Mandadi Satyanarayana Reddy v. Andhra Pradesh Legislative Assembly, Hyderabad And Others

Ramesh Ranganathan, J.:— “The evil of political defections has been a matter of national concern. If it is not combated, it is likely to undermine the very foundations of our democracy and the principles which sustain it. With this object, an assurance was given in the Address by the President to Parliament that the Government intended to introduce in the current session of Parliament an anti-defection Bill. This Bill is meant for outlawing defection and fulfilling the above assurance.”

[Statement of Objects and Reasons for introducing the Tenth Schedule in the Constitution by the Constitution (Fifty-second Amendment) Act, 1985].

2. Unprincipled defection is a political and social evil. People have grown distrustful of the emotive political exultations that such floor-crossings belong to the sacred area of freedom of conscience, or of the right to dissent or of intellectual freedom. The anti-defection law seeks to recognise the practical need to place the proprieties of political and personal conduct — whose awkward erosion and grotesque manifestations have been the bane of the times — above certain theoretical assumptions which in reality have fallen into a morass of personal and political degradation. (Kihoto Hollohan v. Zachillhu, 1992 Supp (2) SCC 651).

3. Aggrieved by the order of the Speaker of the Andhra Pradesh State Legislative Assembly, in Disqualification Petition No. 1 of 2007 dated 22.12.2008, declaring that they were disqualified from continuing as members of the 12th Legislative Assembly under Para 2(1)(a) of the tenth schedule, and that their seats had fallen vacant, respondents 3 and 6 therein have filed these two writ petitions. A writ of certiorari is sought to quash the said order and to declare that they continue to be members of the Andhra Pradesh Legislative Assembly. The 2nd respondent in these two writ petitions was the petitioner in D.P No. 1 of 2007. Parties shall, hereinafter, be referred to as they are arrayed in D.P No. 1 of 2007.

4. D.P No. 1 of 2007 was filed before the Speaker contending that the respondents therein, including the petitioners in these two writ petitions, were set up and elected on the Telangana Rastra Samithi (TRS) party ticket, that they were elected as members of the Legislative Assembly in the general elections held in 2004, that TRS party had set up two candidates i.e (1) Sri H.A Rahman and (2) Sri M. Sudarshana Rao to contest in the elections to the A.P State Legislative Council held on 22.3.2007, that all the 9 respondents had openly disobeyed the decision of the TRS political party and had proposed the nomination of Sri Kasani Gnaneswar, the President of Mahajan Party, as an independent candidate, that their conduct amounted to their having voluntarily given up membership of the TRS political and Legislature party and that they were disqualified from continuing as members, of the A.P State Legislative Assembly, under Article 191(2) read with Para 2(1)(a) of the tenth schedule of the Constitution of India. A common counter-affidavit was filed, in D.P No. 1 of 2007, on behalf of all the 9 respondents.

5. D.P No. 2 of 2007 was filed, before the Speaker, by the Chief Whip of the TRS party to declare that these 9 MLAs had suffered disqualification, under Para 2(1)(b) of the tenth schedule, on the ground that they had not only proposed the name of Sri Kasani Gnaneswar but had also set up and supported him, that they had celebrated his victory though a resolution had been, passed by the TRS party on 5.3.2007 to set up two candidates, and a whip was issued on 19.3.2007 to all MLAs of TRS Legislature party, including the nine respondents, which was widely published in the newspapers. However, D.P No. 2 of 2007 was not pressed.

6. In D.P No. 1 of 2007, the Speaker framed 7 points for consideration. The petitioner, (2nd respondent in these two writ petitions), examined himself as a witness. Exs.P 1 to P. 21 were marked. Respondent No. 3, (the petitioner in W.P No. 28453 of 2008), examined himself as R.W 1 and 3 others as his witness. Exs.B 1 to B. 5 were marked.

7. By his order dated 22.12.2008, and in exercise of the powers vested in him, under Para 6 of the Tenth Schedule and Rule 8 the Members of A.P Legislative Assembly (Disqualification on Ground of Defection) Rules, 1986, (hereinafter referred to as the “disqualification rules”), the Speaker held that three of the respondents, including both the writ petitioners, stood disqualified from continuing as members of the 12th Andhra Pradesh Legislative Assembly and that their seats had fallen vacant.

8. Detailed submissions, both oral and written, have been made before us by Sri M. Chandrasekhar Rao, Sri V. Venkataramana, learned Counsel for the writ petitioners, and Sri K. Ramakrishna Reddy, learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the 2nd respondent-complainant. On the rival submissions, the following questions arise for consideration:

(1) While exercising jurisdiction, under the Tenth Schedule, can the Speaker adjudicate a dispute whether or not a Legislator belongs to a particular Legislature party?

(2) Were the petitioners members of the TRS party when D.P No. 1 of 2007 was instituted before the Speaker?

(3) Is Article 171(4) a constitutional mandate to a Legislator to vote, in the elections to the Legislative Council, on the basis of proportional representation? If so, does the act of a legislator, in proposing a candidate for election to the Legislative Council, fall within the ambit of such a mandate, clothing him with constitutional protection?

(4) Should the power of condonation, in Para 2(1)(b), be read into Para 2(1)(a) of the Tenth Schedule, and the action of T.R.S party, in not pressing D.P 2 of 2007, be held as condoning the act of the legislators in proposing an independent candidate, though T.R.S party had set up two candidates for election to the Legislative Council?

(5) Was the Speaker justified in adjudicating D.P No. 1 of 2007 when D.P No. 2 of 2007 was not pressed, and both D.P Nos. 1 and 2 of 2007 were based on similar set of facts?

(6) Is disqualification under Para 2(1)(a) confined only to exercise of vote, or abstention from voting, where a change of Government is likely to be brought about or a major policy or programme, on which the political party had gone to the polls, is involved?

(7) In the absence of a whip or a direction, that the Legislators, belonging to the party, should or should not do something, could the Speaker have drawn an inference on the conduct of such legislators to hold that they “had voluntarily given up membership” of the TRS party?

(8) Whether newspaper reports and CDs. could have been relied upon by the Speaker while exercising jurisdiction under the Tenth Schedule?

(9) Whether the Speaker has recorded findings on all the points framed for consideration and, if not, would such failure require the impugned order to be set aside?

I. Regarding Question No. 1:

9. Sri V. Venkataramana would submit that the essential jurisdictional fact, for adjudication of a disqualification, is an undisputed factual position that “the legislators belong to a particular Legislature party” in view of the words in Para 2(1)(a) that “a member of a house belonging to any political party shall be disqualified for being a member of the house”, that a combined reading of Paras 1, 2 and 6 of the Tenth Schedule would lead to the irresistible conclusion that incurring of disqualification could be decided by the Speaker only if the jurisdictional fact, of the particular legislator belonging to a particular Legislature party, was admitted, that, since the Speaker was conferred with limited jurisdiction to decide upon the incurring of disqualification, the factual dispute in the present case, i.e, whether the petitioner was elected as an independent candidate or was set up or sponsored by the TRS party, did not fall within his jurisdiction.

