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Raichander Mohanlal v. Permanaad Sanghi And Another

Andhra Pradesh High Court
Feb 10, 1978
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Structured Summary of the Opinion — Civil Revision Petition

Factual and Procedural Background

The plaintiff filed a suit for declaration of title over land in Ameerpet, Hyderabad, valuing the suit at Rs. 7,815 and paying court-fee on half the market value under section 24-B of the Andhra Court-fees and Suits Valuation Act, 1956. The 1st defendant disputed title and alleged the land's market value exceeded Rs. 100,000. The Municipal Corporation (2nd defendant) alleged gross undervaluation and that the suit value could not be less than Rs. 15 per square yard, making the court-fee insufficient and placing the matter beyond the pecuniary jurisdiction of the 3rd Assistant Judge.

The 3rd Assistant Judge framed issues including (4) whether the suit valuation is incorrect and court-fee insufficient, and (5) whether the Court lacks pecuniary jurisdiction. After evidence, the Assistant Judge found the market value (half) to be Rs. 11,948 (even assuming a minimum rate), and held that the Court had no jurisdiction. He returned the plaint, directed payment of deficit court-fee (Rs. 11,948) and ordered presentation before the proper Court.

The plaintiff appealed to the Chief Judge, City Civil Court, Hyderabad. Before the Chief Judge the plaintiff did not seriously dispute the valuation finding but argued the trial court should have reported to the Chief Judge to allot the suit to a judge having pecuniary jurisdiction rather than returning the plaint. The Chief Judge dismissed the appeal, upholding the Assistant Judge's order returning the plaint. The plaintiff then filed the present civil revision against the order of the Chief Judge.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the phrase "a Court to be called the City Civil Court" in the Andhra Pradesh Civil Courts Act means the statute creates one single Court (so that judges are merely parts of that one Court) or whether each judge of the City Civil Court constitutes a separate Court for judicial purposes.
  2. When the value of a suit on the file of an Assistant Judge exceeds that Judge's pecuniary jurisdiction, does the Assistant Judge have to report the matter to the Chief Judge for allotment to a judge having the requisite pecuniary jurisdiction, or may the Assistant Judge return the plaint to be presented before the proper Court?

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's (Plaintiff's) Arguments

  • The Andhra Pradesh Civil Courts Act provides for "a Court" called the City Civil Court, implying a single Court; the various judges (Chief Judge, Additional Chief Judges, Additional Judges, Assistant Judges) are parts/branches of that one Court rather than separate Courts.
  • Because the City Civil Court is a single Court, an Assistant Judge who finds he lacks pecuniary jurisdiction should report the matter to the Chief Judge for allotment to another judge having the pecuniary jurisdiction, rather than returning the plaint to be presented elsewhere.
  • The return of the plaint forced the plaintiff to lead fresh evidence and amount to a de novo trial before the properly constituted Court; this prejudiced the plaintiff because some witnesses reportedly died in the interim.

Respondent's (Municipal Corporation's) Arguments

  • The words "judge" and "court" are synonymous for the purposes of the statute: every judge presides over a separate Court and thus each Judge of the City Civil Court is a unit by itself.
  • Although for administrative purposes the City Civil Court may be treated as a single unit, judicially each judge's Court is separate. Pecuniary jurisdiction is determined by statute for each judge and not by the Chief Judge.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Prabhakara Rao v. Hyderabad State Bank Addressed whether an Additional Judge of the City Civil Court could entertain execution of a decree passed by another judge of the City Civil Court; the High Court in that case held the First Additional Judge had the same pecuniary and territorial jurisdiction as the judge who passed the decree and was competent to entertain the execution petition. The court in the present opinion held that this authority had no application to the present facts. The earlier decision concerned execution jurisdiction where the Additional Judge had the same pecuniary and territorial jurisdiction as the judge who passed the decree; that situation differed from the present controversy about returning a plaint and the interpretation of whether the City Civil Court is a single court or multiple distinct courts.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court examined the statutory scheme of the Andhra Pradesh Civil Courts Act, XIX of 1972, and related provisions to determine whether the City Civil Court is a single Court in which all judges are components, or whether each judge constitutes a separate Court.

