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S. Parimalom v. State Of Kerala
Summary of Opinion by Bhaskaran, C.J.
Factual and Procedural Background
The petitioner was sponsored by the employment exchange and appointed by the 2nd respondent (the Executive Engineer) by an appointment order (Ext. P1) dated 12-11-1984 on a purely temporary basis under rule 9(a)(i) of the Kerala State and Subordinate Services Rules, 1958 for a period of 180 days or until a regular appointment through the Public Service Commission was made, whichever was earlier. The central question before the Court was whether the petitioner was entitled to continue in the post beyond the 180-day period specified in Ext. P1.
A stay petition (C.M.P No. 13473 of 1985) was referred to a Division Bench because of an apparent divergence of approach among single Judges of this Court (John Mathew, J., & Radhakrishna Menon, J., on the one hand and Sukumaran, J., on the other).
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the petitioner, appointed temporarily under rule 9(a)(i) of the Kerala State and Subordinate Services Rules, 1958 for a period not exceeding 180 days, is entitled to continue in service beyond the expiry of that 180-day period.
- Whether the Government of Kerala's Circular dated 3-5-1984 — limiting the benefit of continuance beyond 180 days to provisional employees who were in continuous employment on 24-11-1983 — is sustainable in light of the Supreme Court's decision in Narayani's case (1984 K.L.T. 17).
Arguments of the Parties
Petitioner's Arguments
- The petitioner's sole ground in the writ petition was that, relying on the Supreme Court's decision in Narayani's case (1984 K.L.T. 17), she was entitled to continue in service until a regular hand advised by the Public Service Commission reported for duty in the post she occupied.
Government / Respondent's Position
- The Government relied on rule 9(a)(i) of the Kerala State and Subordinate Services Rules, 1958, including the second proviso which prohibits continuation in such post for a period exceeding 180 days for specified categories of temporary appointments.
- The Government pointed to the Kerala Public Services (Amendment) Act, 1983 (Act 4 of 1984) inserting Section 4 in the Kerala Public Services Act, 1968 (with retrospective effect from 1-10-1981) to the effect that conditions of service (including termination) for persons in public service are to be governed by the Kerala Public Services Act and its rules, notwithstanding provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.
- The Government issued a Circular dated 3-5-1984 clarifying that the benefit of continuance beyond 180 days was intended only for temporary (provisional) employees who had been in continuous employment on 24-11-1983 (the date of the Supreme Court judgment), and that temporary appointments made after 25-11-1983 would be governed by rule 9(a)(i).
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Remlath's case (1984 K.L.T. 312) | That a person appointed under clause (i) (rule 9(a)(i)) can be terminated after the lapse of the period for which appointed, even if a replacement has not yet reported for duty. | The Court relied on this ruling to support the proposition that the petitioner could not remain in service beyond the appointed period of 180 days; termination after the period is permissible. |
| Narayani's case (Supreme Court) (1984 K.L.T. 17) | The Supreme Court directed that the petitioners be allowed to appear for the next Public Service Commission examination, permitted relaxation of age restriction limited to the next examination, and observed that similarly situated petitioners may be allowed to continue in service provided there are vacancies and provided they have been in continuous employment. | The Court examined the specific paragraphs of this decision and held that those directions must be read in context and do not nullify the second proviso to rule 9(a)(i). The Court concluded the Government's circular correctly reflected the Supreme Court's opinion as limited by the judgment's own restrictions. |
| Umayammal's case (1982 K.L.T. 829 (F.B.)) | The Full Bench considered petitions challenging termination of service on the basis that terminated persons were workmen under S.2(s) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, and that such terminations amounted to retrenchment under S.2(oo), implicating Chapter V-A of the Industrial Disputes Act. | The opinion notes that this Full Bench decided the question (as referenced in the chronology), and that the same question later came before the Supreme Court; the Court references this background but does not rely on it to alter its conclusion in the present matter. |
| Decision in O.P Nos. 5041/84 and connected cases (Division Bench of this Court) | Related to provisional employment in a newly formed statutory Corporation (The Kerala Water and Waste Water Authority); observations were made permitting certain provisional employees to continue until regular hands are appointed and report for duty, on a specific concession by the Advocate-General and factual matrix. | The Court held that this decision could not be cited in support of the petitioner's stand because the decision did not consider the applicability of rule 9(a)(i) and was founded on a different factual and regulatory setting (a statutory Corporation which had not made rules or regulations for selection and appointment), and relied in part on a concession by the Advocate-General. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court's analysis proceeded by closely examining the text of rule 9(a)(i) of the Kerala State and Subordinate Services Rules, 1958 and its second proviso which explicitly provides that a person appointed under that clause shall not be allowed to continue in such post for a period exceeding one hundred and eighty days for certain categories of appointments.
