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Abdul Khader v. Abdulrahiman Master

Kerala High Court
Nov 3, 1987
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Structured Summary of the Judgment

Factual and Procedural Background

A landlord filed an application before the Rent Control Court seeking eviction of his tenant on various grounds; the only surviving ground was bona fide need to reconstruct the building under S. 11(4)(ii) of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1963 ("the Act"). The Rent Control Court and the Appellate Authority did not favour the landlord, but the District Court, Tellicherry, exercising revisional jurisdiction, granted an order of eviction dated 4-2-1986. The tenant challenged the District Court's order under S.115 of the Code of Civil Procedure ("the Code"), but that application was dismissed in view of a Supreme Court decision that a second revision is not maintainable. The tenant then filed an Original Petition under Article 227 of the Constitution, which was dismissed in limine.

Subsequently the tenant discovered that the licence obtained by the landlord for reconstruction had ceased to be effective (it had expired on 14-12-1982). The tenant filed an application under Order 47 Rule 1 of the Code before the newly created District Court, Kasaragod, contending that the eviction order was vitiated by an apparent error because the District Court which granted the eviction had not been told that the licence was invalid. The District Court, Kasaragod, dismissed that application by order dated 5-8-1987 (Ext. P2). The tenant sought review of that dismissal; the review application was dismissed by the District Court mainly on three grounds: (a) lack of jurisdiction in the District Court, Kasaragod, to entertain review of an order passed by the District Court, Tellicherry; (b) the review application was barred by limitation as it was filed seventeen months after the eviction order; and (c) lack of bona fides because the tenant had not earlier mentioned the licence's expiry when moving under S.115 or in the earlier Original Petition. The present Original Petition challenges the legality of the Ext. P2 order dismissing the review application.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the newly constituted District Court, Kasaragod, has jurisdiction to entertain an application for review (Order 47 Rule 1 CPC) of an order passed earlier by the District Court, Tellicherry, on the basis that territorial jurisdiction over the village was subsequently transferred to Kasaragod (i.e., whether S. 150 CPC operates to transfer pending and past business automatically to the new court).
  2. Whether the tenant's review application is barred by limitation where it was filed seventeen months after the order of eviction.
  3. Whether the expiry of the landlord's licence for reconstruction during the pendency of rent control proceedings renders the eviction order erroneous or vitiates it, such that review is warranted.
  4. Whether, as a matter of relief, the tenant could obtain safeguards (for example, conditions requiring production of a renewed licence) in the eviction order or by review/variation of that order.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's (Tenant's) Arguments

  • The eviction order was vitiated by an apparent error because the District Court granting eviction was not informed that the landlord's licence for reconstruction had expired (expired on 14-12-1982).
  • The tenant therefore sought review under Order 47 Rule 1 of the Code before the District Court, Kasaragod, which now has territorial jurisdiction over the village where the building is situate.
  • It was contended (by learned counsel for the petitioner) that the newly constituted District Court, Kasaragod, obtains jurisdiction to entertain the review by virtue of S. 150 of the Code, because the business relating to villages now included in Kasaragod should be deemed transferred to the new District Court.

District Court / Respondent Reasons for Dismissal (as recorded in the opinion)

