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Ramakrishna Govinda Hanmashet & Ors. v. Belgaum Bidi Bepari Sangh & Ors.
Factual and Procedural Background
This petition under Sec. 50 of the Karnataka Rent Control Act (as it stood unamended) challenges the judgment dated 18-6-1974 of the I Additional District Judge, Belgaum in HRC App. 10 of 1973 which confirmed the order dated 21-11-1972 of the II Additional Munsiff, Belgaum in HRC. 135 of 1970. The lower orders had rejected the petitioners' application under S. 21(1) of the Karnataka Rent Control Act.
The undisputed facts are that the petitioners own the schedule premises and, on 23-11-1960, they leased it to the Belgaum Bidi Bepari Sangh (respondent-1), represented by partners respondents 2 to 17, by lease deed Ext. P2 for one year; thereafter the tenancy continued monthly. By March–April 1967 the Sangh was dissolved and respondents 2–10 and 12–17 transferred their assets and liabilities to respondent-11, who continued the business in the same premises.
In 1968 the petitioners filed HRC. 25 of 1968 seeking vacant possession under S. 21(1)(b) of the Act; that petition was dismissed and the dismissal was affirmed on appeal and a revision petition (CRP. 1299/70) was dismissed on 21-7-1971. The district court had considered grounds under S. 21(1)(f) as well; when CRP. 1299/70 was disposed, the petitioners had already instituted HRC. 135/70 and were given liberty to develop grounds in that proceeding.
In the courts below the petitioners relied on S. 21(1)(b), (f), (o) and (h) of the Act; in the present petition they limited themselves to S. 21(1)(f) and (o), having given up contentions under S. 21(1)(b) and (h).
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the circumstances amounted to a change of user or unauthorized user falling within Section 21(1)(o) of the Karnataka Rent Control Act (i.e., whether the premises were being used for a purpose other than that for which they were let).
- Whether the continued occupation by respondent-11 after the dissolution/withdrawal of certain partners constituted a sub-letting such as to attract Section 21(1)(f) of the Act (i.e., whether occupation by respondent-11 was effectively sub-letting or was occupation by the original tenants/partners).
- Whether the petitioners had shown a reasonable and bona fide requirement for the premises for personal occupation (to run hardware and lathe business), such as would justify recovery under the relevant provision considered by the courts.
Arguments of the Parties
Petitioners' Arguments
- Under S. 21(1)(o): The lease (Ext. P2) was to the Belgaum Bidi Bepari Sangha; by 1968 the Sangh had been dissolved and respondent-11 was using the premises. This amounted to a change of user so as to satisfy the ingredients of S. 21(1)(o), including continuous changed user for more than six months.
- Under S. 21(1)(f): Initially argued among other grounds (b and h), but in this petition the petitioners confined themselves to (f) and (o) (having relinquished b and h).
- On personal occupation: The petitioners asserted they required the premises for running a hardware and lathe business and thus had a bona fide requirement for vacant possession for personal use.
- Counsel (Sri K.I. Bhatta) urged that the evidence supported a finding under S. 21(1)(o) since the lease purpose (for the Sangha) had been changed by respondent-11's use, and criticized the lower courts for relying on perceived lapses by the petitioners concerning their evidence on the personal-occupation ground.
Respondent-11's Arguments
- Respondent-11 contended that the partners (respondents 2–17) formed the association and took the premises; when most partners dis-associated in 1967 and transferred assets/liabilities, respondent-11 continued to run the same business in the same premises. Thus respondent-11 was not a sub-lessee but a continuation of the same occupational interest.
- Because the same business (bidis, matches, soaps, etc.) was being carried on, there was no change in user to attract S. 21(1)(o).