Key steps in the Court's reasoning:
- The Court observed that it was beyond doubt that the petitioner was not entitled to continue in service beyond the 180-day period either under the terms of Ext. P1 or under rule 9(a)(i) — a point the petitioner did not contest.
- The Court relied on Remlath's case to confirm that a temporary appointment made under rule 9(a)(i) can be terminated after the appointed period even if a regular candidate has not yet reported for duty; the temporary hand employed as a stop-gap does not acquire a right to continue beyond the appointment period by virtue of the replacement not reporting.
- The petitioner relied on the Supreme Court's Narayani decision. The Court therefore extracted and examined the relevant paragraphs of that decision (permission to appear for the next PSC examination; relaxation of age restricted to the next examination; continuation in service limited to those in continuous employment and subject to vacancies).
- The Court read the broader observation in Narayani (that similarly situated persons "may be allowed to continue in service, provided that there are vacancies") in the context of the earlier, restrictive paragraphs of that judgment. The Court concluded that Narayani did not intend to nullify the statutory limit contained in the second proviso to rule 9(a)(i).
- The Court further considered the Government's legislative and administrative responses: the retrospective amendment (Kerala Public Services (Amendment) Act, 1983) inserting Section 4 in the Kerala Public Services Act to make conditions of service for State public servants governed by that Act (and its rules), and the Government Circular of 3-5-1984 clarifying that the benefit of continuation beyond 180 days applied only to those in continuous employment on 24-11-1983. The Court concluded that the Circular accurately reflected the proper reading of the Supreme Court's Narayani decision.
- The Court rejected reliance on the Division Bench decision in O.P Nos. 5041/84 and connected matters as distinguishable on facts and regulatory context (a statutory Corporation without rules and with a concession by the Advocate-General), and therefore not a proper precedent for the instant case.
Based on the foregoing analysis, the Court concluded that the petitioner had no legal right to continue beyond the period specified in Ext. P1 or the 180-day statutory limit, and that the Government's circular was consistent with the Supreme Court's decision in Narayani when that decision is read in context.
Holding and Implications
Holding: The writ petition is DISMISSED.
Implications and direct effects:
- The petitioner is not entitled to continue in service beyond the period of 180 days specified in her appointment order (Ext. P1) or as limited by rule 9(a)(i) of the Kerala State and Subordinate Services Rules, 1958.
- The Government's Circular dated 3-5-1984 — which limits the benefit of continuance beyond 180 days to provisional employees who had been in continuous employment on 24-11-1983 — is treated by the Court as correctly reflecting the scope of the Supreme Court's Narayani decision when that decision is read in context.
- The writ petition was dismissed and the Court ordered no costs.
Note: This summary is based exclusively on the information contained in the provided opinion and does not add or infer facts or holdings beyond what the opinion states.
Bhaskaran, C.J:— The sole question that falls for decision in this O.P is whether the petitioner, sponsored by the employment exchange and appointed by the 2nd respondent, the Executive Engineer, by his proceedings Ext. P1 dated 12-11-1984 purely on a temporary basis under rule 9(a)(i) of the Kerala State and Subordinate Services Rules, 1958(the Rules) for a period of 180 days or till regular appointment through Public Service Commission is made, whichever is earlier, is entitled to continue in the post even after the expiry of 180 days beyond which in terms of Ext. P1 appointment order she could not remain in the post. When the stay petition, C.M.P No. 13473 of 1985, came up for consideration, our learned brother Kalliath, J., referred the matter to a Division Bench in view of the apparent divergence in approach made by John Mathew, J., & Radhakrishna Menon, J., on the one hand and Sukumaran, J., on the other.
