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Abdulrahiman N.K v. Government Of Kerala & Others

Kerala High Court
Feb 13, 2009
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Structured Summary of the Opinion (K. Balakrishnan Nair, J.)

Factual and Procedural Background

The petitioner was appointed as a Cook in a leave vacancy in the 4th respondent's school (a special school for visually challenged children) on 10-7-2003 and was relieved from service on 30-11-2003; that appointment was approved by the District Educational Officer (D.E.O). On termination of that vacancy the petitioner became a Rule 51-A claimant for future vacancies in the school.

Subsequently, a vacancy arose in the post of Scavenger on 1-7-2005 and the petitioner was not appointed. Later, a vacancy for Cook arose on 5-6-2006 and the petitioner was again not considered. The petitioner submitted multiple representations (referred to in the opinion as Ext. P2, P3, P4, P5, P6 and P7) and sought information under the Right to Information Act, which resulted in Ext. P8 stating that the petitioner was not appointed to the Scavenger post because of a relinquishment letter dated 14-12-2005.

The vacancy for Scavenger was filled by appointing the 5th respondent and the Cook vacancy was filled by appointing the 6th respondent. Aggrieved by these appointments and the authorities' refusal to intervene, the petitioner filed this writ petition seeking (i) certiorari to quash the appointments and approvals of respondents 5 and 6, (ii) a declaration that the petitioner is entitled to appointment to one of those vacancies, and (iii) mandamus directing appointment and approval.

The 4th respondent (Manager), respondents 5 and 6, and the D.E.O filed counter-affidavits. The Manager relied on a relinquishment letter (Ext. R4(a)) alleged to have been executed by the petitioner on 14-12-2005 and signed by the D.E.O. The D.E.O affirmed approval of the appointments. There were conflicting judicial views at Single Judge level on the effect of an amendment (first proviso) to Rule 51-A (Chapter XIV-A K.E.R.), so the matter was referred to a Division Bench for a decision on that issue.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. What is the effect of the first proviso introduced to Rule 51-A (by amendment w.e.f. 25-6-2005) on persons who were appointed to short-term vacancies before that amendment and who became Rule 51-A claimants on termination of those vacancies?
  2. Whether a relinquishment letter executed by the petitioner (Ext. R4(a)) can operate to defeat or forfeit the petitioner's preferential right under Rule 51-A, or whether forfeiture can occur only by compliance with the procedure in Note 2 to Rule 51-A.
  3. Whether the appointments of the 5th and 6th respondents (to the posts of Scavenger and Cook respectively) and their approvals by the D.E.O. are legally sustainable.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's Arguments

  • The relinquishment letter (Ext. R4(a)) has no legal validity to defeat the petitioner's claim under Rule 51-A.
  • The petitioner will lose his preferential claim only if the Manager follows the procedure prescribed under Note 2 to Rule 51-A; the Manager did not follow that procedure.
  • On the effect of the first proviso to Rule 51-A, the petitioner’s counsel submitted the proviso should apply only to those who obtained appointment after the amendment (i.e., not to claimants who became Rule 51-A claimants prior to the amendment).
  • Reliance was placed on Division Bench decisions in Lakshmikutty Amma v. Vijayalakshmikutty (1992 (2) KLT 341) and Nalini v. State of Kerala (2001 (2) KLT 273) in support of the submissions regarding forfeiture and procedure.

Respondents' / Manager's Arguments

  • The Manager relied on Ext. R4(a), a relinquishment letter dated 14-12-2005 said to be executed by the petitioner in the presence of the D.E.O and other witnesses; it was submitted this extinguished the petitioner's right to claim appointment.
  • The Manager and respondents 5 and 6 contended that Ext. R4(a) was genuine and that, in view of it, the petitioner had no right to be re-appointed.
  • It was also contended that a male candidate could not be appointed as Scavenger because the vacancy concerned a girls' hostel (duties involved cleaning rooms of blind girls and leading them to toilets), providing an independent reason for appointing a different person to the Scavenger post.

