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Chaudhari Visabhai Karmsibhai & Ors. v. State Of Gujarat And Ors.

Gujarat High Court
Oct 24, 2013
Smart Summary (Beta)

Summary of Opinion — C.L. Soni, J.

Factual and Procedural Background

This petition under Article 226 was filed by elected members of the Agricultural Produce Market Committee, Harij (the petitioners), challenging an order dated 10.9.2013 passed by respondent No.1 (State of Gujarat through its Joint Secretary (Appeal), Agricultural and Co-operation Department) under Section 46 of the Agricultural Produce Markets Act, 1963. The impugned order removed the petitioners as office bearers of the Market Committee and appointed the District Registrar, Patan as Administrator.

Relevant events and procedural history (as stated in the opinion): elections for the Market Committee were held on 24.3.2011; two defeated candidates (Shri Samirbhai Bhupendrabhai Thakkar and Shri Karamsibhai Mevabhai) filed appeals (Appeal Nos.110 & 111 of 2011) and the appeals were initially allowed setting aside the petitioners' election. The petitioners successfully challenged those appeal orders before this Court, which observed that the elections could not be set aside without recording required reasons. Subsequently, an inquiry under Section 44 of the Act was initiated; the Director prepared a report and sent a proposal dated 16.8.2012 to respondent No.1 for initiating proceedings under Section 46. A show cause notice under Section 46 was issued to the petitioners; they replied. The State (respondent No.1) contended the petitioners caused financial loss and failed to protect the Market Committee's financial interest. The petition was heard with service issues noted (respondent Nos.1–3 waived service; Market Committee—respondent No.4—was served but did not appear).

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the action under Section 46 of the Agricultural Produce Markets Act, 1963 (removal of elected office bearers and appointment of an administrator) was a bonafide and valid exercise of power in the facts of this case.
  2. Whether the specific grounds relied upon in the impugned order—(a) construction of a parking facility without permission, (b) giving a tender advertisement with 11 days instead of 15, (c) alleged inadequate publicity of tenders, and (d) awarding contract at a higher price—constitute incompetence, abuse of power or persistent default justifying exercise of Section 46.
  3. Whether the Director's conduct in the inquiry under Section 44 (not issuing requisition under Section 44(4)) affected the correctness or propriety of initiating proceedings under Section 46.
  4. Whether the impugned action was influenced by extraneous/political pressure (as alleged by the petitioners) and, if so, whether that would vitiate the order under Section 46.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioners' Arguments (as advanced by learned senior Advocate Mr. Mihir Joshi)

  • The impugned order is not a bonafide exercise of power under Section 46 and does not meet the statutory prerequisites for removal (i.e., incompetence, persistent default or abuse of power).
  • The action was motivated by political pressure from a defeated candidate (Shri Samirbhai), rather than by bona fide administrative reasons.
  • Ground 1: Construction of a parking facility without N.A. permission cannot be a basis for Section 46 because the Market Committee, as a local authority, was not required to obtain permission from the Collector for construction on its plot.
  • Ground 2: Issuing an advertisement giving 11 days instead of 15 cannot be equated with incompetence, abuse of power or persistent default to justify removal.
  • Ground 3: There was adequate publicity—advertisement was placed on the committee notice board and in the Jan Satta daily with 156,945 copies sold in Gujarat (358 sold outside Gujarat); no complaint was made about publicity.
  • Ground 4: The tender was awarded to the lowest among three tenders (Uday Construction Company); if any illegality existed, it was open to challenge before the Director or a court; absence of such challenge undermines the Section 46 action.
  • Where the Director, after inquiry under Section 44, did not issue any requisition or direction, respondent No.1 could not validly initiate Section 46 proceedings on the same grounds.
  • Reliance placed on three authorities: Sharda Kailash Mittal v. State of M.P., Tarlochan Dev Sharma v. State of Punjab and Haryana, and State of Madhya Pradesh v. Sanjay Nagayach.

