- Bookmark
- Share
- CaseIQ
J.C. May, In Re
Factual and Procedural Background
Criminal Revision (Motor Vehicle Collision)
On 14-7-1957 at about 16:10 hours the accused, Mr. J. C. May, driving car MSZ.6150, collided with car MSZ.5070 driven by P.W.2 at the intersection of South Beach Road and Edward Elliots Road, Madras. The prosecution case (as given by P.W.2) was that P.W.2 approached the junction, observed a prominent caution board to stop, listened and proceed, stopped within about 10 feet of the fountain, looked both ways, and then turned right onto South Beach Road when the way appeared clear. Shortly after proceeding he heard a collision and found MSZ.6150 had struck his vehicle, causing damage to the rear of P.W.2's car. The accused's case was that P.W.2 had stopped suddenly and unexpectedly, and despite the accused applying brakes, the collision was inevitable and amounted to an error of judgment, not punishable under S.116 Motor Vehicles Act or S.71 Madras City Police Act. The learned Third Presidency Magistrate, Madras, accepted P.W.2's version, convicted the accused under Sec.116 M.V. Act and Sec.71 City Police Act, and sentenced him to pay a fine of Rs.40. The accused filed the present Revision challenging conviction and sentence.
Civil Second Appeal (Execution & Limitation in Mortgage Suit)
This second appeal arises from an execution petition E.P. No.112 of 1954 filed by the decree-holder in O.S. No.125 of 1948 (Subordinate Judge, Devakottai) seeking sale of mortgaged properties in execution of a mortgage decree. Procedural chronology provided: a preliminary mortgage decree was obtained on 31-8-1949 and a final decree on 10-3-1950. An appeal by the judgment debtor against the preliminary decree was disposed of on 16-1-1951 (dismissed), though the decree-holder's cross-objection on costs was allowed and a personal decree for costs was given against the judgment debtor. While the first execution petition (E.P. No.165 of 1950, filed 4-7-1950) was dismissed on 31-7-1951 (no satisfaction obtained), the decree-holder filed the second execution petition (E.P. No.112 of 1954) on 9-4-1954. The lower courts dismissed the second execution petition as barred by limitation; the decree-holder appealed.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the conviction under Section 116 of the Motor Vehicles Act and Section 71 of the Madras City Police Act was justified on the facts of the collision (i.e., whether the accused's conduct amounted to reckless/dangerous driving rather than an inevitable accident or mere error of judgment).
- Whether the second execution petition (E.P. No.112 of 1954) filed to execute the trial court's final mortgage decree was within time under Article 182, Column 3, Clause 5 of the First Schedule to the Limitation Act (i.e., whether the second execution petition must be treated as filed within three years of the final order on a prior execution application made in accordance with law).
Arguments of the Parties
Criminal Revision — Prosecution / P.W.2
- P.W.2 (driver of MSZ.5070) testified that he stopped at the junction in compliance with a prominent caution board, looked both ways, and turned right when the road appeared clear; MSZ.6150 was some 150 yards away on his left when he started; he heard a collision shortly after proceeding.
- The prosecution's case (as summarised) is that the accused was driving at a speed and in a manner dangerous to the public and thus guilty of driving recklessly or dangerously within Sec.116 M.V. Act and Sec.71 Madras City Police Act.
Criminal Revision — Accused (Defence)
- The accused contended that P.W.2 had stopped suddenly and unexpectedly; the accused applied brakes but could not avoid the collision, which was therefore an inevitable accident or an error of judgment not punishable under Sec.116 M.V. Act or Sec.71 of the City Police Act.
Civil Appeal — Respondents (Judgment Debtor) / Mr. Ramachandra Aiyar
- Argued that the first execution petition was not "in accordance with law" because after a decree is varied or confirmed or reversed by an appellate court, the decree of the appellate court alone is executable; therefore the first execution petition could not properly be regarded as the kind of application contemplated by Clause 5 of Article 182.
- Conceded that, objectively, the pendency of an appeal does not automatically stay execution and accepted that if the trial court's decree was executable before the appellate decree, such execution might be in accordance with law.