D.E.O.'s Position

  • The D.E.O reiterated that the petitioner had relinquished his claim for posting as Scavenger and confirmed that the appointments of respondents 5 and 6 were approved by the D.E.O.
  • The D.E.O stated that approval of the appointment of the 6th respondent relied on the Manager's declaration that no claimant was waiting for appointment to the post of Cook.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Lakshmikutty Amma v. Vijayalakshmikutty (1992 (2) KLT 341) Proposition that forfeiture of preferential right under Rule 51-A cannot be achieved by informal relinquishment but must follow the prescribed procedure (Note 2). The Court relied on this decision (among others) to hold that a relinquishment letter such as Ext. R4(a) is not the method contemplated by Rule 51-A to forfeit the preferential right; forfeiture only occurs in the manner provided in Note 2.
Nalini v. State of Kerala (2001 (2) KLT 273) Similar support for the principle that the procedural safeguards in Rule 51-A / Note 2 govern forfeiture of preferential claim. The Court cited this decision to reinforce that the right under Rule 51-A will be lost only as provided in Note 2 and not by a separate relinquishment letter.
Prabhakaran v. General Manager, K.S.R.T.C (1981 KLT 164) Industrial jurisprudence principle that short-term appointees/ retrenched persons are entitled to preferential consideration on future vacancies; rejection of a requirement that retrenchment must follow 240 days of service. The Court invoked this decision to support the proposition that rights accruing to persons appointed to short duration vacancies (exceeding two months) prior to the amendment cannot be taken away by a later amendment; historical industrial jurisprudence supports preferential treatment for such incumbents.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court proceeded in two related phases: (A) determination of the legal effect of the amendment (first proviso) to Rule 51-A and the related amendment to Rule 7-A (both effective from 25-6-2005); and (B) application of the legal principles to the facts of the petitioner's case.

A. Interpretation of Rule 51-A and related provisions

  • The Court set out the text of Rule 51-A as it stood before and after the amendment of 25-6-2005, and also quoted Rules 49 and 52 (which deal with teachers retained during vacation and teachers relieved due to reduction of posts respectively).
  • The first proviso to Rule 51-A introduced a minimum continuous service requirement of one academic year for teachers relieved under Rule 49 or Rule 52 in order to be entitled to preference under Rule 51-A; the second proviso gave first preference to protected teachers.
  • Simultaneously, Rule 7-A was amended so that vacancies the duration of which is less than one academic year shall not be filled up (earlier the threshold was two months or less).
  • The Court identified the central interpretive question as whether the amendment (raising the minimum vacancy duration to one academic year and introducing the one academic year threshold for Rules 49/52 claimants) affected persons who had been appointed to short-term vacancies (exceeding two months) prior to 25-6-2005 and who had become Rule 51-A claimants on termination of those vacancies.
  • Applying the plain meaning of the amended rule and established principles, the Court concluded that the amendment could not be given a retrospective effect to defeat rights already accrued to persons appointed prior to the amendment. In particular, the first proviso expressly deals only with teachers relieved under Rules 49 and 52 (and the minimum service requirement applies to them) and does not extend to persons relieved on termination of vacancies (the third category), such as the petitioner.
  • The Court relied on industrial jurisprudence (including Prabhakaran) to reason that preferential re-employment rights attaching to prior short-term appointments are well recognised and could not be taken away merely by the subsequent amendment; therefore, persons who obtained appointments to short-duration vacancies before 25-6-2005 and thereby became Rule 51-A claimants retained their accrued rights.
  • Consequently, the Court overruled a conflicting view taken in W.P.(C) No.15291 of 2007 and upheld the view taken in W.P.(C) Nos. 31924 of 2005 and 19155 of 2005, answering the reference accordingly.

B. Application to the petitioner's case (relinquishment letter and appointments)

  • The Court examined Ext. R4(a), the relinquishment letter relied upon by the Manager. It concluded that Rule 51-A contains no provision for loss of the right by execution of a separate relinquishment document before the D.E.O. The only procedure for forfeiture is that set out in Note 2 to Rule 51-A (service of appointment order by registered post with a 14-day period to join, followed by a further 7-day period after a specific notice), and decisions such as Lakshmikutty Amma and Nalini support that position.
  • Therefore, even assuming Ext. R4(a) to be genuine, it could not operate to defeat the petitioner's preferential right under Rule 51-A because it did not follow the prescribed forfeiture procedure in Note 2.
  • Turning to the appointments: the Court recognized a factual/functional constraint in relation to the Scavenger post — because the vacancy involved work in a girls' hostel for visually challenged girls, a male scavenger could not properly have been appointed. In view of that constraint, the Court declined to interfere with the appointment of the 5th respondent in exercise of discretionary writ jurisdiction under Article 226.
  • However, regarding the Cook appointment, the Court found that the Manager wrongly denied appointment to the petitioner and that appointment of the 6th respondent (to the Cook post, for the period 5-6-2006 to 8-3-2008) and its approval were untenable. The Court held that the appointment and its approval were ab initio void and of no legal effect (while noting that the 6th respondent's salary drawn cannot be recovered from him), and that such drawal/approval would not give the 6th respondent any preferential claim in the future over the petitioner.
  • To give practical effect, the Court directed the Manager to issue an appointment order to the petitioner as Cook for the period 5-6-2006 to 8-3-2008 within one month, forward it to the D.E.O. for approval within two weeks, and asked the D.E.O. to approve and release the salary for the period to the petitioner. The Court also provided that respondents 1 to 3 (official respondents) can recover the salary paid to the petitioner from the Manager.

