Jai Ram Dass v. Director Of Panchayats And Others

- This is petitioner under Article 226 of the Constitution by a dismissed Sarpanch. The petitioner was elected Sarpanch of the Gram Panchayat Lalru in December, 1960. According to the allegations in the petition in his zeal to efficiently manage the affairs of the Panchayat he came in clash with certain powerful element of the public on whose complaint at the instance of the Chief Minister, Punjab he has been removed by the Director of Panchayats. Two contentions have been advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioner namely :- 1. That the order of removal is quasi-judicial order and that he could not be removed without there being a formal enquiry. He relies on a decision of this Court in Bijay Singh etc. v. State of Punjab, Civil Writ No. 1642 of 1960, decided on 10th of November, 1961. This decision derives support from a decision of the Supreme Court in The Board of High School & Intermediate Education U.P. (Allahabad) v. Ghanshayam Dass Gupta, etc, Civil Appeal No. 132 of 1959. On the other hand Mr. M.R. Sharma, learned counsel for the State contends that a Division Bench (Dulat and Pandit, JJ.) of this Court in Saudagar Singh v. Punjab State, decided on 28th March, 1962, has held that the orders of the removal of a Panch or a Sarpanch are purely administrative orders and, therefore, they cannot be the subject-matter of a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution; 2. That the provision of Section 102(2)(e) of the Gram Panchayat Act under which the removal of the petitioner has been effected are vague and indefinite and that no criteria has been laid down for the executive on the basis of which the removal of a panch can be justified in the interest of the public. In support of this contention reliance is placed on a decision of this Court in Harke v. Giani Ram, 1962 P.L.R. 213. 3. The contentions raised in this petition are of considerable importance and in view of the conflict on the first contention, it will be proper that this matter is settled by a larger Bench and preferably by a Full Bench. I, therefore, direct that the papers of this case be laid before my Lord the Chief Justice for necessary orders. ORDER S.B. Capoor, J. - This Writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is by Jai Ram Dass, who was elected as a Sarpanch of the Gram Panchayat Lalru in the election held in December, 1960 under the provision of the Punjab Gram Panchayat Act, 1952, (Punjab Act No. IV of 1953), hereinafter to be referred to as the Act, and the rules made thereunder. 2. On the 25th September, 1961, the Director of Panchayats, Punjab (hereinafter to be referred to as the Director) passed an order (copy Annexure `A' to the petition) in which it was stated that during the course of an enquiry it has transpired that the petitioner was alleged to have been responsible for misconduct in the discharge of his duties as Sarpanch and various acts of omission and commission were stated on the basis of which it was mentioned that his continuance in the office of Sarpanch was considered undesirable in the interest of the public. Accordingly in exercise of the powers conferred upon the Director by sub-section (1) of Section 102 of the Act, the petitioner was suspended and debarred from taking part in any act or proceedings of the Panchayat during the period of his suspension. In the endorsement to this order, whereby a copy was forwarded inter alia to the Block Development and Panchayat Officer concerned, it was directed that the Sarpanch should be asked to explain why he should not be removed on those charges and his explanation be sent to the Director with comments at an early date. A copy was also sent to the petitioner for compliance. Subsequently, on the 10th November, 1961 the Director passed an order stating that being satisfied after enquiry that the petitioner had been responsible for misconduct in the discharge of his duties as Sarpanch in relation to the various acts of omission and commission which had been mentioned in the preceding order, he held that his continuance in the office of Sarpanch was considered undesirable in the interests of the public. In exercise of the powers contained in clause (e) of sub-section (2) of Section 102 of the Act, the Director removed the petitioner from the office of Sarpanch. 3. The above was the order impugned in the writ petition and the respondents are (1) The Director of Panchayats, Punjab and (2) The Financial Commissioner and Secretary to Government Development and Panchayats, Punjab who had turned down the petitioner's representation against the order dated the 10th November, 1961. The petition has been opposed by the respondents. This writ petition came up for hearing before my learned brother D.K. Mahajan, J. before whom two contentions were advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioner. 1. That the order of removal was a quasi-judicial order and that the petitioner could not be removed without there being a formal enquiry. 2. That the provision of clause (e) of sub-section (2) of Section 102 of the Act were vague and indefinite and no criteria had been laid down for the executive on the basis of which the removal of the Panch can be justified as being in the interests of the public. 