M.N Roy, J.:— This Appeal is directed against the judgment and decree dated October 5, 1972 made in P.A No. 381 of 1969 by M.N Dutta, J. against a judgment and decree of I.B Burman, Chief Judge, City Civil Court, Calcutta in Title Suit No. 314 of 1966 dated December 22, 1967.

2. “Hindi High School”, which is a Higher Secondary School and affiliated to the Board of Secondary Education, West Bengal, is a Society registered under the Societies Registration Act, 1860.

3. On or about December 20, 1955 the appellant was appointed as a Librarian of the said School by a letter of appointment issued by the Principal. Thereafter, by another letter dated January 25, 1957 issued by the said Principal he was confirmed as a permanent member of the staff. By another letter dated March 29, 1965, the defendant No. 1 as the Secretary of the School for and on behalf of the same, sought to terminate the services of the plaintiff because of his failure to render effective services to the students and teachers of the school, by serving three months notice effective from April 1, 1965. On or about May 24, 1966 the plaintiff appellant filed Title Suit No. 314 of 1966 in the City Civil Court at Calcutta for a declaration that he was still continuing in the services of the Hindi High School as Librarian on the ??? terms and his removal or dismissal from the services of the school was of no effect and the letter of dismissal in question dated March 29, 1965 was illegal, ultra, vires, void, insperative and was not binding on him and that the purported removal and/or dismissal and/or replacement and/or retrenchment was illegal, ultra vires and void. He also prayed for a further declaration that defendant Nos. 1 and 2 in the suit had no right in their independent capacity to interfere with his services as the Librarian of the School. The plaintiff prayed for a mandatory injunction directing the defendants to allow him to work as Librarian of the School and also for a permanent injunction restraining the defendants Nos. 1 and 2 from interfering with his continuance in the services of the school as Librarian or from doing any not prejudicial to his interest. Alternatively, the plaintiff made a prayer for an inquiry into damages and a decree for such amount as the plaintiff would be found entitled to in law and equity.

4. In the suit, the plaintiff contended that after his appointment and confirmation as stated hereinbefore, he had served the school as Librarian with an unblemished and impressive record and in recognition of such services he was awarded periodical increments in pay. He alleged that since February, 1963 the defendant No. 2, who at the material time was the Principal of the school and bore grudge against him, illegally and wrongfully made some false and malicious reports to the defendant No. 3 viz., the Secretary of the School and the said defendant No. 1 succumbed to such illegal, irregular and wrongful termination of the defendant No. 2 and served on him the letter of March 29, 1965, whereby his services were brought to be terminated by stating that it had because necessary to replace him by an adequately qualified trained Librarian. The plaintiff contended that no further order terminating the services or effective replacement from July 1, 1965 or thereafter was made or communicated to him and he has not handed over the charge of his office. He further claimed that his services had not been terminated in law and at all material times he continued to be in service of the school on usual terms. He contended further that the action purported to be taken through the letter in question or the allegations made therein do not emanate from any resolution of the Managing Committee and therefore the name was also illegal, wrongful, void, inoperative and without authority. He contended further that the act of the defendant No. 2 either on his own or at the instance of the defendant No. 1 in refusing to allot work to him or to allow him to discharge his duties as Librarian and their refusal to pay him any salary beyond June, 1965 was improper and unauthorised. He also contended that the act of omission and commission on the part of the defendant Nos. 1 and 2 was thoroughly illegal, irregular, wrongful, malicious and in breach of the contract of service which was still subsisting.

5. The defendant Nos. 1 and 2 contested the suit by filing two separate written statements. Their defence was that the plaintiff was not efficient or diligent in the discharge of his duties and he committed breach of discipline. It was alleged that the acts of omission or commission and insubordination of the plaintiff amounted to misconduct on his part. It was contended that inspite of repeated opportunities being given to him, the plaintiff failed to correct himself and created an atmosphere of dissatisfaction and resentment amongst the students was staff of the school. The defendants further denied the other allegations as made in the plaint and contended that the Secretary of the School had the authority to terminate the plaintiff's Services and the order of termination was quite legal and valid. They further denied that the plaintiff was still continuing in services of the school. They also contended that by the impugned letter the plaintiff was duly called upon to hand over the charge of the library but he wrongfully failed and neglected to do so.

