Login
  • Bookmark
  • PDF
  • Share
  • CaseIQ

Sha Chunnilal Sohanraj v. T. Gurushantappa .

Karnataka High Court
Jan 13, 1972
Important Paras
Please sign up to view Important Paras.
Smart Summary (Beta)

Factual and Procedural Background

The respondent is the landlord and the petitioner is the tenant of a house in Shikaripur town. The landlord filed an application under Section 21(1)(a) of the Mysore Rent Control Act, 1961, seeking eviction of the tenant on grounds of rent arrears. The learned Munsiff at Sagar ordered eviction on 4-10-1970, applying Section 21(2) as it existed before its amendment by Mysore Act No. 14 of 1969. The amendment, substituting Section 21(2), was published while the proceedings were pending. The tenant appealed to the District Judge, Shimoga, who dismissed the appeal without considering the amendment. The tenant then filed this revision petition challenging the failure to apply the amended provision.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether Section 21(2) of the Mysore Rent Control Act, as substituted by Section 7 of Mysore Act No. 14 of 1969, applies to eviction proceedings instituted before the amendment but pending when the amendment came into force.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's Arguments

  • The amended Section 21(2), substituted by Mysore Act No. 14 of 1969, governs the case since the proceedings were pending when the amendment came into force.
  • The courts below erred by ignoring the amended provision and applying the pre-amendment law.

Respondent's Arguments

  • The amendment affects substantive rights and therefore has no retrospective effect.
  • The amended provision does not govern pending proceedings instituted before the amendment.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Shamrao v. District Magistrate, Thana Principles of statutory construction regarding amendments: an amended Act is to be read as if the altered words had been incorporated into the original Act. The Court relied on this precedent to hold that the amended Section 21(2) must be treated as part of the Act from its inception and applied to the pending proceedings.
Crawford, Statutory Construction—Interpretation of Laws When a section is amended, the original ceases to exist and the new section supersedes it as if it had always been part of the law. The Court applied this principle to conclude that the amended Section 21(2) replaced the earlier provision for all intents and purposes.
American Jurisprudence, Vol. 50, Para 468 An amending Act is not independent; the amended statute is regarded as if the original statute had been repealed and re-enacted with the amendment. The Court used this principle to support that the amendment should be considered incorporated into the statute, governing pending cases unless a contrary intent is shown.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court examined the effect of the statutory amendment under principles of statutory construction. It noted that when a statute is amended, the original provision ceases to exist and the amended provision supersedes it, becoming part of the law as if it had always been included. The Court referred to authoritative texts and a Supreme Court decision (Shamrao v. District Magistrate, Thana) to affirm this principle. Since no repugnancy or inconsistency was pointed out between the old and new provisions, the Court inferred that the Legislature intended the substituted Section 21(2) to apply from the moment it came into force. Consequently, the amended provision governs the pending eviction proceedings, notwithstanding that the case was instituted before the amendment. The lower courts erred by ignoring the amendment and applying the old law. Therefore, the Court set aside the orders of the District Judge and remitted the case to the Munsiff’s Court with directions to dispose of it according to the amended law.

Holding and Implications

The revision petition is allowed.

The Court set aside the lower courts' orders and remitted the case to the original trial court to be decided in accordance with the amended Section 21(2) of the Mysore Rent Control Act, as substituted by Mysore Act No. 14 of 1969. This decision clarifies that amendments to substantive provisions of law apply to pending proceedings unless a clear contrary intent is expressed. No new precedent beyond the application of established principles of statutory construction was created. The direct effect is that eviction proceedings pending at the time of amendment must be governed by the amended statute.

Show all summary ...

1. This revision petition which arises under S. 50 of the Mysore Rent Control Act, 1961, hereinafter called ‘the Act’ was referred to a Bench of two Judges by Datar, J. under the proviso to S. 8(2) of the Mysore High Court Act 1961, as it raises the question whether the provisions of S. 21(2) as amended by Mysore Act No. 14 of 1969 is applicable to the present case.

