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Chandran Nair v. Krishnan
Factual and Procedural Background
This appeal arises from O.S. No. 217/84 before the Munsiff's Court, Alathur. The plaintiff filed suit for eviction of the defendant from the plaint-schedule building and for recovery of arrears of rent. The plaint alleges that the property (about 30 cents in R.S. No. 67.B6 of Pazhampalakode Village) belonged in jenm to the Kavalappara Estate and that the defendant Krishnan had verumpattom rights. By a registered document (Ext. A1 dated 23.11.1983) verumpattom rights together with the house were assigned to the plaintiff, who allegedly came into possession. Thereafter the defendant purportedly took the building on rent by a vadakachit (Ext. A2 dated 1.12.1983) at Rs. 60 per month up to 31.5.1984; rent was paid only up to 31.3.1984 and two months remained outstanding. Ext. A3 was a notice terminating tenancy and claiming arrears; there was no reply, and the suit quantified arrears as Rs. 720/-.
The defendant appeared and filed a written statement contending, inter alia, that the property was jointly possessed by him, his brother Kandan and his children and remained undivided; that Ext. A1 had been executed under a bona fide belief it was a simple mortgage; that Ext. A2 had not been executed and that he was never dispossessed or a tenant of the plaintiff; the documents were alleged to be collusive.
At trial six issues were raised. The plaintiff examined himself as PW1 and the scribe of Ext. A1 as PW2 and marked Ext. A1–A6. The defendant produced no documents but gave evidence as DW1 and called DW2 (Kandan). The trial court dismissed the suit; the lower appellate court affirmed, both courts finding that the defendant (an illiterate person) had not proved execution of Ext. A1, that the document was not read over to him, and that the defendant had been deceived into executing a sale deed whereas he intended a mortgage. The appellate court also found Ext. A2 had not been executed.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether Ext. A1 (assignment deed dated 23.11.1983) was a sale deed executed with the requisite understanding and intention by the defendant, or whether the defence of non est factum / mistaken belief (that it was a mortgage) succeeds.
- Whether Ext. A2 (vadakachit/lease dated 1.12.1983) was in fact executed by the defendant and whether the sequence of documents and conduct (including alleged tenancy and rent payments) supports the parties' respective cases.
- Whether the courts below correctly assessed the evidence (including the failure to read the document over to an alleged illiterate signer) and whether the burden of proof has been properly applied.
- Whether the matter should be remanded to the trial court to permit further evidence to be placed on record by either party.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant's Arguments (Plaintiff)
- The lower courts' approach was incorrect; the written statement only baldly asserted that the defendant intended a mortgage without particulars.
- The defendant's sons joined in execution of the deed; there was no case that they were illiterate.
- Previous documents of title (Exts. A4 and A5) were handed over to the plaintiff and the building was thereafter transferred to the plaintiff's name (Ext. A6), supporting that Ext. A1 was a sale deed.
- The courts below were not justified in concluding that Ext. A1 was not intended as a sale deed; the surrounding circumstances cannot support that conclusion, according to the appellant's counsel.
Respondent's Arguments (Defendant)
- The defendant needed money and approached the plaintiff to execute security for a loan; as an illiterate person he believed he was executing a mortgage deed, not a sale deed.
- The defence of non est factum applies because the document executed was essentially different from what the defendant intended.