6. Before the learned trial court it was contended by the plaintiff that the order of termination dated March 29, 1965 was not a valid order inasmuch as the same was not passed or issued by the Managing Committee of the School, which incidentally was the sole authority to terminate his service. In support of that contention the plaintiff relied on Rule 25 of the Rules for Management of non-Government High Schools including the Aided Schools framed under section 62 read with section 61(2) of the West Bengal Secondary Education Act, 1950. The plaintiff also contended that the said latter dated March 29, 1965 which purported to be a notice terminating his service was not really a notice terminating his services. On consideration of the materials and the arguments which were advanced, the learned trial Court came to the conclusion that the defendant No. 1 viz., the Secretary of the School was the highest Administrative Officer of the School and the impugned letter was duly issued. It was further found that the plaintiff was not governed by Rule 25 of the Rules as mentioned hereinbefore as the School in the instant case was a private institution and was a Society registered under the Societies Registration Act, 1860, having its own Constitution. On the other point, the learned trial court on a construction of the impugned Letter held that it was apparent that the intention of the same was to terminate the plaintiff's services as Librarian of the School on three months notice and it further hold that the plaintiff was not entitled to the declaration that he continued to hold the office of the Librarian. The learned trial Court, however, held that the plaintiff was entitled to his pay for the month of June, 1965 and as such decreed the suit in part, allowing thereby the plaintiff to recover a sum of Rs. 225/- only on account of his salary for the said month and dismissed the suit in other respects, by the judgment and decree dated December 22, 1967.

7. Against such determination, the plaintiff on January 25, 1968 preferred F.A No. 361 of 1969 which was finally disposed of by M.N Dutta, J by the judgment and decree dated October 5, 1972. The principle question which was involved in the said appeal was whether the plaintiff was entitled to a declaration that he was still in service, or in otherwords. Whether he was entitled to the declaration sought for. The learned appellant Court on consideration of the relevant fact held that when there has been a termination of a contract of service, a declaration, that the contract of service still subsisted could not be made in the absence of special, circumstances as the courts do not ordinarily grant specific performance of contracts of service, if the master rightfully made the contract, there can be no complaint and in case for wrongful termination, the servant may pursue a claim for damages. The learned appellate court in making the determination followed the principles led down in the cases of S.R Tewari v. District Board Agra reported in A.I.R 1964 S.C 1600, Executive Committee of U.P State Warehousing Corpn. Ltd. v. Chandra Kiran Tyagi reported in A.I.R 1970 S.C 1244, Indian Air Lines Corpn. v. Sukhdeo reported in (1971) 1 SCC 785 : A.I.R 1971 S.C 1623 and Vidya Ram Mishri v. The Managing Committee, Sri Jainarain College reported in (1972) 1 SCC 623 : A.I.R 1972 S.C 1450 where it has been observed that there are three well recognised exceptions to the general rule under the law of Master and Servants namely, (1) cases of public servants falling under Article 311(2) of the Constitution of India, (2) cases falling under the Industrial Law and (3) cases where acts of statutory bodies are in breach of a mandatory obligation imposed by a statute. Before the learned appeal court it was urged on behalf of the plaintiff that in the instant case it was the Managing Committee of the School which alone was competent to terminate his services in terms of Rule 25 of the Rules and the Secretary of the School had no such authority and the plaintiff's case would fall under the third exception. It was also urged by the plaintiff before the learned appellate court relying on the definition of “Managing Committee” as contained in section 2(d) of the West Bengal Board of Secondary Education Act, 1963 that the Managing Committee in the instant case was a Statutory body. The learned appellate court on a consideration of section 27(1) and other provisions of the Act negatived the contentions of the plaintiff and held that the Managing Committee of the School was not a Statutory body. In coming to such conclusion the learned appellant Court placed reliance in the case of Subodh Chand Dewan v. Managing Committee, Belgachia Mahatma Aawini Dutta, Vidyapith reported in 75 C.W.N 21 and over-ruled the contentions of the plaintiff that his case was covered by the third exception as mentioned hereinbefore. The learned appellate court further found that the Act or the Rules in the instant case have not conferred any right on the plaintiff or the members of the School and as such the case of Prabhakar Ramkrishana Jodh v. M. Panday reported in (1965) 2 S.C.R 713, on which reliance was also placed by the plaintiff, had no application in the present case. The learned App:Date court also held that even if the plaintiff was able to make out a case for his reinstatement, such order could not be made in the facts and circumstances of the case as the grant of such prayer would not be conducive to the interest of the School when the plaintiff is and would be considered to be an undeserving element and more no when in the instant case, the Managing Committee admittedly does not want that the plaintiff should continue in the service of the school. In arriving at such conclusion the learned appellate court relied on the case of Baidya Nath Bose v. Sudha Roy reported in 70 C.W.N 572. The learned appellate court also concluded that the termination effected by the Secretary in the instant case and not by the Managing Committee was legal and there was no violation of Rule 25 of the Rules and it was further held that the plaintiff was not entitled to anything beyond three months salary in lieu of notice and dismissed the appeal by the judgment and decree dated October 5, 1972.