Holding and Implications

Holding:

The Writ Petition was allowed in part. In particular:

  • The Court held that the first proviso to Rule 51-A (amendment w.e.f. 25-6-2005) does not retrospectively affect the rights of persons who became Rule 51-A claimants on the termination of short-term vacancies that arose before the amendment.
  • The Court held that a relinquishment letter (Ext. R4(a)) is not the method for forfeiture of the right under Rule 51-A and does not deprive the petitioner of his preferential claim; forfeiture can occur only by compliance with Note 2 to Rule 51-A.
  • The Court refused to disturb the appointment of the 5th respondent to the Scavenger post for reasons related to the nature of duties and the unsuitability of a male scavenger in the girls' hostel.
  • The Court declared the appointment and approval of the 6th respondent to the Cook post (5-6-2006 to 8-3-2008) to be ab initio void and directed that the Manager appoint the petitioner to that Cook vacancy and obtain D.E.O. approval and salary payment for the period, subject to specified procedural directions.
  • The Court quantified costs at Rs. 5,000 and directed the Manager to pay this amount to the petitioner.

Implications:

  • Direct effect on the parties: the petitioner is to be appointed as Cook for the specified period and to receive the salary for that period; the appointment of the 6th respondent stands declared void for all preferential-claim purposes though the salary already drawn by the 6th respondent will not be recovered from him; the appointment of the 5th respondent is left undisturbed.
  • Doctrinal/administrative clarification: the Court resolved conflicting Single Judge decisions on the effect of the first proviso to Rule 51-A, answering a reference and holding that the amendment does not affect accrued rights of prior claimants. The judgment treated the procedure in Note 2 to Rule 51-A as the exclusive method by which preferential rights can be forfeited.
  • Remedial directions: the Court provided explicit procedural directions (time limits for issuing appointment order, forwarding for approval, and payment of salary) to implement its determination in this case.

Note: This summary is based exclusively on the information and material contained in the provided opinion. No facts or reasoning beyond those expressly stated in the opinion have been added.

Show all summary ...

K. Balakrishnan Nair, J.:— The petitioner was appointed as a Cook in a leave vacancy in the 4th respondent's school on 10-7-2003. It is a special school meant for visually challenged children. On termination of the vacancy, he was relieved from service on 30-11-2003. The said appointment was approved by the District Educational Officer (D.E.O). The petitioner submits that, thus he became a Rule 51-A claimant for future vacancies that may arise in the said school.

2. Later, a vacancy arose in the post of Scavenger on 1-7-2005. The petitioner was no appointed in that vacancy. Still later, another vacancy arose in the post of Cook on 5-6-2006. Even then, he was not considered for appointment. Claiming the vacancy in the post of Scavenger, the petitioner preferred Ext. P2 representation before the Manager on 12-9-2005. It was followed by Ext. P3 representation dated 10-10-2005 filed, before the D.E.O Since the said officer did not take any action, the petitioner preferred Ext. P4 representation dated 17-5-2006 before the Director of Public Instruction. Since those representations were not considered, he fried Ext. P5 representation dated 20-7-2006 before the Government. But, the Government also did not take any effective action. The vacancy in the post of Scavenger was filled up by appointing the 5th respondent and the vacancy in the post of Cook was filled up by appointing the 6th respondent. When he was not considered even for appointment to the post of Cook, the petitioner filed Ext. P6 representation before the Manager, followed by Ext. P7 representation dated 18-6-2007 before the third respondent, D.E.O

