Login
  • Bookmark
  • PDF
  • Share
  • CaseIQ

I.T.C Ltd. v. Union Of India & Others

Karnataka High Court
Nov 6, 1974
Important Paras
Please sign up to view Important Paras.
Smart Summary (Beta)

Factual and Procedural Background

Two writ petitions were heard together because a common question of law arose. WP. 1957 of 1974 was filed by a company engaged in the manufacture of cigarettes at several places in India; the petition concerned liability under the Central Excise & Salt Act, 1944 (the Act) in respect of goods manufactured at its Bangalore factory. WP. 1292 of 1973 was filed by a company manufacturing rubber products in Bangalore.

Both petitioners' goods were chargeable to ad valorem excise duty under Items 4 and 16A of the First Schedule and ss. 3 and 4 of the Act. The petitioners sold goods to wholesalers at places across India. After the Supreme Court decision in A.K. Roy v. Voltas Ltd. (Voltas' case), the petitioners claimed before the Central Excise Authorities that the method previously used to compute excise liability (based on list prices at which goods were sold to wholesalers at different places) was incorrect. They sought deductions for several post-manufacturing expenditures (marketing and distribution, advertising, interest, freight) from the list prices to arrive at the “wholesale cash price” under s. 4(a).

The Assistant Collector of Central Excise, Bangalore passed an order dated 1-4-1974 rejecting the contentions of the petitioner in WP. 1957 of 1974 and subsequently issued notices (including a direction to file fresh lists) and, in WP. 1292 of 1973, a show-cause notice dated 26-4-1973 proposing to treat 19.5% of list price as post-manufacturing expenses. The petitioners challenged these actions by filing the writ petitions. The Revenue resisted the petitions and raised a preliminary objection as to maintainability, contending that an appeal to a higher authority was available.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether, for the purpose of determining the “wholesale cash price” under s. 4(a) of the Central Excise & Salt Act, 1944, amounts attributable to post-manufacturing expenditures (specifically marketing and distribution expenses, advertising, interest on deferred payment, and freight from factory to selling points) must be deducted from list prices.
  2. Whether the High Court should exercise its writ jurisdiction under Article 226 in the presence of an alternative statutory appeal remedy when a subordinate authority has applied the law in contravention of a Supreme Court decision (specifically the decision in A.K. Roy v. Voltas Ltd.).

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioners' Arguments

  • After the Supreme Court's decision in A.K. Roy v. Voltas Ltd., the petitioners argued that the computation of excise liability on the basis of list prices without allowing deductions for post-manufacturing expenses was incorrect.
  • In WP. 1957 of 1974 the petitioner claimed that the following four items of expenditure must be deducted from list prices to determine the wholesale cash price: marketing and distribution expenses, advertising expenses, interest, and freight paid to transport goods from factory premises to selling points.
  • In WP. 1292 of 1973 the petitioner contended that 19.5% of the list prices represented post-manufacturing expenses and should be deductible.
  • Regarding advertising, the petitioner in WP. 1957 of 1974 advanced two contentions: (i) an extreme view that the entire advertising cost should be excluded as relating solely to selling activity; and (ii) alternatively, that advertising costs should be bifurcated between manufacturing-related managerial activity and selling activity so that the selling-related portion could be deducted. For the bifurcation argument reliance was placed on the decision in Commr. of I.T. v. Ahmedbhai Umarbhai & Co. and earlier authorities cited therein.

Revenue's Arguments

  • The Revenue resisted the petitions generally.
  • By way of preliminary objection the Advocate General (appearing for the Revenue) submitted that the orders of the Assistant Collector were appealable to a higher authority on both facts and law and therefore the High Court should not exercise its Article 226 jurisdiction at this stage because an adequate alternative remedy existed.
  • The Asst. Collector had earlier rejected the petitioners' deduction claims (as reflected in the impugned orders and notices).