Civil Appeal — Appellant / Decree-holder
This opinion does not contain a detailed account of the appellant's separate legal arguments beyond the procedural facts and the court's discussion of Article 182 and the authorities relied upon.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Cheriyan v. Sirkar Prosecutor, AIR 1950 Trav-Co. 14 | Cited in discussion of classifications of culpable driving (negligent, rash, errors of judgment). | Included among authorities supporting the tripartite classification of culpable driving used by the court. |
| R. v. Finney (1874) 12 Cox C. C. 625 | Authority referenced in the discussion of negligent/rash driving and criminal liability. | Relied upon in the general exposition of criminal negligence/rashness principles. |
| Jumman v. Emperor, AIR 1944 Nag 285 | Cited as authority in the context of culpable driving and criminal liability. | Used with other cases to illustrate legal boundaries between civil error of judgment and criminal rashness/negligence. |
| Emperor v. Abdul Qayyum, AIR 1941 Lah 113 | Authority on criminal negligence/rashness in motor incidents. | Referred to among cases defining the scope of criminal culpability in driving cases. |
| Robson v. Emperor, AIR 1934 Rang 194 | Precedent addressing criminal culpability in vehicular incidents. | Cited in the consolidated list of authorities for principles of reckless or negligent driving. |
| Andrew v. Director of Public Prosecutions (1937) 2 All E.R. 552 | Referenced concerning principles of criminal responsibility in driving-related cases. | Included to support legal background on when driving conduct becomes criminal. |
| In re, Ganesan, AIR 1950 Mad 71 (1949-2 Mad LJ 255) | Authority in the corpus of cases dealing with driving liability. | Quoted among authorities delineating negligent/rash driving. |
| In re, Appayya, 1956 Andh W.R. 784 (AIR 1957 Andh-Pra. 100) | Authority addressing vehicular negligence/rashness. | Referred to by the court in its survey of case-law on culpable driving. |
| Gulam Saeed Gulam Amir v. The State, AIR 1954 Madh-Bha 41 | Case cited in the context of culpable motor driving. | Used as part of the supporting authorities for the legal framework applied. |
| Chammanlal v. State, AIR 1954 All 186 | Cited in relation to criminal rashness/negligence. | Referenced in the court's compilation of authorities on criminal driving liability. |
| S. V. Subba Rao v. State, AIR 1953 Hyd. 123 | Authority on driving-related criminal liability. | Listed among cases supporting distinctions drawn by the court. |
| Laurie v. Raglan Building Co. (1942) 1 K.B. 152 | Remark on the particular danger of speed and its bearing on ability to avoid accidents. | Quoted at length to emphasise the role of speed in creating danger and legal negligence. |
| Blyth v. Birmingham Waterworks Co. (1856) 11 Ex. 781 | Definition of negligence ("omission to do something which a reasonable man..."). | Used to define the civil standard of negligence relied upon in the court's reasoning. |
| Bourhill v. Young (1943) A.C. 92 | Referenced in discussion on reasonable foresight as a criterion of negligence. | Quoted to support the fluid, fact-specific application of negligence standards. |
| Rothschild v. Royal Mail Steam Packet Co. (1851) 18 L.T. | Authority referenced on standards of foreseeability and negligence. | Listed among authorities illustrating limits of negligence based on foresight. |
| Hart v. Lancashire and Yorkshire Rly. Co. (1889) 21 L.T. 261 | Referenced with other cases regarding foreseeability and negligence. | Used to illustrate points about the standard required to establish negligence. |
| Fardon v. Harcourt Rivington (1932) 146 L.T. 391 | Authority on when a mere possibility of danger does not impose extraordinary precaution. | Quoted to explain that only reasonably apparent risks require precautions. |
| Grant v. Sun Shipping Co. (1948) A.C. 549 | Authority quoted for the proposition that prudent persons guard against commonly observed negligence. | Used in the court's general exposition on reasonable precautions and foreseeability. |
| London Passenger Transport Board v. Upson (1949) 1 All E.R. 60 | Discussed in relation to reasonable foresight and negligence. | Included among authorities cited to explain standards of care. |
| R. v. Bateman, 1925 (?) | Authority on the high degree of negligence required for criminal liability. | Cited to show that criminal negligence requires more than civil negligence. |
| Reg v. Elliott (1887-90) 16 Cox C. C. 710 | Authority on criminal negligence and required degree of culpability. | Referenced in the court's discussion of criminal negligence thresholds. |
| Hiltons case (1838) 2 Lewin 214 | Referenced among older authorities on criminal culpability. | Included in the list of cases illustrating the history of criminal negligence law. |
| Rex v. Dalloway (1846-48) 2 Cox C. C. 273 | Authority relevant to criminal negligence jurisprudence. | Appears in the compendium of cases used to explain the difference between civil and criminal negligence. |
| Emperor v. W.S. Priestley, AIR 1944 Sind 124 | Authority on criminal negligence in a comparable context. | Referred to as support for the court's description of criminal negligence. |
| In re, Nidamarti Nagabhushanam, 7 Mad HCR 119 | Cited in relation to criminal rashness and its characteristics. | Used among other cases to define criminal rashness. |
| Empress of India v. Idu Beg, ILR 3 All 776 | Authority on criminal rashness/negligence. | Included in the set of authorities cited for criminal rashness principles. |
| Smith H.W. v. Emperor, ILR 53 Cal 333 (AIR 1926 Cal 300) | Authority on criminal culpability (rashness/negligence). | Referenced in the discussion of criminal rashness. |