  • The District Court, Kasaragod, held it did not have jurisdiction to entertain the review of an order passed by the District Court, Tellicherry, because Order 47 Rule 1 requires review to be filed before the court which passed the decree or made the order and the business of the earlier court had not been transferred in the manner contemplated by law.
  • The review application was held to be barred by limitation, since it was filed seventeen months after the earlier eviction order.
  • The District Court found lack of bona fides on the part of the tenant, because the tenant had not earlier mentioned the expiry of the licence when he filed the second revision under S.115 or when he filed the earlier Original Petition in this Court.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Aundal Ammal v. Sadasivan Pillai, 1987 (1) KLT 53 The Supreme Court held that a second revision is not maintainable. Explains why the tenant's S.115 application (a second revision) was dismissed; relied on this authority in the history of the proceedings.
Seen Nadan v. Muthuswamy Pillai, AIR 1920 Madras 427 Execution applications cannot be filed in a new court merely because territorial jurisdiction over the village was transferred to that new court after the decree was passed. Adopted as persuasive authority for the proposition that mere formation of a new court and transfer of territorial jurisdiction does not transfer pending or past business; supports finding that Kasaragod has no jurisdiction to entertain the review.
Ramier v. Muthu Krishna, AIR 1932 Madras 418 Full Bench upheld Seen Nadan's principle that pending/past business is not transferred merely by change of territorial jurisdiction. Used to reinforce the conclusion that S.150 CPC cannot be invoked to transfer pending/past business absent an express transfer; supports refusal of jurisdiction to Kasaragod.
Gopalakrishna v. Laxman, AIR 1964 Mysore 34 Division Bench followed the principle that formation of a new court does not automatically transfer pending/past business. Followed as consistent authority supporting the court's view on non-transfer of pending business.
Hanumayya v. Venkata Subbayya, AIR 1964 Andhra Pradesh 68 Division Bench followed the principle that pending/past business is not transferred by mere change of territorial jurisdiction. Followed as further supporting authority for the jurisdictional conclusion.
Maryarul Nadar v. Nanu Pillai, AIR 1957 T.C. 69 Full Bench held S.150 CPC cannot be invoked to enable transferee court to get jurisdiction in respect of pending and past business where there was only a mere transfer of territorial jurisdiction and nothing was said about transfer of pending business. Directly relied upon: the court applied the same principle to hold that Kasaragod cannot assume jurisdiction over the Tellicherry order by virtue of S.150 alone.
Ammini v. Leelamma, 1977 KLT 441 The landlord's plan and licence for reconstruction need not be produced along with the petition at the first instance; satisfaction can be formed later during proceedings. Applied to hold that expiry of the licence during pendency of proceedings does not, by itself, make the eviction order erroneous; supports dismissal on merits for want of "error apparent on the face of the record."
Haneefa v. Subhalekshmi Ammal, 1980 KLT 627 Section 23 of the Act does not limit the powers of the District Court; the District Court exercising revision can exercise powers of a civil court under the Code. Cited to explain what powers the District Court may exercise in revision and the applicability of ordinary civil procedure rules to revisional jurisdiction.
Vareed v. Mary, 1968 KLT 583 Observations that, in exercising revisional power under the Act, the revisional authority functions as a court and orders/decrees are governed by ordinary rules of civil procedure. Quoted for the proposition that the District Court, as revisional authority, functions as an ordinary court; the court notes that although the decision was overruled by the Supreme Court on another aspect, these specific observations were not disapproved.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court's reasoning proceeded in two main strands: (A) jurisdictional analysis and (B) merits of the review/application regarding the licence expiry.

A. Jurisdictional Analysis

  1. Legal starting point: Order 47 Rule 1 of the Code requires that an application for review be filed before "the court which passed the decree or made the order." The District Court, Kasaragod, did not pass the eviction order (Tellicherry did), so prima facie Kasaragod lacked jurisdiction.
  2. Counsel for the petitioner relied on S.150 of the Code, which provides that where the business of any Court is transferred to another Court, the transferee court shall have the same powers and perform the same duties as the transferor court.
  3. The Court examined whether the formation of the new District Court and the Government Orders (G.O. (Ms) 31/86.Home dated 13-2-1986 and G.O. (Ms) 527/86 dated 26-3-1986) effected a transfer of business from Tellicherry to Kasaragod. It found nothing in those Government Orders to indicate a transfer of pending proceedings; there was no transfer under S.24 of the Code (which prescribes transfer of proceedings), and therefore no automatic transfer of pending or past business.
  4. The Court relied on authorities (Seen Nadan; Ramier; Maryarul Nadar and later decisions in Mysore and Andhra) holding that mere transfer of territorial jurisdiction does not transfer pending or past business and S.150 cannot be invoked for that purpose where nothing is said about transfer of pending business. Although many of those cases related to execution under S.38 CPC, the Court held the principle applicable to review jurisdiction under Order 47 Rule 1 as well.
  5. On that basis the Court concluded that the District Court, Kasaragod, rightly held it had no jurisdiction to entertain the review application challenging the Tellicherry order.