8. From such determination the plaintiff has preferred the present Letters Patent Appeal No. 63 of 1973.

9. Mr. Chatterji, learned Advocate for the appellant contended, relying on the cases mentioned hereinbefore, in addition to the other cases of Ramkrishna Bhanuka v. Satya Charan, A.I.R 1950 P.C 51; Vine v. National Dock Labour Board, (1957) A.C 488; Jcrone Froncic v. The Municipal Councillors of Qualalampore, 1962 (1) W.L.R 1411, Vidyodaya University v. Silva, (1965) 1 W.L.R 77 : (1964) 3 All. E.R 865; Malloch v. Abdeon Corporation, (1971) 2 All E.R 1278; Hill v. C.A Persona & Co. Ltd., (1971) 3 All E.R 1345 contended that the order of termination dated March 29, 1965 was void ab initio. Because the same was not a proper order, having been passed and issued by the Secretary of the School and not by the Managing Committee in the terms of Rule 25 of the Rules for Management of Non-Government High Schools including the Aided Schools framed under section 62 read with section 61(2) of the West Bengal Secondary Education Act, 1950. So the Courts below had every right and authority to pass an order of reinstatement and also to issue and grant necessary directions or declarations to that effect and they had not acted legally and properly in refusing to make such order. Mr. Chatterjee further contended that his client, because of the subsequent statutory in corporation orrecognition of Rule 25 as aforesaid, gained the character of a statutory employee and as such his position was also fortified by a statute or the Rules as framed.