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
A.K. Roy v. Voltas Ltd. (Voltas' case) The interpretation of "wholesale cash price" in s. 4(a): excise is a tax on production/manufacture and the real value for ad valorem excise should exclude selling cost and selling profits (post-manufacturing costs); wholesale cash price must reflect delivery at factory gate and exclude post-manufacturing charges such as freight, octroi, and interest on deferred payments. The court applied Voltas' principle as the guiding precedent to hold that marketing & distribution expenses, interest and freight are post-manufacturing and must be deducted proportionately from list prices; advertising required case-by-case determination.
Chhotabhai Jethabhai Patel & Co. v. Union of India Excise is a duty on home-produced goods, calculated by quantity or value, levied because of manufacture and unrelated to commercial transactions. Used to explain the nature and incidence of excise duty as a tax on production, supporting the distinction between manufacturing and selling activities.
Amalgamated Coalfields Ltd. v. Union of India Excise is primarily a duty on production/manufacture and is an indirect duty which the manufacturer may pass on to the ultimate consumer; method of collection does not change its fundamental nature. Reinforced the characterization of excise as a tax on manufacture to support limiting the taxable base to manufacturing costs and manufacturing profit.
Re: Sea Customs Act (1878) (case under Sea Customs Act) The taxable event for duties of excise is the manufacture of goods; duty is on the manufacture rather than directly on goods. Reiterated the principle that excise incidence is tied to manufacture, cited in the court's exposition of excise law.
Shinde Brothers Etc. v. Deputy Commissioner, Raichur & Others Reiterated the consistent Supreme Court view regarding the nature and incidence of excise duty as a tax on production/manufacture. Reaffirmed the Supreme Court's consistent approach and supported reliance on Voltas' case.
Union of India v. Delhi Cloth & General Mills Authority for the proposition that excise is a tax on production and manufacture (cited within Voltas' reasoning). Referred to within the Voltas' discussion quoted by the court to support the view of excise as a production tax.
Commr. of I.T. v. Ahmedbhai Umarbhai & Co. Considered allocation of profits between manufacturing activity and selling activity; cited with approval certain Privy Council authorities on attributability of profit/expenses. The petitioners relied on this authority to support bifurcation of advertising costs; the court accepted the analogy to permit proportionate treatment of advertising expenses but rejected the claim for wholesale exclusion.
International Harvst Co. of Canada v. Provincial Tax Commn (Privy Council) Authority cited in Ahmedbhai Umarbhai & Co. on principles of attribution of profit/expenses between manufacturing and other activities. Cited indirectly via Ahmedbhai Umarbhai & Co. to support the proposition that some costs/profits may be attributable to manufacture and others to selling, informing the court's view on advertising.
Anglo-French Textile Co. v. Commr. of I.T. Another authority cited in Ahmedbhai Umarbhai & Co. concerning attribution principles. Cited indirectly to support the argument for bifurcation of advertising expenses between manufacturing and selling activities.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court proceeded in stages. First it dealt with the Revenue's preliminary objection on maintainability. Although an appeal lay against orders of the Assistant Collector, the court found interference appropriate because the Assistant Collector had proceeded in direct contravention of the Supreme Court's enunciation in Voltas' case and had failed to recognize the distinction between manufacturing profits and selling profits. Where a subordinate authority disposes of a case in direct contradiction of a Supreme Court decision, the High Court's intervention under Article 226 was held to be justified.

The court then examined the nature and incidence of excise duty through prior decisions, reiterating that excise is a tax on production/manufacture and that s. 4 of the Act requires determination of value for ad valorem duty by excluding selling costs and selling profits so that only manufacturing costs and manufacturing profit are included in the taxable base.

Applying Voltas' decision to the facts before it, the court concluded as follows:

  • Expenses incurred in connection with marketing and distribution, interest on the value of goods attributable to the period between removal from factory and payment by the wholesaler, and freight charges for transporting goods from the factory gate to selling points are post-manufacturing in nature and therefore fall outside manufacturing expenses as understood under s. 4(a). Consequently a proportionate deduction for these items must be made from list prices before arriving at the wholesale cash price.
  • The status of advertising expenses was treated as res integra (not previously settled). The court analyzed production as involving both a physical process and a managerial/decision-making process (production planning, forecasting, research, maintaining communication with consumers). The court recognized that advertising can form part of the managerial/production-related functions necessary to effect manufacture that will sell in the market.
  • The court rejected the petitioners' extreme argument that the entire advertising cost must be excluded as purely selling expense. Instead it held that only the proportion of advertising expenses attributable to selling activity should be deducted; the portion attributable to managerial/production activity must be included in the wholesale cash price. Determination of the correct bifurcation is a question of fact to be decided by the assessing authority on the evidence produced in each case.