- Respondent-11 denied that the petitioners had a reasonable and bona fide requirement for personal occupation.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| K. Devaraju Naidu v. Ethirajavathi Thayaramma | The firm name is merely a compendious way of describing the partners; a firm is not a separate legal entity for these purposes. | The court relied on this principle to treat occupation by the firm as occupation by its partners, undermining a claim of sub-letting to respondent-11. |
| Saraswati Devi v. Gian Chand | Consistent view (as expressed by the Delhi Court) that a firm name does not create a separate legal entity; occupation by the firm is occupation by partners. | Used to reinforce the proposition that the firm's occupation cannot be treated as distinct from the partners', supporting the conclusion that no sub-letting occurred. |
| Murlidhar v. Chuni Lal | Supreme Court authority stating that a firm is not a legal entity for such purposes; occupation by a firm is occupation by partners, so transfer among partners does not amount to sub-letting. | The court quoted and applied this Supreme Court view directly to hold that continuation of occupation by respondent-11 (a partner or successor in interest) did not constitute sub-letting under S. 21(1)(f). |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court undertook a step-by-step application of the facts to the legal provisions and precedents:
- Analysis under S. 21(1)(o) (change of user): The court examined the lease (Ext. P2) and found that the stated purpose was that respondents 2–17 (collectively) would use the premises for "Belgaum Bidi Bepari Sangha"—specifically to run businesses in bidis, matches, soaps, etc. The undisputed evidence showed respondent-11 was carrying on the very same business. Because the user of the premises remained the same (the same description of business), the court concluded the petitioners had not established a change of user required by S. 21(1)(o). The court therefore upheld the two courts below in finding that the petitioners failed to make out S. 21(1)(o).
- Analysis under S. 21(1)(f) (sub-letting): The court noted that the courts below relied on authorities holding that a firm is not a separate legal entity and that the firm name merely describes the partners (citing K. Devaraju Naidu, Saraswati Devi, and Murlidhar v. Chuni Lal). Applying these authorities, the court held that occupation by the Belgaum Bidi Bepari Sangha was occupation by its partners (respondents 2–17). Although many partners had dis-associated and transferred assets/liabilities to respondent-11, the Supreme Court principle meant that the continued occupation by respondent-11 was not a sub-letting distinct from the original tenancy; consequently, the petitioners failed on the ground under S. 21(1)(f).
-
Analysis of petitioners' claim of reasonable and bona fide requirement for personal occupation: The court reviewed the concurrent findings of the two courts below, which rejected the petitioners' claim. The lower courts' reasoning, accepted by this court, rested on several points present in the record:
- The petitioners' assertions in the quit notice and application described an intention to start hardware and lathe business, whereas PW-1's evidence stated a plan to shift lathe machines from a rented building in Talakawadi—creating a variance between pleadings and evidence.
- If the requirement had been genuine and bona fide, the petitioners would have sought vacant possession earlier (for example, before installing lathe machines in the rented Talakawadi building) and would likely have relied on this ground in the earlier HRC. 25 of 1968; the petitioners did not do so.
- The courts below observed that lathe machines are generally installed in industrial estates and the schedule premises was not situate in an industrial estate—casting doubt on the practicability of the asserted requirement.
- When asked, PW-1 could not satisfactorily explain why the petitioners had not earlier relied on the relevant ground (Sec. 21(1)(h) in the earlier case), and the court declined to treat this unexplained lapse as favourable to the petitioners.
- Conclusion of analysis: On all strands litigated in this petition (S. 21(1)(o), S. 21(1)(f), and the claimed personal requirement), the court found the petitioners had failed to establish the necessary facts or legal basis to warrant granting vacant possession. The court therefore dismissed the petition.
Holding and Implications
Holding: The petition is dismissed (the opinion states: "this petition fails and is dismissed with costs"). The court affirmed the concurrent findings of the two courts below that the petitioners had not established entitlement to vacant possession under the grounds relied upon in this petition.
Implications:
- Direct effect on the parties: The petitioners' application for possession under the claimed sections of the Karnataka Rent Control Act (primarily S. 21(1)(f) and S. 21(1)(o) and the personal-occupation claim) fails; the occupancy of respondent-11 is not treated as a sub-letting nor as a prohibited change of user on the facts before the court.
- Precedential effect: The court applied established precedents (as cited) regarding the legal status of partnerships and firms in tenancy contexts, and did not purport to lay down any new legal principle. The decision affirms application of those precedents to the facts before it rather than creating novel law.
Costs were awarded against the petitioners as indicated by the final line of the opinion.
1. This petition under Sec. 50 of the Karnataka Rent Control Act as it stood unamended is directed against the judgment dt. 18-6-1974 passed by the I Addl. Dist Judge, Belgaum in HRC App. 10 of 1973 confirming the order dt. 21-11-1972 passed by the II Addl. Munsiff, Belgaum, in HRC. 135 of 1970, rejecting the application filed by the petitioners under S. 21(1) of the Karnataka Rent Control Act (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’).
