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Bijivemula Venkata Subba Reddy v. Jangam Satya Babu And Others
Structured Summary of the Provided Opinion
Factual and Procedural Background
The respondents instituted O.S. No. 89 of 2002 in the Court of Junior Civil Judge, Badvel, seeking a decree of perpetual injunction in respect of the suit schedule property. The petitioner filed a counter-claim seeking the same relief. The trial Court dismissed the respondents' suit and decreed the petitioner's counter-claim.
The respondents appealed by filing A.S. No. 5 of 2008 in the Court of Additional Senior Civil Judge-cum-Fast Track Court, Rajampet at Badvel. They subsequently filed I.A. No. 37 of 2008 under Order XXIII Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (CPC), seeking permission to withdraw the appeal "without prejudice" to their right to institute a fresh suit for declaration of title and recovery of possession in respect of the suit schedule property. The petitioner opposed the application on the ground that valuable rights had accrued to him by virtue of the decree in his counter-claim and that permitting withdrawal with such liberty would defeat those rights. The lower Appellate Court allowed the I.A. by an order dated 15.07.2008. The petitioner challenged that order in the present Civil Revision Petition (C.R.P.), which is the subject of this opinion.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the lower Appellate Court rightly permitted the respondents to withdraw their appeal with liberty to institute a fresh suit under Order XXIII Rule 1 CPC.
- Whether the conditions specified in sub-rule (3) of Rule 1 of Order XXIII CPC were present (or required) to permit withdrawal with liberty to file a fresh suit.
- Whether granting such permission would violate Order II Rule 2 CPC, which requires that a suit include the whole claim arising from the same cause of action and normally precludes subsequent suits for omitted reliefs.
Arguments of the Parties
Petitioner's Arguments
- The order passed by the trial Court (and the permission granted) was contrary to law and lacked factual basis.
- None of the conditions mentioned in sub-rule (3) of Rule 1 of Order XXIII CPC were present in this case, so the impugned order could not be sustained in law.
- Granting permission to the respondents to file a fresh suit would defeat the valuable rights accrued to the petitioner by the decree in his counter-claim.
- The permission would violate Order II Rule 2 CPC, which, according to the petitioner, mandates that a plaintiff include the whole claim arising out of the same cause of action in one suit (thus prohibiting splitting of reliefs).
Respondents' Position (as presented in the opinion)
- The respondents applied (I.A. No. 37 of 2008) under Order XXIII Rule 1 CPC seeking leave to withdraw the appeal with liberty to file a fresh suit for declaration of title and recovery of possession. The application sought the withdrawal expressly "without prejudice" to their right to file a fresh suit.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Somaraju Chinnammi v. Sumanthu Sivaji Ganesh, 2008 (6) ALT 215 | Authority addressing withdrawal of a suit for perpetual injunction where the plaintiff sought leave to file a fresh suit on the same cause of action; relevant to sub-rule (3) of Rule 1 of Order XXIII CPC. | The Court noted that Somaraju Chinnammi concerned a plaintiff seeking to withdraw a suit for perpetual injunction with liberty to file a fresh suit on the same cause of action, and in that case the ingredients of sub-rule (3) were absent. The Court distinguished that situation from the present case, observing that the facts here were not of the same kind and that the prior decision did not mandate interference with the impugned order. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court proceeded through a statutory and contextual analysis of Order XXIII Rule 1 CPC and Order II Rule 2 CPC, applying those provisions to the facts before it.
First, the Court observed that procedure applicable to original proceedings generally governs appeals as well unless particular separate provisions apply. Thus the availability of withdrawal in original suits extends to appeals where appropriate procedure is analogous.
The Court then discussed the scope of Rule 1 of Order XXIII CPC, emphasizing that a plaintiff (and by logical extension an appellant) has liberty to withdraw a suit (or appeal) at any stage subject to the restriction that withdrawal normally precludes filing a fresh suit on the same cause of action and for the same relief unless the party reserves the right and the Court grants permission. The text of sub-rule (3) was cited (permitting withdrawal with liberty to institute a fresh suit where the Court is satisfied either that the suit must fail by reason of some formal defect or that there are sufficient grounds to allow the plaintiff to institute a fresh suit for the subject-matter).