10. Dr. Manatosh Mookerjee, learned Counsel for the appearing respondents contended that the relevant Rule is the instant case does not deregate from any existing Rule or the power of any other person competent to terminate the services of the employees. He further contended that the wordings of the Rule 25 would show that they confer some additional power to the committee and does not take away their jurisdiction. In any event he contended that the provisions of the said Rule are not mandatory but permissive and the Managing Committee, in fact, by their conduct has accepted the authority of the Secretary concerned and also ratified the action taken by him viz., termination of the appellant's services. On this aspect, Dr. Mookerjee also took the alternative plea of waiver by conduct against the appellant and contended that he having accepted the initial appointment from an authority not being the Managing Committee but the Head Master of the School, cannot now challenge the authority of the Secretary to terminate his services. Dr. Mookerjee, in fact, contended further that in the facts and circumstances of the case, the appellant not having challenged the validity of his initial order of appointment, cannot and should not be allowed to challenge the validity of the order of termination. He submitted further that the breach of Rule 25, if at all, would not invalidate the order of termination but would entitle the appellant to damages as the action as taken would at least or in any event be wrongful. In support of his contentions that in an action of personal service as was the case here. Dr. Mookerjee, relying on the case of Hannam v. Bradford Corporation, (1970) 1 W.L.R 937 contended that the declaration as was asked for should not be granted and such a prayer in any event was not available in a civil proceeding to the appellant because of his terms of service and conditions of employment. In support of his contentions Dr. Mookerjee further relied on a Bench decision of this Court in Calcutta Electric Supply Corporation v. Ram Ratan Mahato, 78 C.W.N 628. He further relied on the decision in Subodh Chandra Devi an v. Managing Committee, Belgachia Mahatma Aswini Dutta Vidyapeeth, 75 C.W.N 21 which has since been affirmed on a reference in the unreported Bench decision of this Court dated September 21, 1973 and further contended that the Managing Committee of the School not being a statutory body, in any view of the matter, the appellant was not entitled to the declaration is question. He contended relying on the case of Vidyadaya University v. Silva, (1965) 1 W.L.R 77 : (1964) 3 All E.R 865, that the appellant in the instant case, in order to succeed in his contentions must have a status or otherwise consequences would be different. By subsequent incorporation of the statute in the instant case and the Rules framed thereunder he did not acquire such status and as such his contract of employment did not acquire a statutory character. Dr. Mookerjee also contended that for the purpose of finding out whether the appellant in the instant case, as contended by Mr. Chetterjee had or has a status, the relationship between him and the School will have to be ascertained and in fact his relationship or terms of employment was not governed by Rule 25, which has application only, to teachers and not to non-teachers. Dr. Mookerpe, relying on the cases of Baidyanath Bose & Ors.… v. Sm. Sudha Roy & Ors.…, 70 C.W.N 571 and Modern Wood, Craft Dahramdin Tellicherri v. Modern Woodcrafts Employees' Union, Dharmadan Tellicherri, (1969) 1 L.L.J 208, contended that is the facts and circumstances of the present case, order of reinstatement should nor in any event be granted and in making a determination the exicting relationship between the employer and the employee concerned will also have to be taken into consideration. In this connection Dr. Mookerjee also relied on two other cases viz., The Management of Panitola Tea Estate v. The Workman, (1971) 1 SCC 742 : A.I.R (1971) S.C 2171 and Air India Corporation, Bombay v. V.A Rabella, (1972) 1 SCC 814 : A.I.R (1972) S.C 1343.

11. Thus the whole question for consideration in the instant appeal is whether the appellant's employment was of a statutory character and if so, whether the Civil Court in the facts and circumstancs of the case had jurisdiction or authority to issue a declaratory order to the effect that the appellant's termination of service was wrongful and whether he was entitled to the consequential reliefs as prayed for. The cases on the question of Court's power to issue declaratory orders and consequential relief of reinstatement as were cited by Mr. Chatterjee, excepting the case of Hill v. C.A Parsons & Co. Ltd. (supra) came up for consideration before the Supreme Court of India in the series of cases viz., S.R Tewari v. District Board, Agra, Executive Committee of U.P State Ware Housing Corporation Limited v. Chandra Kiran Tyaji, Indian Airlines Corporation v. Sukhdeo and Vidyaram Mishra v. The Managing Committee Sri Joynayan College and as has been found by the learned Appellate Court, three well recognised exceptions to the general rule under the law of Master and Servants viz., (1) cases of public servants falling under Article 311(2) of the Constitution of India, (2) cases falling under the Industrial Law and (3) cases where acts of Statutory bodies are in breach of a mandatory obligation imposed by a statute, have been laid down.

12. Unless the decision in the case of Hill v. C.A Parsons and Co. Ltd. (supra) makes a deviation from the determination as made by the Supreme Court in the cases referred to hereinbefore and the same has any application in the present case, we would not be justified in interfering with the determination made by the learned Appellate Court. In Hill's case the plaintiff was a Chartered Engineer and he was employed by the defendants for 35 years and was due to retire at the age of 65. The plaintiff's salary was Rs. 3000/- a year and as a members of the defendants' Pension Scheme, the amount of his retirement pension would depend on his average salary during the last three years of his employment. Until 1963 the plaintiff and other professional Engineers were not members of a Trade Union but the defendants' employees of lesser standing belong to one of the two rival Unions, most belonging to the Draftsmans and Allied Technician Association known as ‘DATA’. Data began a vigorous campaign to increase their membership and acquire exclusive negotiating rights with the defendants. In March, 1970 Data called their members out on strike in support of a demand that the defendants should make all their employees join DATA. The defendant gave way to this pressure and in May 1970, signed an agreement under which, all their employees including professional Engineers were to be required to join Data within)2 months from the signing of the agreement. On May 19, 1971 the defendants wrote to the plaintiff. “In accordance with the agreement which the Company made with Data on May 13, 1970, we hereby give one month's notice of a change in your conditions of employment.—………………………. It will be a condition of employment that you are required to become a member of Data”. The plaintiff refused to join. So, on July 30, 1970 the defendants wrote to him purporting to terminate his contract of employment on August 31, 1970. In the latter it was stated that the defendants were bound to honour their agreement with Data and that the sole reason for terminating the plaintiff's employment was that he was in breach of his conditions of employment. The plaintiff obtained a writ against the defendants for wrongful dismissal and asked for an interim injunction restraining the defendants from treating the notice in question as having determined his employment. In such circumstances an order of injunction was granted for the following reasons:

(i) For a professional man of the plaintiff's standing one month's notice to terminate his contract of service was far too short; accordingly the defendants' purported notice to terminate the plaintiff's employment amounted to a wrongful repudiation of his contract of service.

(ii) When a Master had unlawfully repudiated a contract of service by giving notice of dismissal which was too short to comply with the terms of the contract, the notice was not effective to terminate the contract unless the servant accepted it.

(iii) Ordinarily if a Master insisted on the servant's employment terminating on the day named in the notice despite the fact that the notice was unlawful, the relationship of Master and servant thereupon came to an end for it was inconsistent with the confidential nature of the relationship that it should continue contrary to the will of one of the parties; the rule was not, however, inflexible and, where special circumstances existed, the court had power to grant a declaration that the relationship still subsisted and an injunction to stop the Master treating it as at an end.

(iv) In the present case there was special circumstances justifying the grant of an injunction in the exercise of Court's discretion; the plaintiff had suffered a wrong by receiving notice which was too short and damages would be quite inadequate ready; if the proper notice were to be given to him it would be probable that his employment would continue until the coming into operation of Part II of the Industrial Relations Act, 1971 in which case his rights would thereafter be safeguarded and he would not be obliged to join Data; further more personal confidence between the parties continued to exist and therefore one of the main grounds for refusing an injunction i.e that it was wrong to enforce a contract based on a confidential relationship in the absence of personal confidence, was not applicable.

13. The decision in Hill v. C.A Parsona & Co Ltd. (Supra) and the ratio and the conclusions involved therein, in our opinion, has no application to the facts and circumstances of the present case, more so when in India specific performance of an action, rested on personal volition or contract, is forbidden under the provisions of the Specific Relief Act and furthermore as the said case was decided on ??? considerations. Where specific obligations are incorporated under a state, equitable considerations can hardly arise. In the instant case it appears that the services of the appellant, even if the same were terminated wrongfully, damages for such wrongful termination would be the proper remedy and in fact such is also the finding of the learned lower appellate court. Dr. Mookerjee appearing for the respondents, was right in contending that even if the termination of the services of the appellant was wrongful he was entitled to have damages only for such wrongful termination, The Civil Courts have no jurisdiction, which the Industrial Tribunals have, to direct reinstatement of an employee and as such the trial Court in the instant case had no right or authority to order reinstatement of the plaintiff-appellant. We further find that even if the appellant had acquired a status by the subsequent in corporation of the statute and the Rules as framed thereunder and as contended by Mr. Chatterjee, the appellant was not entitled to have an order for his reinstatement. We also find that Rule 25 and the other connected Rules framed under the statute do not derrogate from any existing Rule or the power of any other person viz the Secretary in the instant case to terminate the services of the appellant and such exercise of power in the facts and circumstancs of the case and more particularly when such act has been ratified by subsequent conduct of the authorities of the School, cannot be interfered with or any declaration which has been asked for by the appellant can be granted. The provisions of the said Rule are also not mandatory but are missive only and the Managing Committee of the School having by their conduct accepted the authority of the Secretary and also having ratified his action, no inteference with the order of termination of the appellant's services was called for. It his been held consistently by this court that the Managing Committee of a School is not a statutory body and we do not find any reason to deviate from such determination. The view which we have taken does not require us to make any further decision on that point. It is true that where the employer has lost confidence on the employee, no useful purposes would be served by directing his re-employment. Such an order if made, would create future administrative complications and affect the personal relationship of the parties. In the instant case it appears that the employer has lost confidence is the appellant and as such even if he is directed to be reinstated, that would not be beneficial either for him or for the administration and the students. In the view which we have taken, it is not necessary for us to decide the question of waiver or estoppel by conduct of the appellant raised by Dr. Mookerjee.