Statutory interpretation of structure and jurisdiction:

  • Section 3 authorises the Government to establish "a Court to be called the City Civil Court" for Hyderabad and Secunderabad, and the court considered the significance of the article "a" in that provision but did not accept that it mandates a unitary judicial entity in the sense argued by the petitioner.
  • Section 4 specifies categories and numbers of judges (Chief Judge, Additional Chief Judges, Additional Judges, Assistant Judges) to be appointed to the City Civil Court, reflecting separate judicial offices of differing ranks.
  • Section 5 delineates the original jurisdiction of the Chief Judge/Additional Chief Judge/Additional Judge (subject to CPC and Act) and expressly provides that an Assistant Judge's jurisdiction is limited to suits where the value of subject-matter does not exceed Rs. 10,000. Reading subsections (1) and (2) together demonstrates a statutory allocation of pecuniary jurisdiction among judge-cadres.
  • Section 6 empowers the Chief Judge to make administrative arrangements for distribution of business among the various Judges. The Chief Judge's administrative role does not convert all judicial functions into a single Court; it is consistent with separate courts presided over by individual judges while enabling administrative allocation of work.

Context from related provisions confirming separate courts:

  • Sections 7 and 8 (dealing with District Munsiffs and extensions of City Civil Court jurisdiction) show that the Chief Judge's administrative authority extends beyond mere internal distribution within the City Civil Court, indicating a structure of separately constituted courts and administrative supervision rather than a single monolithic judicial body.
  • Section 9 (appeals) uses language that an appeal lies "to the Court of the Chief Judge" from orders of Additional Judges and Assistant Judges. The explicit reference to the "Court of the Chief Judge" indicates that the statute contemplates distinct Courts presided over by individual judges; if the City Civil Court were a single undifferentiated Court, appeals could not consistently be described as lying to the Court of the Chief Judge from another judge of the same (single) court.
  • Section 20 expressly equates judicial offices and courts: in relation to the District of Hyderabad the terms for judges and courts are defined so that the Chief Judge, Additional Chief Judge, Additional Judge and Assistant Judge of the City Civil Court are, respectively, the District Court, Court of Additional Judge, Court of District Munsiff etc., thereby making clear that each judge presides over a separate Court.

Based on the statutory text and scheme, the court concluded that the proposition that the City Civil Court is a single Court (making individual judges mere parts of a single judicial body) cannot be sustained. Rather, each judge presides over a separate Court for judicial purposes even though administrative arrangements can be made by the Chief Judge.

Application to the disputed procedure:

  • Because judges preside over separate Courts, when an Assistant Judge finds that the suit's value exceeds his pecuniary jurisdiction, the Assistant Judge may return the plaint to be presented in the proper Court (i.e., a separate judge's Court that has pecuniary jurisdiction); the Assistant Judge is not limited to reporting the matter to the Chief Judge for internal re-allotment as the petitioner urged.
  • The court observed that the petitioner did not seriously dispute the Assistant Judge's valuation finding before the Chief Judge, and that the statutory scheme (including the provisions requiring framing of an issue on valuation under Section 11(4) of the Andhra Court-fees and Suits Valuation Act and Order 18 CPC procedure) meant that the plaintiff could have requested valuation/pecuniary-jurisdiction issues be decided before trial. The plaintiff's failure to insist on that procedure limited his ability to complain that evidence had already been recorded and that returning the plaint caused prejudice (including death of witnesses).
  • With respect to the cited precedent (Prabhakara Rao), the court found it inapplicable because that case dealt with execution jurisdiction where an Additional Judge had the same pecuniary and territorial jurisdiction as the judge who passed the decree; that factual and juridical posture differed materially from the present dispute about return of a plaint and the meaning of "a Court" in the Act.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The Civil Revision Petition is dismissed. The court's core ruling can be stated as follows:

DISMISSED — the revision petition is dismissed and the order of the Chief Judge confirming the return of the plaint stands.