A key element of the Court's analysis concerned the meaning of the phrase "subject-matter" in sub-rule (3). The Court rejected a narrow reading equating "subject-matter" with the physical item of property alone. Instead, it explained that "subject-matter" in the context of sub-rule (3) refers to the nature of the relief sought rather than merely the item of property. The Court illustrated this by example: a suit for perpetual injunction (requiring the plaintiff to be in possession and seeking protection from interference) is different in nature from a suit for foreclosure or for recovery of possession (which presupposes dispossession and a different factual posture). If "subject-matter" were construed only as the item of property, then withdrawing an injunction suit would improperly bar an independent suit for foreclosure or recovery of possession. The Court concluded that this was not the scheme of CPC.
Consequently, the Court read Rule 1 of Order XXIII CPC to bar only the filing of a suit for the same relief on the same cause of action—not all subsequent suits that relate to the same property but seek different reliefs of a different nature.
Applying that construction to the case at hand, the Court held that a suit for perpetual injunction and a suit for declaration of title and recovery of possession are of different nature and in many respects mutually exclusive: an injunction presupposes plaintiff's possession threatened by defendant, whereas recovery of possession presupposes dispossession by a defendant. Because the reliefs are not part of the "same claim" in the sense contemplated by Order II Rule 2 CPC, permitting respondents to withdraw with liberty to sue for declaration of title and recovery of possession did not amount to impermissible splitting of claims.
The Court further observed that the respondents' prayer for leave to file a fresh suit for declaration of title and recovery of possession was, strictly speaking, unnecessary—such a fresh suit could have been filed even without formal leave—because the reliefs are different in nature from the injunction claim. Nonetheless, the lower Appellate Court's grant of leave did not contravene the CPC.
The petitioner's reliance on Somaraju Chinnammi was addressed: that case concerned a withdrawal with liberty to file a fresh suit on the same cause of action where sub-rule (3) ingredients were absent; the Court found that the present facts were distinguishable and did not warrant the same conclusion.
Finally, the Court rejected the petitioner's contention based on Order II Rule 2 CPC (prohibition on splitting claims), explaining that Rule 2 is aimed at preventing splitting of reliefs arising out of the same cause of action; it does not encompass reliefs that are contradictory in nature or belong to different categories (as injunction and recovery of possession do). The Court therefore concluded there was no breach of Rule 2 in the impugned grant of liberty.
Holding and Implications
Holding: The Civil Revision Petition is dismissed. DISMISSED
Direct implications and immediate effects:
- The order of the lower Appellate Court dated 15.07.2008 allowing I.A. No. 37 of 2008 (permitting withdrawal of the appeal with liberty to institute a fresh suit for declaration of title and recovery of possession) is upheld and is not interfered with.
- The respondents remain free, consistent with the Court's reasoning, to institute a fresh suit for declaration of title and recovery of possession notwithstanding the earlier suit for injunction, because those reliefs are of a different nature and not barred by Order XXIII Rule 1 or Order II Rule 2 CPC as interpreted in this opinion.
- There shall be no order as to costs.
The opinion does not state or claim that it establishes a new, binding precedent beyond its application to the facts of this revision. No broader implications beyond the direct effect described above are expressly discussed in the provided text.
The respondents filed O.S.No.89 of 2002 in the Court of Junior Civil Judge, Badvel, against the petitioner, for the relief of perpetual injunction, in respect of the suit schedule property. The petitioner, on the other hand, presented a counter-claim, for that very relief. The trial Court dismissed the suit and decreed the counter-claim.