Respondents' Arguments (as advanced by learned Assistant Government Pleader Mr. Neeraj Ashar)

  • The petitioners, as elected members, failed to protect the financial interest of the Market Committee and thereby caused financial loss by awarding the tender to a bidder who was not the lowest.
  • The petitioners allowed construction of a parking facility on Market Committee land without prior approval of the appropriate Authority, thereby violating land laws and abusing their powers.
  • The petitioners failed to follow State guidelines (resolution dated 17.3.2007) by giving only 11 days instead of 15 for tenders, and the limited time and purportedly limited publicity resulted in only three tenders being received; the tender awarded was at a higher price, causing financial loss.
  • For these reasons respondent No.1 rightly invoked Section 46 and the petition should be dismissed.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Sharda Kailash Mittal v. State of M.P. and others, 2010(1) GLH 744 The removal of an elected office bearer is an extreme step to be resorted to only in grave and exceptional circumstances; a singular or casual aberration is not enough to justify removal. The Court relied on this principle to hold that solitary acts (construction of parking facility; alleged tender irregularities) cannot justify the harsh step of removal under Section 46. The Court concluded the impugned order was not called for on the stated grounds.
Tarlochan Dev Sharma v. State of Punjab and Haryana, (2001) 6 SCC 260 "Abuse of powers" implies wilful, intentional wrongdoing; an honest but erroneous act or a single error is insufficient. Removal must be clearly made out and is to be construed narrowly. The Court applied this narrow construction, finding no evidence of wilful abuse or habitual failure; the acts complained of did not constitute 'abuse of powers' or persistent default justifying removal.
State of Madhya Pradesh v. Sanjay Nagayach, (2013) 7 SCC 25 Statutory authorities must act independently and form opinions based on objective criteria; action under statutory powers must not be driven by external pressure or pre-conceived notions. The Court noted the relevance of this rule given the petitioners' allegation of political pressure; it emphasized that the authority must form its own objective opinion and not speak an external party's voice. This supported scrutiny of the motivations and basis for the removal order.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court's analysis proceeded by examining the statutory context, the inquiry under Section 44, the factual findings in the show-cause and impugned order, the submissions of parties, and authoritative precedents cited by the petitioners.

  1. Inquiry and administrative steps: The Director conducted an inquiry under Section 44 and sent a report to respondent No.1; however the Director did not issue any requisition under Section 44(4) to require the Market Committee to do or abstain from doing anything. The impugned order under Section 46 was then passed by respondent No.1 based on alleged irregularities identified in that inquiry.
  2. Grounds relied upon: The impugned order and show cause alleged (i) illegal change in parking zone/construction of parking facility, and (ii) actions causing financial loss (including tender-related irregularities: shortened advertisement period, insufficient publicity, and awarding contract at a higher price).
  3. Legal status of the Market Committee and construction issue: The Court observed Section 10 of the Act deems the Market Committee a "local Authority" within the meaning of clause (26) of Section 3 of the Bombay General Clauses Act. A Collector's order dated 9.5.2003 (on record) under the Gujarat Town Planning Act held the Market Committee exempted from taking permission for construction on its own land. On that basis the Court reasoned the construction of a parking facility did not, by itself, require prior permission and could not properly be the basis for removal under Section 46; if there was a breach, the appropriate authority or the Director under Section 44 should have acted.
  4. Tender publicity, time and award: The petitioners showed that the advertisement was placed on the committee notice board and published in Jan Satta with 156,945 copies sold in Gujarat (358 copies outside Gujarat); this was undisputed. The Court recorded that there was "no dispute" the party awarded the tender was the lowest tenderer. The Court held that even if 11 days were accepted as shorter than recommended 15 days, or if publicity were thought insufficient, such matters are solitary acts and do not amount to incompetence, abuse of power, or persistent default warranting removal.
  5. Application of precedents: The Court drew on the three cited Supreme Court decisions to reiterate that removal of an elected office-bearer is an extreme step, requires grave and weighty reasons, and that "abuse of power" connotes wilful or intentional wrongdoing or habitual failure. The Court also emphasized that statutory authorities must act independently and not under external influence. Applying these principles, the Court concluded the grounds in the impugned order were not germane to Section 46.
  6. Conclusion from analysis: The Court found that the alleged acts (change in parking facility and tender-related issues) were, at best, solitary or isolated and could not amount to the severe findings necessary to justify removal under Section 46. The impugned order was therefore held to be passed for reasons not germane to taking action under Section 46 and was not called for in the circumstances.