- Relying on the reasons given by the lower appellate court (including the improbability of selling and then renting the same dilapidated house), counsel submitted the appeal lacked merit and should be dismissed.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Kwamin Bassayin v. Bendentu II, A.I.R. 1937 P.C. 274 | The onus is on the party relying on a document to prove that a person not knowing English had the document properly explained and interpreted so as to understand its true import. | Cited to state the burden on a party relying on a document executed by a person who does not know the language in which it is written. |
| Mst. Kharbuja Kuer v. Jangbahadur Rai, A.I.R. 1963 S.C. 1203 | In transactions with pardanashin women (and similarly vulnerable persons) the burden rests on the person seeking to sustain the transaction to establish the document was executed after clearly understanding its nature; burden can be discharged by direct and circumstantial evidence. | Relied upon to explain that the burden to show understanding may be discharged by other evidence and circumstances, not only by proving the document was read over. |
| Geresh Chunder Lahoree v. Mst. Bhuggobutty Debia, (1870) 13 M.I.A. 419 | As regards documents taken from pardanashin women, the court must ascertain that the party executing them was a free agent and duly informed; ordinary presumption of understanding does not apply. | Referred to illustrate the special evidentiary approach where a party may be especially unable to understand a document and the ordinary presumption of comprehension does not apply. |
| Farid-Un-Nisa v. Mukhtar Ahmad, A.I.R. 1925 P.C. 204 | A mere subsequent declaration of non-understanding is not conclusive; the court must consider the settlor's personality, nature of transaction, circumstances and history to decide if the deed was the free and intelligent act of the settlor. | Invoked to show that proof of understanding may be established or rebutted by considering surrounding circumstances and the nature of the parties. |
| Jagadish Chandra v. Debnath, A.I.R. 1940 P.C. 134 | Reiterated that discharge of burden can be evaluated by the facts and circumstances and not solely by a declaration that the document was not understood. | Referred to support the proposition that the burden may be discharged by other evidence and circumstances. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court first set out the doctrine of non est factum: a person who has signed a written document essentially different from what he intended may plead that it is not his deed in law. For illiterate persons the doctrine applies if it is proved that the mind did not accompany the signature. The court explained that the burden of proof rests on the party relying on the document to show it was properly explained when the signer does not know the language (citing Kwamin Bassayin), and that in special situations (e.g., pardanashin women) the burden must be discharged by proof that the document was not only physically but mentally understood, which can be shown by direct and circumstantial evidence (citing Mst. Kharbuja Kuer and earlier Privy Council decisions).
The court examined the findings of the courts below (that Ext. A1 was not proved, not read over, and that the defendant was deceived into executing a sale instead of a mortgage). It noted several material aspects not accepted or considered sufficiently by the courts below:
- Ext. A1 was executed not only by the defendant but also by his major sons; there is no case they were illiterate.
- Previous title documents (Exts. A4 and A5) were handed over to the plaintiff — an act that, the court observed, would ordinarily be done if a sale was intended; the defendant did not say they were handed over only for verification.
- Ext. A6 showed that the building was assessed and transferred in the plaintiff's name and that tax for 1983–84 was paid by the plaintiff.
- The defendant did not reply to Ext. A3 notice terminating tenancy; if the defendant truly believed he was a tenant (or that he had been deceived), an immediate reply would have been expected.
- The written statement did not give particulars of the alleged misrepresentation/fraud as required by Order 6 Rule 4 of the Code of Civil Procedure; the pleading was bald and lacked detail about relationship, purpose of the loan, and the circumstances of execution.
The court held that although it was not clear if Ext. A1 was read over to the defendant, the surrounding circumstances could show that the defendant's mind accompanied his signature and that the reasoning of the courts below rejecting Ext. A1 completely could not be accepted. The court emphasized that the burden of proof may be discharged by evidence other than proof that the document was read over (consistent with cited authorities).
The respondent sought permission to adduce further evidence, arguing the property was valuable and the price inadequate; counsel asked for an opportunity to lead fresh evidence. Considering (a) the defendant's occupation as an ordinary cooly, (b) the defendant's apparent misunderstanding and counsel's plea that the defendant believed the burden lay on the plaintiff, and (c) the overall interest of justice, the court concluded that both parties should be permitted to adduce further oral and documentary evidence.
The court also commented on trial practice: it noted an endorsement on DW1's deposition suggesting the witness had signed though he was illiterate and stressed Rule 146 of the Civil Rules of Practice which requires the deposition to be read over to and admitted by the witness, criticizing the practice of merely handing depositions to witnesses to read themselves.
Holding and Implications
Holding: The court ALLOWED the appeal in part by setting aside the judgment and decree of the courts below and remanding the matter to the trial court.
Immediate consequences and directions given by the court:
- The case is remanded to the trial court to enable both parties to adduce fresh evidence, both oral and documentary.
- The appellant (plaintiff) is entitled to a refund of the amount of court fee paid in the memorandum of appeal.
- Parties were directed to appear before the court below on 5.4.1997.
Implications on precedent: The opinion applies and reiterates existing principles (doctrine of non est factum, burden of proof in cases involving persons unable to understand documents, and Order 6 Rule 4 CPC pleading requirements) and does not purport to establish a new legal precedent beyond applying those authorities to the facts; the court remanded for further evidence rather than resolving the ultimate factual contest on the record before it.
