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S. Halappa v. Assistant Commissioner, Shimoga Sub-Division, Shimoga And Others

Karnataka High Court
Dec 1, 1992
Smart Summary (Beta)

Factual and Procedural Background

This appeal challenges the order dated 24-2-1992 of the learned single Judge dismissing Writ Petition No. 4654 of 1992. The petitioner sought quashing of (a) order dated 7-1-1992 (No. P.D.A 107/1990-1991) of the Assistant Commissioner, Shimoga Sub-Division and (b) order dated 15-10-1990 (No. NADA.RR.TCR.59:90-91) of the Deputy Tahsildar, Nada Kacheri. The petitioner had applied for mutation of his name in respect of Survey No. 82/2 on the death of his ancestor. The fourth respondent objected, alleging that 1 acre 30 guntas in S. No. 82/2 was sold by the ancestor under a registered sale deed dated 13-3-1972. The Tahsildar concluded the sale deed mentioned S. No. 82/1 but related to S. No. 82/2 and dismissed the mutation application. The Assistant Commissioner, on appeal under Section 136(2) of the Karnataka Land Revenue Act, 1964, reached a similar conclusion and dismissed the appeal. The single Judge dismissed the writ petition on the ground that the appellant could file a suit.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the Tahsildar and the Assistant Commissioner, exercising jurisdiction under Chapter XI of the Karnataka Land Revenue Act, 1964, could determine which survey number (82/1 or 82/2) was the subject of the 13-3-1972 sale deed (i.e., effectively decide title).
  2. If the revenue authorities lacked such jurisdiction, whether the orders of 15-10-1990 and 7-1-1992 should be quashed and the petitioner entitled to mutation subject to the fourth respondent's right to seek rectification or declaration of title.
  3. From what date the period of limitation for seeking rectification of the sale deed or other relief should be computed (i.e., when the alleged mistake in survey number was discovered).

Arguments of the Parties

The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the parties' legal arguments.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Srimanmaharaja Niranjana Jagadguru Mallikarjuna Murugarajendra Mahaswamy v. Deputy Commissioner*, Coorg, 1986 (1) Kar. L.J 373 : ILR 1986 KAR 1059 Referenced for the proposition that the opinion rendered by a learned single Judge holds good and there cannot be two opinions in view of a Division Bench decision. The court observed that although normally that principle applies, the present case is not governed by it because the Tahsildar and Assistant Commissioner purported to decide title, thereby usurping civil jurisdiction.
Payappa Nemanna Huded v. Chamu Appayya Huded, 1969 Mys. L.J 198 Referenced alongside Srimanmaharaja for the same proposition regarding the effect of Division Bench authority. The court noted the precedent but held it inapplicable here for the same reason—revenue authorities exceeded their jurisdiction.
Rajasab Husseinsab Mulla v. Inayuthullakhan*, 1990 (4) Kar. L.J 496 : ILR 1992 KAR 1649 Establishes that authorities exercising jurisdiction under Chapter XI of the Act have no jurisdiction to decide the title relating to immovable property. The court applied this authority to conclude the Tahsildar and Assistant Commissioner had no jurisdiction to decide which survey number was sold and therefore had exercised jurisdiction not vested in them.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court proceeded on the following analysis:

  • Recited the factual findings of the Tahsildar and the Assistant Commissioner that the sale deed dated 13-3-1972 mentioned S. No. 82/1 but, in substance, related to S. No. 82/2 because the vendor had no right in 82/1.
  • Observed that normally a Division Bench authority means the single Judge's opinion would stand, citing Srimanmaharaja and Payappa, but found those cases inapplicable because the revenue authorities had effectively determined title—an exercise beyond their jurisdiction under Chapter XI.
  • Relied on Rajasab Husseinsab Mulla to state that authorities under Chapter XI have no jurisdiction to decide title to immovable property; if the sale deed contains a mistake in survey number, parties must seek rectification under Section 26 of the Specific Relief Act or have title declared by a civil court.
  • Held that because the Tahsildar recorded a specific finding that a mistake occurred in the sale deed, the date of discovery of the mistake is 15-10-1990 (the Tahsildar's order), and the period of limitation for any suit or rectification should be computed from that date.
  • Concluded that the revenue authorities had exercised jurisdiction not vested in them, warranting interference by this court and quashing their orders, while safeguarding the procedural rights of both parties to seek civil remedies.

Holding and Implications

Core Ruling: The writ appeal is allowed; the order dated 24-2-1992 is set aside; the orders dated 7-1-1992 (No. P.D.A 107/1990-1991) and 15-10-1990 (No. NADA.RR.TCR 59:90-91) are quashed.

Direct consequences and implementation:

  • Respondents 1 to 3 are directed to mutate the petitioner's name in respect of land bearing S. No. 82/2, subject to the fourth respondent's right to have his title determined or to seek rectification of the sale deed.
  • The court held that the alleged mistake in mentioning the survey number in the sale deed must be treated as discovered on 15-10-1990 for the purpose of computing limitation for any suit or rectification application.
  • The court intervened on the basis that revenue authorities under Chapter XI had exceeded their jurisdiction by deciding title; parties retain their civil remedies (e.g., rectification under Section 26, Specific Relief Act, or suits to declare title).

Additional order: Sri Gupta, learned Government Advocate, is permitted to file his memo of appearance for respondents 1 to 3 within six weeks.

Show all summary ...

1. Though this appeal has come up for orders, having regard to the fact that it can be disposed of on a short point it is heard for final disposal.

2. This appeal is preferred against the order dated 24-2-1992 passed by the learned single Judge in Writ Petition No. 4654 of 1992.

