Ramakrishnan, J.:— Revision petitioners, the Palakkad District Co-operative Printing Press Limited (for short ‘the Society’) and its President, are challenging the concurrent orders of eviction of the building occupied by the society as a tenant under the respondents on the ground of bona fide need.

2. Though in the memorandum of revision, the correctness of the finding regarding bona fide need was also challenged, at the time of arguments learned counsel for the revision petitioners Shi V. Chitambaresh, according to us very fairly, has not pressed any such contentions and has raised only one point for our consideration. The learned counsel has thus canvassed the correctness of the view taken by the Rent Control Court and the learned District Judge that the tenant in this case being a Co-operative Society is disentitled to avail the protection granted under the second proviso to Sec. 11(3) of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965 to the tenants in general. It was forcefully submitted that so long as the Society is a tenant as defined in the Act and satisfies the two mandatory conditions stipulated in the second proviso to Sec. 11(3) of the Act, the Society cannot be denied the benefit of the said proviso which is a very valuable protection conferred on the tenants in general by the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, a beneficial legislation mainly intended to protect the tenants from unreasonable eviction by the landlords. The learned counsel has sought support for the above contention from a Division Bench decision of this Court reported in 1986 KLT 1250 (Haji P. Mammu v. Abdurahiman Basha).

3. The second proviso to Sec. 11(3) of the Act is thus:

“Provided further that the Rent Control Court shall not give any direction to a tenant to put the landlord in possession, if such tenant is depending for his livelihood mainly on the income derived from any trade or business carried on in such building and there is no other suitable building available in the local ity for such person to carry on such trade or business.”

4. For availing the protection granted as per the above proviso, the tenant is bound to establish that he is depending for his livelihood mainly on the income derived from any trade or business carried on in the building let out to him and that there is no other suitable building available in the locality for him to carry on such trade or business. In this case, both the Rent Control Court as well as the learned District Judge has taken the view that the tenant of the building being a co-operative Society, it cannot claim the protection conferred under the above proviso. Both the authorities have not given any reasons it support of the view taken by them. In fact, both the authorities have proceeded on the basis that it is a point on which there cannot be any controversy at all. The learned District Judge has in fact noted that the tenants have no such contention even.

5. The definition of the word ‘tenant’ contained in Sec. 2(6) of the Kerala Buildings (Lease & Rent Control) Act, 1965 would certainly take in both natural and legal persons within its fold as the word ‘tenant’ has been defined to mean any person by whom or on whose account rent is payable for a building. However, it is important to note thatthewords defined in Sec. 2 of the Act may have a wider or restricted meaning as the context requires. That is clear from the opening words of Sec. 2 of the Act which contains the usual clause “unless the context otherwise requires”. The wording of the proviso would clearly indicate that only if a tenant proves that he is depending for his livelihood mainly on the income derived from any trade or business carried on in the building occupied by him as a tenant, the tenant can take advantage of the protection granted under. The second proviso to Sec. 11(3) of the Act. The words ‘his livelihood’ can naturally have only reference to a natural person and not to an inanimate lifeless legal entity like a co-operative society or a company incorporated under the Companies Act. The word ‘his’ would place the matter beyond any doubt. It can only be a pronoun for a natural person. If legal persons or entitles like companies or societies registered under the Societies Registration Act and statutory bodies were also comprehended as beneficiaries of the second proviso, the legislation would have certainly used the words ‘his or its livelihood’ even accepting that there can be livelihood for legal persons or entities. The principles laid down in the decision in Haji P. Mamma v. Abdurahiman Basha (1986 KLT 1250) relied on by the learned consel in support of his contention would not lend any assistance to the counsel in support of his contention. On the other hand, the said decision would really support the view which we have taken in the matter. What was decided in the said decision was that if a firm is a tenant of a building, such firm will be entitled to get the benefit of the second proviso to Sec. 11(3) of the Act, since firm is only a compendious name for its partners and it is distinguishable from legal persons or entities like companies and statutory bodies. It is relevant to note that the Division Bench in the above decision has referred to and relied upon specifically the observations of the Supreme Court in Madras Bangalore Transport Company (West) v. Inder Singh ((1986) 3 SCC 62 : AIR 1986 SC 1564) to the following effect:

“A firm unless expressly provided for the purpose of any statute which is not the case here is not a legal entity. The firm name is only a compendious way of describing the partners of the firm”.

6. As such, we are inclined to hold that the second proviso to S. 11(3) of the Act will have application only in cases where the tenant of a building is a natural person or persons and not when the tenant is a legal personality or entity as in the case of incorporated companies or statutory bodies. The fact that a co-operative society may also be a tenant as defined in the Act may not be a sufficient reason to hold that the protection conferred by the second proviso to S. 11(3) of the Act is available to the society also. The context in which the word ‘tenant’ is used in the second proviso would unfailingly indicate that the said word has been used therein as taking in only natural persons or group of persons in contrast to legal personality or legal entities like Companies and statutory bodies. In this view, we find no merit in the above contention.

7. Having failed to substantiate the above point, the learned counsel requested thatsince the tenant is a co-operative society carrying on a printihgpress in the building, it may be granted a reasonable period of at least six months to vacate and surrender possession of the building to the landlord.

8. Having considered the request of the learned counsel for the petitioners, in the facts and circumstances of the case, we are of the view that it is only just and proper to grant a period of three months from today to the petitioners to vacate andsurrender the building to the landlord unconditionally. We would accordingly allow the petitioners three months' time for surrendering the building to the landlord on condition that the petitioners file an affidavit unconditionally undertaking to surrender the building and premises to the landlord within three months from today. The said affidavit shall be filed within three weeks from today. The petitioners shall also continue to pay the rent payable for the said three months without any default If the petitioners fail to file the affidavit, it will be open to the landlord to take delivery or possession of the building forthwith.

9. C.R.P is disposed of with the above directions.