeal.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether Rule 101 of the Karnataka Civil Services Rules (K.C.S.R.) prohibiting payment of full pay/allowances during suspension while criminal proceedings are pending applies to a government servant who has been permitted to retire while under suspension.
- Whether the period of suspension (4-6-1980 to 21-10-1980) should be treated as "on duty" for the purpose of regulating terminal benefits and pensionary entitlements after the respondent was permitted to retire.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant (State Government) — represented by Sri Mandappa, Additional Government Advocate
- Submitted that Rule 101 of the K.C.S.R. applies where criminal prosecution is pending against a civil servant and prevents payment of service benefits until the criminal proceedings are terminated in favour of the accused (i.e., until honourable acquittal).
- Contended that the learned single Judge's view was contrary to the intendment of Rule 101, which does not permit extending benefits arising out of service until criminal proceedings are terminated in the employee's favour.
Respondent — represented by Sri Muralidhar Rao
- Argued that because the respondent was permitted to retire with the consent of the authorities while under suspension, Rule 101 should not prevent treatment of the period of suspension as on duty for pension/terminal benefits purposes.
- Maintained that the single Judge correctly interpreted Rule 101 and that the prohibition in that rule does not apply after lawful retirement with authority's permission.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| State of Assam v. Raghava Rajagopala Chari (Civil Appeals Nos. 1561 and 1562 of 1966 — disposed of on 6-10-1967); reported reference to (1963) 1 S.C.R. 121 and subsequent orders | Consideration of treatment of period of suspension and payment of pay/allowances where criminal proceedings affected service status; principle that the competent authority may, under relevant rules, treat period of suspension as on duty and grant full or partial pay depending on whether the government servant is considered fully exonerated | The court relied on the Supreme Court's handling of a similar fact pattern to show that authorities have discretion under relevant rules to regularise suspension periods as on duty and to determine pay; the precedent supports the view that where retirement is permitted while suspension/criminal proceedings are pending, the prohibitions of rules like R.101 do not automatically preclude treating the suspension period as on duty. The appellate court cited this authority as reinforcing the single Judge's approach and conclusion. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court proceeded in a stepwise analysis grounded in the text of Rule 101 and the factual sequence in this case:
- Interpretation of Rule 101: The court examined the language of R.101 which, on its face, imposes a prohibition on payment of full salary/allowances during periods when criminal proceedings against a government servant are pending or until the proceedings are terminated in the servant's favour (i.e., honorable acquittal). The rule contemplates suspension and restriction of pay/allowances during such pendency.
- Identification of the absence of an anticipated scenario: The court observed that R.101 does not contemplate the specific incident where, during the pendency of criminal proceedings, a government servant is permitted to retire in accordance with law. In other words, the rule does not expressly provide for the situation where the employing authority consents to retirement while suspension and prosecution are ongoing.
- Effect of lawful retirement on employment relationship: Because the respondent was permitted to retire with the consent of the authorities, the court found that the master–servant relationship between the State and the respondent was severed with effect from the date of retirement. Once retirement took effect, the question of rejoining duty after termination of criminal proceedings no longer arises.
- Consequence for the suspension order: The court reasoned that, given the permitted retirement, the earlier order of suspension necessarily lapsed and could no longer be regulated by disciplinary or appellate authorities. Accordingly, the period of suspension had to be treated as on duty for purposes of regulating terminal benefits.
- Reliance on precedent: The court discussed the Supreme Court decision in State of Assam v. Raghava Rajagopala Chari, which dealt with comparable facts and principles regarding treatment of suspension periods and payment of pay/allowances when criminal proceedings affect employment. That authority was used to reinforce the view that authorities may regularise suspension periods as on duty and grant pay as appropriate, and that the absence of an express bar in the rules to retirement during pendency means the prohibition in R.101 does not apply to bar benefits after a permitted retirement.
- Conclusion from combined analysis: On the basis of the reading of R.101, the factual circumstance of permitted retirement, and the supporting precedent, the court concluded the single Judge correctly held that R.101 has no application to a case where a government servant has been permitted to retire while under suspension, and therefore the period from 4-6-1980 to 21-10-1980 must be treated as on duty for regulating terminal benefits.