1. This appeal is preferred by the plaintiff in O.S No. 217/84 of the Munsiff's Court, Alathur. Suit was filed for evicting the defendant from the plaint schedule building with arrears of rent. According to the plaintiff, the property, which is about 30 cents in extent in R.S No. 67.B6 of Pazhampalakode Village belonged in jenm to the Kavalappara Estate. Defendant Krishnan had verumpattom right over the property. Verumpattom right with Krishnan's house were assigned to the plaintiff by means of a registered document, Ext. A1 dated 23.11.1983 As per that document, plaintiff came into absolute possession and enjoyment of the property and the building thereon. Subsequently, the defendant took the building on rent and executed Ext. A2 vadakachit dated 1.12.1983 By that vadakachit, the defendant undertook to pay a monthly rent of Rs. 60/-. According to the vadakachit, the building was given on lease upto 31.5.1984 Defendant paid rent only upto 31.3.1984 The rent for the subsequent two months was outstanding. Ext. A3 notice was issued to the defendant terminating the tenancy and for arrears of rent. There was no reply from the defendant. Hence, the suit was filed for a decree for evicting the defendant from the plaint schedule property and for realising the arrears of rent, which was quantified as Rs. 720/-.
2. Respondent/defendant entered appearance and filed written statement. Defendant contended that the plaint schedule property belonged to him and his brother Kandan and his children. The property in their joint possession and enjoyment and it remains undivided. According to him, even though he executed Ext. A1 document, that was under the bonafide belief that what he executed was a simple mortgage. He denied the execution of Ext. A2 vadakachit. According to the defendant, he was never dispossessed and he was never a tenant of the plaintiff. The documents referred to in the plaint as assignment deed and cooly chit are collusive.
3. On the basis of the pleadings, the trial court raised six issues. Plaintiff examined himself as PW1 and examined the scribe of Ext. A1 document as PW2. On the side of the plaintiff, Ext. A1 to Ext. A6 were marked and on the side of the defendant, no documents were marked. Defendant examined himself as DW1 and examined Kandan as DW2.
4. Trial court dismissed the suit, which was affirmed by the lower appellate court. Both the courts took the view that the defendant was an illiterate person and there was no evidence to prove the execution of Ext. A1. The document was not read over to him. Further, the court took note of the circumstances regarding the execution of Ext. A2 and on that basis, came to the conclusion that the defendant was deceived into executing the sale deed when as a matter of fact, he agreed only to execute a simple mortgage deed. It also found that Ext. A2 was not executed by the defendant.
5. The Lower Appellate Court held that the defendant was an illiterate person. It took the view that it is highly imporbable that the defendant who had no other house to live in would have sold his house and compound and subsequently taken the very same house on rent. According to Ext. A1, the house is a dilapidated one and it is not at all believable that the plaintiff would have resided in the said house. Evidence was lacking to show as to where the defendant was residing between the execution of Exts. A1 and A2 documents. Thus, it came to the conclusion that Ext. A1 was not intended as a sale deed and that the defendant had not taken the house on lease as per Ext. A2.
6. Learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the entire approach made by the courts below was not correct. Learned counsel contended that except baldly stating in the written statement that the defendant actually wanted to execute a mortgage deed, no further details were stated in the written statement. Further, the counsel highlighted the fact that the defendant was joined in the execution of the deed by his son and there was no case that they are illiterate persons. Counsel also highlighted the fact that the previous documents of title were handed over to the plaintiff and that the building was transferred in the name of the plaintiff. Thus, according to the learned counsel for the appellant/plaintiff, the courts below were not correct in coming to the conclusion that Ext. A1 was never intended to be a sale deed and the circumstances mentioned by the courts below cannot be the basis for coming to such a conclusion.
7. Learned counsel for the respondent submitted that the respondent was in need of money and he approached the plaintiff and agreed to execute a security for the loan amount. The respondent is an illiterate person and he believed that the document he was executing was a mortgage deed. It was only subsequently he came to know that he executed the sale deed. According to the counsel, the principle of non est factum applies. Learned counsel also put forward his arguments on the basis of the reasons given by the Lower Appellate Court. Counsel submitted that the appeal is bereft of any merit and it has to be dismissed.