14. The questions whether an order for removal from service contrary to regulations would enable the employees to have a declaration against a statutory Corporation such as the Oil and Natural Gas Commission, the Industrial Finance Corporation and the Life Insurance Corporation, as constituted under the respective statutes and whether the employees of these statutory Corporations are entitled to claim protection of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India or whether those Corporations are “authorised” within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution of India and whether the regulations framed under the Statutes establishing these Corporations have the force of law, came up for consideration before the Supreme court of India in the cases of Sukhdev Singh v. Bhagat Ram Sardar Singh Raghuvanshi (Civil Appeal No. 2137 of 1972). The Oil and Natural Gas Commission v. The Association of Class II Officers, O.N.G.C (Civil Appeal No. 1655 of 1973), and the L.I.C Ltd. v. Shyam Lal Sharma (Civil Appeal No. 1879 of 1972) and The Industrial Finance Corporation Employees Association v. Industrial Finance Corporation (Civil Appeal No. 113 of 1974) and in the unreported decision dated February 21, 1973. It has been held that Rules and Regulations framed by Oil and Natural Gas Commission. Life Insurance Corporation and Industrial Finance Corporation have the force; of law. The employees of these statutory bodies have a statutory status and they are entitled to declaration of being in employment when their dismissal or removal is in contravention of these statutory provisions although they are not servants of the Union or the State. We are making references to the above determinations of the Supreme Court as the determinations made therein have some bearing on the arguments of Mr. Chatterjee Viz., that the appellant has a statutory star us because of the incorporation of the rules and regulations under the Board of Secondary Education Act. In the said unreported decision the Supreme Court has held that the bodies as mentioned hereinabove are “authorities” within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution of India. Such finding has been arrived at on the construction of the provisions of the respective statutes creating the Corporations, their Constitution, rights and obligations imposed on them under the statutes in relation to the Union, their powers and functions and so also the characteristic of these statutes and their contents. It has been held in that judgment that Life Insurance Corporation as well as the Industrial Finance Corporation confers power on the Corporations to frame regulations as to the method of recruitment of employees and the terms and conditions of service of such employees or coyent. It has also been held that the Oil and Natural Gas Commission Act, under section 12, lays down that the functions and terms and conditions of employees shall be such as may be provided by the regulations under the Act and those regulations provide inter alia the terms and conditions of appointment and scales of pay of the employees of the Commission. It has further been observed by the Supreme Court that these statutory bodies have no free hand in framing the conditions and terms of service of their employees and they are bound to apply the terms and conditions as laid down in the regulations and are not free to make such terms as they think fit and proper. It has been observed that a regulation framed under a statute accords uniform treatment to every one or to all members of same group or class. The Oil and Natural Gas Commission, the Life Insurance Corporation and Industrial Finance Corporation are required by the statute to frame regulations inter alia for the purpose of duties and conduct and conditions of service of officers and other employees and the statutory authorities cannot deviate from the conditions of service. Any deviation will be enforced by legal sanction or declaration by Courts to invalidate actions in violation of rules and regulations. The statute establishing the Oil and Natural Gas Commission indicate at each stage that the creation, composition of membership, the functions and powers, the financial powers, the audit of accounts, the returns, the capital, the borrowing powers, the dissolution of the Commission and acquisition of and for the purpose of the Commission and as such the same is an authority and agency of the Central Government. In the case of Life Insurance Corporation of India it has been held that the provisions of the Life Insurance Corporation Act amply establish that the Corporation has the exclusive privilege of carrying on life insurance business. The policies are guaranteed by the Central Government. If profits accrue from any business other than life insurance business then alter making provisions for reserves and other matters, the balance of profit shall be paid to the Central Government. The report of the activities of the Corporation is to be submitted to the Central Government. The structure of the Life Insurance Corporation indicates that the Corporation is an agency of the Government carrying on the exclusive business of Life Insurance and each and every provision shows in no uncertain terms that the voice is that of the Central Government and the hands are also of the Central Government. The same is more or less the case of Industrial Finance Corporation Act which shows that the Corporation is in effect managed and controlled by the Central Government. It has also been held that the Oil and Natural Gas Commission is owned by the Government. It is a statutory body and not a Company. The Commission has the exclusive privilege of extracting petroleum. The management is by the Government. It can been dissolved only by the Government. The Life Insurance Corporation it has further been observed is also owned by the Government. The Life Insurance business is nationalized and vested in the Corporation. No other insurer can carry on life insurance business. The management is by the Government. The dissolution can be only by the Government. The Industrial Finance Corporation, it has also been found is under the complete control and management of the Central Government. Citizens cannot be shareholders. Certain specified institutions like Scheduled Bank, Insurance Companies, Investment Trusts and Co-operative Banks may apply for the shares. The Central Government may acquire shares held by shareholders other than the Development Banks. After such acquisition, the Government may direct that the entire undertaking of the Corporation shall be vested in the Development Bank. The Corporation cannot be dissolved except by the Government.