Holding and Implications

Holding: IMPUGNED ORDER DATED 10.9.2013 QUASHED AND SET ASIDE; RULE MADE ABSOLUTE.

Direct effect on the parties: The Court allowed the petition and quashed the impugned order/notification at Annexure-A dated 10.9.2013. The immediate legal consequence is that the removal under Section 46 was declared invalid.

Broader implications: The opinion applies established Supreme Court principles (as cited) emphasizing that removal of elected office-bearers is an extreme measure requiring grave and weighty reasons, and that isolated administrative lapses or solitary acts do not suffice. The Court did not purport to create new law; it applied existing authorities to the facts and concluded the Section 46 action was unwarranted in these circumstances.

Judge: C.L. Soni, J.

Show all summary ...

C.L. Soni, J.:-

1. RULE. Learned Assistant Government Pleader Mr. Neeraj Ashar waives service of Rule for respondent Nos. 1 to 3. Though notice was served to the Market Committee-respondent No. 4, nobody appeared and since it is a formal party, Rule was not issued to it. With the consent of the learned Advocates for the parties, the petition was taken up for final disposal. In this petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, the petitioners, who are elected members of the Agricultural Produce Market Committee, Harij-respondent No. 4, have challenged the order dated 10.9.2013 passed by respondent No. 1-State of Gujarat through its Joint Secretary (Appeal), Agricultural and Co-operation Department, under Section 46 of the Agricultural Produce Markets Act, 1963 ('the Act' for short) removing the office bearers of the Market Committee-the petitioners and appointing the District Registrar, Patan as Administrator of the Market Committee.

2. The case of the petitioners is that the election of the Market Committee was held on 24.3.2011 and they were elected in such election for which a notification under Rule 27 of the Gujarat Agricultural Produce Markets Rules, 1965 ('the Rules' for short) was issued. It is alleged in the petition that one Shri Samirbhai Bhupendrabhai Thakkar lost in the said election and he as also one Shri Karamsibhai Mevabhai had preferred election petitions, being Appeal Nos. 110 of 2011 and 111 of 2011 and the said appeals were allowed and the election of the petitioners was set aside. Such orders passed in the appeals were challenged by the petitioners before this Court and this Court set aside the orders passed in appeals by observing that the election of the returned candidates could not have been set aside without recording the reasons required for setting aside the election. The petitioners have further alleged that the State Authorities then initiated inquiry under Section 44 of the Act at the behest of said Samirbhai and the District Registrar without considering the stand of the Market Committee gave one sided report, based on which, the Director-respondent No. 2 sent proposal dated 16.8.2012 for initiating proceedings under Section 46 of the Act.

3. The petitioners have averred that show cause notice under Section 46 of the Act was issued to them, to which the petitioners clarified each and every grounds stated in the show cause notice. However, respondent No. 1 passed the impugned order on frivolous and baseless grounds.

4. The petition is opposed by affidavit-in-reply filed on behalf of respondent No. 1 stating that the petitioners being elected members of the Market Committee have miserably failed in protecting the financial interest of the Market Committee and thereby caused losses to the Market Committee and therefore, the impugned action taken vide order dated 10.9.2013 is just and proper.