Implications and consequences:

  • Direct effect on the parties: The order of the 3rd Assistant Judge returning the plaint (and the Chief Judge's confirmation thereof) remains operative; the plaintiff must comply with directions given (including payment of the deficit court-fee and presentation before the proper Court). The parties are ordered to bear their own costs in the revision.
  • Statutory and precedential implications: The court interpreted the City Civil Court statute as creating multiple separate Courts presided over by individual judges for judicial purposes (even though the Chief Judge has administrative powers to distribute business). The opinion did not purport to lay down a broader novel precedent beyond resolving the present dispute and expressly held the cited authority (Prabhakara Rao) inapplicable to these facts; the decision therefore resolves the parties' dispute without announcing a sweeping new principle beyond its statutory interpretation in context.

Final order as expressed in the opinion: "For the foregoing reasons, the Civil Revision Petition is dismissed but in the circumstances, the parties will bear their own costs. Revision dismissed."

Show all summary ...

(1) THIS is a revision filed by the plaintiff against the Judgment of the chief Judge, City Civil Court, hyderabad, in C. M. A. No 79 of 1976, dismissing the appeal and confirming the order passed by the third Assistant judge, City Civil Court, Hyderabad, returning the plaint in O. S. No. 368 of 1968, to be presented before proper Court.

(2) IN this revision the learned Counsel for the petitioner raised an interesting point with regard to the establishment of "a Court" to be called City Civil court. He contended that the Andhra pradesh Civil Courts Act provides for only one City Civil Court, with Judges of different cadres for cities of hyderabad and Secunderabad. As the city Civil Court constitutes one Court, one Judge cannot pass an order to return the plaint to be presented before another Judge having pecuniary jurisdiction in the same City Civil Court. If a particular Judge finds that according to his cadre he is not competent to hear that particular suit, the learned judge should refer the suit to the chief Judge, City Civil Court, for being allotted and posted before another judge having the pecuniary jurisdiction to entertain the suit. He further elaborated the point by stating that if the plaint is returned to be presented in proper Court, it necessarily implies that there is another Court and that is contrary to the intendment of the creation of a City Civil Court.

(3) THE learned Counsel for the municipal Corporation, on the other hand, contended that the words 'judge' and 'court' are synonymous. Every judge presides over a separate Court. The Judges are given powers under a statute. The pecuniary jurisdiction to a particular Judge in City Civil Court is given by the statute but not by the Chief judge, City Civil Court. The City Civil court consists of several Judges and each Judge is a unit by itself i. e., each judge presides over a separate Court. For the purpose of administration the city Civil Court may be a single unit, but for the judicial purpose the Courts are different.

(4) THEREFORE, the point that arises for consideration is that when the value of the suit on the file of the Court of the assistant Judge, exceeds its pecuniary jurisdiction the Assistant Judge has to report the matter to the chief Judge to allot the suit to a Court having the pecuniary jurisdiction to entertain the suit or the plaint could be returned by the Assistant Judge to be presented in the proper Court.

(5) BEFORE I proceed to note the relevant provisions of the City Civil Courts Act, it would be appropriate to note the facts of the case.

(6) THE plaintiff filed the suit claiming to be the rightful owner of a piece of land measuring Ac. 1-17 cts. Situated in S. No. 139 (old S. No. 40) in Ameerpet, Hyderabad. The plaintiff valued the suit land at rs. 7,815/- and paid the court-fee rs. 101-10 on half of the market value under section 24-B on the Andhra court-fees and Suits Valuation Act, 1956. The 1st defendant denied the title of the plaintiff and alleged that that he is in possession of the suit land. He further alleged that the suit land is worth more than a lakh of rupees. If the suit property is properly valued, it will be beyond the pecuniary jurisdiction of that Court. The 2nd defendant, municipal Corporation of Hyderabad, also alleged that the valuation of the suit land is grossly undervalued and the Court-fee paid is insufficient and that the market value of the suit land cannot be less than Rs. 15 per square yard and the Court-fee paid is insufficient; in view of the market value of the suit land, the Court (3rd assistant Judge), has no pecuniary jurisdiction to try the suit. The 3rd assistant Judge framed as many as six issues. Among them issues 4 and 5 are as follows :