Holding and Implications
Holding: The appeal is dismissed. The appellate court upheld the learned single Judge's decision that Rule 101 of the Karnataka Civil Services Rules does not apply to a government servant who has been permitted to retire while under suspension, and that the period of suspension from 4-6-1980 to 21-10-1980 must be treated as on duty for the purpose of regulating terminal benefits.
Implications:
- Direct effect on the parties: The respondent is entitled to have the period of suspension treated as on duty and to have his pensionary and other terminal benefits regulated on that basis. The appeal by the State of Karnataka challenging that relief was dismissed.
- Cost order: No order as to costs was made in the circumstances of the case.
- Broader precedent: The opinion applies established principles and relies on an earlier Supreme Court decision addressing similar issues. The judgment resolves the specific dispute between the parties; it does not purport to lay down a novel rule beyond applying the text of R.101 and the cited authority to the facts at hand.
This summary is based exclusively on the information contained in the provided opinion and does not add or infer facts beyond that text.
1. In order to appreciate the legal question arising in this case and also to dispose of this appeal, a few facts that are necessary are as follows:—
2. The respondent R.S Naik, a member of the Karnataka Judicial Services in the cadre of District Judges, while travelling in a passenger bus, was alleged to have been involved in a drunken brawl in connection with which a complaint was lodged by a co-passenger or crew before the Police. In view of the said complaint this court on the administrative side, placed the respondent under suspension by an order No. HPS. 60/1980 dated 3-6-1980 (Annexure-C in the writ petition) till further orders with a direction that he should be paid subsistence allowances as per rules. Subsequently, however, as the respondent was on the verge of retirement, on representation made by him, the Government accepting the recommendation made by this Court and in exercise of the powers conferred on it by R. 285 of the Karnataka Civil Services Rules (hereinafter called the Rules) issued a notification No. DPAR 82 SHC 80 dt. 22-10-1980 (Annexure-D in the Writ Petition) and permitted him to voluntarily retire from service with immediate effect. Accordingly and in pursuance of the said notification, the appellant retired from service with effect from 22-10-1980. On his retirement, the respondent made a representation that the period of suspension from 4-6-80 to 21-10-1980 may be treated as on duty and pension terminal benefits settled. The Registrar of this Court had requested the State Government, as per Annexure-F produced in the writ petition, to make payment of subsistence allowance for the aforesaid period. However, the respondent urged that, on his retirement, the period of suspension had to be treated as on duty irrespective of the result of the intended prosecution against him and payments regulated only on that basis. Since his prayer was not granted, the respondent moved this Court in W.P No. 14128 of 1981 seeking relief under Arts 226 & 227 of the Constitution.
3. The Writ Petition was resisted by the State Government appellant No. 1. It was urged for the State Government in the Writ Petition that R. 101 of the Rules applies to a case where a Criminal Prosecution is pending against the Civil Servant and that until that Criminal Proceedings were terminated in favour of the accused (Civil Servant), the benefit sought for by him could not be granted.
4. The learned single Judge having heard both parties, held as follows:—
R. 101 of the K.C.S.R applies to a case where a Criminal Prosecution is pending against a Civil Servant and such servant is not permitted to retire from service. But that rule has no application to a case where a Government Servant has been permitted to retire while under suspension as in the present case. In this view also, the authorities are bound to treat the petitioner as on duty from 4.6.80 to 21.10.80 and regulate his terminal and other benefits on that basis only and not on the basis of the communication dt. 29.1.1981 addressed by the Registrar.
5. With the above observations, the learned single Judge allowed the Writ Petition granting the relief prayed for by the respondent.
6. Aggrieved by the said decision of the learned single Judge, the State of Karnataka, appellant-1, has, in this appeal, questioned the correctness of the said decision.
7. We heard Sri Mandappa, learned Addl., Govt. Advocate for the appellants and Sri Muralidhar Rao, learned Counsel for the respondent.