On this basis the court allowed the petitions, quashed the impugned order of the Assistant Collector (dated 1-4-1974) and the notices impugned in both writ petitions, and directed the Assistant Collector to issue fresh notices and determine the petitioners' liabilities under the Act in accordance with Voltas' case and the observations made in the judgment.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The writ petitions were allowed. The impugned order of the Assistant Collector of Excise (1-4-1974) and the associated notices (including the notices challenged in WP. 1957 of 1974 and the show-cause notice dated 26-4-1973 in WP. 1292 of 1973) were quashed. The Assistant Collector was directed to issue fresh notices and re-determine the petitioners' excise liability in light of A.K. Roy v. Voltas Ltd. and the court's observations.

Implications:

  • Direct effect on the parties: assessments must be redone so that post-manufacturing items—specifically marketing and distribution expenses, interest attributable to deferred payment, and freight from factory to selling points—are treated as deductible from list prices in determining the wholesale cash price. Advertising expenses must be analyzed and bifurcated where appropriate; only the portion attributable to selling activity may be deducted.
  • The court emphasized that determining what portion of advertising expense is attributable to selling (and thus deductible) is a factual inquiry to be made by the assessing authority on the material produced by each assessee; the court did not itself quantify any deduction.
  • No novel legal principle was formulated by this court; it applied and gave effect to the Supreme Court's decision in Voltas' case and directed subordinate authorities to follow that precedent. The order therefore corrects the subordinate authority's application of law rather than establishing a new precedent.
  • Costs: The court ordered no costs.
Show all summary ...

1. Because a common question of law arises for consideration in these two writ petitions, they are disposed by this common order.

2. The petitioner in WP. 1957 of 1974 is a company engaged in the manufacture of cigarettes at several places in India. In this writ petition we are concerned with the liability of the petitioner under the provisions of the Central Excise & Selt Act, 1944 (hereinafter referred to as the Act), in so far as the goods manufactured by the petitioner at its factory in Bangalore. The petitioner in WP. 1292 of 1973 is also a company which manufactures rubber products in Bangalore.

3. The goods manufactured by the two petitioners are liable for payment of excise duty under the provisions of the Act on ad valorem basis. The relevant provisions of the Act are Ss. 3 and 4. They read as follows:

“3. Duties specified in the First Schedule to be levied.—

(1) There shall be levied and collected in such manner as may be prescribed duties of excise on all excisable goods other than salt which are produced or manufactured in India and a duty on salt manufactured in, or imported by land into any part of India as, and at the rates, set forth in the First Schedule.

(2) The Central Govt. may, by notification in the Official Gazette, fix, for the purpose of levying the said duties, tariff values of any articles enumerated, either specifically or under general headings, in the First Schedule as chargeable with duty ad valorem and may alter any tariff values for the time being in force.

(3) Different tariff values may be fixed for different classes or descriptions of the same articles.

(3A) ****

(4) Determination of value for the purposes of duty—where, under this Act, any article is chargeable with duty at a rate dependent on the value of the article, such values shall be deemed to be—

(a) the wholesale cash price for which an article of the like kind and quality is sold or is capable of being sold at the time of the removal of the article chargeable with duty from the factory or any other premises of manufacture or production for delivery at the place of manufacture or production, or if a wholesale market does not exist for such article at such place at the nearest place where such market exists, or

(b) where such price is not ascertainable the price at which an article of the like kind and quality is sold or is capable of being sold by the manufacturer or producer, or his agent, at the time of the removal of the article changeable with duty from such factory or other premises for delivery at the place of manufacture or production if such article is not sold or is not capable of being sold in such place, at any other place nearest thereto.

Explanation.—In determining the price of any article under this section, no abatement or deduction shall be allowed except in respect of trade discount and the removal of the article chargeable with duty from the factory or other premises aforesaid.”

4. Under Items 4 and 16A of the First Schedule of the Act, cigarettes and rubber products are respectively made liable to, payment of excise duty on an ad valorem basis.