"4. Whether the suit valuation is incorrect and the court-fee paid is insufficient? 5. Whether this Court has no pecuniary jurisdiction to try the suit?"
on issue No. 4, after recording the evidence, the third Assistant Judge found that half of the market value of the suit property comes to Rs. 11,948 even at the minimum rate of Rs. 4 per square yard. Accordingly on issue No. 5 he held that that Court has no jurisdiction to try the suit. Therefore, he returned the plaint and directed to pay the deficit court-fee of Rs. 11,948 and present the plaint in proper Court. Against this order, the plaintiff preferred an appeal before the Chief Judge, City civil Court, Hyderabad. Before the learned Chief Judge, City Civil Court, the learned Counsel for the appellant-plaintiff did not seriously dispute the finding of the 3rd Assistant Judge with regard to the valuation of the suit. But he contended that the trial Court ought to have made a report to the Cihef judge, City Civil Court, Hyderabad, in respect of allotting the suit to the Judge having pecuniary jurisdiction. It was also contended that on account of the return of the plaint, the plaintiff had to lead fresh evidence which amounts to de novo trial of the suit before the Court having pecuniary jurisdiction. It was also contended that some of the witnesses are reported to have died However, the learned Chief Judge, found that the order of the 3rd Assistant Judge returning the plaint was a proper order and dismissed the appeal. The plaintiff has preferred this revision against the order of the learned Chief Judge, City civil Court, Hyderabad.

(7) NOW I will note the relevant provision of the Andhra Pradesh Civil Courts Act, XIX of 1972 (hereinafter called 'the Act') which have a bearing on the case. Section 3 provides for the establishment of the City Civil Court. Section 3 reads as under:-"3 (1) The Government, may, after con-suitation with the High Court by notification establish a Court to be called the City Civil Court with jurisdiction to receive, try and dispose of subject to the provisions of this Act, all suits and proceedings of a civil nature arising in the cities of Hyderabad, and Secunderabad in the district of Hyderabad. (2) The City Civil Court existing on the date of commencement of this act, shall be deemed to have been established under sub-section (1)". Section 4 is with regard to the appointment of Judges to the City Civil Court section 4 reads as follows:-"4 (1) The number of Judges to be appointed to the City Civil Court shall be one Chief Judge, of the rank of a district Judge and such number of additional Chief Judges of the rank of District Judge and such number of Additional judges of the rank of subordinate Judge and such number of Assistant Judges of the rank of a district Munisiff as the Government may after consultation with the High court from time to time by notification fix. Section 5 is in respect of the jurisdiction of the Judges of the City Civil Court in original suits and proceedings section 5 reads as under:-"5 (1) The jurisdiction of the Chief judge, an Additional Chief Judge and additional Judge shall subject to the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 and the other provisions of this Act, extend to all original suits and proceedings of a civil nature. (2) The jurisdiction of an Assistant judge shall extend to all like suits and proceedings, not other wise exempted from his cognizance under any other law for the time being in force, the amount or value of the subject-matter of which does not exceed rupees ten thousand. "section 6 speaks of the distribution of work in the City Civil Court and reads as under :-6 " (1) The Chief Judge, may, from time to time, mage such arrangements as he may think fit, for the proper distribution of the business of the city Civil Court among the various judges thereof. (2) An Additional Chief Judge shall subject to the general or special order of the High Court, perform all or any of the functions of the Chief Judge which the Chief Judge may assign to him and in the peformance of those functions, the additional Chief Judge shall exercise the same power as the chief Judge. The learned Counsel for the petitioner vehemently contended that section 3 (1)provides for the establishment of a court called "city Civil Court". Much emphasis was laid on the word "a court" to show that the Government was creating only one Court which is called City Civil Court. When that is the position the learned Counsel submitted that all the Judges i. e. , the chief Judge, Additional Chief Judge, additional Judges and Assistant judges put together are part and parcel of one Court and for that reason under section 6 (1) of the Act, the Chief Judge from time to time makes such arrangements as he may think fit for the proper distribution of the business of the City civil Court, among the various Judges thereof. Whenever a suit is filed in the city Civil Court and if the suit is allotted to an Assistant Judge and subsequently it is found that the value of the suit exceeds the pecuniary jurisdiction, then the Assistant Judge has simply to report the matter to the Chief Judge to allot the suit to some other Judge, who is competent to entertain the suit. This procedure is to be adopted in view of the fact that there is only one Court established i. e., the City Civil Court. If several Courts are separately established in the City Civil court by the Government the position could have been different. The learned Counsel for the petitioner as well as the respondents stated across the Bar that so far as the assistant Judges are concerned, for the purpose of distribution of the business of the Court, the Chief Judge appoints a senior-most Judge among the Assistant judge, to receive the suits and he would allot such suits to the other Assistant Judges.