2. The respondent is the landlord and the petitioner is the tenant of a house bearing Door No. 708 in Shikaripur town. The respondent-landlord filed an application under S. 21(1)(a) of the Act for eviction of the petitioner-tenant alleging that the tenant was in arrears of rent. By order dt. 4-10-1970 made in HRC. No. 2 of 1968, the learned Munsiff at Sagar ordered the eviction of the tenant. While making the said order, the Munsiff proceeded under S. 21(2) of the Act as it existed prior to its amendment by Mysore Act No. 14 of 1969. S. 7 of Mysore Act No. 14 of 1969 substituted the following sub-section for sub-sec. (2) of Section 21:

“No order for the recovery of possession of any premises shall be made on the ground specified in clause (a) of the proviso to sub-sec. (1), if the tenant—

(i) complies with the provisions of Section 29;

(ii) satisfies the Court that he had sufficient cause for the default to pay or tender the rent within the period referred to in the said clause (a); and

(iii) pays to the landlord or deposits in the Court such further amount, as may be determined by the Court to be due, along with a sum not exceeding ten per cent of the rent thereof as may be fixed by the Court, within one month from the date of the order of the Court.”

3. Mysore Act No. 14 of 1969 was published in the Mysore Gazette dt. 17-7-1969 when the proceedings in HRC. No. 2 of 1968 were pending. Without considering the effect of the substitution made by S. 7 of Mysore Act 14 of 1969 and applying the provision as it existed before the amendment, the learned Munsiff made the order of eviction. The tenant's appeal in HRC. No. 9 of 1970 to the Court of the District Judge, Shimoga was dismissed by order dt. 18-2-1971. Before the learned District Judge also, the parties as well as the Court did not take notice of the amendment of S. 21(2) of the Act and proceeded as if there was no amendment. In this revision petition, Sri T.S Ramachandra, learned Counsel for the petitioner urged that sub-sec. (2) of Sec. 21 as substituted by Sec. 7 of Mysore Act 14 of 1969 governs the case as the proceedings were pending before the Court of the Munsiff when the amendment came into force. Learned Counsel argued that the Courts below have erred in the exercise of their jurisdiction by ignoring the provision of law which governs the case.

4. Sri P.R Srinivasan, learned Counsel for the respondent contended that since the amendment affects the substantive rights of the parties the amendment has no retrospective effect and it does not govern pending proceedings.

5. The question for decision is whether S. 21(2) of the Act as substituted by S. 7 of Mysore Act 14 of 1969 governs cases where the proceedings for eviction had been instituted before the said amendment came into force.

6. The matter pertains to rules of construction of statutes and the effect of amendments made to an Act. In the instant case, sub-sec. (2) of S. 21 provides for the circumstances under which relief against eviction can be granted in proceedings under the Act. The said sub-section was amended by substitution of a new provision set out in the earlier part of this order. Where a section of a statute is amended, the original ceases to exist and the new section supersedes it and becomes part of the law just as if the amendment has always been there. (Vide Crowford, Statutory Construction—Interpretation of Laws pages 110-111).

7. An amending Act is not regarded as an independent statute. The statute in its old form is superseded by the statute in its amended form, the amended section of the statute taking the place of the original section, for all intents and purposes as if the amendment had always been there. The amendment should be considered as if embodied in the whole statute of which it has become a part. Unless a contrary intent is clearly indicated, the amended statute is regarded as if the original statute had been repealed and the whole statute re-enacted with the amendment. (Vide Para 468 of American Jurisprudence—Vol. 50 pages 481-482).

8. The above principles of canons of construction have been accepted by the Supreme Court in Shamrao v. District Magistrate, Thana(1). This is what Bose, J. has stated in the said decision:

“The construction of an Act which has been amended is now governed by technical rules and we must first be clear regarding the proper canons of construction. The rule is that when a subsequent Act amends an earlier one in such a way as to incorporate itself, or a part of itself, into the earlier, then the earlier Act must thereafter be read and construed (except where that would lead to a repugnancy, inconsistency or absurdity) as if the altered words had been written into the earlier Act with pen and ink and the old words scored out so that thereafter there is no need to refer to the amending Act at all.”

9. No repugnancy or inconsistency between the old and the new sub-sections have been pointed out to us. When the amending Act has stated that the old sub-section has been substituted by the new sub-section, the inference is that the Legislature intended that the substituted provision should be deemed to have been part of the Act from the very inception. When the proceedings were pending, the amended provision came into force. It is the amended provision that has to be applied and not the old provision which has ceased to exist.

10. Unfortunately both the parties did not bring to the notice of the Court below the amended provision and the Courts below proceeded as if there was no amendment. In these circumstances, the proper course for us to follow is to set aside the orders of the learned District Judge under revision and remit the matter to the Court of the Munsiff at Sagar with a direction to restore the case to its original file and dispose of the same in accordance with law.

11. It is ordered accordingly. No costs.