5. The petitioner in WP. 1957 of 1974 sells its goods to wholesalers at places other than Bangalore also. Similarly, the petitioner in the other writ petition has got its Branch Offices at several places in India where the goods manufactured by it are sold in favour of the wholesalers. Until the decision of the Supreme Court in A.K Roy v. Voltas Ltd.(1) was delivered, the petitioners were, paying excise duty on the basis of the list prices at which the goods were sold ta the wholesalers at different places in India. After the above decision was rendered, the petitioners claimed before the Central Excise Authorities that the computation of the liability of the petitioners under the Act on the basis of the prices at which the goods were actually sold to the wholesalers at different places in India was incorrect and inconsistent with the principle enunciated by the Supreme Court in Voltas' case. They claimed that while determining the taxable base, the Central Excise Authority should deduct from the prices at which the goods were sold to the wholesalers at different places, several items of expenditure incurred by them, to which reference will be made a little later, after the manufacturing process of the goods was over. They relied Upon the observations of the Supreme Court in Voltas' Case in support of their contention.

6. The Asst. Collector of Central Excise, Bangalore passed an order on 1-4-1974 rejecting the contention of the petitioner in WP. 1957 of 1974 in respect of the period referred to therein. In respect of three other periods on the basis of order passed by him on 1-4-1974 he made a demand on the petitioner in WP. 1957 of 1974 to file fresh lists so that excise duty payable by it could be computed on the basis of the prices at which the goods were sold to the wholesalers at different places. Aggrieved by the order di/. 1-4-1974 and the three notices in respect of subsequent periods, the petitioner has filed WP. 1957 of 1974.

7. In WP. 1292 of 1973 the petitioner has questioned the correctness of the notice d/. 26-4-1973 issued by the Asst. Collector of Central Excise calling upon it to show cause as to why it should not be made liable to pay excise duty in respect of 19.5 per cent of the list prices at which the goods were sold to the wholesalers, which according to the petitioner therein, was attributable to post-manufacturing expenses incurred by it.

8. The petitions are resisted by the revenue.

9. At the outset, it is necessary to dispose of the preliminary objection raised, by the learned Advocate General, who appeared for the) Revenue, regarding the maintainability of these petitions. It is contended that against an order passed by the Asst. Collector an appeal would lie to a higher authority, both on facts and law and therefore, this Court should not exercise its jurisdiction under Art. 226 of the Constn of India and interfere with the proceedings at this stage. Ordinarily, this Court would not exercise the jurisdiction under Art. 226 of the Constn, if it is shown that a party, who approaches the Court has an adequate alternative remedy. I am of the view that in the instant case, interference is called for because as can seen from the order passed on 1-4-1974 by the Asst. Collector of Central Excise, which is impugned in WP. 1957 of 1974, he has failed to apply the principle enunciated by the Supreme Court, in Volyas' case and has failed to recognise the distinction between the manufacturing profits and the selling profits as indicated by the Supreme Court in the above decision. When a subordinate authority proceeds to dispose of a case in direct contravention of the enunciation made by the Supreme Court, interference by this Court would be necessary notwithstanding that there is an appeal provided against the action of the authority. The preliminary objection raised on behalf of the Revenue is overruled.

10. The expression ‘excise duty’ is understood in different ways in different contexts. In its widest amplitude, it is a ‘tax’ on goods payable by a person who manufactures them or by some other person who is required by law to, pay the same on the basis of the quantity of goods manufactured and may be levied on the basis of the expenses incurred by the manufacturer until the goods actually reach the hands of the consumer. So far as our country is concerned, the meaning of the expression ‘excise duty’ has been explained by the Supreme Court in more than one case. Hence it is unnecessary to refer to the cases of other countries. In Chhotabhai Jethabhai Patel & Co.…Plaintiff- v. The Union Of India…Defendants-(2) the Supreme Court held that a duty of excise was a tax-levy on home-produced goods of a specified class or description, the duty being calculated according to the quantity or value of the goods and which was levied because of the mere fact of the goods having been produced or manufactured and unrelated to and not dependent on any commercial transaction in them. In Amalgamated. Coalfields Ltd. v. Union of India(3) the Supreme Court observed that excise duty was primarily a duty on the production or manufacture of goods produced or manufactured within the country, and it was an indirect duty which the manufacturer or producer passed on to the ultimate consumer. It was, however, observed that the method of collection did not affect the essence of the duty that it was a tape on manufacture or production. In a case arising under the Sea Customs Act in re: Sea Customs Act (1878)(4) it was observed that the taxable event in the case of duties of excise was the manufacture of goods and the duty was not directly on the goods but on the manufacture thereof.