5. I have heard learned Advocates for the parties.

6. Learned senior Advocate Mr. Mihir Joshi appearing with learned Advocate Mr. Dipen Desai for the petitioners submitted that the impugned order is not bonafide exercise of the powers under Section 46 of the Act. Mr. Joshi submitted that the allegations of the show cause notice which are taken as grounds for passing the impugned order do not satisfy the prerequisites to reach an opinion that the Market Committee was either not competent to perform or persistently make default in performing the duties imposed on it under the Act or abuses its power. Mr. Joshi submitted that the action of respondent No. 1 in resorting to proceedings under Section 46 of the Act is not independent but is under the political pressure at the instance of Shri Samirbhai who lost in general election of the Market Committee. Mr. Joshi submitted that the grounds stated in the impugned order are otherwise not germane to taking of action under Section 46 of the Act against the petitioners.

6.1. Learned senior Advocate Mr. Joshi submitted that the first ground as regards making of construction for parking facility without N.A. permission is not available for taking action under Section 46 of the Act because the Market Committee being local Authority was not required to take any permission from Collector to make construction for parking facility on the plot of the Market Committee.

6.2. Learned senior Advocate Mr. Joshi submitted that second ground about giving of advertisement for new construction providing for 11 days time instead of 15 days time could neither be termed as incompetency or abuse of the power of the Market Committee or in anyway could be said to be persistent default of the Market Committee and therefore, such could never have been made the basis for invoking the drastic action under Section 46 of the Act.

6.3. Learned senior Advocate Mr. Joshi submitted that third ground about not giving wide publicity for inviting tenders and not placing on record the evidence of publishing the advertisement on the notice board of the Market Committee in presence of panchas/witnesses is far from truth inasmuch as there is no dispute that the advertisement was placed on the notice board of the committee and the advertisement was given in Jan Satta daily newspaper having circulation in the entire State of Gujarat and 1,56,945 copies of newspaper were sold containing the advertisement. Even out of the State of Gujarat, 358 copies were also sold. Mr. Joshi submitted that no person has made any grievance as regards the public notice for the advertisement. Mr. Joshi submitted that if there was any illegality in the process of tender, it was always open to any person to challenge it before any Court or even before the Director to take action in connection with the tender process. Mr. Joshi submitted that the fact that no complaint is made on the ground of less publicity of the tender, such could not be the basis for action under Section 46 of the Act.

6.4. As regards ground No. 4 about giving of contract at higher price, learned senior Advocate Mr. Joshi submitted that after wide publicity, when three tenders were received, the Committee accepted the lowest amongst three tenders of one Uday Construction Company and thereby the committee has taken due care to see that there may not be any financial loss to the Committee in giving public contract. Mr. Joshi submitted that if there was any illegality in giving of contract to Uday Construction, it was always open to the Director to take action but neither at the time of inquiry under Section 44 of the Act nor by any independent action, the Director questioned legality or otherwise of the action of the Market Committee in awarding the contract in favour of Uday Construction.

6.5. Learned senior Advocate Mr. Joshi submitted that in respect of making of construction for parking facility on the plot of the Market Committee or as regards the tender process, if the Director thought it fit not to issue any direction to the Market Committee pursuant to inquiry under Section 44 of the Act, it is not open to respondent No. 1 to initiate proceedings under Section 46 of the Act on the same grounds.

6.6. Learned senior Advocate Mr. Joshi submitted that none of the grounds for which the action is taken under Section 46 of the Act could be said to be either an act of incompetency of the Market Committee or an abuse of the powers of the Market Committee or a persistent default of the Market Committee and therefore, the respondent No. 1 was not justified to pass the impugned order. Mr. Joshi submitted that the action under Section 46 of the Act has divested the elected members of the Committee to function and such harsh action cannot be taken on solitary grounds, like constructing the parking facility without permission of the Collector or like not following the due process for inviting tender. He thus urged to allow the petition.