3. The learned single Judge has rejected the writ petition. Hence, the petitioner in the writ petition has come up in this appeal.

4. In the writ petition, the petitioner sought for quashing the order dated 7-1-1992 bearing No. P.D.A 107/1990-1991 passed by the Assistant Commissioner, Shimoga Sub-Division, Shimoga and the order dated 15-10-1990 bearing No. NADA.RR.TCR.59:90-91 passed by the Deputy Tahsildar, Nada Kacheri, Kallihal, Bhadravathi Taluk. The proceeding was initiated before the Tahsildar, Nada Kacheri by the appellant/petitioner for mutating his name in respect of S. No. 82/2 on the death of his ancestor. That was objected to by the fourth respondent on the ground that an extent of 1 acre 30 guntas comprised in S. No. 82/2 was sold by the ancestor of the appellant under a registered sale deed dated 13th March, 1972.

5. The Tahsildar found that though the sale deed mentioned S. No. 82/1, however it related to S. No. 82/2 because the ancestor of the appellant had no right to sell any portion comprised in S. No. 82/1, therefore the sale deed should be construed as pertaining to S. No. 82/2, as such, no right or interest had remained with Eshwarappa, in the land bearing S. No. 82/2 to be succeeded to by the appellant/petitioner on the death of Eshwarappa. Consequently, he dismissed the application.

6. In the appeal preferred before the Assistant Commissioner under Section 136(2) of the Karnataka Land Revenue Act, 1964 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’) the Assistant Commissioner also came to the conclusion that the land that was mentioned in the sale deed was S. No. 82/1 but as the vendor had no right, title or interest in S. No. 82/1 but, he had right, title and interest in S. No. 82/2, therefore the sale deed should be construed as the one relating to S. No. 82/2. Accordingly, he held that the mutation entry should be rectified so as to remove the mistake. Hence, he dismissed the appeal.

7. The learned single Judge has dismissed the writ petition on the ground that if the appellant/petitioner is aggrieved, it is open to him to file a suit.

8. In the normal course the opinion rendered by the learned single Judge holds good and there cannot be any two opinions in view of a Division Bench decision of this court in Srimanmaharaja Niranjana Jagadguru Mallikarjuna Murugarajendra Mahaswamy v. Deputy Commissioner*, Coorg, 1986 (1) Kar. L.J 373 : ILR 1986 KAR 1059 and also in Payappa Nemanna Huded v. Chamu Appayya Huded, 1969 Mys. L.J 198. But, this is a case in which the Tahsildar and the Assistant Commissioner have tried to usurp the jurisdiction of a Civil Court and determine that the land that has been sold under the sale deed is S. No. 82/2 and not 82/1. Thus they have tried to go behind the apparent tenor of the sale deed and find out as to whether it was S. No. 82/1 or S. No. 82/2 that was sold under the sale deed consequently resulting in deciding the question of title of the parties to a particular land. The authorities exercising the jurisdiction under Chapter XI of the Act have no jurisdiction to decide the title relating to an immovable property vide decision in Rajasab Husseinsab Mulla v. Inayuthullakhan*, 1990 (4) Kar. L.J 496 : ILR 1992 KAR 1649. If really there is a mistake in mentioning the survey number in the sale deed, it is open to either of the parties to seek rectification of the sale deed under Section 26 of the Specific Relief Act or to have the title to the land declared by the court. But, it is not open to the revenue authorities to go into that matter and determine that the land that has been sold under the sale deed in comprised in S. No. 82/2 and not S. No. 82/1 as mentioned in the sale deed. That would amount to usurping the jurisdiction of a civil court. Therefore, we are of the view that this case is not governed by the decision in Srimanmaharaja Niranjana Jagadguru's case. Whenever the authority exercises the jurisdiction not vested in it, it becomes the duty of this court to interfere with the order passed without jurisdiction and keep the authorities and the Tribunal's within their bounds. This is sufficient to allow the writ appeal.

9. In a case like this we are of the view that the interest of both the sides should be safeguarded because the fact that Eshwarappa sold the land to fourth respondent under a sale deed dated 13-3-1972 is not in dispute. The only question that is in dispute is as to whether he has sold the land comprised in S. No. 82/1 or 82/2. As per the order of the Tahsildar there was a mistake committed while mentioning the Survey Number in the sale deed as 82/1 instead of 82/2. Therefore for the purpose of seeking rectification of the sale deed or for the purpose of seeking any other relief in this connection open to the parties under law, the period of limitation shall be computed from the date of the order of the Tahsildar i.e 15-10-1990 because the Tahsildar has recorded a specific finding that the mistake has occurred in the sale deed in mentioning the S. No. as 82/1 instead of 82/2. As such the mistake regarding mentioning of the survey number in the sale deed must be held to have been discovered on 15-10-1990.

10. Accordingly, the writ appeal is allowed. The order dated 24-2-1992 passed in Writ Petition No. 4654 of 1992 is set aside. The writ petition is allowed. The order dated 7-1-1992 bearing No. P.D.A 107 of 1990-1991 and the order dated 15-10-1990 bearing No. NADA.RR.TCR 59:90-91 are quashed. However, we make it clear that in any suit filed by either of the parties the mistake that they claim to have crept in the sale deed regarding mentioning of the survey number must be held to have been discovered only on 15-10-1990. We direct respondents 1 to 3 to mutate the name of the petitioner in respect of the land bearing S. No. 82/2 subject to the right of the fourth respondent to have his title determined or the sale deed rectified.

11. Sri Gupta, learned Government Advocate is permitted to file his memo of appearance on behalf of respondents 1 to 3 in six weeks.