8. As already stated, on behalf of the plaintiff, Exts. A1 to A6 documents were marked and P.Ws 1 and 2 were examined. Ext. A1 is the assignment deed dated 23.11.1983 It was executed by the defendant on his behalf and on behalf of his two minor children Manikandan and Murali and also by his two major sons Chandran and Chellappan. The document shows that the sale deed was executed for an amount of Rs. 7,000/- and that possession was handed over to the plaintiff. It also shows that PW2 was one of the witnesses to the document and also the scribe of the document. Ext. A4 is a document by which the defendant's predecessors obtained verumpattom right over the property. Ext. A5 is document by which the defendant purchased the rights of his brothers Chamy and Kunju. In this context, it is worthwhile to mention that in Ext. A1 it is also stated the defendant had two brothers, Kunju and Chamy and he had purchased their rights. Ext. A6 is a receipt issued by the Panchayat. It shows that the building has been assessed in the name of the plaintiff and he had paid the tax for the year 1983-84. PW1 mentions about the execution of Exts. A1 and A2 and denies that Ext. A1 was to be executed as a mortgage deed. He also stated that he did not instruct PW2 regarding the contents of the document. PW2 is the scribe of Ext. A1. According to him, the defendant signed the document only after he understood the contents of the documents. He also stated that it was the defendant who gave the details for the execution of Ext. A1 document. PW1 in his evidence, no doubt, stated that he was under the bonafide belief that Ext. A1 was a mortgage document. He only stated that he wanted some money from the plaintiff and he was willing to execute a simple mortgage deed. He also admitted that Exts. A3 and A4 documents were handed over to the plaintiff. DW2 was examined only to show that he was the brother of the defendant. It is in the light of the above facts that it has to be examined whether the courts below were right in dismissed the suit.
9. The principle of non est factum permits one who has signed a written document, which is essentially different from that which he intended to sign, to plead that, notwithstanding his signature, it is not his deed in contemplation of law. In order to succeed in the defence of non est factum, person executing the document must show that the transaction which the document purports to effect is essentially different in substance or in kind from the transaction intended. So far as illiterate persons are concerned, this doctrine has been applied if it proved that the mind did not accompany the signature when the document was executed.
10. In one of the earlier decision, Kwamin Bassayin v. Bendentu II, A.I.R 1937 P.C 274 - the Privy Counsil observed thus:
“Where a person not knowing English has affixed his mark to a document written in English language, the onus to prove that the document was properly explained and interpreted to the person affixing his mark so as to make him understand its true import is on the party relying on the document”.
11. This doctrine was equally applied in the case of pardanashin lady also. A case relating to execution of a document by pardanashin lady came before the Supreme Court and it is reported in Mst. Kharbuja Kuer v. Jangbahadur Rai, A.I.R 1963 SC 1203. In that case, the Supreme Court examined the burden of proof in such cases. It referred to the decision in Geresh Chunder Lahoree v. Mst. Bhuggobutty Debia, (1870) 13 M.I.A 419. In that decision, it is held thus: “… as regards documents taken from pardanashin women the court has to ascertain that the party executing them had been a free agent and duly informed of what she was about. The reason for the rule is that the ordinary presumption that a person understands the document to which he had affixed his name does not apply in the case of a pardanashin woman”. This view, which was affirmed in subsequent decisions, was modified to some extent, with regard to the nature of the mode of discharging the burden. In Farid-Un-Nisa v. Mukhtar Ahamad, A.I.R 1925 P.C 204, it was observed thus:
“The mere declaration by the settlor, subsequently made, that she had not understood what she was doing, obviously is not in itself conclusive. It must be a question whether, having regard to the proved personality of the settlor, the nature of the settlement, the circumstances under which it was executed, and the whole history of the parties, it is reasonably established that the deed executed was the free and intelligent act of the settlor or not. If the answer is in the affirmative, those relying on the deed have discharged the onus which rests upon them.”
12. It was also held that the proof of the fact that it has been explained to her is not the only made of discharging the said burden, but the fact whether she voluntarily executed the document or not could be ascertained from other evidence and circumstances in the case. This view was reiterated by the Judicial Committee of Privy Council in Jagadish Chandra v. Debnath A.I.R 1940 P.C 134. Considering the above decisions, Supreme Court in Mst. Kharbuja Kuer v. Jangbahadur Rai, AIR 1963 SC 1203 held as follows:
“The burden of proof shall always rest upon the person who seeks to sustain a transaction entered into with a pardanashin lady to establish that the said document was executed by her after clearly understanding the nature of the transaction. It should be established that it was not only her physical act but also her mental act. The burden can be discharged not only by proving that the document was explained to her and that she understood it, but also by other evidecne, direct and circumtantial”.