15. In those background it has been found that those bodies are or would be “authorities” as contemplated under Article 12 of the Constitution of India and as such the rules and regulations as framed by those authorities have the force of law.

16. It has been held that the existence of rules and regulations under statute is to ensure tegular conduct with a distinctive altitude to that conduct or standard. It has also been held in that case that an ordinary individual in a case of master and servant can enforce his contractual relationship for breach of contractual terms. The remedy in such contractual relationship of master and servant is damages because personal service is not capable of enforcement. In case of statutory bodies, there is no personal element whatsoever because of the impersonal character of statutory bodies it has been observed that a public authority is a body which has public or statutory duties to perform and which performs those duties and carries out its transactions for the benefit of the public and not for private profit.

17. Applying the tests laid down by the Supreme Court, schools simplicitor according to us would not come within the definition of “authority” in Article 12 of the Constitution of India. Considering the provisions of the West Bengal Board of Secondary Education Act, the Rules and Regulations framed thereunder, we also find in agreement with the decision in Subodh Chandra Dewan v. Managing Committee Belgaehia Mahatama Aswini Dutta, Vidyapith, Begachia (supra) which as stated hereinbefore has since been affirmed by the unreported Bench decision dated September 21, 1973, that the Managing Committee of a School is not a statutory body. The Act only defines the term “Managing Committee” and by such definition “Managing Committee of a school could not either be said to be a body corporate or a statutory body. Such committee, at best, is a Committee of private individuals and by the definition in the statute those private individuals do not per se become a statutory body. Furthermore, under the relevant Rules and more particularly under Rule 28(8) of the Rules for Management of Recognised Non-Government Institutions (Aided and unaided), 1969, if there is a violation of the Rules, the order of dismissal, termination or removal may be wrongful and for the redress of his grievances an employee can certainly prefer an appeal before the appropriate authorities as provided for in the statute itself or to sue for damages for wrongful dismissal and since the declaration as to reinstatement is not possible to be made by a Civil Court, the appellant in the instant case will at best be entitled to have reasonable damages. The rules and regulations as framed under the West Bengal Board of Secondary Education Act cannot be equated with the rules and regulations as framed under the statutes creating the Corporations as mentioned hereinbefore and these rules and regulations although they ensure some statutory protections, but they do not confer on a teacher or an employee of the aided or unaided school, a statutory status. A school under the relevant Act is not created by the statute but comes into existence in accordance with the provisions of the Act. It is not a statutory body because it is not created by the statute but the same is created in accordance with the provisions of the statute. Apart from the reasons as mentioned hereinbefore, on the basis of the decision and reasonings in Praga Tools Corporation v. C.V Imanual reported in A.I.R 1969 S.C 1306 the appellant in the instant case will not be entitled to have the type of declaration, he has asked for. With the above observations and agreeing with the findings arrived at by the learned lower appellate Court, we dismiss the appeal. There will however be no order for costs.

S.K Mukherjee, J.:— I agree.

18. Appeal dismissed.