| Chotelal v. Emperor, ILR 1944 All 674 (AIR 1945 All 16) | Authority cited on criminal rashness/negligence. | Used as an example among cases dealing with criminal rashness. |
| State of Bihar v. Mangal Singh, AIR 1953 Pat 56 | Authority on criminal negligence/rashness. | Included to show the breadth of authority on criminal culpability. |
| Emperor v. Abdul Latif, AIR 1944 Lah 163 | Authority addressing criminal rashness/negligence (also cited with Cr. L.J. reference). | Referred to in the court's survey of case-law on criminal rashness. |
| Sivaramachari v. Anjaneya Chetty, ILR (1952) Mad 277 : AIR 1951 Mad 962 (Full Bench) | Full Bench authority on Article 182 (Limitation Act) and the disjunctive application of clauses permitting execution applications to be within time under different clauses. | Relied upon in the civil appeal to support that Clause 5 of Article 182 can operate to save a second execution petition filed within three years of a final order on a prior execution application made in accordance with law. |
| Periakaruppan Chettiar v. Venugopal Pillai, AIR 1946 Mad 383 (1946-1 Mad LJ 347) | Authority addressing execution, amendment and Article 182 interpretation in mortgage/execution context. | Used to support the proposition that appellate modifications are to be treated as incorporated and to show clause 5 applicability. |
| V. Subbarao v. Kesavayya, AIR 1955 Andhra 254 | Authority in the context of mortgage suits and execution petitions under Article 182. | Cited in support of the view that appellate modifications are deemed incorporated and the second execution petition can be within time under clause 5. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
Criminal Revision — Reasoning
The court analysed the elements required for an offence under Sec.116 Motor Vehicles Act (speed and driving in a manner dangerous to the public) and Sec.71 Madras City Police Act (rash or negligent driving in a public place). It surveyed authorities distinguishing negligent driving, rash driving and errors of judgment and explained that only negligence or rashness of a sufficiently high degree (i.e., criminal recklessness) attracts penal consequences, whereas mere errors of judgment typically give rise to civil liability only.
Applying the statutory elements and the evidence, the court found:
- The expert/forensic evidence (skid mark of 91 feet and brake efficiency readings) supported an estimated speed of the accused's car between 40 and 50 miles per hour; the court accepted P.W.1's calculation based on the Ferrodo Brake Testing Meter Reading Conversion table.
- P.W.2's testimony that he had stopped in compliance with the caution board and had not suddenly or unexpectedly stopped was accepted by the court; thus the collision was not caused by an unforeseeable stop by P.W.2.
- The accused approached from the left and attempted to overtake P.W.2 on the right at considerable speed without sounding horn or obtaining any signal to pass; this conduct showed a conscious decision to take a risky overtaking manoeuvre at a junction.
- Given the speed and the manner of overtaking without signalling, the court concluded the conduct was not merely an error of judgment but amounted to reckless and careless driving within Sec.116 M.V. Act and Sec.71 City Police Act.
On these bases the court confirmed the conviction and sentence.
Civil Appeal — Reasoning
The civil appeal turned on the proper application of Article 182 (First Schedule, Limitation Act) — specifically Column 3 Clause 5 — which provides that where an application mentioned has been made, the period runs from the date of the final order passed on an application made in accordance with law to the proper court for execution or to take some step-in-aid of execution.
The court set out that Clause 5 is applicable to a second execution petition if the first execution petition was "in accordance with law." The court rejected the respondents' narrow contention that the first execution petition could not be "in accordance with law" merely because an appellate court later varied or confirmed the decree, observing:
- The pendency of an appeal does not ipso facto operate as a stay of execution; if execution of the trial court's final decree during the pendency of an appeal is permissible, a petition seeking such execution is in accordance with law.
- If the first execution petition was in accordance with law, Clause 5 permits the decree-holder to treat the final order on that application as the starting point for the three-year limitation period for a subsequent execution petition.
- The court relied on Full Bench authority (Sivaramachari v. Anjaneya Chetty) and other decisions (Periakaruppan Chettiar v. Venugopal Pillai; V. Subbarao v. Kesavayya) to show that where an appellate decree modifies a preliminary decree in a mortgage suit, the modification is to be deemed automatically incorporated in the trial court's decree and that Article 182's clauses are disjunctive (the decree-holder may take the benefit of any applicable clause).
- Accordingly, the court concluded E.P. No.112 of 1954 was filed within time under Clause 5 and that the lower courts had misconstrued the law.
Holding and Implications
Criminal Revision (Motor Vehicle Case)
DISPOSED: The Revision is dismissed; the conviction and sentence are confirmed.
Implications: The direct effect is that the accused's conviction under Sec.116 Motor Vehicles Act and Sec.71 Madras City Police Act and the fine of Rs.40 stand confirmed. The court applied established principles distinguishing civil errors of judgment from criminal recklessness and concluded the facts constituted criminally reckless driving. The opinion does not indicate that the court intended to lay down any novel precedent beyond applying the cited authorities to the facts.