3. Finally, the petitioner moved the Assistant Public Information Officer attached to the office of the D.E.O under the Right to Information Act and pursuant to that the said officer issued Ext. P8 communication to him, pointing out that he was not appointed in the post of Scavenger because of the relinquishment letter given by him on 14-12-2005. Feeling aggrieved by the appointments of respondents 5 and 6 and also the refusal of the Educational Authorities to interfere with the same, this writ petition was filed, seeking the following reliefs:

“i) call for the records leading to the appointment of 5th respondent and 6th respondent by 4th respondent and subsequent action taken by the 3rd respondent and issue a writ of certiorari quashing the same.

ii) declare that the petitioner is entitled to be appointed in the vacancy which arose on 1-7-2005 in which post the 5th respondent was appointed and alternatively in the post in which R6 was appointed.

iii) to issue a writ of mandamus directing the 4th respondent to appoint the petitioner in the vacancy which arose on 1-7-2005 and the 3rd respondent to approve the same”.

4. The 4th respondent has filed a counter affidavit, in which it is submitted that the petitioner has given Ext. R4(a) relinquishment letter dated 14-12-2005, relinquishing his claim for appointment as Scavenger. It was executed in the presence of the D.E.O and other witnesses. Pursuant to that, the 5th respondent was appointed as Scavenger and the said appointment was approved also. There was yet another reason for not considering the petitioner for the said post. The vacancy arose in the Girls Hostel. The rooms, where the blind girls are residing, are to be cleaned and the children have to be led to the toilet and therefore a male scavenger cannot be appointed. In view of the relinquishment letter, the petitioner is not entitled to claim the post of Cook also. So, the 6th respondent was appointed in the vacancy of Cook, which was available from 5-6-2006 to 8-3-2008. The said appointment was approved by the D.E.O as evidenced by Ext. R4(c). Therefore, the 4th respondent prayed for dismissed of the writ petition.

5. The 6th respondent has filed a counter affidavit on behalf of respondents 5 and 6 They supported the stand of the Manager. According to them, in view of the relinquishment letter given by the petitioner, he has no right to claim re-appointment in the school.

6. The D.E.O has filed a counter affidavit, stating that the petitioner has relinquished his claim for posting as Scavenger. It is also submitted that the appointments of both the 5th and 6th respondents, were approved by the D.E.O It is also submitted that the appointment of the 6th respondent was approved, relying on the declaration of the Manager that there is no claimant waiting for appointment to the post of Cook.

7. When the writ petition came up before the learned Single Judge, it was pointed out that there were conflicting decisions concerning the impact of the newly introduced first proviso to Rule 51-A of Chapter XIV-A of the Kerala Education Rules (for short ‘K.E.R’). The learned Judge noticed the decisions in W.P.C 19155 of 2005 and W.P.C a 31790 of 2007, which took conflicting views on the point. Therefore, the matter was referred for decision by a Division Bench of this Court, so that the conflicting decision could be considered and a pronouncement may be made on the effect of the first proviso to Rule 51 A.

8. Heard the learned counsel on both sides. The learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the relinquishment letter has no validity and the claim of the petitioner will be lost if only the Manager followed the procedure prescribed under Note 2 to Rule 51 A. In support of that submission, the learned counsel relied on the decisions of the Division Bench of this Court in Lakshmikutty Amma v. Vijayalakshmikutty (1992 (2) KLT 341) and Nalini v. State Of Kerala (2001 (2) KLT 273). Regarding the impact of the first proviso to Rule 51-A, it was submitted that the said proviso will apply to Rule 51-A claimants who got appointment after the introduction of the above amendment and not those who got appointment earlier.

9. The learned counsel for the 4th respondent Manager submitted that in view of Ext. R4(a) relinquishment letter, the petitioner has no right to claim appointment as Scavenger or Cook. The learned counsel for respondents 5 and 6 supported the stand of the Manager. It is pointed out that Ext. R4(a) is a genuine document, because it was executed in the presence of the D.E.O and counter signed by him. Therefore, the petitioner cannot claim re-appointment in the school after executing Ext. R4(a).

10. We heard the learned Government Pleader for the official respondents. We also had the benefit of hearing the learned counsel appearing in the connected writ petitions, concerning the interpretation of the first proviso to Rule 51 A.