11. The views expressed in the three Supreme Court cases referred to above, were reiterated in Shinde Brothers Etc. v. Deputy Commissioner, Raichur & Others Etc.(5). Having regard to the consistent view taken by the Supreme Court with regard to nature and incidence of excise duty, the Supreme Court held in A.K Roy v. Voltas Ltd. as follows:

“Excise is a tape on the production and manufacture of goods (see Union of India v. Delhi Cloth & General Mills ((1963) Supp. 1 SCR 586). S. 4 of the Act therefore provides that the real value should be found after deducting the sellnig cost and selling profits and that the real value can include only the manufacturing costs and the manufacturing profit. The section makes it clear that excise is levied only on the amount representing the manufacturing cost plus the manufacturing profit and excludes post-manufacturing cost and profit arsing from post-manufacturing operation, namely selling profit. The section postulates that the wholesale price should be taken on the basis off cash payment thus eliminating the interest involved in wholesale price which gives credit to the wholesale buyer for a period of time and that the price has to be fixed for delivery at the factory gate thereby eliminating freight, octroi and other charges. As already stated it is not necessary for attracting the operation of S. 4(a) that there should be a large number of wholesale sales. The quantum of goods sold by a manufacturer on wholesale basis is entirely irrelevant. The metre fact that such sales may be few or scanty does not alter the true position.”

12. The occasion for making the above pronouncement arose in the following circumstances.

13. Voltas Ltd. was a company which was carrying on the business of manufacturing air conditioners, water coolers etc. It had its Head Office at Bombay and Branch Offices at Calcutta, Delhi, Madras, Bangalore, Cochin and Lucknow. From these several branch offices it effeced direct sales to consumers at list prices and such sales amounted to 90 to 95 per cent of its total production. Apart from the said sales, it also sold certain products at its head office. The case of the petitioner was that the list price after deducting the discount of 22 per cent allowed to the wholesale dealers alone constituted the “whole sale cash price” within the meaning of S. 4 of the Act for ascertaining the real value of the articles on the basis of which ad valorem excise duty could be levied. The Excise Authorities were, however, of the view that the expression “wholesale cash price” referred to the list price at which the goods were sold to the retailers and that no deduction was permissible therefrom for the purpose under S. 4(a) of the Act. In the above context, the Supreme Court was called upon to interpret the expression “wholesale cash price” appearing in Sec. 4(a). The Supreme Court rejected the contention of the Revenue that the trade discount in respect of which a deduction was claimed by the assessae did not fall within the scope of the explanation to S. 4 of the Act. The Supreme Court observed that unless it was shown that the discount that was allowed was given to the wholesalers with a view to conferring on them certain extra commercial advantages, it was obligatory on the part of the Excise Authorities to exclude the said sum from the list price in order to determine the ‘wholesale cash price’. In substance, the view of the Supreme Court was that the expenses incurred by a manufacturer from the stage at which the goods left the factory premises including interest payable on the value of the goods on account of deferred payment, could not form part of ‘wholesale cash price’, referred to in S. 4(a).

14. In WP. 1957 of 1974, the petitioner has claimed that four items of expenditure, namely, expenses incurred in connection with marketing and distribution, advertising, interest and freight paid for transporting the goods from the factory premises to the jelling points, had to be deducted from the list prices in order to determine the ‘wholesale cash price’. In WP. 1292 of 1973, the claim of the petitioner was that 19.5 per cent of the list, prices would, constitute post-manufacturing expenses and consequently would be deductible from the list price. The question which arises for consideration, therefore, is whether the expenses in respect of which deduction is claimed by the petitioners from part of the manufacturing expenses or not. Production of goods in the classical sense involves four economic factors, namely, (1) land, (2) labour, (3) capital and (4) organisation. In order to secure the above four factors an enterpreneur has to pay rent, wages, interest and provide for certain amount of profits to himself. We are not concerned in this case with the first three factors. There is no dispute regarding them. What, is, however, to be decided is whether the sums in respect of which deduction is claimed by the petitioners form part of managerial expenses relatable to production or whether they ane unconnected with production. The expenses incurred in connection with marketing and distribution of goods, interest on the value of goods attributable to the period between the time at which the goods leave the premises and the time at which the pride is paid by the wholesaler and the freight charges for transporting the goods from the factory gate to the selling points where goods are sold to the wholesalers, clearly fall outside the scope of the manufacturing expenses in view of the enunciation made by the Supreme Court in Voltas' case. Hence, a proportionate deduction from the list prices has to be made before arriving at the wholesale cash price. But so far as the expenses incurred in connection with advertisement are concerned, the question appears to be res integra.