(8) I will now, examine the submissions made by the learned Counsel for the petitioner.

(9) I have already extracted the relevant sections viz., sections 4 and 5 of the Act.

(10) IN section 4 (1) three categories of Judges are mentioned, viz. (1)Chief Judge of the rank of a District judge, (2) Additional Judges of the ranks of a Subordinate Judge and (3) Assistant judges of the ranks of a District munsiff. Under section 5 (1) it is the jurisdiction of the Judges of the City civil Court in original suits that is defined. Subject to the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure and the other provisions of the Civil Courts Act, the jurisdiction of the Chief judge, and Additional Chief Judge, extends to all original suits or proceedings of civil nature. Under sub-sections (2) of section 5 an Assistant Judge shall take cognizance of the suits of the amount or value of the subject-matter which does not exceed rs. 10,000. Therefore, if sub-sections (1) and (2) are read together, it becomes clear that when the value of the subject-matter of the suit does not exceed ten thousand rupees, an Assistant Judge, would entertain the suit and over and above ten thousand rupees, the Additional Judge as well as the Chief Judge, could take cognizance of the same, subject to the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure. In the present suit the 3rd Assistant Judge found that the value of subject-matter exceed more than 10 thousand rupees and therefore the same had to be filed before a Judge having pecuniary jurisdiction exceeding Rs. 10,000. The contention of the learned Counsel for the petitioner is that as the City civil Court constitutes one Court a report ought to have been sent to the chief Judge, City Civil Court, and the chief Judge ought to have allotted the suit to an Additional Judge who can entertain the suit.

(11) TO test this argument it is necessary to refer to some other provisions of the Act. The Chief Judge of the City Civil Court is of the rank of a District Judge. Section 7 provides for the establishment of the Courts of the District Munsiffs in the remaining area of the District of Hyderabad and it reads thus:"7 (1) The Government may, after consultation with the High Court, by notification, establish in the remaining area of the District of hyderabad, such number of courts of District Munsiffs as they may deem necessary with jurisdiction to receive, try and dispose of all original suits and proceedings of a civil nature the amount or value of the subject-matter of which does not exceed rupees ten thousand arising in the area for which such Court is established". Sub-section (5) (a) of section 7 provides:-"where more than one District munsiff is appointed to a Court of district Munsiff one of the District munsiffs shall be designated by the high Court as the Principal District munsiff and the others as the Additional District Munsiffs. "clause (b) of sub-section (5) of section 7 further provides:"subject to the general or special orders of the Chief Judge, City Civil court, the Principal District Munsiff may from time to time, make such arrangements as he thinks fit for the proper distribution of the business of the Court among the District Munsiffs". Clause (b) of sub-section (5) of secion 7 makes it clear that the Principal district Munsiff, subject to the general or special orders of the Chief Judge, city Civil Court, makes such arrangements as he thinks fit for the proper distribution of the business of the court among the District Munsiffs i. e., principal District Munsiff receives orders from the Chief Judge on the administrative side. This shows that the chief Judge, City Civil Court, exercises administrative jurisdiction not only in respect of the business of the City civil Court among the various Judges thereof but also exercises jurisdiction: o give suitable orders to the Principal district Munsiff to make arrangements for the proper distribution of business of the Court among the District munsiffs. Thus, the Chief Judges, City civil Court, exercises adminisrative jurisdiction in respect of the City Civil court as well as the District Munsiffs courts in the Hyderabad District. If the City Civil Court is one Court exclusively for the cities of Hyderabad and Secunderabad, the Chief Judge, City civil Court is not supposed to exercise his jurisdiction beyond the City Civil court. The statute provides that he could exercise his jurisdiction even with regard to the other Courts also. That apart sub-section (1) of section 8 also provides that the Government may, after consultation with the High court, by notification, extend the jurisdiction of the Chief Judge, Addi-; ional Chief Judges and Additional judges of the City Civil Court to the remaining area of the District of hyderabad. , Sub-section (3) of section 8 provides that the jurisdiction that is being exercised by the Chief Judge, additional Chief Judges, and Additional Judges of the City Civil Court over the remaining area of the District of Hyderabad on the date of commencesment of this Act shall be deemed to have been extended under sub-section (1) i. e. , for all practical purposes. The city Civil Court, even though was created for the cities of Hyderabad! And Secunderabad, but the Judges ofi the Chief Judge cadre of the City Civil court are exercising their jurisdiction through out the District of Hyderabad i. e. , their jurisdiction is not confined to the cities of Hyderabad and Secunderabad.