Civil Appeal (Execution & Limitation)
APPEAL ALLOWED: The orders of both lower courts are set aside.
Consequent orders and implications:
- The costs of the appeal are to be paid by the respondents.
- Execution is to proceed from the stage at which it was left when the first court dismissed the execution petition (i.e., execution will continue from the earlier stage rather than being time-barred).
- The court held that a second execution petition can be within time under Article 182, Column 3, Clause 5 if the earlier execution application was "in accordance with law," including situations where execution of a trial court's decree during pendency of an appeal was lawful; the decision applies the Full Bench authority and related decisions on mortgage execution and limitation and clarifies the disjunctive operation of Article 182's clauses.
The decision resolves the limitation point in favour of decree-holders seeking a second execution petition where the prior execution application was properly made; the court did not purport to create a new legal principle but applied and relied on existing Full Bench and other authorities.
Judgement
This Revision is sought to be filed against the conviction and sentence by the learned Third Presidency Magistrate, Madras, in M. V. Case No. 901 of 1957.
2. The accused Mr. J. C. May who was driving his car MSZ. 6150 on 14-7-1957 at about 16-10 hours collided against the car MSZ 5070 coming on his right at the intersection of South Beach Road and Edward Elliots Road, Madras, which is near the Inspector-General of Polices Office.
3. The case for the prosecution as set out by P.W. 2 the driver of MSZ 5070 is : He was driving his car (Hudson) from Edward Elliots Road to St. Thomas Road. At the junction of the road there was the caution board prominently calling upon vehicles to stop, listen and proceed. P.W. 2 accordingly stopped on the Edward Elliots Road at the turning point within about 10 feet of the fountain and looked up on either side of the main road. MSZ. 6150 was coming at a distance of about 150 yards on P.W. 2s left. As both sides were thus clear for him, P.W. 2 turned to his right and proceeded on the South Beach Road at a moderate speed. Then he heard a collision sound in his rear.
He stopped his car, got down and saw MSZ. 6150 had hit his car and had gone and stopped near the I. G. office gate. P.W. 2s right rear mudguard, bumper, dicky and rear lights had been damaged. In other words, P.W. 2s case is that by reason of the accused driving at a speed and in a manner dangerous to the public, had brought about The collision and thereby the accused is guilty of driving recklessly or dangerously within the meaning of S. 116 of the Motor Vehicles Act IV of 1939 arid S. 71 of the Madras City Police Act III of 1888, which penalises any one who drives any vehicle in a rash or negligent manner in any public place.
4. The case for the accused was that finding that P.W. 2 had stopped his vehicle suddenly and unexpectedly, he (accused) applied his brakes but could not avoid colliding and that therefore this is nothing more than an inevitable accident and an error of judgment not punishable under S. 116 of the M. V. Act or S. 71 of the Madras City Police Act.
5. The learned Magistrate came to the conclusion that the version of P.W. 2 was acceptable and convicted the accused as charged and sentenced him to pay a fine of Rs. 40. Hence this Revision.
6. Section 116 of the Motor Vehicles Act corresponds to Sec. 5 of Act VIII of 1914 which ran as follows :
"Whoever drives a motor vehicle in a public place recklessly or negligently, or at a speed or in a manner which is dangerous to the public, having regard to all the circumstances of the case, including the nature, condition and use of the place and the amount of traffic which actually is at the time, or which might reasonably be expected to be, in the place ........."
It may be noted that words "in a public place recklessly or negligently or" have been omitted in the new Act. The old section had not however specified the definition of reckless and negligent driving and it was left to the case-law on the subject to define their limits.
7. Culpable driving of a motor vehicle giving rise to penalties on the criminal side and damages on the civil side may be classified as negligent driving, rash driving and guilty errors of judgment.
Of these three classes, the first two constitute the component elements of reckless or dangerous driving punishable under Sec. 116 of the M. V. Act. Section 71 of the City Police Act postulates the rash or negligent driving in any public place as the requisites for an offence to be committed under that section. Errors of judgment which fell within that clause give rise to civil liability but are not punishable criminally. Gours Penal Law 5th edition p. 1047 quoted with approval in Cheriyan v. Sirkar Prosecutor, AIR 1950 Trav-Co. 14; R. v. Finney (1874) 12 Cox C. C. 625; Jumman v. Emperor AIR 1944 Nag 285; Emperor v. Abdul Qayyum, AIR 1941 Lah 113; Robson v. Emperor AIR 1934 Rang 194; Andrew v. Director of Public Prosecutions (1937) 2 All E. R. 552; In re, Ganesan AIR 1950 Mad 71 : 1949-2 Mad LJ 255; In re, Appayya, 1956 Andh W.R. 784 : (AIR 1957 Andh-Pra. 100); Gulam Saeed Gulam Amir v. The State, AIR 1954 Madh-Bha 41; Chammanlal v. State, AIR 1954 All 186; S. V. Subba Rao v. State, AIR 1953 Hyd. 123.