13. When we analyse the judgments of the courts below it is seen that the document was not read over to the defendant. It was also held that the defendant never intended to execute a sale deed. No doubt, some other circumstances like execution of rent deed have also been taken into consideration. But the following essential aspects were not taken into consideration: (1) The document was executed not merely by the defendant, but also by his major sons. There is no case that they are illiterate persons. (2) The previous documents of title, viz., Exts. A4 and A5 had been handed over to the plaintiff. This could be done only in a case where the defendant wanted to execute a sale deed. Defendant has no case that it was handed over to the plaintiff only for the purpose of verification. (3) Ext. A6 shows that the building standing in the name of the defendant has been transferred in the name of the plaintiff. The courts below have refused to accept these documents on the ground that within a short time the plaintiff was able to get the transfer of the building. Of course, Ext. A6 itself has no evidentiary value to prove the intention of the defendant. It is also pertinent to note that the defendant did not reply to Ext. A3 notice. If we belived the case of the defendant, he ought to have replied to Ext. A3 immediately, since Ext. A3 goes on the basis that the defendant was a tenant. Another important factor is that the written statement does not give the full details regarding misrepresentation. The relevant paragraph of the written statement is paragraph No. 3. It states as follows:
In the same paragraph, it is further stated as follows:
14. In evidence, plaintiff merely stated that it was as security for a loan that he executed the document.
15. Under Order 6 Rule 4 of the Code of Civil Procedure, in all cases in which the party pleading relies on any misrepresentation, fraud, etc., particulars shall be stated in the pleading. It is stated that the document was executed on a misrepresentation. Defendant does not say as to what was the relationship he had with the plaintiff and for what purpose he approached the plaintiff and for what purpose he took loan from the plaintiff. These details are absent. But I don't want to defest the defence of the defendant on the above grounds because both the authorities have gone into the evidence and understood the nature of the claim and the nature of the defence set up by the defendant.
16. According to me, even though it is not very clear from the evidence whether the document, Ext. A1, was read over to the defendant, since there are other circumstances in the case to show that the defendant had intended to execute the sale deed, the reasoning given by the courts below cannot be accepted. As observed by the decisions referred to above, the burden can be discharged not only by showing that the document was read over to the defendant, but also by other circumstances and evidence. I have given the details of the circumstances which tends to show that the defendant's mind also worked with his hand when he executed Ext. A1 document.
17. Learned counsel for the respondent submitted that as a matter of fact his party was willing to adduce further evidence to show that he approached the plaintiff only for the purpose of a loan and because of the fact that there was no evidence to show that the document was read over to the defendant, the other items of evidence were not adduced. Counsel also brought to my notice that the property is very valuable and the price shown in the document is very inadequate and hence prayed for an opportunity to adduce fresh evidence.
18. Taking into consideration the fact that the defendant is an ordinary cooly and the plea of the counsel that the defendant was under the mistaken belief that the entire burden was on the plaintiff, I think, in the interest of justice, it is highly essential that the defendant should be given an opportunity to prove his defence. Of course, in that event, the plaintiff would also be entitled to give further evidence. In the light of the above facts, I set aside the judgment and decree of the court below and remand the case to the trial court to enable both the parties to adduce fresh evidence, both oral and documentary.
19. In the above case as already stated, defendant was examined as DW1. The case is that the defendant is an illiterate person. When I went through the deposition of DW1, at the foot of the deposition it is stated thus: I don't think, this endorsement is correct. Since is an illiterate person, he canot read himself. The trial Judges should take more care in such cases. As a matter of fact, Rule 146 of the Civil Rules of Practice enjoins the Presiding Officer to read out the deposition to the witnessws. Rule 146 of the witnesses. Rule 146 of the Civil Rules of Pratice is as follows:
“146. Signing of depositions:— (1) After a deposition has been read over to the witness the last page thereof shall be signed in full by him. The Judge shall initial every page if the deposition is not recorded in his hand. A cerficate in the following form shall be appended at the foot of the deposition and the judge shall affix his signature there to over his name.
“Taken down by/before me in open Court, interpreted/read over to the witness and admitted by him to be correct”.
(2) If the witness denies the correctness of any part of the evidence when the same is read over to him, the presiding Judge may, instead of correcting the evidence, make a memorandum thereon or the objections made to it by the witness and shall add such remarks as he thinks necessary”.
20. Hence, it is highly essential that in all cases, the deposition should be read over to the witness. The practice of handing over the deposition to be read by the witness is to be stopped. It may give rise to situation as has taken place in this case.
21. Appeal is allowed. Appellant will be entitled to refund the amount of court fee paid in the memorandum of appeal.
22. Parties are directed to appear before the court below on 5.4.1997 s
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