(12) THAT apart section 9 gives a clue to the scheme of the Courts under the act. It provides a forum for appeals and it will be useful to extract section 9 in full.

"9. (1) An appeal shall, when it is allowed by law, lie, from any decree or order in a civil suit or proceeding - (1) of the Chief Judge or the Additional Chief Judge, of the City Civil court, to the High Court : (2) of the Additional Judge of the City Civil Court : (a) To the Court of the Chief Judge, when the amount or value of the subject-matter of the suit or proceeding is not more than rupees fifteen thousand ; (b) to the High Court in other cases; and (iii) of the Assistant Judge of the city Civil Court, or of the District munsif in the remaining area of the district of Hyderabad, to the Court of the Chief Judge. (2) The Chief Judge, may subject to the orders of the High Court transfer for disposal any appeal filed in the City Civil Court to any Additional Chief Judge, or any Additional Judge"
. The provisions of section 9 make it clear that when the subject-matter of the suit or proceeding is not more than rupees fifteen thousand, the appeal wzould lie to the Court of the Chief Judge (underlining is mine). The emphasis is that the appeal lies to the Court of the Chief Judge. Here the Court of chief Judge is specifically mentioned. It indicates that whenever a Judge presides, he presides over a Court. Therefore, it is stated that the appeal lies to the Court of the Chief Judge. If the City Civil Court is construed as one Court, no appeal could lie from a decree of the Assistant Judge, or additional Judge to the Chief Judge, city Civil Court. The appeal must be filed, if the argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner is accepted, before some other Court which is not a City Civil Court. But section 9 provides a forum in the City Civil Court, itself. It states that from the Assistant judge as well as the Additional Judge, when the value is below fifteen thousand rupees and also from the District Munsiff of the Hyderabad District, appeals can lie to the Court of the Chief Judge, city Civil Court. Therefore, in the face of this provision it cannot be held that the entire City Civil Court and the judges presiding over the Courts put together constitute only one Court. On the other hand, it has to be held that they are separate Courts. It may also be noted that from any decree or order in a civil suit or proceeding* of the assistant Judge of the City Civil Court and of the District Munsiff in the remaining area of the District of hyderabad, an appeal lies to the Court of the Chief Judge. Further it can be noted that the petitioner himself filed the appeal in the Court of the Chief Judge under section 9 of the Act, against the order of the Assistant judge returning the plaint. It therefore admits of no doubt that when one court of the City Civil Court passed the order, appeal is filed in another Court of the City Civil Court, and this position itself is contrary to the contention of the petitioner.