8. The two ingredients of an offence under sec. 116 of the m. v. act are (a) speed and (b) driving in a manner which is dangerous to the public having regard to all the circumstances of the case including the nature, condition and use of the place where the vehicle is driven and the amount of traffic which is actually at the time or which might reasonably be expected to be in the place.
9. Turning to speed, both as regards civil and criminal liability, the rate of speed which will be considered dangerous varies with the nature, conditions and use of the particular highway and the amount of traffic which actually is, or may be expected to be on it. The driver of a vehicle must drive at a speed that will permit of his stopping or deflecting his course within the limits of his vision, and if he strikes a person or object without seeing that person or object, he may in the circumstances be placed in the dilemma that either he was not keeping a sufficient look out or, if he was keeping a look out, he was driving too fast in view of the look out that could be kept.
It is the duty of the driver to drive his vehicle at a speed which will not imperil the safety of others using the road. Particularly at night it is his duty to drive at such a speed that he is able to stop within the range of visibility. (Halsburys taws of England Hailsham edition Vol. XXX p 639; Gibb: Collisions on land p. 1 and foll; Underbill: Law of Torts 15th edition p. 157; Clerk and Lindsell: Law of Torts p. 357; Chaudhri: Indian Motor Vehicles Act 3rd edition (1957) pp. 239-240; Gibb and Millner: Trial of motor car accident cases, Third edition (Sweet and Maxwell) pp. 37-42).
10. The following remarks of Lord Greene, M. R., in Laurie v. Raglan Building Co. (1942) 1 K.B. 152 at p. 154 are apposite :
"Despite all that can be said, it is speed that is the great begetter of accidents. It is in respect of speed, pre-eminently that the motor car is distinguished from the horse vehicle. But for the speed at which motor cars can travel, the motorcar, which does not pit an independent will against the will of the driver, should be much safer than a horse vehicle. Yet road accidents have multiplied beyond all reckoning since the motor car became common. It is the speed of the modern motor car which embroils and confuses the traffic and makes it more difficult to avoid accident. A person travelling at 40 miles per hour has less chance of avoiding accident than one going at 20 or 30 miles per hour, because the guidance of a vehicle going at a higher speed calls for rarer qualities of skill and judgment than does the guidance of the slower vehicle.
And, moreover, the high speed is more likely to induce confusion and difficulty in other road users who while possibly less skilled, are not in any way negligent. It is to be hoped that the Courts will never lend countenance to the utterly fallacious argument of too many motorists that speed is not dangerous. It is dangerous, and in the legal sense it is negligence, in a very great number of cases. True, a clear line cannot be drawn, but, the truth of the statement just made will be obvious if the test of ability to avoid accident by pulling up or swerving be applied. For example, no car driven at 35 miles an hour can safely be pulled up sharp on a greasy road. No car going at that speed can so safely swerve to avoid collision as one going at 25. It may swerve more easily, but certainly not so safely, because the driver has far less time to take in his surroundings. It has been plainly laid down, too, that when conditions are such that it is not safe to go at more than a foot pace a driver must go at a foot pace. If even that is unsafe, he must stop".
11. The question whether speed constitutes negligence has been the subject-matter of much study in the United States of America where practically every family owns an automobile. 5 American Jurisprudence at page 645 et. seq. has the following to say :
"At common law there is no precise limit of speed. A driver must exercise ordinary care and drive his car at a reasonable rate of speed, and what is a reasonable rate of speed is dependent upon the circumstances of the case. An excessive speed may, under certain circumstances, constitute negligence at common law. Some circumstances may require a very slow speed if the charge of negligence is to be avoided. Another fundamental rule is that in order to impose liability the speed must have been the proximate cause of the injury .....Regulation of speed is now quite generally effected by statute or ordinance........ Driving an automobile at a greatly excessive rate of speed in violation of the statutes may constitute an act so wanton and reckless as to evince an utter disregard for the safety of others, and necessarily to imply an intent to injure, so as to constitute gross negligence......It is asserted as a general rule of law that it is negligence as a matter of law to drive an automobile at such a rate of speed that it cannot be stopped in time to avoid an obstruction discernible within the drivers length of vision ahead of him..........
Without denying that in many situations and under many conditions a driver of an automobile is as a matter of law guilty of negligence in driving at such a rate of speed as prevents stopping within time to avoid an obstruction within the range of vision, there is a strong tendency in the recent cases to refuse to adopt that as a universal formula or a hard and fast rule. Thus, it has been held to have no application in case of emergencies creating unexpected hazards. The rule does not apply to a case where an object or obstruction which the driver has no reason to expect appears suddenly immediately in front of his automobile...."