6.7. Learned senior Advocate Mr. Joshi has relied upon the following decisions in support of his submissions:--

(1) In the case of Sharda Kailash Mittal v. State of M.P. and others reported in 2010(1) GLH 744,

(2) In the case of Tarlochan Dev Sharma v. State of Punjab and Haryana reported in : (2001) 6 SCC 260,

(3) In the case of State of Madhya Pradesh v. Sanjay Nagayach reported in : (2013) 7 SCC 25.

7. As against the above arguments, learned Assistant Government Pleader Mr. Neeraj Ashar appearing for respondent Nos. 1 to 3 submitted that the petitioners being elected members of the Market Committee were required to see that the tenders for the work contract were given to the lowest bidder. However, the petitioners failed to properly discharge their duties in awarding the tender to the bidder who is not the lowest one. Mr. Ashar has drawn the attention of the Court to the affidavit-in-reply wherein, it is stated that the tender is awarded to party who is not the lowest bidder and thereby the petitioners have caused financial loss to the Market Committee.

7.1. Learned Assistant Government Pleader Mr. Ashar submitted that the petitioners are also responsible to allow the construction of parking facility on the plot of the Market Committee without taking prior approval of the appropriate Authority and thereby have committed violation of the land laws. Mr. Ashar submitted that the above act of the petitioners in making the construction of the parking facility on the plot of the Market Committee was thus in abuse of their powers. Mr. Ashar submitted that the petitioners also failed to follow the guidelines issued by the State Government vide resolution dated 17.3.2007 by not giving 15 days clear time to the tenders for filling up the tenders. Mr. Ashar submitted that the advertisement gave only 11 days time to the tenderers and thus only 3 tenders could be received by Market Committee. It was therefore, the case of re-tendering so as to avoid causing financial loss to the Market Committee. Mr. Ashar submitted that the petitioners have also miserably failed to see that the advertisement for inviting tenders is given wide publication. Mr. Ashar submitted that the public notice given for such tender was given only in such a newspaper which had no wide publicity, which resulted into getting of only three tenders and out of three tenders, tender awarded to one of the parties was also at the higher price. Mr. Ashar submitted that such act of the petitioners caused financial loss to the Market Committee. Mr. Ashar submitted that for the above acts on the part of the petitioners, the respondent No. 1 has rightly taken action under Section 46 of the Act. He thus urged to dismiss the petition.

8. Having heard learned Advocates for the parties and having perused the record of the petition, it appears that after the petitioners succeeded before this Court in Special Civil Application Nos. 16244 of 2011 and 16245 of 2011, which were filed against the orders passed by the State Authorities in appeals filed by Shri Samirbhai Thakkar and Shri Karamsibhai Desai challenging the election of the petitioners, an inquiry under Section 44 of the Act against the Market Committee followed. Sub-Section (4) of Section 44 of the Act gives power to the Director to require the Market Committee to do a thing or to abstain from doing a thing as a result of inquiry which the Director considers necessary for the purpose of the Act and to send a written reply to him within a reasonable time stating whether the requisition is complied and if not complied, state reason for non-compliance. However, it appears that the Director did not think it fit to send requisition to the Market Committee for doing anything as regards the work of construction of the parking facility or the tender process. The report of such inquiry was sent to the respondent No. 1, based on which the impugned action is taken.

9. It is stated in the impugned order at Annexure-A that the irregularities were found in the affairs of the Market Committee and the proposal was made for removal of the petitioners under Section 46 of the Act. By the impugned order, the petitioners are removed from their position as office bearers of the Market Committee in exercise of the powers under Section 46 of the Act on the ground that it is established that the Market Committee has committed irregularities as stated in the grounds of the order and thus, the present elected Committed has failed to perform its duties under the Act.

10. In the show cause notice at Annexure-H, it is stated that in the inquiry under Section 44 of the Act, it is found that the Market Committee has made illegal change in its parking zone and has acted in such a manner so as to cause financial loss and damage to the interest of the Market Committee.