(13) THAT apart section 20 of the Act makes the position very clear that every Judge presides over a District court. Section 20 reads as under :-

" In this part, the terms 'district judge', 'additional District Judge; 'subordinate Judge' and 'district munsiff and the District Court', 'court of Subordinate Judge' and the 'court of District Munsiff' shall in relation to the District of hyderabad, including the cities of hyderabad and Secunderabad respectively mean the Chief Judge, additional Chief Judge, Additional judge, and Assistant Judge of the city Civil Court, and the Courts of the Chief Judge or Additional Chief judge, Additional Judge and Assistant Judge, thereof."
this provision clearly lays down that the Court of each and every Judge is separate. There is no ambiguity left and it is made clear that wherever a judge of the City Civil Court, presides, he constitutes a Court. Therefore, in my view there is no substance in the contention pf the learned Counsel for the petitioner that the entire City Civil court is one Court and that they cannot be called distinct and separate courts. This construction sought to be pressed into service on 'a Court' cannot be put in the face of the provisions of section 20 of the Act. The scheme of the Act does not permit such a construction as sought to be put by the learned Counsel for the petitioner to be put on 'a Court' to be called City Civil court.

(14) THE learned Counsel for the petitioner relied upon the decision in prabhakara Rao v. Hyderabad State bank. In my view this judgment has no application to the facts of the present case. In that case the contention advanced by the judgment-debtor was that the First Additional Judge, City civil Court, had no jurisdiction to entertain the first execution petition because the decree put into execution was passed by the second Judge, City civil Court. His argument was that a decree could be executed only by the court which passed it or by the Court to which it is duly transferred to him for execution, and as the first Additional judge, City Civil Court, neither passed the decree nor was the decree transferred to him for execution he could not have entertained the execution application. The learned Judges of the High Court held that the First Additional Judge, dealt with the execution petition in 1959 after the records were returned by the high Court to which it has been transmitted in connection with the appeal and his execution petition remained on the file of the first Additional Judge only for a short period of time. But the Counsel for the judgment-debtor contended that the fact that the execution petition was kept on the file of the First Additional Judge, for however short a time, was fatal and that the execution petition must be deemed to have been entertained by a court which had absolutely no jurisdiction to do so. The learned Judges were pleased to hold that this argument was founded upon a misapprehension. The first Additional Judge, City Civil Court, is not a separate Court. He is only one of the Judges of the City Civil Court. The decree was passed by the city Civil Court. Furthermore the First Additional Judge had the same pecuniary and territorial jurisdiction as the Judge who passed the decree. It is, therefore, idle to argue that the First Additional Judge had no jurisdiction to entertain the execution petition. It is also worth noticing that the judgment-debtor did not raise any objection to the jurisdiction of the First additional Judge to entertain the execution petition at any time when it was pending before him.

(15) IT can be noted thai the learned judges held that the First Additional judge had the pecuniary and territorial jurisdiction as the Judge who passed the decree i. e. , a Judge of the same rank of the City Civil Court, who passed the decree and a Judge of the same rank was executing the decree.

(16) THEREFORE, in my view, as already noted, this authority has no application to the facts of the present case.

(17) THE learned Counsel next contended that the entire evidence has been recorded and in fact the trial has almost come to an end. At that stage the question of pecuniary jurisdiction was taken up Section 11 (4) of the Andhra court-fees and Suits Valuation Act, lays down that whenever a question is raised that the suit exceeds the pecuniary jurisdiction of the Court, the Court is bound to frame an issue and before entering the trial under Order 18, Civil procedure Code, it should decide the said issue. When an objection with regard to the pecuniary jurisdiction is taken by the defendants, if the plaintiff could have requested the Court to frame an issue and decide the same before entering the trial. If the plaintiff has not chosen to adopt that procedure, he cannnot complain of the fact that the evidence is recorded on all the issues which entails a great hardship to him, as some of the witnesses are reported to have died. The plaintiff has to reap the consequences for having not insisted upon deciding the issue of valuation first That apart if some of the witnesses are reported to have died whose statements are recorded, the law will take its own course in respect of that evidence. That cannot be a point to urge that the evidence is almost recorded and the return of the plaint is not proper.

(18) THUS, there is no substance in the points raised by the Counsel for the petitioner. For the foregoing reasons, the Civil Revision Petition is dismissed but in the circumetances, the parties will bear their own costs. Revision dismissed.