10. According to the learned Counsel a dispute, whether a legislator belonged to a Legislature party or not, may some times be bona fide or real in contra distinction to a camouflage of a dispute, that if a dispute was raised for the purpose of a dispute or to escape from a possible disqualification, it could be decided by the Speaker at the threshold without going deep into the matter, that in the present case, since the writ petitioners had filed their nomination as independent candidates and were merely sponsored and not set up by the TRS party, the dispute, whether or not they belonged to the TRS party, was bona fide and as the foundational jurisdictional facts were themselves in dispute the Speaker lacked jurisdiction to adjudicate thereupon.

11. The Tenth Schedule cannot be read or construed independent of Article 191 of the Constitution and its object of discouraging defection which has assumed menacing proportions, (Rajendra Singh Rana v. Swami Prasad Maurya, (2007) 4 SCC 270), and to curb the evil of political defections motivated by lure of office or other similar considerations which endanger the very foundation of our democracy. (Kihoto Hollohan). A purposive interpretation of the Tenth Schedule is called for (Rajendra Singh Rana), which is to suppress the mischief, namely, breach of faith of the electorate and to curb the evil of defections which has polluted our democratic polity. (G. Viswanathan v. Hon'ble Speaker T.N Legislative Assembly, (1996) 2 SCC 353). The remedy proposed is to disqualify the person, who is found to have defected, from continuing as a member of the House. (Kihoto Hollohan).

12. The provisions in the Tenth Schedule give recognition to the role of political parties in the political process. Paragraph 2(1)(a) proceeds on the premise that political propriety and morality demand that if a person changes his affiliation after the election, and leaves the political party which had set him up as a candidate in the election, he should give up his membership of the Legislature and go back before the electorate. The same yardstick is applied to a person who is elected as an Independent candidate and wishes to join a political party after the election. (Kihoto Hollohan).

13. The words “such political party” in Para 2(1)(a) refers to the ‘original political party’ as defined in Para 1(c) of the Tenth Schedule. Under explanation (a) to Para 2(1), an elected member of a House shall be deemed to belong to the political party by which he was set up as a candidate for election as such member. The essential jurisdictional fact to be ascertained, in order to decide if a member of the House attracts disqualification, under Para 2(1) of the Tenth Schedule, is whether he was set up as a candidate for election as such member by a political party. If he was, the legal fiction in explanation (a) would require his being deemed to be a member of such political party. The legal fiction, enacted in explanation (a) to Para 2(1) of the Tenth Schedule, must be given full effect. Otherwise, the member will escape the rigour of the law intended to curb the evil of defections which has polluted our democratic polity. Para 2(1) read with the explanation clearly points out that an elected member shall continue to belong to that political party by which he was set up as a candidate for election as such member. (G. Viswanathan). The expression ‘original political party’, as defined in Para 1(c) of the Tenth Schedule, must also be read in the context of Para 3, as it originally stood, whereunder a split in the original political party would not attract disqualification on the ground of defection.

14. Under Para 6(1), the Speaker is required to decide the question whether a member of the House is subject to disqualification under the Tenth Schedule. In case of a dispute the Speaker cannot, without recording a finding on the jurisdictional facts whether or not a member of the House was set up by a political party as a candidate for election, and that he belongs to such political party, exercise jurisdiction under Para 6(1) to decide whether such a member has suffered disqualification under clause (a) or (b) of para 2(1) of the Tenth Schedule. There is nothing in paras 1, 2 and 6 of the Tenth Schedule which fetter exercise of jurisdiction by the Speaker to decide this question. Accepting the contention, urged by Sri V. Venkataramana, would mean that, by merely disputing his membership of the political party, a member of such political party can avoid the rigour of the Tenth Schedule. Such a construction would defeat the object of the Constitution (Fifty-second Amendment) Act, 1985 and the purpose for which clause (2) to Article 191 and the Tenth Schedule were inserted. The distinction sought to be made by the learned Counsel between a “real and bona fide dispute” and a “camoflauge of a dispute” does not find support in the provisions of the Tenth Schedule. Question No. 1 is answered in the affirmative.

II. Regarding Question No. 2:

15. Sri M. Chandrasekhar Rao would contend that, while R.W.I had deposed that he was never a member of the TRS political party, he was not cross-examined on this aspect, that the nomination form filed in the 2004 general elections showed that they had contested as independent candidates sponsored by the TRS party which was further established by the fact that their nomination was proposed by 10 voters, that, under Section 33 of the Representation of the People Act, 1951, if a candidate was set up by a recognized political party one proposer was sufficient for a valid nomination whereas 10 voters were required to propose an independent candidate's nomination, that reliance placed on the gazette notification dated 12.5.2004, (marked as Ex.P 22 wherein the names of the disqualified members were shown in the list of TRS party legislators), was misplaced, that the basis for such publication, under Section 73 of the Representation of the People Act, was the declaration of result by the returning officer under Section 66 of the Act, that the heading “names of the members elected for those constituencies along with their party affiliation” in the gazette notification showed that MLAs were broadly categorized to include those elected on a party ticket as well as independent candidates sponsored by a political party, that the basis to decide whether a candidate had contested as an independent, or on behalf of political parties, was the nomination form, that declaration of result of the petitioner's election, in Form No. 21-C under Section 66 of the Representation of the People Act read with Rule 64 of the Conduct of Election Rules, 1961, showed that he was only sponsored and not set up by the TRS party and, since their nomination forms had been signed by 10 voters, and the declaration form showed that they were sponsored by TRS, it was evident that respondent Nos. 3 and 6 had contested the election as independent candidates and that they were not members of the TRS party.

16. Sri K. Ramakrishna Reddy would submit that TRS was a registered political party with effect from 21.8.2001 and recognized as a political party vide Election Commission letter dated 21.5.2004, that the respondents were set up as candidates, for election to the Legislative Assembly by the TRS political party, that they were given party tickets based on which they were elected as members of the legislative assembly, that they had filed statutory declarations in Form 2-B, and the nomination paper in Part III(b)(ii), stating that they were set up in the election by the Telangana Rashtra Samithi (TRS) party which was a registered, but unrecognized, political party, that they had also filed a declaration in Form III, under Rule 4 of the disqualification rules, stating that they were affiliated to the TRS party by depositing the election certificate issued by the Returning Officer in Form 21-C before taking oath as an MLA under Article 188 of the Constitution of India, that a notification was published by the Election Commission, in A.P Gazette No. 24 dated 12.5.2004, stating that the petitioners were elected as MLAs with TRS party affiliation and that it was conclusively established that the writ petitioners were TRS party MLAs.

