S K Katriar, J.

The petitioner of C.W.J.C. No.2170 of 2010 has preferred this appeal under Clause 10 of the Letters Patent of the High Court of Judicature at Patna, and is aggrieved by the order dated 5.3.2010, whereby the writ petition has been dismissed, and the order passed by the State Human Rights Commission (hereinafter referred to as the “SHRC”), whereby fine was imposed on the appellant for violation of human rights of respondent no.2, has been upheld.2. A brief statement of facts essential for the disposal of this appeal may be indicated. The appellant was at the relevant point of time posted as Sub-Divisional Police Officer, Bettiah. Respondent no.2 was at logger-heads with one Abhay Prasad concerning a land dispute. Abhay Prasad has had a dispute with respect to a piece of land situate in front of the complainant”s house. According to the complainant, he had purchased the land for Rs.3,30,000/- way back in the year 2002, his name had been mutated in the revenue records in pursuance of the order passed in Mutation Case No.284 of 2002-03, and he has been paying rent to the State Government. According to the complainant, Abhay Prasad wanted to grab the land and, with this end in view, got in collusion with the appellant who was then posted there.2.1) Respondent no.2 simultaneously forwarded copies of the same complaint to the National Human Rights Commission (“NHRC” for short), as well as the SHRC, alleging therein that the appellant had, on 1.10.2008, beaten him on his palm on the spot with a cane stick, whereafter taken him to the police Station, had detained him there for whole day, and had beaten him up throughly. He further complained that, on account of collusion between the appellant and Abhay Prasad, the latter had initiated a false criminal case against respondent no.2. On receipt of the complaint, NHRC did not entertain the complaint and passed the following order: “The complaints be transmitted to the concerned authority for such action as deemed appropriate.” The office of NHRC forwarded this order to respondent no.7, who, it appears, initiated an enquiry.2.2) SHRC took cognizance of the allegations made in the complaint on 30.4.2009, and proceeded with the matter. The appellant did not appear before the Commission leading to the order dated 2.9.2009, whereby the learned Commission held that the appellant was guilty of violation of human rights of respondent no.2, and, therefore, directed respondent no.4 to make payment of the monetary compensation of Rs.40,000/- to respondent no.2 to be recovered from the appellant. Aggrieved by the order dated 2.9.2009, the appellant filed a review application before the SHRC, inter alia, on the ground that notice of the proceedings had not been served on him because the same had been forwarded to him as per the address of his last posting whereas he had been transferred to Patna on account of the order of suspension passed against him. SHRC saw reason in this contention and decided to hear the matter afresh. The appellant was given a detailed hearing and, on consideration of the entire materials placed by the appellant, passed order dated 26.11.2009, whereby the review application was dismissed, and the same order was reiterated. The appellant challenged the order dated 26.11.2009, by preferring the writ petition which has been dismissed leading to the present appeal. It may further be indicated that, during the pendency of the proceedings, the State Government placed the appellant under suspension and is being proceeded against departmentally.3. While assailing the validity of the order of the learned writ court, learned counsel for the appellant submits that, in view of the period of limitation prescribed in Section 36(2) of the Protection of Human Rights Act 1993 (hereinafter referred to as “the Act”), SHRC could not have been proceeded against after expiry of one year commencing from the act constituting violation of human rights. He relies on the judgment of the Supreme Court in N.C. Dhoundial vs. Union of India and others [(2004)2 SCC 579, paragraphs 14 to 17]. He submits in the same vein that the learned Single Judge has erred in relying on Section 16 of the Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Act 1985. He next submits that SHRC has seriously erred in refusing to rely on the report of the D.I.G. which makes adverse comments on the report of the Superintendent of Police. In his submission, if reliance were placed on the D.I.G.”s report, then the appellant would not in the least be guilty of violation of any human rights. He lastly submits that, in view of the position that NHRC was already in seisin of the complaint, jurisdiction of SHRC is excluded in view of the proviso to sub-section (5) of section 21 of the Act.4. The learned Additional Advocate General has made elaborate submissions in support of the order of the learned Single Judge.5. We have perused the materials on record and considered the submissions of the learned counsel for the parties. We shall do well to reproduce Section 36 of the Act, and is as follows:“36. Matters not subject to jurisdiction of the Commission.—(1) The Commission shall not inquire into any matter which is pending before a State Commission or any other Commission duly constituted under any law for the time being in force. (2) The Commission or the State Commission shall not inquire into any matter after the expiry of one year from the date on which the act constituting violation of human rights is alleged to have been committed.”It appears to us that sub-section (2) prescribes the bar of limitation beyond which SHRC cannot entertain a complaint. The complaint must be received by the NHRC or the SHRC within a period of one year from the date on which the act constituting violation of human rights is alleged to have been committed. In the instant case, the act had taken place on 10.4.2008, and the SHRC had passed the first order on 30.4.2009, deciding to proceed with the matter. The construction put by the appellant on sub-section (2) of section 36 of the Act is to the effect that the final order should be passed by the