The respondents filed A.S.No.5 of 2008 in the Court of Additional Senior Civil Judge-cum-Fast Track Court, Rajampet at Badvel. After some time, they filed I.A.No.37 of 2008, under Order XXIII Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (CPC), with a prayer to permit them to withdraw the appeal, without prejudice to the right to file a fresh suit for declaration of title and recovery of possession, in respect of the suit schedule property. The petitioner opposed the application, stating that the valuable rights have accrued to him, on account of the decree passed in his counter-claim and the same cannot be defeated by according permission to the respondents, enabling them to file a fresh suit. Through an elaborate order, dated 15.07.2008, the lower Appellate Court allowed the I.A. The same is challenged in this C.R.P.
Sri L.J.Veera Reddy, learned counsel for the petitioner, submits that the order passed by the trial Court granting permission to the respondents to file a fresh suit, is opposed to law and there was absolutely no factual basis for it. He contends that none of the conditions mentioned in sub-rule (3) of Rule 1 of Order XXIII CPC, are present in this case, and that the impugned order cannot be sustained in law. He further submits that the permission accorded to the respondents by the lower appellate Court would violate the mandate under Order II Rule 2 CPC, which insists that the whole claim of a plaintiff, based the same cause of action, must be included in a suit.
The respondents failed in their effort to obtain a decree of perpetual injunction, against the petitioner. On the other hand, they suffered a decree of similar nature vis- -vis the petitioner, in the form of a counter-claim. They preferred an appeal against the decree passed by the trial Court. Instead of proceeding with the appeal, they have chosen to withdraw it, with liberty to file a fresh suit for declaration of title and recovery of possession. Though learned counsel for the petitioner, initially, raised an objection stating that there is no provision in the C.P.C., which enables the respondents to withdraw the appeal. He did not proceed beyond a point, obviously on realizing that the procedure that applies to original proceedings would govern the appeals also, unless separate provisions are made, on any aspect.
A plaintiff in a suit has full liberty to withdraw the suit, at any stage. The only restriction placed upon him is that, if a suit is withdrawn, he cannot present a fresh suit on the same cause of action and obviously, for the same relief, unless he reserves to himself the right to do so and the Court accords such permission. Rule 1 of Order XXIII CPC, which governs the withdrawal of a suit, reads as under:
1. "Withdrawal of suit or abandonment of pat of claim:-
(1) At any time after, the institution of a suit, the plaintiff may as against all or any of the defendant abandon his suit or abandon part of his claim:
Provided that where the plaintiff is a minor or other person to whom the provisions contained in rules 1 to 14 of Order XXXII extend, neither the suit nor any part of the claim shall be abandoned without the leave of the Court.
(2) an application for leave under the proviso to sub-rule (1) shall be accompanied by an affidavit of the next friend and also, if the minor or such other person is represented by a pleader, by a certificate of the pleader to the effect that the abandonment proposed is, in his opinion, for the benefit of the minor or such other person.
(3) Whether the Court is satisfied,-
(a) that a suit must fail by reason of some formal defect, or
(b) that there are sufficient grounds for allowing the plaintiff to institute a fresh suit for the subject-matter of a suit or part of a claim, it may, on such terms as it thinks fit, grant the plaintiff permission to withdraw from such suit or such part of the claim with liberty to institute a fresh suit in respect of the subject-matter of such suit or such part of the claim.
(4) Where the plaintiff-
(a) abandons any suit or part of claim under sub-rule (1) or
(b) withdraws from a suit or part of a claim without the permission referred to in sub-rule (3),
he shall be liable for such costs as the Court may award and shall be precluded from instituting any fresh suit in respect of such subject-matter or such part of the claim.
(5) Nothing in this rule shall be deemed to authorize the Court to permit one of several plaintiffs to abandon a suit or part of a claim under sub-rule (1), or to withdraw, under sub-rule (3), any suit or part of a claim, without the consent of the other plaintiffs."