17. On the question whether respondents 1 to 9 were members of the TRS party, the Speaker noted that the petitioner had filed copies of the nomination papers filed in the general elections held to the Andhra Pradesh Legislative Assembly in 2004, the Gazette Notification dated 12.5.2004 issued by the Election Commission, copies of the party-wise list of members of the Legislative Assembly maintained by the Andhra Pradesh Legislature and that the Secretary, Andhra Pradesh Legislature had also been examined. The Speaker also noted the contention of the respondents that they did not belong to the TRS party, that they had contested as independent candidates with a common symbol, got elected as independent members of the Legislative Assembly and continued to remain as such.

18. The Speaker observed that, in the instant case, the Election Commission had issued the Gazette Notification on 12.5.2004 constituting the 12th Andhra Pradesh State Legislative Assembly, that the notification clearly mentioned that the respondents belonged to the TRS party, that it was only on the basis of the notification issued by the Election Commission, and the details furnished by the leadership of the TRS Legislature party, would the Legislature Secretariat deal with the members, that the records of the Andhra Pradesh Legislature, and the evidence of R.W 4, indicated that the strength of TRS Legislature party including the respondents was 26, that nothing had been brought on record that the respondents had disputed the same at any time after their election till the filing of the disqualification petition, that the respondents had, in their counter, referred to the TRS party as “our” party and, therefore, he considered that TRS was a political party and all the respondents were its members.

19. The contention, based on Section 33 of the Representation of the People Act, 1951, is only to be noted to be rejected. The Election Commission of India issued the Election Symbols (Reservation and Allotment) Order, 1968 (hereinafter referred to as “the Symbols Order”). Para 6 of the symbols order classifies political parties into recognised and unrecognised political parties. (Janata Dal (Samajwadi) v. Election Commission Of India, (1996) 1 SCC 235; Krishna Mohini (Ms) v. Mohinder Nath Sofat., (2000) 1 SCC 145). The expression “recognised political party”, as occurring in the first proviso to sub-section (1) of Section 33 of the Act, must be assigned the same meaning as assigned to it by the Symbols Order. The privilege enjoyed by a candidate set up by a recognised political party, as spelt out by a combined reading of Section 33 of the Act with the provisions of the Symbols Order, is that his nomination paper is complete if proposed by an elector, (i.e, one only), of the constituency. If the candidate be one not set up by a recognised political party, i.e, if he be a candidate set up by an unrecognised party or be he an independent candidate, his nomination paper must be subscribed by ten proposers being electors of the constituency. The nomination paper filed by a candidate set up by an unrecognised political party, or an independent candidate, cannot be proposed by a single elector of the constituency or by electors less than ten. (Krishna Mohini)

20. As TRS was registered as a political party with effect from 21.8.2001, and as it was not a recognized political party when the 2004 general elections were held both to the Lok Sabha and to the Andhra Pradesh Legislative Assembly, (having been recognized as a political party only after the elections i.e, with effect from 21.5.2004), respondents 1 to 9 were required to be proposed by 10 electors. Unlike the Representation of People Act, 1951, or the Symbols Order, the Tenth Schedule to the Constitution does not make any distinction between a recognized political party and a registered but unrecognised political party. All that it requires is that a member of the House should belong to a political party and should be set up by such a party in the election. The distinction sought to be made between “sponsored” and “set up” by the TRS party, in the 2004 elections, does not find support in the Tenth Schedule. A perusal of Ex.B 5 would make it clear that respondents 1 to 9 were set up by TRS party and had contested the 2004 elections on its behalf as members of a registered but unrecognized political party.

21. Ex.P 3 is the declaration of the result of the election under Section 66 of the Representation of the People Act, 1951, in Form 21-C under Rule 64 of the Conduct of Election Rules, 1961. It shows that respondent No. 3, sponsored by the T.R.S, had been elected to fill the seat in the House. While the Gazette notification, issued under Section 73 of the Representation of the People Act, 1951, shows the party affiliation of respondents 3 to 6 as Telangana Rashtra Samithi, the party affiliation of a few other elected members, is shown therein as “independent”. As has been held by the Speaker, respondents 3 and 6 never questioned these proceedings at any time before D.P No. 1 of 2007 was instituted. Under Rule 5(1) of the disqualification rules, the Secretary shall maintain, as in Form-IV, a register based on the information furnished under Rules 3 and 4 in relation to the members. Form-IV also requires the name of the political party to which a member belongs to be recorded. Ex.P 2 i.e, the party-wise list of members of the 12th A.P Legislative Assembly shows respondents 3 and 6 as belonging to the T.R.S party.

22. The conclusion reached by the Speaker, is supported by the evidence on record and does not necessitate interference in proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. This question must also be answered in the affirmative.

III. Regarding Question No. 3:

23. According to Sri M. Chandrasekhar Rao, Article 171(4) of the Constitution is a constitutional mandate requiring the writ petitioners to vote on the system of proportional representation by means of a single transferable vote, that the said right to vote included the right to propose a candidate for the legislative council elections, that Article 171(4) and para 2(1)(a) of the Tenth Schedule should be harmoniously construed, that, as Article 171(4) was a special provision it would prevail over the general provision in para 2(1)(a) of the Tenth Schedule, that it should be treated as an exception to para 2(1)(a) of the Tenth Schedule, that Articles 105 and 194 were not relevant for the purpose of deciding disqualification in the light of Article 171(4), that while the freedom of speech conferred under Articles 105 and 194 was subject to the provisions of the Constitution and to the rules and standing orders regulating the procedure of Parliament/Assembly, the right conferred under Article 171(4) was not circumscribed by any such provision, that, in the present case, the Speaker did not consider the effect of Article 171(4) of the Constitution and that his findings were perverse and a colourable exercise of power. Sri V. Venkataramana would adopt the submissions of Sri M. Chandrasekhar Rao on the effect of Article 171(4) of the Constitution and the fundamental right of freedom of speech to include the right of nomination.

24. On the other hand, Sri K. Ramakrishna Reddy would submit that the right to elect/be elected as a member of the Legislature was only a statutory right, that such rights were subject to the statutory limitations specified in the Tenth Schedule and that constitutional immunity could not be claimed from being disqualified thereunder. Learned Senior Counsel would submit that Article 171(4) dealt with the composition of the Legislative Council and its method of election, that it did not confer any immunity under the Tenth Schedule, that Para 2(1)(a) and (b) of the Tenth Schedule dealt with the conduct of legislators and their disobedience/defiance of the decision of their political/Legislature party both inside and outside the House and that they were not barred or prohibited from voting.

25. With regards the contention that Article 171(4) enabled them to propose/vote in favour of as many candidates as the number of seats in the Legislature council were vacant, and that such acts were immune from action under the Tenth Schedule, the Speaker noted that, under Articles 105 and 194, every member had the freedom of speech and expression on the floor of the House which included the right to vote, but this right was circumscribed by the Tenth Schedule, that exercise of this right of freedom of speech and expression publicly against the party by a member was contrary to the Tenth schedule and that the argument based on Article 171(4) of the Constitution did not appear to be reasonable.