4. The learned Judge, in his referring order dated the 11th May, 1962, noticed that as regards the first point there was a certain conflict of decisions and he directed the matter be settled by a larger Bench and preferably by Full Bench. This is how the case has come before us. 5. After hearing the counsel for the parties, we find that it is not really necessary to determine in this petition either of the legal questions raised in the referring order. 6. It was submitted in the writ petition that the Gram Panchayat under the petitioner's guidance had realised about Rs. 7000/- out of the arrears of rent and taxes amounting to Rs. 40,000/-, that this action offended various people, and that one Shri Prithvi Singh, Director of the National Disciplinary Scheme under the Government of the Punjab wanted some land for the construction of his residence at Lalru, but the Panchayat by its resolution No. 22 dated the 22nd February, 1961, refused to give him that land and that Shri Prithvi Singh Azad got offended with the petitioner and it was through his instrumentality that the petitioner was removed from the office of Sarpanch. It was further stated that on receipt of the notice dated the 4th September, 1961, the petitioner had submitted his reply stating that he had not committed any misconduct but the Director passed the impugned order dated the 25th September, 1961, without holding an enquiry. In the return on behalf of the respondents, it is maintained that the Director by his letter dated the 4th September, 1961, had informed the petitioner that he would be visiting Lalru the hold an enquiry in the matter and that the petitioner should be present at he spot (paragraph 10). It was further asserted (Paragraphs 11 and 12) that the Director went to the village on the 8th September, 1961, in order to hold an enquiry and found that the complaints against the petitioner were substantiated and that on account of his harsh and objectionable dealings the majority of the electors were against him. Then it was asserted (sub-paragraph (iii) of Paragraph (15) that respondent No. 2, had, in connection with a representation made by the petitioner, given him oral hearing. Lastly it was denied that any mala fide was involved in the action taken against the petitioner which, it was maintained, was perfectly legal. 7. The records of the proceedings taken in connection with the petitioner were produced at the hearing by the learned counsel for the State and in view of conflict on the crucial matter, whether there was any enquiry or not we have looked into the record. It has been verified that actually notice was issued to the petitioner on the 4th September, 1961, informing him that enquiry was to be held on the 8th September, 1961, and that he should be present at it. Similarly, letters were issued to various persons including those who had complained against the petitioner. The enquiry was duly held on the 8th September, 1961, as mentioned in the return, and the Director made his report against this Sarpanch. The petitioner has suppressed these material facts and in his petition he only stated that the Director had visited his village on the 8th September, 1961, in order to find out if no-confidence motion against the petitioner was supported by the requisite majority or not. This suppression of material facts should itself be sufficient for throwing out the writ petition. Even otherwise it appears that the terms of the statute have been complied with so far as this case is concerned. Under sub-section (1) of Section 102 of the Act, the Director may during the course of an enquiry, suspend a Panch for any of the reasons for which he can be removed. Under sub-section (2) Government may after such enquiry, as it may deem fit, remove any Panch on any of the grounds mentioned in this sub-section including the followings : (d) Who, in the opinion of Government or of the officer to whom Government has delegated its powers of removal, has been guilty of misconduct in the discharge of his duties. (e) Whose continuance in office is, in the opinion of Government or of the officer to whom Government has delegated its powers of removal, undesirable in the interests of the public. It is not denied that the powers of the Government under this sub-section have been delegated to the Director under sub-section (1) of Section 95. Now all that statute requires is the holding of such enquiry as Government (or the officer to whom Government has delegated its powers) may deem fit. It is clear that enquiry has actually been held in this case, and in the circumstances it is not open to this Court to hold that the order was without jurisdiction. 8. There remains the question of malice. It is admitted in the return that the Panchayat has actually passed resolution No. 22 in its meeting on the 22nd February, 1961, refusing to give land to Shri Parithvi Singh Azad, but it is equally clear that there were other complaints against the petitioner and while it may be the particular complaint by Shri Prithvi Singh Azad triggered of the enquiry against the petitioner, there is nothing else on the record to substantiate the allegation of malice. 9. In the result, I would dismiss the writ petition but leave the parties to bear their own costs. S.S. Dulat, J. - I agree. D.K. Mahajan, J. - I agree. Petition dismissed.