8. Sri Mandappa reiterated the contentions advanced before the learned single Judge and brought to our notice the provisions of R. 101 of the Rules 101 reads:
“A Government servant against whom proceedings have been taken either for his arrest for debt or on a Criminal charge or who is detained under any law providing for preventive detention should be considered as under suspension for any periods during which he is detained in custody or is undergoing imprisonment and not allowed to draw any pay and allowances other than any subsistence allowance that may be granted in accordance with the principles laid down in R. 98 for such periods until the termination of the proceedings taken against him or until he is released from detention and allowed to rejoin duty, as the case may be. An adjustment of his allowances for such periods should thereafter be made according to the circumstances of the case, the full amount being given only in the event of the officer being acquitted of the blame of (if the proceedings taken against him were for his arrest for debt) of its being proved that the officers liability arose from circumstances beyond his control. In cases where the arrest is for detention under a law providing for preventive detention the full amount of allowances, for the period of detention, shall be given only when such detention is held by any competent authority to be unjustified.” (underline is mine)
9. Sri Mandappa, learned counsel for the appellants, argued that R. 101 provided prohibition for payment of benefits sought for by the respondent so long as the Criminal Proceedings were pending against him before the Criminal Court or until he was acquitted honourably from the allegations made against him before the Criminal Court. He further argued that the view taken by the learned single Judge was contrary to the intendment of R. 101, as the intendment of the said Rule was not to extend the benefit arising out of the service of an employee until the Criminal Proceedings taken against him were terminated in his favour or he was acquitted of such allegations made against nim.
10. Sri Muralidhar Rao, however, submitted that, having gone through the essential ingredients of R. 101, the learned single Judge held that, since the respondent having retired with the permission of the authorities, the prohibition provided under R. 101 as to the payment of financial benefit should not come in the way of the person legally retired. The view taken by the learned single Judge was just and proper and, therefore, the appeal was liable to be dismissed.
11. Having gone through the ingredients found in R. 101 and the approach of the learned single Judge in appreciating the intendment of the legislation that can be gathered from the said rule, we are clearly of opinion that this appeal has no merit. Firstly, by a perusal of the language employed under R. 101, it is seen that a prohibition has been imposed upon an employee, who is governed under the said Rule, so long as the Criminal case is pending against him or until it is terminated in his favour resulting in honourable acquittal, to the effect that the service shall not be given to such Government Servant. Secondly, R. 101 does not contemplate an incident where, during the pendency of a criminal case against a Government Servant, he is permitted to retire from service in accordance with law and, consequently, he is entitled to the financial benefit that may be accrued during the period of suspension owing to his involvement in a criminal case. Therefore, the learned single Judge has taken the correct approach in assessing the situation and circumstances under which the respondent came to retire. When once he retired, the relationship of master and servant between the State and the respondent ceased to be there. In other words, with the severance of the status between the two by virtue of the effective retirement of the respondent with the consent of the authorities, the respondent's rejoining duty even after the termination of the criminal proceedings that might be pending earlier to his tetirement, does not and cannot arise. Therefore, the result of the Criminal procecution launched against the respondent and pending before the Criminal Court does not alter the status at all. In deed, as the learned single Judge observed, a fortiori this Court or Government revoking the earlier order of suspension or regulating his period of suspension will not also arise whatever be the result of the Criminal prosecution, if any, against the respondent. As a matter of fact, the Government having permitted the respondent to retire, the earlier order of suspension has necessarily to be treated as having lapsed and it is no longer available for being regulated by the disciplinary authority or the appellate authority. In view of the circumstances stated above there is no alternative but to treat the period of suspension as on duty only and cannot be treated as under suspension. We uphold the view of the learned single Judge holding “But the rule has no application to a case where a Government servant has been permitted to retire while under suspension as in the present case.” Therefore, we are clearly of opinion that, having regard to the permission granted by the authorities to enable the respondent to retire from service, the authorities are bound to treat the period of suspension of the respondent-from 4.6.1980 to 21.10.80 as on duty regulating the benefits accrued from his service on that basis only and not on the basis of the communication made by the Registrar of the Court on 29.1.1981
12. The Supreme Court had the occasion to deal with a similar issue arising from the retirement of a government servant who had to face Criminal proceedings during his career as such and continued to be under suspension until he was asked to retire.