2. rule 9(a)(i) of the rules reads as follows:
“9. Temporary appointments. (a)(i) Where it is necessary in the public interest, owing to an emergency which has arisen to fill immediately a vacancy in a post borne on the cadre of a service, class or category and there would be undue delay in making such appointment in accordance with these rules and the Special Rules, the appointing authority may appoint a person, otherwise than in accordance with the said rules, temporarily;”
3. The second proviso to rule 9(a)(i) reads as follows:
“Provided further that a person appointed under this clause by direct recruitment to a post other than teaching post and a post covered by the proviso to clause (iii) of rule 10(b) shall not be allowed to continue in such post for a period exceeding one hundred and eighty days”.
(emphasis supplied)
4. That the petitioner is not entitled to continue in service beyond the period of 180 days either in terms of Ext. PI appointment order or in accordance with the provisions contained in rule 9(a)(i), admits of no doubt. We had also ruled in Remlath's case (1984 KLT. 312):
“It is true that a person appointed under clause (i) shall be replaced as soon as possible by a member of the service or an approved candidate qualified to hold the post; that does not, however, mean that unless such candidate reports for duty, the service of the temporary hand emaloyed to meet the emergency and as a stop-gap arrangement, could not be terminated even after the lapse of the period for which he or she was appointed in terms of the appointment order issued to him or her under rule 9(a)(i) of the rules.”
5. In fact, the petitioner has no case that in terms of the appointment order or by virtue of rule 9(a)(i) of the rules she is entitled to continue in the post after the expiry of the period of 180 days. The sole ground raised in the writ petition is in terms of the decision of the Supreme Court in Narayani's case (1984 K.L.T 17) she was entitled to continue in service till a regular hand advised by the Public Service Commission reported for duty in the post occupied by her. A large number of writ petitions challenging the termination of service of the petitioners were filed in this Court contending that they were workmen within the definition of that term in S. 2(s) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and the termination of their services amounted to retrenchment under S. 2(oo) of that Act, and therefore, such termination was invalid for non-compliance with the provisions contained in Chapter V-A of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. The question was decided by a Full Bench of this Court in Umayammal's case (1982 K.L.T 829 (F.B)). The same question came up before the Supreme Court and the decision relied on (1984 K.L.T 17) is the one rendered by the Supreme Court while disposing of the appeals.
6. Before proceeding further, we may notice two things: the State of Kerala has amended the Kerala Public Services Act, 1968 by the Kerala Public Services (Amendment) Act, 1983 (Act 4 of 1984) with retrospective effect from 1st October, 1981 as provided for in S. 1(2) of the Amending Act. By S. 2 of the Amending Act, a new section has been inserted in the Kerala Public Services Act as S. 4, which laid down that notwithstanding anything contained in Chapter V-A or in any other provision of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (Central Act 14 of 1947) or in any other law for the time being in force, or in any judgment, decree or order of any Court, the appointment of any person to any public service or post in connection with the affairs of the State of Kerala and the conditions of service (including termination of service) of any person appointed to any such service or post shall be governed by the provisions of this Act and the rules made or deemed to have been made thereunder’. Thus, the conditions of service including termination of a person appointed to public service would be governed by the provisions of the Kerala Public Services Act, not the Industrial Disputes Act. The Government have also issued a Circular dated 3rd May, 1984, stating therein in paragraph 2 as follows:
“It has come to the notice of Government that the benefit of continuing in service beyond 180 days is allowed not only to provisional employees who have been in continuous employment on the date of the judgment of the Supreme Court viz., 24-11-1983, but also to those appointed through Employment Exchanges after 24-11-1983 as well. This is not the intention of Government in issuing circulars dated 5-12-1983 and 9-1-1984. The benefit of continuance beyond 180 days till regular hands advised by the Kerala Public Service Commission join duty is allowed only to those temporary (provisional) employees who have been in continuous employment on 24-11-1983, the date of Supreme Court judgment. The temporary (provisional) appointments made after 25-11-1983 will be governed by the provisions contained in Rule 9(a)(i) of the Kerala State and Subordinate Services Rules, 1958.”