26. Article 171 of the Constitution relates to composition of the Legislative Council. Clause (3) thereof, relates to the manner in which the seats in the legislative council are to be filled up either by election or by nomination. Clause (4) merely provides that election, under clause 3 (d), shall be held in accordance with the law made by Parliament, and in accordance with the system of proportional representation by means of a single transferable vote. In the present case, election to the Legislative Council was under Article 171(3)(d) and ⅓rd of the members were to be elected by members of the Legislative Assembly.

27. The contention urged, in effect, is that exercise of the right to vote under Article 171(4), for as many candidates as there are vacancies, is immune from disqualification under Article 191(2) read with the Tenth Schedule to the Constitution and that the right to propose a candidate falls within the ambit of the right to vote. Even if the right of vote is presumed to include a right to propose, Article 171(4) does not confer any right on members of the House to vote for candidates, on the system of proportional representation, in defiance of/or against the directives of the political party to which the members belong. A political party's political stability and social utility depends on the shared beliefs and concerted action of its members in furtherance of commonly held principles. Any freedom of its members to vote as they please, independently of the political party's declared policies, will not only embarrass its public image and popularity but also undermine public confidence in it which, in the ultimate analysis, is its source of sustenance — nay, indeed, its very survival. A public image of disparate stands by members of the same political party is not looked upon, in political tradition, as a desirable state of things. (Kihoto Hollohan). Loyalty to the party is the norm. A divided party is looked on with suspicion by the electorate. (Griffith and Ryle on Parliament Functions, Practice and Procedure (1989 edn., p. 119); Kihoto Hollohan).

28. The question whether the right to vote was constitutionally protected and did not attract the anti-defection law, in view of Articles 105(2)/194(2) of the Constitution, fell for consideration in Kihoto Hollohan and the Supreme Court observed:

“…………The freedom of speech of a Member is not an absolute freedom. That apart, the provisions of the Tenth Schedule do not purport to make a Member of a House liable in any ‘Court’ for anything said or any vote given by him in Parliament. It is difficult to conceive how Article 105(2) is a source of immunity from the consequences of unprincipled floor-crossing…………

29. The right to vote is a statutory right and is, therefore, subject to statutory limitations. [Kihoto Hollohan (supra), Jyoti Basu v. Debi Ghosal, (1982) 1 SCC 691 : AIR 1982 SC 983]. No constitutional protection is conferred on a member of the House if, in exercising his vote on the system of proportional representation, he violates the provisions of the Tenth Schedule. It is difficult to conceive how Article 171(4) is a source of immunity from the consequences of unprincipled floor-crossing. While it is true that, unlike Article 171(4), Article 194(2) is subject to constitutional provisions, the rules and standing orders regulating procedure of the Legislature, all that clause (4) of Article 171 provides for is the method and manner in which elections, under clauses (a) to (d) of Article 171(3), are to be held i.e, under a law made by parliament and on the system of proportional representation by means of a single transferable vote. Neither is Article 171(4) a constitutional mandate requiring a member of a house to exercise his vote, nor does it confer immunity on a member from being disqualified under the Tenth Schedule for proposing a candidate, in defiance of the political party to which he belongs.

30. To quote M.N Venkatachaliah, J, (as he then was), in Kihoto Hollohan,

“………The argument that the constitutional remedies against the immorality and unprincipled chameleon-like changes of political hues in pursuit of power and pelf suffer from something violative of some basic features of the Constitution, perhaps, ignores the essential organic and evolutionary character of a Constitution and its flexibility as a living entity to provide for the demands and compulsions of the changing times and needs. The people of this country were not beguiled into believing that the menace of unethical and unprincipled changes of political affiliations is something which the law is helpless against and is to be endured as a necessary concomitant of freedom of conscience. The onslaughts on their sensibilities by the incessant unethical political defections did not dull their perception of this phenomenon as a canker eating into the vitals of those values that make democracy a living and worthwhile faith…………”

31. The Tenth Schedule is a part of the Constitution and attracts the same canons of construction as are applicable to the expounding of the fundamental law. One constitutional power is necessarily conditioned by the others as the Constitution is one “coherent document”. [Kihoto Hollohan]. Neither the doctrine of generalia specialibus non-derogant, nor the judgments relied upon in this regard, i.e, Calcutta Gas Co. v. State of W.B, AIR 1962 SC 1044; Sultana Begum v. Prem Chand Jain, (1997) 1 SCC 373; P. Raghava Kurup v. V. Ananthakumari, (2007) 9 SCC 179; Anwar Hasan Khan v. Mohd. Shaft, (2001) 8 SCC 540; Gujarat Urja Vikas Nigam Ltd. v. Essar Power Ltd.., (2008) 4 SCC 755 and J.K Cotton Spinning and Weaving Mills Co. Ltd. v. State of U.P, AIR 1961 SC 1170, have any application as Article 171(4) does not fall foul either of Article 191(2) or the Tenth Schedule. The contention that the findings of the Speaker are perverse, and a colourable exercise of power, are without basis and necessitate rejection. This question must be answered in the negative.

IV. Regarding Question No. 4:

32. Sri V. Venkataramana would submit that, before D.P No. 1 of 2007 was decided, D.P No. 2 was not pressed which amounted to condonation of the alleged misconduct, if any, on the part of the legislator and that the spirit of condonation in para 2(1)(b) must be read into para 2(1)(a) also as the ultimate object of both these constitutional provision is to protect the loyalty of the legislator to the party to which he belonged.

33. The words “such voting or abstention has not been condoned by such political party, person or authority within fifteen days from the date of such voting or abstention”, in para 2(1)(b), are absent in para 2(1)(a) of the Tenth Schedule. Accepting the contention, that the spirit of condonation in para 2(1)(b) must be read into para 2(1)(a), would require the aforesaid words to be read into para 2(1)(a) also. A construction which requires, for its support, addition or substitution of words has to be avoided. (Gwalior Rayons Silk Mfg. (Wvg.) Co. Ltd v. Custodian of Vested Forests, 1990 Supp SCC 785 : AIR 1990 SC 1747, Shyam Kishori Devi v. Patna Municipal Corpn, AIR 1966 SC 1678, A.R Antulay v. Ramdas Sriniwas Nayak, (1984) 2 SCC 500, Dental Council of India v. Hari Prakash, (2001) 8 SCC 61, J.P Bansal v. State of Rajasthan, (2003) 5 SCC 134 and State of Jharkhand v. Govind Singh, 2005 (1) ALD (Crl.) 398 (SC) : (2005) 10 SCC 437). Courts should not, ordinarily, add words or read words which are not there. (Delhi Financial Corpn v. Rajiv Anand, (2004) 11 SCC 625). There is a line, though thin, which separates adjudication from legislation. That iine should not be crossed or erased. Courts expound the law, they do not legislate. (State of Kerala v. Mathai Verghese, (1986) 4 SCC 746, Union of India v. Deoki Nandan Aggarwal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 323 : AIR 1992 SC 96). Legislative casus omissus cannot, ordinarily, be supplied by the judicial interpretative process. (Maruti Wire Industries Pvt. Ltd. v. S.T.O, (2001) 3 SCC 735, State of Jharkhand's case (supra)