2. The undisputed facts are that the schedule premises belongs to the petitioners. On 23-11-1960 the petitioners leased the schedule premises to respondent-1, Belgaum Bidi Bepari Sangh, represented by its partners respondents 2 to 17, by a lease deed Ext. P2. The lease was for one year. After the expiry of that period of one year, the lease continued on monthly basis. By March-April 1967 the Sangh was dissolved and respondents 2 to 10 and 12 to 17 made over their assets and liabilities to respondent-11 and respondent-11 continued to rim the same business in the very premises. In 1968 the petitioners filed a case in HRC. 25 of 1368 praying for vacant possession of the premises on the ground available to them under S. 21(1)(b) of the Act. The petition was dismissed and that decision was confirmed by the Dist Judge in appeal. The Dist Judge observed in the course of his judgment that in fact the ground relied upon by the petitioners was under S. 21(1)(o) and they had failed to establish the same. The petitioners filed a revision petition in CRP. 1299/70 and the same was dismissed on 21-7-1971. As in the course of the judgment the Dist Judge had dealt with the ground available under S. 21(1)(f) of the Act also and by the time CRP. 1299/70 was to be disposed of, the present HRC proceeding had been instituted by the petitioners, this Court, while disposing of the revision petition, allowed liberty to the petitioners to develop the ground available to them in the present HRC. 135/70. In the Court's below the petitioners relied on grounds u/S. 21(1)(b), (f), (o) and (h) of the Act. In this petition the petitioners have restricted their case only to the grounds available to them u/s. 21(1)(f) and (o), They have given up their contention in regard to the grounds under Section 21(1)(b) and (h) of the Act.
3. The case of the petitioners is that it was by 1968 the petitioners came to know that the Belgaum Bidi Bepari Sangha had dissolved and discontinued and that respondent-11 was a sub-lessee of Belgaum Bidi Bepari Sangha. It is nextly the case of the petitioners that as premises had been leased to Belgaum Bidi Bepari Sangha for its use, the use of the premises by respondent-11 would be hit by S. 21(1)(o) of the Act. Lastly, the case of the petitioners is that the petitioners want to run hard-ware and lathe business in the schedule premises and hence they reasonably and bonafide require the premises for their personal occupation.
4. Respondent-11 has contended that he and respondents 2 to 10 and 12 to 17 associated themselves and formed an association called Belgaum Bidi Bepari Sangha and as partners of that Sangha they took the premises on lease as per Ext. P2 and started business in bidies, matches, soaps, etc., and that by 1967 March-April, respondents 2 to 10 and 12 to 17 dis-associated themselves from the partnership and as such the partnership business was discontinued and respondents 2 to 10 and 12 to 17 sold their assets and liabilities to him and he continued to run the very business in the very premises and therefore he is not a sub-lessee under Belgaum Bidi Bepari Sangha. In view of the fact that the very business that was being run by Belgaum Bidi Bepari Sangha is being run by him, the provisions of S. 21(1)(o) of the Act have not been violated. He has denied the claim of the petitioners that they require the premises reasonably and bonafide for their personal occupation.
5. The learned Addl. Munsiff has held that the petitioners have not established their case on any of the grounds. The same is the view expressed by the learned Additional District Judge also.
6. Sri K.I Bhatta, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioners, urged in regard to the case of the petitioners under S. 21(1)(o) of the Act that as per the lease deed the purpose of the lease was for the use of Belgaum Bidi Bepari Sangha and when it is seen that the premises is being used for respondent-11 by respondent-11, the purpose for which the premises was leased has been changed without reasonable cause and such user has been for more than continuous period of six months and as such the petitioners have satisfactorily established the ingredients of S. 21(1)(o) of the Act. The purpose of the lease is described in Ext. P2 as follows:
7. Exhibit P-2 has been executed by respondents 2 to 17 collectively. They have stated as aforesaid in Ext. P2. It therefore means that respondents 2 to 17 stated that they were going to use the schedule premises for Bidi Sangha, Belgaum. To what use it was put for Bidi Sangha, Belgaum is an undisputed fact, i.e, business in bidies, matches, soaps etc. was to run in the schedule premises. So the purpose for which the schedule premises was taken on lease was run business in bidies, matches soaps etc. by Belgaum Bidi Bepari Sangha. The same is the business run by respondent-11 as is admitted by petitioner-1 in his evidence. Hence the premises has not been used for any purpose other than the one for which it had been leased. Therefore it will have to be held that the two Courts below are right in coming to the conclusion that the petitioners have failed to establish their case under Section 21(1)(o) of the Act.