12. I have just before mentioned that driving recklessly or dangerously is the result of two mental states viz., (a) negligence and (b) rashness. Bingham in his Motor Claims Cases, Second edition, at page 3 (Butterworth and Co.) (1951) has given the following definitions for negligence culled out from the standard authorities :
"Negligence was defined in the well-known case of Blyth v. Birmingham Waterworks Co. (1856) 11 Ex. 781 : 25 LJ Ex. 212 : 4 WR 294; 36 Dig. 6 as follows.
Negligence is the omission to do something which a reasonable man, guided upon those considerations which ordinarily regulate the conduct of human affairs, would do, or doing something which a prudent and reasonable man would not do.
The Law Revision Committee in 1939 (Cmd. 6032) adopted the following definition :
Negligence may be said to consist in a failure to exercise due care in a case in which a duty to take care exists.
The general concept of reasonable foresight is the criterion of negligence and is fluid in its application; it has to be fitted to the facts of the particular case. Lord Wright in Bourhill v. Young, (1943) A.C. 92 at page 107 ...
Negligence is not established by proving that the loss might possibly and with extraordinary foresight and prudence have been avoided. Rothschild v. Royal Mail Steam Packet Co. (1851) 18 L.T. (O.S.) 334; Hart v. Lancashire and Yorkshire Rly. Co. (1889) 21 L.T. 261.
X X X X X X
If the possibility of danger emerging is reasonably apparent, then to take no precautions is negligence; but if the possibility of danger emerging is only a mere possibility which would never occur to the mind of a reasonable man, then there is no negligence in not having taken extraordinary precautions. Per Lord Dunedin in Fardon v. Harcourt Rivington (1932) 146 L.T. 391.
I am far from saying that every one is entitled to assume, in all circumstances, that other persons will be careful. On the contrary a prudent man will guard against the possible negligence of others when experience shows such negligence to be common. Per Lord Du Parcq in Grant v. Sun Shipping Co. (1948) A. C. 549. Both quoted in Upsons case, London Passenger Transport Board v. Upson, (1949) 1 All E.R. 60.
* * * * * *"
There is a duty on the driver of a motor car to observe ordinary care or skill towards persons using the highway whom he could reasonably foresee as likely to be affected."
13. In order to render a person liable for criminal negligence there must be something more than a mere negligence; for law distinguishes between negligence which originates a civil liability and one the consequence of which is a criminal prosecution. Brett, J., said "there must be negligence so great as to satisfy a Jury that the offender had a wicked mind in the sense of being reckless or careless whether death occurred or not". But negligence does not mean, even for criminal negligence, absolute carelessness or indifference but want of such a degree of care as is required in particular circumstances. Simple lack of care as will constitute civil liability is not enough. A very high degree of negligence is required to be proved before the felony is established and this may aptly be described by the epithet "reckless" : R. v. Bateman 1925-94 LT K. B. 791; Reg v. Elliott, (1887-90) 16 Cox C. C. 710 : (1874) 12 Cox C. C. 625; Hiltons case (1838) 2 Lewin 214 Rex v. Dalloway, (1846-48) 2 Cox C. C. 273; Emperor v. W.S. Priestley, AIR 1944 Sind 124.
14. There is a clear distinction between "negligence" and "rashness" and that distinction is contemplated even by Sec. 279 I.P.C. In the case of negligence, the party does not do an act which he was bound to do, because he adverts not to it. In the case of rashness, the party does an act and breaks a positive duty. He thinks of the probable mischief, but in consequence of a missupposition begotten by insufficient advertence, he assumes that the mischief will not ensue in the given instance or case. The radical idea denoted is always this.
The party runs a risk of which he is conscious. Even in ordinary parlance, "negligence" connotes want of proper care and "rashness" conveys the idea of recklessness or the doing of an act without due consideration. Culpable rashness is often explained as acting with the consciousness that dangerous consequences will follow, but with the hope that they will not follow and with the belief that the actor has taken sufficient precautions to prevent the happening of such consequences. Similarly, culpable negligence is acting without the consciousness that dangerous consequences will follow, but in the circumstances which show that the actor has not exercised the caution that was incumbent of him.
Criminal rashness is hazarding a dangerous or wanton act with the knowledge that it is so and that it may cause injury, but without intention to cause injury or knowledge that it will be probably caused. The criminality lies in running the risk of doing such an act with recklessness or indifference as to the consequence : In re, Nidamarti Nagabhushanam, 7 Mad HCR 119; Empress of India v. Idu Beg, ILR 3 All 776; Smith H.W. v. Emperor, ILR 53 Cal 333 : (AIR 1926 Cal 300) Chotelal v. Emperor ILR 1944 All 674 : (AIR 1945 All 16); State of Bihar v. Mangal Singh, AIR 1953 Pat 56; Chammanlal v. State, AIR 1954 All 186; ILR 1944 Nag 732 : (AIR 1944 Nag 285); Emperor v. Abdul Latif, AIR 1944 Lah 163 : 45 Cr. L.J. 699. For a comprehensive discussion see V. B. Raju, I.C.S. Penal Code p. 916 and foll.