A perusal of sub-rule (3) discloses that the permission to institute a fresh suit is needed, only when the plaintiff intends to file it "in respect of the subject-matter" of such suit, or part of the claim. The expression "subject-matter" employed in sub-rule (3) is prone to be understood as the property, which is shown in the suit schedule. However, a close scrutiny reveals that the expression refers to the nature of relief than the item of property. For instance, the plaintiff in a suit is in enjoyment of an item of immovable property, on the strength of usufruct mortgage. Anticipating or complaining interference by the defendant, he may file suit for perpetual injunction. If for any reason, he does not want to proceed with the suit, he can withdraw it and his right to seek foreclosure of the mortgage is totally independent of, and unconnected with the suit for perpetual injunction. In both the suits, "the subject-matter", in the ordinary parlance, is the mortgaged property. If the expression "subject-matter", occurring in sub-rule (3), is construed as the item of property, than the nature of relief claimed, withdrawal of suit for mortgage would bar the suit for foreclosure also. That is never the purport of CPC, nor the scheme under relevant provisions. The inescapable conclusion is that what is barred under Rule 1 of Order XXIII CPC is, the filing of a suit for the same relief, on the same cause of action.
It is not uncommon that whenever a plaintiff in a suit for perpetual injunctions finds it difficult to prove his possession, he would withdraw the same, without prejudice to his right to file a suit for recovery of possession, if necessary by seeking declaration of title. Suits for declaration of title and recovery of possession can be filed, even after dismissal of the suit for injunction. Since the nature of relief and cause of action in the two categories of suits are totally different, there is no necessity to seek leave under Rule 1 of Order XXIII CPC in such cases. The prayer made by the respondents for granting them leave to file a fresh suit for declaration of title and recovery of possession was, in fact, unnecessary and superfluous. Without such leave also, they could have filed it.
Learned counsel for the petitioner placed reliance upon the judgment of this Court in Somaraju Chinnammi v. Sumanthu Sivaji Ganesh 2008 (6) ALT 215. That was a case where the plaintiff in a suit for perpetual injunction wanted to withdraw the suit with liberty to file a fresh suit on the same cause of action. This Court found that the ingredients contained in sub-rule (3) of Rule 1 of Order XXIII CPC were totally absent, in the permission accorded by the trial Court. Such is not the case here.
The objection raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner based upon Order II Rule 2 CPC, is equally untenable. The said provision reads as under:
2. "Suit to include the whole claim:-
(1) every suit shall include the whole of the claim which the plaintiff is entitled to make in respect of the cause of action; but a plaintiff may relinquish any portion of his claim in order to bring the suit within the jurisdiction of any Court.
(2) Relinquishment of part of claim.-
Where a plaintiff omits to sue in respect of, or intentionally relinquishes, any portion of his claim, he shall not afterwards sue in respect of the portion so omitted or relinquished.
(3) Omission to sue for one of several reliefs.-
A person entitled to more than one relief in respect of the same cause of action may sue for all or any of such reliefs; but if he omits, except with the leave of the Court, to sue for all such reliefs, he shall not afterwards sue for any relief so omitted."
What this provision mandates is that, a plaintiff shall include whole of the claim in respect of the cause of action. In another words, it prohibits splitting of reliefs, which are based on the same cause of action. For instance, if it became necessary for an individual to seek declaration of title in respect of an item of property, and for recovery of possession on the same set of facts, he cannot split the relief and file separate suits for such reliefs. The examples can be multiplied. The claim mentioned in Rule 2 takes in its fold, the reliefs that are connected with each other. However, it is difficult to group in the reliefs, which are in a way contradictory to one another.
The relief of perpetual injunction presupposes the plaintiff in a suit being in possession of the property and his facing threats from the defendant. In a suit for recovery of possession, on the other hand, the very basis is that the plaintiff was dispossessed by the defendant and he prays for a decree of recovery of possession. The suit for these reliefs cannot belong to the same category, much less the reliefs of that nature would form part of the same claim. Consequently, the question of splitting them does not arise. As a matter of fact, they are mutually exclusive.
Viewed from any angle, the contention advanced on behalf of the petitioner cannot be accepted and the order under revision does not warrant interference.
The Civil Revision Petition is accordingly dismissed.
There shall be no order as to costs.
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