11. We will first consider the point referred for decision by the Division Bench. Rule 51-A, as it stood before the amendment dated 25-6-2005, reads as follows:

“Qualified teachers who are relieved as per Rule 49 or 52 or on account of termination of vacancies shall have preference for appointment to future vacancies in schools under the same Educational agency or an Educational agency to which the school may be subsequently transferred provided that they have not been appointed in permanent vacancies in schools under any other Educational Agency”.

12. Rule 51-A, after the amendment, reads as follows:

“R. 51-A.: Qualified teachers ate relieved as per Rule 49 or 52 or on account of termination of vacancies shall have preference for appointment to future vacancies in the same or higher or lower category of teaching posts, for which he is qualified that may arise in schools tinder the same Educational Agency or an Educational Agency to which the school may be subsequently transferred provided they have not been appointed in permanent vacancies in schools under any other Educational Agency.

Provided that a teacher who was relieved under Rule 49 or Rule 52 shall not be entitled to preference for appointment under this rule unless such teacher has a minimum continuous service of one academic year as on the date of relief;

Provided further that the first preference under this rule shall be given to protected teachers”.

Rules 49 and 52 are relevant. Therefore, they are also quoted below for convenient reference:

“R, 49: Qualified teachers except Headmasters appointed in vacancies which are not permanent which extend over the summer vacation and who continue in such vacancies till the close date shall be retained in the vacancies during the vacation, if their continuous service as on the closing day is not less than eight months. The teachers so retained shall be entitled to the vacation salary. These teachers shall be relieved on the closing day if their continuous service as on that day is less than the aforesaid period. This rule shall not apply to teacher appointed in training vacancies”.

“R. 52(1): Teachers who are relieved on account of any reduction in the number of posts under orders of the department shall on reappointment in the same school or in another school under the same management or a different management start on the same pay as they were getting at the time of relief, whether the new appointment is permanent or not.

(2) Teachers thrown out from service due to the withdrawal of recognition of schools by the Department shall also be eligible to draw the pay which they were getting at the time of withdrawal of recognition of the schools on re-appointment in another school”.

The above rules govern appointment and re-appointment of teachers in Aided Schools. But, by virtue of Rule 7 of Chapter XXTV B, the aforementioned rules are mutatis mutandis applicable to non-teaching staff working in the Aided Schools. Rule 49 deals with appointees in temporary vacancies, which extent over summer vacation, but who have not completed 8 months' service on the closing day. Such teachers will be relieved on the closing day and will be re-appointed on there-opening day. Retention during vacation is permissible only if the teacher has completed more than 8 months' service.

13. Rule 52 deals with teachers, who are relieved on account of reduction in number of posts under the orders of the department. Rule 51-A deals with not only teachers covered by Rules 49 and 52, but also those relieved on account of termination of vacancies, like the petitioner herein. But, the first proviso introduced deals with only teachers relieved under Rules 49 and 52 and not the teachers coming under the third category, relieved on account of termination of vacancies. While introducing the above proviso, simultaneously Rule 7-A of Chapter XTVA was also amended and sub-rule (3) was introduced, which says that vacancies, the duration of which is less than one academic year, shall not be filled up. Earlier, prior to that amendment, sub-rule (3) of Rule 7-A stated that vacancies, the duration of which is two months or less, shall not be filled up by any appointment. The said amendment was also introduced w.e.f 25-6-2005. Rule 7-A before the said amendment, was as follows:

“7-A. (1) xxxxxxxx

(2) Posts that may fall vacant on the closing date shall not be filled up till the reopening date except in the case of Posts of non-vacation Staff.

(3) Vacancies, the duration of which is two months or less shall not be filled up by any appointment”.

The above Rule after the amendment, reads as follows:

“7-A (1) xxxxx

(2) Posts that may fall vacant on the closing date shall not be filled up till the reopening date except in the case of posts of non-vacation staff.

(3) Vacancies, the duration of which is less than one academic year, shall not be filled up”.