15. Bearing these principles in mind, if we examine the facts of this case, we find that the accused has been rightly convicted under Sec. 116 M. V. Act and Sec. 71 of the City Police Act. The accused has certainly been driving his car at a speed between 40 and 50 miles per hour. P.W. 1s opinion is that on account of the 91 feet skid mark and the brake efficiency of the car MSZ 6150 being 75 per cent and 20 per cent the speed must have been 40 to 50 miles per hour, based on Ferrodo Brake Testing Meter Reading Conversion table, is entitled to acceptance. Then the evidence of P.W. 2 rightly accepted shows that he did not suddenly or unexpectedly stop his car inviting the collision.
P.W. 2 proceeded from the right side of the accused and the accused should not under the rules have taken the risk at the junction of the road. The accused had obviously decided that he could overtake P.W. 2 on the right. But for this purpose of overtaking he had neither blown his horn nor obtained a signal from P W. 2 to pass. Therefore, when the accused attempted to overtake P.W. 2 at a considerable speed he has hazarded hoping that nothing untoward would happen. Therefore, this is not a mere error of judgment but collision was brought about by reckless and careless driving.
16. The conviction is therefore correct and the sentence is by no means excessive. Both are confirmed and this Revision is dismissed.
Revision dismissed. AIR 1960 MADRAS 54 (V 47 C 14) "Valliammai Achi v. Chockalingam"
MADRAS HIGH COURT
Coram : 1 GANAPATIA PILLAI, J. ( Single Bench )
V. Pr. RM. Valliammai Achi through her Power Agent Kathiresan Chettiar, Appellant v. V.R.A.R. M. Chockalingam Chettiar and another, Respondents.
A.A.A. O. No. 52 of 1957, D/- 25 -3 -1959., against order of Dist. Court Ramanathapuram, D/- 11 -12 -1956.
Limitation Act (9 of 1908), Art.132, Cl.5 - LIMITATION - EXECUTION - DECREE - Execution of trial Courts decree pending appeal against decree - Execution application is in accordance with law.
As execution of the trial courts final decree in a mortgage suit for sale of the hypotheca during the pendency of the appeal would be in accordance with law, an execution petition preferred for that purpose should be treated as one in accordance with law, and, therefore, falling under cl. 5 in Col. 3 of Art. 182. From the final order in such an execution application, the decree-holder would have the benefit of counting three years for the second execution petition. (Para 4)
Anno : AIR Com. Lim. Act. Art. 182 N. 52.
Cases Referred : Courtwise Chronological Paras
(55) (S) AIR 1955 Andhra 254 (V 42) : 1955 Andh WR 492, V. Subbarao v. Kesavayya 4
(46) AIR 1946 Mad 383 (V 33) : 1946-1 Mad LJ 347, Periakaruppan Chettiar v. Venugopal Pillai 4
(51) AIR 1951 Mad 962 (V 38) : ILR (1952) Mad 277 (FB), Sivaramachari v. Anjaneya Chetty 4
A. Sundaram Iyer and N. Palaniappan, for Appellant; P.S. Chandrasekhara Iyer and P.S. Ramachandra Iyer, for Respondents.
Judgement
This second appeal is preferred by the decree-holder in O.S. No. 125 of 1948 on the file of the Court of the Subordinate Judge, Devakottai. He filed E. P. No. 112 of 1954 in that suit for bringing the mortgaged properties to sale in execution of the mortgage decree which he had obtained. An objection was taken to this execution by the judgment debtor based upon limitation, and this objection found favour with both the lower courts and the execution petition was dismissed as barred by time. Hence the appeal.
2. The few facts necessary to appreciate the contention are the following : A preliminary mortgage decree was obtained on 31-8-1949. A final decree followed on 10-3-1950. In the meantime, an appeal had been preferred by the judgment debtor against the preliminary decree of the trial court, and this appeal was disposed of on 16-1-1951. It is common ground that the appeal of the judgment debtor was dismissed. But the cross objection preferred by the decree-holder which related to costs of the mortgage suit was allowed. By the decree of the appellate court, the decree-holder was given a personal decree for costs against the judgment debtor. When the appeal was pending, the decree-holder filed E.P. No. 165 of 1950 on 4-7-1950 for bringing the mortgaged properties to sale. However, he did not obtain satisfaction in that execution petition, which was dismissed on 31-7-1951. Then, he brought E.P. No. 112 of 1954, out of which the present appeal has arisen. This execution petition which is the second petition was filed on 9-4-1954. The lower courts took the view that this execution petition was barred by time as it was filed more than 3 years from the date of the appellate decree.