B. Merits — Licence Expiry and "Error Apparent on the Face of the Record"

  1. Even if jurisdictional objections were set aside, the Court found the petitioner was not entitled to review because there was no "error apparent on the face of the record." The mere fact that the licence expired during the pendency of proceedings does not, by itself, render an eviction order erroneous.
  2. The legal requirement is that the landlord must satisfy the court that he has the required plan and licence. The Court noted (citing Ammini v. Leelamma) that the plan and licence need not be produced at the first instance; they may be produced during the proceedings, and the court may form the necessary satisfaction accordingly.
  3. The Court recognized the practical reality that licence periods often expire during lengthy rent control proceedings through no fault of the landlord. Therefore, courts should not refuse relief to a landlord merely because the licence's period lapsed during pendency; the landlord is not normally to be blamed for judicial delay.
  4. However, the Court emphasized that the courts have ample powers to protect the tenant's rights (for example, the tenant's right of first option) and to guard against possible misuse by a landlord who might delay or refuse reconstruction after taking advantage of licence expiry. One specific safeguard is to condition actual delivery in the eviction order on the production of a renewed licence. The Court referred to the provisos in Clause (iv) of S.11(4) of the Act and the general power of the Rent Control Court to issue directions about reconstruction.
  5. The Court observed that it was open to the tenant to apply to the District Court, Tellicherry, to seek incorporation of such safeguards into the impugned order (and that it would be for Tellicherry to decide whether to condone delay under Order 47 Rule 1). The Court also noted that while the Limitation Act does not apply to the Rent Control Court and the Appellate Authority, the District Court's revisional jurisdiction is governed by the ordinary rules of civil procedure and limitation considerations may therefore be relevant in revision/review before the District Court.

Holding and Implications

HOLDING: The Original Petition is dismissed in limine. (The Court concluded that the District Court, Kasaragod, had no jurisdiction to entertain the review of the Tellicherry order and, in any event, there was no error apparent on the face of the record warranting review.)

Implications:

  • The District Court, Kasaragod, does not acquire jurisdiction to review an earlier order of the District Court, Tellicherry, solely by virtue of being given territorial jurisdiction over the village after the original order was passed; S.150 CPC does not automatically transfer pending and past business in the absence of an express transfer.
  • The expiry of a reconstruction licence during the pendency of rent control proceedings does not, by itself, vitiate an eviction order if the court had been satisfied (or could be satisfied during proceedings) that the landlord had the requisite plan and licence; such expiry is not an "error apparent on the face of the record."
  • The Court highlighted available procedural safeguards (for example, conditioning actual delivery on production of a renewed licence or invoking provisos to S.11(4)) to protect tenant rights where there is concern about a landlord's intentions after licence expiry.
  • The decision applies established precedents concerning transfer of jurisdiction and the treatment of licence production in rent control cases; the Court applied existing authorities rather than purporting to lay down a new precedent. The direct effect is to dismiss the petition and to leave open the tenant's remedy to move the original forum (District Court, Tellicherry) for remedies or safeguards, subject to that court's view on condonation of delay and other procedural considerations.

Final Order: Original Petition dismissed in limine.

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JUDGMENT

1. A tenant filed an application for review of the order passed by District Court in revision under S. 20 of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1963 (for short ‘the Act’). That application was dismissed by the District Court. Hence the petitioner has come to this Court invoking jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution.

2. Facts are these: A landlord filed an application before the Rent Control Court for an order of eviction of his tenant on different grounds, but the only ground now survives is bona fide need to reconstruct the building as per S. 11(4)(ii) of the Act. Though the Rent Control Court and the Appellate Authority did not favour the landlord, he got an order from the District Court, Tellicberry in exercise of the power of revision.

3. The order of the District Court is dated 4-2-1986. The tenant challenged the order in this Court under S. 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure (for short ‘the Code’). But this Court dismissed his application in the light of the decision of the Supreme Court which held that a second revision is not maintainable. (Aundal Ammal v. Sadasivan Pillai., 1987 (1) KLT. 53). He then filed an Original Petition under Article 227 of the Constitution challenging the order of the District Court. The Original Petition was dismissed in limine. Subsequently, the tenant learnt that the licence obtained by the landlord for constructing a new building ceased to be effective (since the period of its validity expired as early as 14-12-1982). He filed an application under Order 47 Rule 1 of the Code before the new District Court of Kasaragod. The tenant urged that the order of eviction was vitiated by an apparent error in that the Court was not told that the landlord did not have a valid licence to construct a new building. He chose to file the said application before the District Court, Kasaragod, since the village in which the building is situate now falls within the limits of the territorial jurisdiction of the District Court, Kasaragod. The District Court dismissed the application by Ext. P2 order dated 5-8-1987. It is the legality of the said order which is challenged now. The application for review was dismissed mainly on three grounds, (a) District Court, Kasaragod does not have jurisdiction to entertain the application for review of the order passed by the District Court, Tellicherry. (b) The application for review is barred by limitation, as the same was filed only seventeen months after the passing of the order of eviotion. (c) There is lack of bona fides in filing the application since the tenant did not mention about the expiry of the licence period either when he filed second revision under S. 115 of the Code or when he filed the earlier Original Petition in this Court.