14. The point to be decided is whether the persons who were appointed before 25-6-2005 to short-term vacancies extending beyond two months and whose appointments were approved and on termination who became 51-A claimants, will be affected by this amendment introduced on 25-6-2005. We feel that an interpretation which will affect them is not possible, going by the plain meaning of the words of the Rule. Up to 25-6-2005, it was possible to appoint persons to vacancies having a duration not less than two months. Such appointees, on being relieved, were treated as 51-A claimants also. Even in the absence of any such rule, it is a well recognised principle in Industrial Jurisprudence that a person retrenched from service should be preferred, when vacancy arises in future. Earlier, it was thought that the said benefit flowing from Chapter VA of the Industrial Disputes Act in favour of the workmen was available only if retrenchment is made after working for 240 days. The said concept has been knocked down by the judgment of the Division Bench of this Court in Prabhakaran v. General Manager, K.S.R.T.C (1981 KLT 164). So, in industries, persons appointed for one or two months, if retrenched, were entitled to get re-appointments when vacancies arise infuture. In the case of Educational institutions, the minimum incumbency period was fixed as two months. That is because valid appointment can be made only if the vacancy extends beyond that period. Now, it is provided that appointments can be made, if only the duration of the vacancy is one academic year and only such incumbents are to be given preference in future appointments. But, the said amendment can in no way affect the rights accrued to persons, on the strength of their appointment to short duration vacancies exceeding two months, made earlier to the amendment. The right of them to get reappointment was always recognised by Rule 51 A. But, after 25-6-2005, one can be appointed if only the vacancy has a duration of one academic year. Therefor, naturally, such persons alone can get the right to re-appointment also. So, the interpretation sought to be advanced by the respondents that the writ petitioner has no right for reappointmient under Rule 51-A, in view of the introduction of the first proviso to the said rule, cannot be accepted. Therefore, we overrule the view taken by learned Judge in W.P(C) No. 15291 of 2007 and uphold the view taken by the learned Judges in W.P(C) Nos. 31924 of 2005 and 19155 of 2005, as legally correct. The reference is answered accordingly.

15. Now, coming to the facts of the case, we are of the view that the reliance placed by the Management on the relinquishment letter, to deny the claim under Section 51-A, is untenable. There is no relinquishment letter, contemplated under Rule 51-A, whether it is executed before the D.E.O or the D.P.I The right under Rule 51-A will be lost only in the manner provided therein. Note 2 to the said rule says that the Manager should issue an order of appointment to the teacher by Registered post acknowledgment due and give a period of 14 (fourteen) clear days to the teacher to join duty. If the teacher does not join duty in time, the Manager should give a further notice to the teacher, stating that another person would be appointed instead and that the preferential right under this rule would be forfeited if not exercised within another 7 (seven) clear days, If nothing is heard during that period also, the preferential right under the rule will be regarded as forfeited. The right under Rule 51-A will be lost only as provided under Note 2 to Rule 51 A. The said position is well settled by several decisions of this Court, including the reported decisions in Lakshmikutty Amma (supra) and Nalini (supra). It is not necessary to embark on an enquiry to find whether Ext. R4(a) is genuine or not Even assuming Ext. R4(a) is genuine, it is not valid and cannot affect the rights of the petitioner.

16. But in this case we notice that having regard to the nature of duties attached to the post of Scavenger a male candidate could not have been appointed. So, we feel that it is not proper to interfere with the appointment of the 5th respondent invoking our discretionary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. But the appointment of the 6th respondent as Cook, ignoring the claim of the petitioner is untenable. Even Ext. R4(a) was concerning only the post of Scavenger. At the time of hearing this case, the learned counsel for the Manager handed over a relinquishment letter, purported to have been executed by the petitioner in relation to the post of Cook also. Since, we have already held that such a relinquishment letter will not affect the rights of the petitioner, we are not referring to that in detail. The Manager has wrongly denied appointment to the post of Cook, which was available for the period from 5-6-2006 to 8-3-2008. It is declared that the appointment of the 6th respondent and its approval are ab initio void and having no legal effect. Since the 6th respondent has worked and drew his salary, the same cannot be recovered from him now. But the approval of his appointment or drawal of salary will not give him any preferential claim for appointment in the future vacancies, in preferential claim for appointment in the future vacancies, in preference to the writ petitioner. The 4th respondent Manager is directed to issue an appointment order to the petitioner, as contemplated under Rule 7 of Chapter XIVA K.E.R appointing him as Cook for the period from 5-6-2006 to 8-3-2008 within one month from today. He shall also forward that appointment order to the D.E.O for approval under Rule 8 of that Chapter, within two weeks from the date of appointment. Thereupon, the D.E.O shall approve the appointment. The D.E.O shall release the salary for the above period tot he petitioner and respondents 1 to 3 can recover the same from the 4th respondent/Manager.

17. The Writ Petition is allowed as above with costs, which is quantified as Rs. 5,000/- The Manager shall pay the costs to the petitioner.