8. Coming to the case of the petitioners under S. 21(1)(f) of the Act, it is seen from the judgment of the Addl. Dist Judge and the order passed by the Addl. Munsiff that reliance has been placed by hem on the decision in K. Devaraju Naidu v. Ethirajavathi Thayaramma(1). It has been held that the firm name is only a compendious way of describing the partners of the firm. The same is the view expressed by the Delhi Court in Saraswati Devi v. Gian Chand(2). Finally in Murlidhar v. Chuni Lal(3), the Supreme Court has expressed the same view as follows:
“…A firm unless expressly provided for the purpose of any statute which is not the case here, is not a legal entity. The firm name is only a compendious way of describing the partners of the firm. Therefore, occupation by a firm is only occupation by its partners. Here the firms have a common partner. Hence the occupation has been by one of the original tenants.”
9. The facts in the case before the Supreme Court were that the premises in dispute, namely, a shop was originally let out to a firm of the name of Chuni Lal, Gherulal. It consisted of three partners, namely, Chunilal, Gherulal and Meghraj. The business of the partnership was closed some time before November 1955 and thereafter the shop was used by a new firm of the name of Meghraj Bansidhar of which the partners were Meghraj of the firm of Chunilal, Gherulal and Bansidhar. A case of sub-letting was made out and vacant possession of the premises sought. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court held as extracted above.
10. In the case on hand, it is undisputed that the partners in the partnership firm were respondents 2 to 17. As held by the Supreme Court in the aforementioned case, occupation of the premises by the firm, namely, Belgaum Bidi Bepari Sangha, is occupation by its partners, namely, respondents 2 to 17. Respondent-11 is still in occupation though respondents 2 to 10 and 12 to 17 have walked away and the firm as it had been constituted has closed its business in favour of respondent-11. Therefore, it will have to be held that there has been no sub-letting in favour of respondent-11 and as such the petitioner fail on the wound under Section 21(1)(f) of the Act.
11. In regard to the case of the petitioners that they require the schedule premises reasonably and bonafide for their personal occupation, the concurrent finding of the two Courts below is against the petitioners. When succintly put the reasoning of the two Courts below in this behalf is that the say of the petitioners in their quit notice and the application is that they wanted to start hard-ware and lathe business in the schedule premises while the say of PW. 1 in his evidence is that they wanted to shift their lathe machine from a buildup in Talakawadi (taken on rent by them) to the schedule premises, and therefore there is variance in their case and that if this requirement was genuine and bonafide, the petitioners would have before installing lathe machines in the rented building in Talakawadi asked for vacant possession of the suit premises from Belgaum Bidi Bepari Sangha and if in case the requirement was genuine and bonafide, they would have put forward this ground also in HRC. 25 of 1968 and lastly that lathe machines cannot be installed in any place other than a place in industrial estate and the place where the schedule premises is situate is not an industrial estate. Sri K.I Bhatta urged that petitioner-1 who has entered the witness-box was not asked as to why the petitioners did not ask for installation of lathe machines when they took the building on rent in Talakawadi and as to why the petitioners did not put forward this ground also in HRC. 25 of 1968, and, therefore, the Courts below ought not to have proceeded to lay down the reasons or to put the fact that there has been a lapse on the part of the petitioners against them. The evidence of PW. 1 shows that he has been asked the reason as to why the petitioners did not rely on the ground available to them under Sec. 21(1)(h) of the Act also in HRC. 25 of 1968. The answer given by PW. 1 is that he could not explain the reason. In this view of the matter I am unable to see any sufficient grounds made out by the petitioners to make this Court to interfere in the concurrent findings recorded by the two Courts below on this aspect of the matter.
12. In the result, this petition fails and is dismissed with costs.
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