34. The Act that constitutes disqualification, in terms of para 2 of the Tenth Schedule, is the act of voluntarily giving up membership of a political party. The fact that a decision in that regard may be taken by the Speaker at a subsequent point of time cannot, and does not, postpone the incurring of disqualification by the act of the legislator. The Speaker has to decide the question of disqualification with reference to the date on which the member voluntarily gives up his membership. It is really a decision ex-post-facto. (Rajendra Singh Rana). While D.P No. 1 of 2007 was filed on 19.3.2007, D.P No. 2 of 2007 was filed thereafter on 7.4.2007 It was much later, i.e, during the course of trial that a submission was made that D.P No. 2 was not being pressed and that the Speaker may be pleased to decide D.P No. 1 of 2007. In the order impugned in these writ petitions the Speaker noted that during the course of personal hearing, though the petitioner did not withdraw D.P No. 2 of 2007, they did not press the same and requested that a decision may be given on D.P No. 1 of 2007. Failure to press D.P No. 2 of 2007 would not amount to condonation of the act of respondents 1 to 9 in proposing the name of Sri Kasani Gnaneswar as an independent candidate, in the election held to the Andhra Pradesh Legislative Council, though Telangana Rashtra Samithi had set up two candidates on its behalf. The answer to this question is in the negative.

V. Regarding Question No. 5:

35. Sri V. Venkataramana would submit that the facts in D.P Nos. 1 and 2 were that the decision of T.R.S party, to propose the names of two persons in the MLC election, was not followed by the respondents as they had proposed the nomination of a candidate other than the official candidates of the party, that the disqualification petition in D.P No. 1 would not survive when the disqualification petition in D.P No. 2 was not pressed, that the Speaker could not have adjudicated D.P No. 1 and that the impugned order suffered from perversity in this context.

36. The nature and degree of inquiry required to be conducted for various contingencies contemplated by Paragraph 2 of the Tenth Schedule are different. The complaint in D.P No. 1 of 2007 is under para 2(1)(a) wherein the inquiry would be limited to whether a member of the House, belonging to a political party, has voluntarily given up his membership of such political party. (Mahachandra Prasad Singh (Dr.) v. Chairman, Bihar Legislative Council, (2004) 8 SCC 747). The act of voluntarily giving up membership of the political party may be either express or implied. When a person who has been thrown out or expelled from the party which set him up as a candidate and got elected, joins another (new) party, it will amount to his voluntarily giving up membership of the political party which had set him up as a candidate for election as such member. (G. Viswanathan's case (supra)). The words ‘voluntarily given up his membership’ in para 2(1)(a) are not synonymous with ‘resignation’ and have a wider connotation. Even in the absence of a formal resignation from membership an inference can be drawn from the conduct of a member that he has voluntarily given up his membership of the political party to which he belongs. (Ravi S. Naik v. Union of India, 1994 Supp (2) SCC 641; G. Viswanathan's case (supra)). Unlike D.P No. 1 of 2007, the complaint, in D.P No. 2 of 2007, was under Para 2(1)(b) of the Tenth Schedule which relates to voting or abstaining from voting by a member of the House contrary to the direction issued by the political party to which he belongs. Disqualification, under clauses (a) and (b) of para 2(1), are for different reasons and the mere fact that D.P No. 2 of 2007 was not pressed would not, by itself, necessitate dismissal of D.P No. 1 of 2007 also.

37. It matters little, even if the person moving the petition seeks to withdraw it later, as a duty is cast upon the Speaker to carry out the mandate of the constitutional provision viz., the Tenth Schedule. (Mahachandra Prasad Singh (Dr.)'s case (supra)). If that be the position even if D.P No. 1 of 2007 was sought to be withdrawn, it goes without saying that failure to press D.P No. 2 of 2007 has no bearing and the Speaker was required to, and he did, decide D.P No. 1 of 2007 independently and on its own merits. This question is answered in the affirmative.

VI Regarding Question No. 6:

38. According to Sri M. Chandrasekhar Rao, every action of a member of the legislative assembly did not amount to incurring disqualification under para-2 of the Tenth Schedule of the Constitution of India and that such disqualification was confined to cases of exercise of vote, or abstention from voting, where a change of government was likely to be brought about, or to cases where voting, or abstention from voting, was on a matter which was a major policy or programme on which the political party had gone to the polls. According to Sri V. Venkataramana, in the absence of an alleged disqualification under para 2(1)(b), the act of proposing an independent candidate did not amount to voluntarily giving up membership of the political party and that, if there was no whip or direction that the legislators belonging to the party should, or should not, do some thing, the question of drawing an inference on the conduct of the legislator did not arise.

39. Disqualification, for having exercised or to have abstained from exercising a vote in the House contrary to a direction issued by the political party, is under para 2(1)(b) of the Tenth Schedule and the observations in Kihoto Hollohan that such disqualification should be confined to cases of exercise of vote in certain circumstances would apply only where a candidate is sought to be disqualified under para 2(1)(b) alone. What is required to be examined by the Speaker, in arriving at a decision that a member of the House has/has not, suffered disqualification under para 2(1)(a), is whether or not his conduct amounts to his having voluntarily given up membership of the political party to which he belongs.

40. Disqualification under para 2(1)(a) may arise even in cases where para 2(1)(b) of the Tenth Schedule is not attracted. In Rajendra Singh Rana the Supreme Court held that the act of giving a letter requesting the Governor to call upon the leader of the other side to form a Government would itself amount to an act of voluntarily giving up membership of the party on whose ticket the said members had got elected, that, from their conduct of meeting the Governor accompanied by the General Secretary of the party in opposition and the submission of letters requesting the Governor to invite the leader of that opposition party to form the Government as against the advice of the Chief Minister belonging to their original party to dissolve the assembly, an irresistible inference arose that the members had given up membership of their political party and that no further evidence or enquiry was needed to find that their action fell within para 2(1)(a) of the Tenth Schedule. The answer to this question is in the negative.