13. In State of Assam v. Raghava Rajagopala chari (Civil Appeals Nos. 1561 and 1562 of 1966—disposed of on 6-10-1967). Their Lordships were dealing with a case where a Government servant who was supposed to retire on 30.6.1953 on superannuation was suspended by an order dt. 13.3.1947, he having indulged in Criminal cases and, by a notification dt. 23.7.1953, his services were continued in the establishment under the Government of Assam after the date on which he attained superannuation till such time as the prosecution against him in the court of law was finalised. On 30.11.1953 he was convicted by the Sessions Judge and he filed an appeal before the High Court and while the appeal was pending, by order dt. 17.3.1954 he was dismissed from service with effect from 30.11.53 on grounds of criminal convictions. The Allahabad High Court confirmed the petitioner's conviction under Ss. 161 and 467 I.P.C and the sentences imposed by the trial Court in that behalf. His conviction under Ss. 120-B I.P.C and under R. 81(4) read with R. 121, Defence of India Rules, was set aside and he was acquitted of the said offences. With certificate obtained from the High Court, the petitioner appealed to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court by its judgment reported in (1963) 1 S.C.R 121 dated 28.3.1962, allowed the appeal. On 5.7.1962 the petitioner applied to the Government of Assam asking for full pay under R. 54 of the Assam fundamental Rules. On 12.1.1963, the Government of Assam passed the following order:—
“No. P.G 62/62/41—The Order issued vide this Deptt. Notification No. G. 27/53/14, dated 17-3-1954 dismissing Shri R.R Chari from Government services is hereby vacated.
“The date of superannuation of Sri Chari and the manner of regularising his absence from duty from the date of suspension upto March 28, 1962 is under consideration.”
14. The petitioner in the reported case filed a Writ Petition under Art. 226 of the Constitution before the High Court of Assam praying that the State of Assam be directed to pass and orders under R. 54 of the Fundamental Rules. It was not disputed before the High Court that Fundamental R. 54 was attracted, in the case, and only question debated was whether the State should be directed to pass orders expeditiously or not. The High Court directed the Government of Assam to pass necessary orders under R. 54 of the Fundamental Rules by January 31, 1964. On January, 28, 1964, the Government of Assam passed the following orders:
“In continuation of this Departmental Notification forwarded under the above quoted Memo and the D.O letter referred to above, I am directed to say that in view of the reserved nature of the Hon'ble Supreme Court's judgment, Sri Chari's acquittal by the Supreme Court could not be considered as honourable and as such, the Governor of Assam is pleased to order that the period of his suspension from may 13, 1947 to March 16, 1954 should be regularised under F.R 54(b) and treated as on duty or the purpose of leave, increment and pension and Sri Chari be given 50 per cent of his pay and allowance during the said period, subject to adjustment of the subsistence allowance already drawn.”
15. The petitioner having not been satisfied with the said order, filed a writ petition under Art. 226 before the Assam High Court and from there the matter went up to the Supreme Court. On this relevant question, allowing the prayer of the petitioner and rejecting the contention of the State Government of Assam, the Supreme Court observed in para-10 of its judgment as follows:—
“It seems to us that if, on reading the judgment and order which acquits a Government servant, it appears to the Government of the competent authority that the Government servant has not been fully exonerated of the charges levelled against him the Government or the competent authority would be entitled to come to the conclusion that clause (b). This conclusion is strengthened by the wide discretion given to the competent authority under clause (b). Acting under clause (b), the competent authority is entitled to give, if the circumstances so warrant, the whole of the pay and allowances and also treat the whole of the period of absence from duty as period spent on duty,”
16. In the instant case, though the Criminal proceedings are still pending against the respondent, who is permitted to retire from service, since R. 101 does not anticipate such an event, the approach of the learned single Judge in upholding the prayer of the respondent and giving him relief is justified. In the result, this appeal fails and is dismissed.
17. In the circumstances of the case, there is no order as to costs.
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