4. On 4-2-1986 when the District Court, Tellicherry passed an order of eviction in exercise of revisional jurisdiction, the new District Court of Kasaragod was not in existence. It was only on 26-3-1986 (as per G.O (Ms) 31/86.Home dated 13-2-1986) that the District Court, Kasaragod, came into being. Its territorial jurisdiction was defined by G.O (Ms) 527/86 dated 26-3-1986. All the villages now falling within the limits of the territorial jurisdiction of the new District Court were earlier within the jurisdiction of the District Court, Tellicherry.

5. Under Order 47 Rule 1 of the Code an application for review shall be filed before “the court which passed the decree or made the order,” District Court, Kasaragod, is admittedly not the court which passed the order. Bat learned counsel contended that new District Court gets jurisdiction to entertain the application for review by virtue of S. 150 of the Code. That Section reads thus:

“Save as otherwise provided, where the business of any Court is transferred to any other Court, the Court to which the business is so transferred shall have the same powers and shall perform the same duties as those respectively conferred and imposed by or under this Code upon the Court from which the business was so transferred.”

6. The contention is that with the formation of the new District Court all the business relating to cases in respect of those villages now included in the new District must be deemed to have been transferred to the new District. When jurisdiction is conferred on a court as per provisions of the Kerala Civil Courts Act, 1957, such jurisdiction is based on territorial as wall as pecuniary limits. As per S. 3(2) of the said Act Government has the power to establish a District Court for each District. As the Government formed a new revenue District of Kasaragod, a notification under S. 3(2) of the said Act became a necessary follow up step. Thus, what is to be decided is whether by the inclusion of those villages within the jurisdictional limits of the new District business in respect of such villages has been transferred from the District Court, Tellicherry to the new District. There is nothing in the two Government Orders referred to above to indicate that business was also transferred to the new District Court. There was no transfer of the proceedings pending before the District Court, Tellicherry to the new District Court as provided in S. 24 of the Code. The mere fact that a new District Court was formed, comprising of some of the villages which for med part of the District Court, Tellicherry, cannot lead to the inference that business relating to those villages got automatically transferred to the nsw District Court.

7. A similar doubt may arise when the question of execution of the decrees passed by the District Court, Tellicherry comes up. Under S. 38 of the Code a decree can be executed either by the Court which passed it, or by the Court to which it is sent for execution. When such a question arose, a Full Bench of the Madras High Court held that execution application cannot be filed in the new court merely because the village wherein the subject matter falls has been transferred to the new District Court subsequent to the date of passing of the decree. (Vide Seen Nadan v. Muthuswamy Plllai, AIR 1920 Madras 427). As a Division Bench of the Madras High Court took a different view, later the question was again considered by another Full Bench in Ramier v. Muthu Krishna (AIR 1932 Madras 418). It was held that Seenl Nadan's case was correctly decided and hencs no rethinking was necessary. The principle laid down in those two decisions were followed by the Division Bsnches of the Mysore High Court and Andhra Pradesh High Court. (Vide Gopalakrishna v. Laxman, AIR 1964 Mysore 34 and Hanumayya v. Venkata Subbayya, AIR 1964 Andhra Pradesh 68). A Full Bench of she the Travancore-Coshin High Court had also considered the same question (vide Maryarul Nadar v. Nanu Plllai, AIR 1957 T.C 69). It was held by the Full Bench that “by the mere transfer of territorial jurisdiction from one Court to another all powers of the first Court will not automatically be transferred to the transferee Court and when there has been only a mere transfer of territorial jurisdiction from one Court to another and nothing is said, whether expressly or impliedly, about the transfer of pending or past business, S. 15O of the Code of Civil Procedure cannot be invoked for the purpose of enabling the transferee Court to get jurisdiction in respect of the pending and past business.” In that case, a new Subordinate Judge's Court for the area in which the immovable properties involved was established. Prior to the establishment of the new court, a District Court, had passed a decree on a hypothecation bond. Execution proceedings were taken out in the new Subordinate Judge's court. It was held that the new court cannot get jurisdiction even by virtue of S. ISO of the Code. Though all the above mentioned decisions were in respect of S. 38 of the Code, the principle involved therein is nevertheless applicable here. The Distsict Court, Kasaragod has therefore rightly held that it has no jurisdiction to entertain the application for review.