VII. Regarding Question No. 7:

41. Sri M. Chandrasekhar Rao would point out that, it was alleged in D.P No. 2 that the resolution passed on 5.3.2007 was despatched under certificate of posting on 19.3.2007 and, apart from the fact that they had proposed the name of Sri Kasani Gnaneswar on 7.3.2007 much before the resolution was alleged to have been despatched, there was no evidence to prove that the said resolution was received by them. Sri V. Venkataramana would submit that proposing an independent candidate did not amount to a disqualification under para 2(1)(a) of the Tenth Schedule and that, as there was no evidence of a direction not to propose the name of Sri K. Gnaneswar, para 2(1)(a) was not attracted. Learned Counsel would submit that, in the present case, there was neither factual foundation nor evidence that respondents 3 and 6 had resorted to any activity detrimental to the interest of TRS political party and hence the impugned order was outside the scope and ambit of para 2(1)(a).

42. The Speaker, while exercising power to disqualify members under para 6(1), acts as a Tribunal. (Kihoto Hollohan's case (supra)). The final authority to take a decision on the question of disqualification of a member of the House vests with the Speaker of the House. (Mahachandra Prasad Singh (Dr.)'s case (supra)). The Tenth Schedule does not, in providing for an additional ground for disqualification and for adjudication of disputed disqualifications, seek to create a non-justiciable constitutional area. The power to resolve such disputes vested in the Speaker is a judicial power. (Ravi S. Naik; Kihoto Hollohan (supra)). The finality clause in Paragraph 6 limits the jurisdiction of the High Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution. Inspite of the finality clause, it is open to the Court to examine whether the action of the authority under challenge is ultra vires the powers conferred on the said authority. An ouster clause attaching finality to a determination ousts the power of the Court to review the decision of an inferior tribunal by certiorari if the inferior Tribunal has not acted without jurisdiction and has merely made an error of law which does not affect its jurisdiction. (Kihoto Hollohan's case (supra)). The validity of orders passed by the Speaker can be questioned in the writ jurisdiction of High Courts on grounds of ultra vires, violation of a constitutional mandate, mala fides, it is a colourable exercise of power, it is based on extraneous and irrelevant considerations, (Ravi S. Naik's case (supra); Jagjit Singh v. State of Haryana, (2006) 11 SCC 1), non-compliance with rules of natural justice and perversity.

43. In his order, in D.P No. 1 of 2007, the Speaker observed that TRS party had taken a decision on 5.3.2007 to propose and support the candidature of Sri H.A Rahman and Sri M. Sudershan Rao, that this decision was also widely published in the media, that the petitioner had filed newspaper clippings of Vaartha, a Telugu daily, of 7.3.2007, that the petitioner had also filed CDs containing video clippings, that even the newspaper clippings, of The Hindu and the Indian Express dated 8.3.2007, filed by the petitioner, were to the effect that, at the time of filing nomination on 7.3.2007, when the respondents came face to face with other Members of TRS party in the Legislative Assembly premises, they had raised slogans against each other and that, subsequently also, respondents 1 to 9 spoke and posed to the media along with Sri Kasani Gnaneswar and, from this conduct of the respondents, it could be inferred that they had proposed Sri Kasani Gnaneswar knowing fully well the decision of TRS party in selecting Sri H.A Rahman and Sri M. Sudershan Rao. The findings of the Speaker are based on the evidence on record and cannot be characterized as perverse. Neither can the question of adequacy or sufficiency of evidence be gone into nor would this Court sit in appeal and reappreciate the evidence on record while exercising certiorari jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.

44. Even assuming that the resolution was despatched to respondents 1 to 9 much later, or that the resolution was not received by them, the aforementioned findings of the Speaker would show that respondents 1 to 9 were aware that the TRS party had selected Sri H.A Rahaman and Sri M. Sudershan Rao despite which they had proposed the candidature of Sri Kasani Gnaneswar. This question is answered in the affirmative.

VIII. Regarding Question No. 8:

45. Sri M. Chandrasekhar Rao would submit that newspaper reports and CDs were marked as exhibits along with the affidavit evidence in chief and, as the Speaker did not decide on their admissibility or endorse thereupon, they could not be relied. Learned Counsel would submit that newspaper reports and CDs were not admissible in evidence unless and until the person who had recorded the CDs, or the statements published in the newspapers, was examined.

46. According to Sri V. Venkataramana, the Speaker had exceeded his jurisdiction, in relying upon the resolution dated 5.3.2007 alleged to have been passed by TRS, in selecting two candidates i.e, Mr H.A Rahaman and M. Sudershan Rao, which was reported in newspaper clippings of Vartha, The Hindu, The Indian Express and CDs, to hold that the respondents had proposed the candidature of Kasani Gnaneswar knowing fully well the decision of the party.

47. In his order, the Speaker observed that the petitioner and the respondents were given reasonable opportunity to put forth their case by giving as many as 22 hearings, that they were also allowed to be represented by their Counsel, that the role of the Speaker was in the domain of ascertaining relevant facts and, once the facts gathered or placed showed that a member of the House had done any such act which came within the purview of sub-paragraphs 1, 2 or 3 of para-2 of the Tenth Schedule, the disqualification would apply and the Speaker of the House would have to make a decision to that effect. According to the Speaker there was no reason why newspapers would publish wrong photographs and reports and that there was no denial to those reports from the respondents.

48. Except for verification of pleadings in Rule 6(6), neither the Tenth Schedule nor the rules made thereunder make the provisions of the C.P.C, or the Indian Evidence Act, applicable to disqualification proceedings before the Speaker. Even otherwise, the Disqualification Rules are procedural in nature and its violation would be a mere irregularity having no bearing on the decision of the Speaker. (Kihoto Hollohan; Mahachandra Prasad Singh (Dr.) (supra)). Such violations cannot be regarded as constitutional mandates and do not afford a ground for judicial review of the order of the Speaker in view of the finality clause in Para 6(1) of the Tenth Schedule. (Ravi S. Naik; Kihoto Hollohan (supra)). Reliance placed by the Speaker on newspaper reports or CDs does not fall foul of any constitutional provision and cannot, therefore, be said to be in violation of any constitutional mandate.

49. The observations, in T. Arthi v. K. Anand Reddy, 2006 (5) ALD 1 : 2006 (5) ALT 42 and T. Basavaraju (Died) Per L.Rs v. T. Nagaratnam, 2006 (3) ALD 838 : 2006 (1) ALT 135, were made in the context of Section 36 of the Indian Stamp Act, 1899 and cannot be extended to disqualification proceedings before the Speaker under the Tenth Schedule to the Constitution. In S.N Balakrishna v. Fernandez, (1969) 3 SCC 238 : AIR 1969 SC 1201, election of a candidate to the Lok Sabha was under challenge on the ground of corrupt practices. The Supreme Court observed that, while trial of an election petition should be held in accordance with the Code of Civil Procedure, the degree of proof required to establish corrupt practices was the same as in a criminal charge. D. Vinaya Bhaskar v. M. Dharma Rao, 2004 (4) ALD 664 : 2004 (5) ALT 574, is also an election petition alleging corrupt practices. In Laxmi Raj Shetty v. State of Tamil Nadu, (1988) 3 SCC 319 : AIR 1988 SC 1274, the appellant was sentenced to death upon his conviction under Section 302 IPC. He was also convicted under Section 392 IPC for having committed the offence of robbery. Strict rules of the Indian Evidence Act, by which criminal proceedings are governed, do not apply to disqualification proceedings under the Tenth Schedule and the proceedings before the Speaker cannot be equated to a criminal trial. The Speaker can regulate disqualification proceedings without being bound by the technicalities of the C.P.C or the Indian Evidence Act, provided the rules of fair play are observed.