Commission within a period of one year commencing from the date of the alleged act and, in our view, most untenable. Submission of the complaint petition is within the control of the complainant, but its disposal by the Commission is not in his control. If such a construction as has been suggested by the appellant were upheld, most of the complaints if not all, will be dismissed on the ground of delay. A lot of time is taken in service of notices, and in completing the pleadings. The adjudication under the Act may necessitate reports from the concerned authorities, or evidence. This is a country where, in order to avoid service of notice, the noticee more often than not brings in God by misrepresenting to the notice server that he has gone out for pilgrimage. It is common knowledge that, subject to exceptional circumstances, the Courts take up such matters in chronological order of filing. In view of growing litigation, paucity of court staff, and Judges etc., disposal takes far more than the needed time.6. The Courts are crowded primarily because of the illegal action and the arbitrariness of the Government, the instrumentalities of the Government, and their functionaries. The two-fold conclusion of a research work in law is that government, governmental agencies, instrumentalities of the Government, and their functionaries are parties to at least 70% of the litigations in this country. The second conclusion is that such authorities and functionaries, on account of their inefficiency, inaction, corruption etc., are passing on their own decision-making to Courts. The net result today has been noticed by Mr. Bibek Debroy in his book entitled “In the dock: Absurdities of Indian Law”, that the pending litigations in this country without any addition thereto, will take 324 years for disposal. These observations were made two decades ago, and the situation has further deteriorated. One Judge of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in one of his speeches recently has observed that it will now take 350 years or so to dispose of the pending cases.7. If we were put the construction suggested by the appellant on section 36(2), not one complaint or petition against the Government would be adjudicated. All of them would become time-barred, and violations of human rights would go unchecked and unpunished. Does it need any emphasis that preparation of a case for its final adjudication will take a minimum time, apart from the position that it has to join a long queue of pending cases? Learned counsel for the appellant has relied on the judgment of the Supreme Court in N.C. Dhoundial vs. Union of India (supra). The facts of that case stood on a fundamentally different footing. Whereas the complaint in the present case was filed well in time, the complaint in that case was filed after expiry of four years as a result of which the Supreme Court held that it was time-barred. The contention advanced on behalf of the appellant is rejected.8. Learned counsel for the appellant has next contended that SHRC has grievously erred in refusing to rely on the report of the D.I.G., and has relied only on the report of the Superintendent of Police. As stated hereinabove, respondent no.2 had forwarded copies of the same complaint to NHRC as well as SHRC. The NHRC declined to entertain the complaint and passed the order that “the complaints be transmitted to the concerned authority for such action as deemed appropriate”. On account of ministerial act in the office of NHRC, and as a fortuitous circumstance, it was transmitted to respondent no.7 who proceeded to enquire into the matter. On the other hand, after SHRC took cognizance of the complaint on 30.4.2009, it had referred the matter to the Superintendent of Police. It had never referred the matter to the D.I.G.. In such a situation, after SHRC assumed jurisdiction over the complaint, the enquiry of respondent no.7 became non-est in law. Furthermore, his report appears to be an appeal against the report of respondent no.8 (on which SHRC has relied), which is impermissible in law. We are, therefore, of the view that SHRC rightly ignored the report of respondent no.7. The contention is rejected.9. Learned counsel for the appellant has lastly submitted that, in view of the first proviso to sub-section (5) of section 21 of the Act, jurisdiction of SHRC is completely ousted because the complaint had been lodged with the NHRC. The contention is stated only to be rejected. NHRC declined to entertain the complaint, and had passed a general order to forward it to the appropriate authority. He did not even name the authority to whom it had to be forwarded. On account of some inexplicable reason, perhaps fortuitous circumstance and ministerial act, got forwarded to respondent no.7. The relevant portion of Section 21(5) is reproduced hereinbelow:“21.Constitution of State Human Rights Commission. xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx (5) A State Commission may inquire into violation of human rights only in respect of matters relatable to any of the entries enumerated in List II and List III in the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution: Provided that if any such matter is already being inquired into by the Commission or any other Commission duly constituted under any law for the time being in force, the State Commission shall not inquire into the said matter.”In view of the order passed by NHRC, declining to entertain the complaint, the same was not pending before NHRC. On the other hand, the first proviso to sub-section (5) of section 21 is relevant in the present case and is applicable to the facts and circumstances of the present case which dispels the submission advanced on behalf of the appellant and dealt 11 with hereinabove. Once SHRC assumes jurisdiction, that of NHRC is obviated.10. Before we part with the records, we must state that the appellant has been placed under suspension and is being proceeded against departmentally. The authorities are directed not to allow any let-up in the departmental proceeding against the appellant.11. In the result, this appeal is dismissed.