3. Both the lower courts have misconstrued the effect of the decisions cited before them and also Art. 182 of the First Schedule to the Limitation Act, which governs the question of limitation for execution petitions. There are as many as six clauses to this Article in Col. 3, which relates to the time from which the period begins to run. Clause 1 in Col. 3 of Art. 182 mentions the starting point as the date of the decree or order. Clause 2 mentions the starting point as the date of the decree or order of the appellate court where there has been an appeal. Clause 3 deals with a case where there has been a review of judgment. Clause 4 deals with a case where the decree has been amended. Clause 5 which directly applies to this case is in these terms :
"Where the application next hereinafter mentioned has been made, the date of the final order passed on an application made in accordance with law to the proper court for execution, or to take some step-in-aid of execution of the decree or order". Without referring to any authorities on the question, if the plain words of the section are applied, a second execution petition will fall under cl. 5 of Art. 182 and will be in time if it is filed within 3 years from the date of the final order passed on the first execution petition, provided the first execution petition was in accordance with law.
4. Mr. Ramachandra Aiyar, learned counsel for the respondents, valiantly argued that the first execution petition in this case was not in accordance with law, because after a decree is varied or confirmed or reversed by an appellate court, it is the decree of the appellate court alone that is executable. However, he conceded fairly enough that, if, before a decree could be passed by the appellate court, the decree of the trial court is executable and has been executed, such execution would not (Sic) be in accordance with law. It is indisputable that the mere pendency of an appeal against a decree does not operate as stay of execution of that decree.
That being so, I am unable to find any reason why, if execution of the trial courts final decree in a mortgage suit for sale of the hypotheca during the pendency of the appeal would be in accordance with law, an execution petition preferred for that purpose should not be treated as one in accordance with law. Certainly, if execution of the final decree was legal during the pendency of the appeal, the execution petition must necessarily be deemed to be one in accordance with law, and, therefore, falling under cl. 5 in Col. 3 of Art. 182. From the final order in such an execution application, the decree-holder would have the benefit of counting three years for the second execution petition.
The only objection which Mr. Ramachandra Aiyar urges against this view is that, in such a case, a second execution petition would not be execution of the appellate courts decree, but would be execution of the original final decree unmodified by the appellate courts decree. I am unable to find any substance in this argument. It has been held in the Full Bench decision in Sivaramachari v. Anjaneya Chetti, ILR (1952) Mad 277 : (AIR 1951 Mad 962) and in Periakaruppan Chettiar v. Venugopal Pillai, 1946-1 Mad LJ 347 : (AIR 1946 Mad 383), and V. Subbarao v. Kesavayya, AIR 1955 Andhra. 254, that, in a case where a preliminary mortgage decree is varied or modified by an appellate court decree, the modification must be deemed to have been automatically incorporated in the decree of the trial court and the second execution petition must be deemed to be one which seeks execution of the trial courts final decree as modified by the appellate courts decree. In the case of mortgage suits, these authorities are uniform and do not give any room for the contention that a different interpretation is possible. The learned District Judge distinguished the decision in 1946-1 Mad LJ 347 : (AIR 1946 Mad 383) relying on the following sentence which occurs at p. 351 of the report (Mad LJ) : (at p. 386 of AIR) : "We do not think that, so long as the decree itself has been kept alive, there can be a bar of limitation to an application of this sort. Such application really calls upon the court to carry out modifications, which in law automatically take place in the final decree already passed before the decree of the appellate court."
This sentence was intended to meet the argument that the application for amendment of the decree of the trial court to be made by the decree-holder after the appellate court had passed its decree, should be within time to enable the decree-holder to execute the appellate decree. That argument is repelled by the Bench by the observation that, so long as the decree itself is kept alive in the sense of its being not barred by limitation for the purpose of execution, any application by the decree-holder for bringing the trial courts final decree into conformity with the decree of the appellate court would certainly be in time.
The learned District Judge has misunderstood this observation to mean that the decree in the case now before me was not kept alive on the date when the second execution petition was filed. For this purpose, he made use of the principle that, after a decree is modified by an appellate decree, it is the appellate decree alone that is capable of execution. That principle has nothing to do with finding out if E.P. No. 112 of 1954 was in time. There is a lucid exposition of the scheme of Art. 182 at pages 285 and 288 of the report (ILR Mad) : (at p. 963 of AIR) in the Full Bench decision cited above.
The central idea expounded therein is that the various clauses appearing in Art. 182, Column 3 are disjunctive. That is to say, the decree-holder has the option of taking the benefit of any one clause in any case for contending that execution was within time. That does not mean that cl. (2) therein precludes the applicability of either cl. 5 or cl. 1 in any case where an appeal has been preferred. In this case, it is cl. 5 that helps the decree-holder to file the second execution application; and, if cl. 5 applies, it is immaterial whether the execution petition would be in time under cl. 2. E.P. No. 112 of 1954 was therefore in time.
5. This appeal is allowed, and the orders of both the lower courts are set aside. The costs of the appeal will be paid by the respondents.
6. Execution will proceed from the stage at which it was left when the execution petition was dismissed by the first court.
Appeal allowed.
Alert