50. Would reliance placed by the Speaker on CDs and newspaper reports result in violation of principles of natural justice? In dealing with a petition, seeking disqualification of a member of the House, the Speaker is required to abide by the rules of natural justice. (Jagjit Singh's case (supra)). Whether the requirements of natural justice have been complied with or not has to be considered in the context of the facts and circumstances of each case. (Ravi S. Naik's case (supra)). While considering the plea of violation of principles of natural justice, it is necessary to bear in mind that disqualification proceedings, under the Tenth Schedule, are not comparable either to a trial in a Court of law or departmental proceedings for disciplinary action against an employee. The proceedings here are against an elected representative of the people and the Judge holds the independent high office of a Speaker. The yardstick to judge the grievance that reasonable opportunity has not been afforded would be different. The Speaker can draw an inference from the conduct of a member depending upon the facts of the case and totality of the circumstances. The question to be asked in the ultimate analysis would be whether the person aggrieved was given a fair deal by the authority or not. Answer to these questions would determine the fate of the case. (Jagjit Singh's case (supra)). As noted hereinabove, the Speaker held that there was no reason why newspapers would publish wrong photographs and reports and that the respondents had not denied the contents. Even before us, the respondents have neither denied the contents of the said reports and CDs nor has the Speaker's findings of their non-denial been challenged.

51. In Ravi S. Naik's case (supra), the Supreme Court held:

“………The High Court has observed that the Speaker has only relied upon the photos of the MLAs published in the newspaper reports which fact was undeniable inasmuch as the appellants have nowhere in their replies and even in the writ petition denied that they had met the Governor in the company of 18 other MLAs under the leadership of Dr Wilfred D'Souza representing the Congress (I) and splinter group of GPP led by Dr Barbosa………”

“………The High Court has rightly pointed out that the Speaker, in referring to the photographs was drawing an inference about a fact which had not been denied by the appellants themselves, viz., that they had met the Governor along with Dr Wilfred D'Souza and Dr Barbosa on December 10, 1990 in the company of Congress (I) MLAs, etc. The talk between the Speaker and the Governor also refers to the same fact. In view of the absence of a denial by the appellants of the averment that they had met the Governor on December 10, 1990 accompanied by Dr Barbosa and Dr. Wilfred D'Souza and Congress MLAs the controversy was confined to the question whether from the said conduct of the appellants an inference could be drawn that they had voluntarily given up the membership of the MGP. The reference to the newspaper reports and to the talk which Speaker had with the Governor, in the impugned order of disqualification does not, in these circumstances, introduce an infirmity which would vitiate the said order as being passed in violation of the principles of natural justice………”

(emphasis supplied)

52. Again in Jagjit Singh's case (supra), the Supreme Court observed:

“…………let us now examine the facts of the present case where the petitioners filed their replies to the complaint and were asked by the Speaker to watch the video recording and point out doctoring thereof, if any. The question is that having failed to do so, can they be heard on the facts of the present case, to say that non-grant of opportunity to cross-examine Ashwani Kumar and to adduce evidence has resulted in violation of rules of natural justice on having simply denied that they have not joined Indian National Congress? Had they availed of the opportunity and pointed out how the recording was not correct and it was doctored and then not permitted to lead evidence, the argument that there has been violation of principles of natural justice may have carried considerable weight. The petitioners cannot be permitted to sit on the fence, take vague pleas, make general denials in the proceedings before the Tribunal of the nature under consideration. Under these circumstances, mere denial of opportunity to cross-examine or adduce evidence may not automatically lead to violation of principles of natural justice……….”

(emphasis supplied)

53. A member cannot be permitted to get away, without facing the consequences of his defection, merely on technicalities. The substance and spirit of the law is the guiding factor. (Jagjit Singh's case (supra)). If respondents 3 and 6 had denied the contents of the newspaper reports, or had questioned the veracity of the photographs published or the contents of the CDs placed before the Speaker, it would have been a different matter altogether. Having chosen not to question the contents of these documents, respondents 3 and 6 cannot be heard to say that the Speaker should not have looked into those documents as they were inadmissible in evidence under the Indian Evidence Act, more so when the strict rules of the Indian Evidence Act have not been made applicable, either under the Tenth Schedule or the disqualification rules, to disqualification proceedings before the Speaker. This question is also answered in the affirmative.

IX. Regarding Question No. 9:

54. Sri V. Venkataramana would submit that, while the Speaker had framed several points for consideration, he had finally recorded a finding in an omnibus fashion that the points were “accordingly” answered and it was declared that the petitioner had suffered a disqualification. Learned Counsel would submit that the decision making process of the Speaker was misdirected as he did not record his findings on all the points formulated for consideration, that a Tribunal, exercising quasi judicial powers, had to record reasons and findings, that its absence would necessitate the impugned order being set aside on the ground of illegality and irrationality, that, as the Speaker had not answered all the points for consideration, the adjudicatory process remained incomplete and that the findings of the Speaker amounted to mal exercise of jurisdiction warranting interference by this Court.

55. Sri M. Chandrasekhar Rao would submit that the term ‘voluntarily’, in para 2(1)(a), meant consciously or knowing the consequences fully, that the 3rd respondent bona fidely thought that, under Article 171(4) of the Constitution of India, a right was conferred on him to propose/vote for a candidate of his choice, that such a bona fide impression was further fortified by the conduct of several other MLAs belonging to different political parties proposing and voting in favour of other party candidates in the elections to the legislative Counsel and that a list of such MLAs had been given in Para 10(3) of the affidavit filed in support of the petition which fact was not denied by the petitioner in D.P No. 1 of 2007.

56. On the other hand, Sri K. Ramakrishna Reddy, learned Senior Counsel, would submit that the writ petitioners had, admittedly, proposed the nomination of Sri Kasani Gnaneswar, an independent candidate, in the MLC elections held in March, 2007 and had openly proclaimed that they were supporting him, that this was widely reported in the electronic and print media and that, in such a situation, there was no escape from the Speaker's conclusion that they had incurred disqualification under Para 2(1)(a) of the Tenth Schedule and, by their conduct, had voluntarily given up their membership of TRS political party. Learned Senior Counsel would submit that the Speaker, after giving sufficient opportunity to both parties, had passed the impugned order recording that (a) TRS was a political party and the respondents were its members, (b) the respondents had proposed the nomination of Sri K. Gnaneswar, an independent candidate, though they knew of the decision of TRS party and (c) Article 171(4) did not confer any immunity from disqualification under the Tenth Schedule.