8. Even otherwise, petitioner is not entitled to get the order reviewed, as there is no error apparent on the face of the record. If the period of licence granted by the local authority for reconstruction of the building lapsed during pendency of proceedings under S. 11 of the Act, and if the court passed an order of eviction in respect of such building, it cannot be said that the order is erroneous. Requirement of law is that the landlord should satisfy the court that he has the plan and licence, if any required. This Court had held that the plan and licence need not be produced along with the petition at the first instance itself. (Vide Ammini v. Leelamma, 1977 KLT 441). Even if the landlord obtains the licence only during the pendency of proceedings, court can have the satisfaction that the landlord has the licence. That being the position, court need not refuse to have the satisfaction merely because the period mentioned in the licence expired during pendency of rent control proceedings. It happens usually that the period of such licence gets expired during pendency of rent control proceedings because of the long duration of such pendency in three tiers of courts. The landlord cannot, normally, be blamed for such delay. In most of the cases the landlords are anxious to have petitions filed by them disposed of as early as possible. But the delay in disposing of cases under the rent control proceedings is mostly due to the tightness of the schedule and the work load of the court. Hence a landlord shall not suffer the consequences of the period of licence getting lapsed during pendency of eviction proceedings. When the Rent Control Court, or the Appellate Authority, or the Revisional Authority, as the case may be, is satisfied that the landlord has a plan and licence to reconstruct the building, his petition is not to be dismissed on a finding that the period of licence expired during the pendency of proceedings under the Act. It is true that there is a possibility of a contumacious or recalcitrant landlord adoptiag dilatory tactics and also trying to take advantage of the expiry of the period of licence by refusing to reconstruct the building. Bat it must be remembered that court has ample powers, in such cases, to provide necessary safeguards in the order for protecting the tenant's right of first option to have the reconstructed building allotted to him. One such safeguard is the power to impose a condition in the order that actual delivery be given to the landlord only if the landlord produces a renewed licence or a new licence granted by the local authority for the purpose of reconstruction of the building. The first and second provisos in Clause (iv) of S. 11(4) of the Act can also be invoked to meet such eventualities es and when necessary. The power conferred by the third proviso is not restricted by any period. The Rent Control Court can issue any direction regarding the reconstruction of the building.

9. It is open to the tenant to move the District Court, Tellicherry, for incorporating of such safeguards in the impugned order in exercise of the power under Order 47 Ruls 1. If any such motion is made, it is for the said District Court to decide whether there are sufficient reasons to condone she delay in making application for review. Though provisions of the Limitation Act are not applicable to the Rent Control Court and the Appellate Authority, the position is different in the case of District Court. All the powers of the Civil Court under the Code could bs exercised by the District Court while hearing revision petitions. S. 23 of the Act does not limit the power of the District Court. (Vide Haneefa v. Subhalekshml Ammal, 1980 K.L.T 627). In this connection it is apposite to b;ar in mind the observations of the Full Bench in Vareed v. Mary (1968 KLT. 583). “In exercising the revisional power under this Section the revisional authority functions as a court and not as a persona designate in as much as the jurisdiction has been conferred under the Act on the court itself…………Since the statute in the case before us has conferred the revisional jurisdiction on one of the ordinary courts of the country viz., the District Court, the procedure as well as the orders and decrees of that court will be governed by the ordinary rules of civil procedure”. (Though the said decision was overruled by the Supreme Court in Aunda’1 Ammal's case (cited supra) on another aspect, the observations extracted above hold good and were not disapproved by the Supreme Court).

10. Subject to the aforesaid observations, I dismiss this Original Petition in limine.

M.MDismissed.