15. Production involve two process, (1) the physical process, namely the process of converting material in-puts into production out-puts and (2) the decision making process which involves production planning and control, forecasting of market conditions, ascertainment of demand for new products, establishment of research centre with a view to reducing cost of production and improving the quality of the product and determination of process standards. It also involves maintenance of lines of communication with the ultimate consumer, which can be conveniently done in modem days by advertisement media. Just like a buyer does not buy the goods to put them on dung hill the manufacturer also does not manufacture goods to put them on a dung-hill. It is absolutely necessary for the manufacturer in order to earn what is known as manufacturing profits to manufacture such articles and goods which would be sold in the market. If he fails to do so the wheels of production will come to a standstill. It was, however, argued by Sriyuths Soli Sorabji, Desai and Ravender Narayana, learned Counsel for the petitioner in WP. 1957 of 1974 that the entire cost incurred by the manufacturer in advertisement had to be the exclude from the computation of taxable base, i.e, the wholesale cash price on the ground that it related only to selling activity of the manufacturer as such. It is difficult to subscribe to the above extreme view canvassed by the petitioner. It was alternatively contended that even granting for the purpose of argument the entire cost of advertisement cannot be allowed to be deducted, an attempt should at least be made to bifurcate the total costs of advertisement between the manufacturing activity on the one hand, and manufacturer's selling activity on the owner. In support of the above contention, reliance was placed on the the decision of the Supreme Court in Commr. of I.T v. Ahmedbhai Umarbhai & Co.(6) in which the Supreme Court cited with approval the decision of the Privy Council in International Harrest Co. of Canada v. Provincial Tax Commn(7) and another decision in Anglo-French Textile Co. v. Commr. of I.T(8). The question which arose, for consideration in Ahmedbhai Umarbhai & Co's case was, whether the entire profits earned by a manufacturer who had its factory within a Princely State was liable to payment of tax on his entire profits under the Excess Profits Tax Act merely because the goods manufactured were sold in British India. The Supreme Court held that the entire profits of the assessees accrued in British India alone as part of the profits was earned by the assessees within the Princely State as soon as the goods were manufactured. The Supreme Court, therefore, affirmed the decision of the Bombay High Court upholding the contention of the assessees that the portion of the profit earned by them which was attributable to their business of manufacture was not liable to tax under the British Indian Act.

16. On the above analogy, it is contended that it is necessary to determine in a given case how much of the advertisement expenses can be attributed tq the managerial activity of the entrepeneur and how much is attributable to his selling activity. There is great force in the above submission. I am of the view that the Excise Authorities can treat only a part of the advertisement expenses as manufacturing cost and not the whole of it. Hence, having regard the extent of advertisement cost attributable to the selling activity a proportionate sum should be deducted from the list prices to determine the wholesale cash price. It is a matter to be decided on the material placed before the authorities concerned in each case. At this stage, it is not possible to decide on the available material what portion of the advertisement expenses incurred by the petitioners can be allowed to be deducted from the list prices in order to arrive at the ‘wholesale cash price’. The assessing authority has, therefore, to decide on the evidence produced before him to what extent the advertisement expenditure incurred by the petitioners can be traceable to the selling activity and on the basis of the above finding, to allow deduction to that extent from the list prices. The remaining part of the advertisement expenses should be included in the wholesale cash price for the purposes of levying excise duty. In the result, these petitions are allowed. The order passed by the Asst. Collector of Excise, which is impugned in WP. 1957 of 1974, is quashed. Similarly, three notices issued to the petitioners in WP. 1957 of 1974 and notices issued to the petitioner in WP. 1292 of 1973 are quashed.

17. The Asst. Collector of Excise is directed to issue fresh notices to the petitioners in these two cases in the light of the decision of Voltas' case, and the observations made herein, and determine the liability of the petitioners under the Act.

18. No costs.