57. The Speaker holds a pivotal position in the scheme of Parliamentary democracy and is the guardian of the rights and privileges of the House. Vestituture of power to adjudicate questions under the Tenth Schedule in such a constitutional functionary should not be considered exceptionable. (Kihoto Hollohan; Jagjit Singh (supra)). In Kihoto Hollohan's case (supra), M.N Venkatachaliah, J., (as he then was), quoted with approval the observations of Sri G. v. Mavalankar, the first Speaker of the Lok Sabha, in “The Office of Speaker”, Journal of Parliamentary Information, April 1956, Vol. 2, No.], Page 22”,

“………Mavalankar, who was himself a distinguished occupant of that high office, says:

“In parliamentary democracy, the office of the Speaker is held in very high esteem and respect. There are many reasons for this. Some of them are purely historical and some are inherent in the concept of Parliamentary democracy and the powers and duties of the Speaker. Once a person is elected Speaker, he is expected to be above parties, above politics. In other words, he belongs to all the members or belongs to none. He holds the scales of justice evenly irrespective of party or person, though no one expects that he will do absolute justice in all matters; because, as a human being he has his human drawbacks and shortcomings. However, everybody knows that he will intentionally do no injustice or show partiality. Such a person is naturally held in respect by all………….”

58. The office of the Speaker is held in the highest respect and esteem in Parliamentary traditions. The evolution of the institution of Parliamentary democracy has as its pivot the institution of the Speaker. The Speaker holds a high, important and ceremonial office. It is inappropriate to express distrust in the high office of the Speaker, merely because some of the Speakers are alleged, or even found, to have discharged their functions not in keeping with the great traditions of that high office. The robes of the Speaker do change and elevate the man inside. (Kihoto Hollohan's case (supra)).

59. In the present case, the Speaker held that, it was not in dispute, that the respondents, contrary to the decision of the TRS party, had proposed the name of Sri Kasani Gnaneswar, an independent candidate, in the election held to the Legislative Council and that Form III B, Notice of Nomination issued by the Returning Officer and Secretary to the Legislature on 7.3.2007 clinchingly established that respondents 1 to 9 had proposed the name of Sri Kasani Gnaneswar. The Speaker noted the respondents contention that they were not party to the decision taken by TRS on 5.3.2007 in selecting Sri H.A Rahman and Sri M. Sudershan Rao and that they had proposed the name of Sri Kasani Gnaneswar in exercise of their constitutional right to oppose the dictatorial attitude of the TRS party president without deviating from the ideology of the TRS party as Sri Kasani Gnaneswar was also supporting the cause of separate Telangana.

60. As noted hereinabove, the Speaker held that the decision taken by the TRS party on 5.3.2007, to propose and support the candidature of Sri H.A Rehman and Sri M. Sudershan Rao, was widely published in media, that the newspaper clippings also showed that, at the time of filing nomination on 7.3.2007, when the respondents came face to face with other members of TRS party in the legislative assembly premises, they had shouted slogans against each other and that, subsequently also, respondents 1 to 9 spoke and posed to the media along with Sri Kasani Gnaneswar. According to the Speaker, there was no reason why newspaper would publish wrong photographs and reports and that there was no denial to these reports from the respondents also. The Speaker held that, from this conduct of the respondents, it could be inferred that they had proposed Sri Kasani Gnaneswar knowing fully well the decision of the TRS party in selecting Sri H.A Rehman and Sri M. Sudershan Rao. He observed that the basic objective of incorporating the Tenth Schedule was to curb the evil of political defections which endangered the very foundation of democracy. He relied on the observations, in Griffith and Ryle in Parliament Functions, Practice and Procedure (1989 edn., p 119), to hold that, if there was any difference of opinion in a party, it had to be sorted democratically in the party fora, but it should not be stretched to the extent of proposing a candidate contrary to the decision of the party.

61. In the light of these findings, even if the Speaker has cryptically dealt with some of the points for consideration, the impugned order does not necessitate interference in certiorari proceedings, as the role of the Speaker, under the Tenth Schedule, is only in the domain of ascertaining relevant facts and, once the facts gathered or placed show that a member of the House has done any such act which comes within the purview of Para 2(1) of the Tenth Schedule, the disqualification will apply and the Speaker of the House will have to make a decision to that effect. (Mahachandra Prasad Singh (Dr.)'s case (supra)).

62. It is not known under what circumstances the other MLAs, referred to in para-10(3) of the affidavit, had proposed the names of candidates belonging to other parties, whether it was on the directions of the political party to which they belonged or in defiance thereof. The question whether the member of a political party has voluntarily given up his membership, attracting disqualification under Para 2(1)(a) of the Tenth Schedule, is essentially a question to be decided on the facts and circumstances of a given case. A proceeding under the Tenth Schedule gets started before the Speaker only on a complaint being made that certain persons belonging to a political party had incurred disqualification on the ground of defection. (Rajendra Singh Rana's case (supra)). In the absence of any disqualification proceedings being initiated against the members, referred to in Para 10(3) of the affidavit, it would be inappropriate to go into the question whether their action, in proposing the names of persons belonging to other political parties, would attract disqualification under Para 2(1)(a). Suffice to hold that the mere fact that several other members belonging to other political parties had proposed the names of candidates, belonging to political parties other than theirs, would not absolve the writ petitioners of their act of defiance of the TRS party in proposing the name of Sri Kasani Gnaneswar.

63. The Speaker has given adequate reasons in support of his conclusion that the writ petitioners had incurred disqualification under Para 2(1)(a) by proposing the candidature of Sri Kasani Gnaneswar in the elections held to the Andhra Pradesh Legislative Council. As noted hereinabove, the scope of judicial review in such matters is limited. It is not for this Court to sit in judgment over the decision of the Speaker or to substitute its views for that of his. Sufficiency or adequacy of evidence are, again, not matters of judicial scrutiny. If the view taken by the Speaker is a reasonable one, the Court would decline to strike down his order on the ground that another view is more reasonable. The question to be asked is whether a reasonable person, under the circumstances in which the Speaker was placed, could have passed such an order? The pride of place given to the office of the Speaker must always be borne in mind by the Court while adjudicating matters relating to disqualification of members of the House. It is only if the order of the Speaker is based on no evidence, or is so perverse so as to necessitate the conclusion that no reasonable man could have arrived at such a finding, would this Court be justified in interference. As long as there is some evidence on record, the order of the Speaker can neither be subjected to microscopic examination nor would the Court be justified in scrutinizing them as if they were judicial pronouncements of Courts. The submission that the proceedings have been disposed of in an omnibus manner is not tenable. The order impugned in these two writ petitions do not, therefore, necessitate interference.

64. The writ petitions fail and are, accordingly, dismissed. However, in the circumstances without costs.