11. Section 10 of the Act provides that the Market Committee shall be deemed to be a local Authority within the meaning of clause (26) of Section 3 of the Bombay General Clauses Act. The petitioners have placed on record copy of an order dated 9.5.2003 passed by the Collector, Banaskantha District under the provisions of the Gujarat Town Planning Act in the matter between Deesa Agricultural Produce Market Committee and Deesa Municipality, wherein the Collector has held that the Market Committee being local Authority is exempted from taking permission for construction on its own land. Therefore, for making construction for parking facility, no permission was required by the Market Committee or even no permission was required from the competent Authority. Even if the construction of parking facility amounted to change in the layout plan and if there was any breach in making such change for construction of parking facility, it was for the concerned Authority to take appropriate action or even for the Director to send requisition under Section 44 of the Act to abstain from making such construction but such ground of making construction for parking facility cannot be made the basis for taking harsh action under Section 46 of the Act. Similarly, for any alleged irregularities in the tender procedure, appropriate action could have been taken by the Director calling upon the Market Committee to take necessary action in this regard. Not only this but no person has made any complaint about not giving of wide publicity or about alleged illegal procedure followed by the Market Committee in the matter of tender for the work to be carried out for the Market Committee. There is no dispute about the fact that the party to whom the tender was awarded was the lowest tenderer. Therefore, it is not correct to say that the tender was not awarded to the lowest bidder.

12. The petitioners have stated in the reply before the respondent No. 1 in response to the show cause notice that 1,56,945 copies of Jan Satta daily newspaper for tender publicity were sold in the State of Gujarat. This is not disputed. Thus, there appears to be no reason to term the publicity as insufficient publicity. Time of 11 days for submitting tender also could not be said to be insufficient. However, even if the same was taken as insufficient publicity or insufficient time for submitting tender, such could never be termed either as incompetence of the Market Committee or abuse of the powers of the Market Committee or even persistent default in performing its duties under the Act. Even otherwise, two alleged acts of the Market Committee, viz. change of parking facility and not properly following the tender process, could be said to be just solitary acts and can never be branded as either incompetence of the Market Committee in performing its duties or even said to be an abuse of power much less to say that it is in anyway default of the Market Committee leaving question of persisting such default for imagination. Therefore, it appears that the impugned order is passed for reasons not germane to taking of action under Section 46 of the Act. For the grounds stated in the impugned order, in no circumstances, harsh action under Section 46 of the Act was called for.

13. In the case of Sharda Kailash Mittal (supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the context of the provisions of Madhya Pradesh Municipalities Act, 1961 has held and observed in para 17.1, 17.2 and 18 as under:-

17.1. In Paragraph 11 this Court observed as under:-

A singular or casual aberration or failure in exercise of power is not enough; a course of conduct or plurality of aberration or failure in exercise of power and that too involving, dishonesty of intention is...The legislature could not have intended the occupant of an elective office, seated by popular verdict, to be shown exit for a single innocuous action or error of decision.

17.2. The same consideration must be taken into account while interpreting Section 41-A of the Act. The President under the M.P. Municipalities Act, 1961 is a democratically elected officer, and the removal of such an officer is an extreme step which must be resorted to only in grave and exceptional circumstances.

18. For taking action under Section 41-A for removal of President, Vice-President or Chairman of any Committee, power is conferred on the State Government with no provision of any appeal. The action of removal casts a serious stigma on the personal and public life of the concerned office bearer and may result in his/her disqualification to hold such office for the next term. The exercise of power, therefore, has serious civil consequences on the status of an office bearer. There are no sufficient guidelines in the provisions of section 41-a as to the manner in which the power has to be exercised, except that it requires that reasonable opportunity of hearing has to be afforded to the office bearer proceeded against. Keeping in view the nature of the power and the consequences that flows on its exercise it has to be held that such power can be invoked by the State Government only for very strong and weighty reason. Such a power is not to be exercised for minor irregularities in discharge of duties by the holder of the elected post. The provision has to be construed in strict manner because the holder of office occupies it by election and he/she is deprived of the office by an executive order in which the electorate has no chance of participation.

14. In the case of Tarlochan Dev Sharma (supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held and observed in para 7 and 11 as under:--

7. In a democracy governed by rule of law, once elected to an office in a democratic institution, the incumbent is entitled to hold the office for the term for which he has been elected unless his election is set aside by a prescribed procedure known to law. That a returned candidate must hold and enjoy the office and discharge the duties related therewith during the term specified by the relevant enactment is a valuable statutory right not only of the returned candidate but also of the constituency or the electoral college which he represents. Removal from such an office is a serious matter. It curtails the statutory term of the holder of the office. A stigma is cast on the holder of the office in view of certain allegations having been held proved rendering him unworthy of holding the office which he held. Therefore, a case of availability of a ground squarely falling within S. 22 of the Act must be clearly made out. A President may be removed from office by the State Government, within the meaning of S. 22, on the ground of "abuse of his powers" (of President), inter alia. This is the phrase with which we are concerned in the present case.

11. The expression 'abuse of powers' in the context and setting in which it has been used cannot mean use of power which may appear to be simply unreasonable or inappropriate. It implies a wilful abuse or an intentional wrong. An honest though erroneous exercise of power or an indecision is not an abuse of power. A decision, action or instruction may be inconvenient or unpalatable to the person affected but it would not be an abuse of power. It must be such an abuse of power which would render a Councillor unworthy of holding the office of President. Inasmuch as an abuse of power would entail adverse civil consequences, the expression has to be narrowly construed. Yet again, the expression employed in S. 22 is 'abuse of his powers or habitual failure to perform his duties.' The use of plural powers, and the setting of the expression in the framing of S. 22 is not without significance. It is suggestive of legislative intent. The phrase 'abuse of powers' must take colour from the next following expression 'or habitual failure to perform duties.' A singular or casual aberration or failure in exercise of power is not enough; a course of conduct or plurality of aberration or failure in exercise of power and that too involving, dishonesty of intention is 'abuse of powers' within the meaning of S. 22 of the Act. The legislature could not have intended the occupant of an elective office, seated by popular verdict, to be shown exit for a single innocuous action or error of decision.

15. In the case of Sanjay Nagayach (supra), Hon'ble Supreme Court has held and observed in para 36 and 37 as under:-

36. Statutory functionaries like Registrar/Joint Registrar of Cooperative Societies functioning under the respective Cooperative Act must be above suspicion and function independently without external pressure. When an Authority invested with the power purports to act on its own but in substance the power is exercised by external guidance or pressure, it would amount to non-exercise of power, statutorily vested. Large number of cases are coming up before this Court and the High Courts in the country challenging the orders of supersession and many of them are being passed by the statutory functionaries due to external influence ignoring the fact that they are ousting a democratically elected Board, the consequence of which is also grave because the members of the Board of Directors would also stand disqualified in standing for the succeeding election as well.

37. The Registrar/Joint Registrar, while exercising powers of supersession has to form an opinion and that opinion must be based on some objective criteria, which has nexus with the final decision. A statutory Authority shall not act with pre-conceived notion and shall not speak his masters' voice, because the formation of opinion must be his own, not somebody else in power, to achieve some ulterior motive. There may be situations where the Registrar/Joint Registrar are expected to act in the best interest of the society and its members, but in such situations, they have to act bona fide and within the four corners of the Statute. In our view, the impugned order will not fall in that category.

In light of the above and for the reasons stated above, the petition is allowed. Impugned order/notification dated 10.9.2013 at Annexure-A is quashed and set aside. Rule is made absolute accordingly.

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