7. In short, our task in this writ petition is to see whether this circular issued by the Government could be sustained in the light of the decision rendered by the Supreme Court in Narayani's case (1984 KLT. 17).
8. We would now extract certain relevant portions from the decision of the Supreme Court (1984 KLT. 17) to ascertain whether the Supreme Court had in mind anything contrary to the view expressed by the Government in the circular to which reference has already been made.
Para—2
“………We are of the opinion that the best solution, in the circumstances of the case, is to ask and allow the petitioners to appear for the next Public Service Commission examination.”
Para—3
“………The petitioners will be entitled to appear for that examination along with the other candidates who may be due to appear for the examination.”
Para—4
“………We direct that the petitioners and-others similarly situated will be allowed to appear for the next examination by a similar relaxation of the age restriction, provided that they have been in continuous employment. Such relaxation will be limited to and available for the next examination only.”
9. The observations of the Supreme Court in paragraph 6 that
“………the petitioners and all others who are similarly situated may be allowed to continue in service, provided that there are vacancies in which they can be allowed to continue to work.”
10. Has to be read and understood in the context of what the Judges had expressed in the earlier paragraphs of the judgment. The petitioner herself has not canvassed the validity of rule 9(a)(i) of the rules; and it could never have been the intention of the Supreme Court, in effect, to nullify the second provisio to the said rule which prohibited the continuation of the person appointed under that clause in the post for a period exceeding 180 days. The directions in paragraph 6 of the judgment has to be appreciated and understood in the context and the circumstances in which it happened to be given, bearing particularly in mind, the restrictions carefully imposed by the learned Judges themselves in regard to the scope and ambit of the directions in the previous paragraphs. It would be totally untrue to the spirit of the directions contained in the judgment if we are to construe that the Supreme Court permitted a perpetual violation of rule 9(a)(i), with particular reference to the second proviso thereto, which prohibited the continuation of the persons so appointed in service for a period exceeding 180 days. In our view, the circular dated 3-5-1984 issued by the Government reflects correctly the opinion of the Supreme Court in the decision in 1984 K.L.T 17.
11. The counsel for the petitioner sought to reply on certain observations made by a Division Bench of this Court in the judgment in O.P Nos. 5041/84 and connected cases. That decision, according to us, could not be cited in support of the stand taken by the petitioner in this case. That is a case of temporary employment in a newly formed statutory Corporation known as. The Kerala Water and Waste Water Authority. The question as to whether the provisional hands, who were appointed after 24-11-1983, the date of the judgment of the Supreme Court in 1984 K.L.T 17 were entitled to continue in service notwithstanding rule 9(a)(i) of the rules, does not appear to have either been raised or gone into by the Division Bench. It has also to be noticed that the question as to whether the conditions of service applicable to the employees of statutory Corporations would be applicable to the employees in Government service was also not before the Division Bench. The Advocate-General, during the course of the hearing of this case, submitted that in that case the Judges found that the petitioners had no legal right to continue in service beyond the period stipulated in the appointment orders; all the same, on a concession made by him (Advocate-General) in view of the fact that not only no selection of personnel for regular appointment had been made, but even the rules for making such appointments also not having been made, the Court made the observations that “all those persons who are now working on provisional basis will be allowed to contiune until such time as regular hands are appointed and they report for duty.” Surely, what is said of a particular category of provisional employees of a statutory Corporation, which had not made rules or regulations for selection and appointment to that category, and that too on a concession stated to have been made by the Advocate-General, could not be the yardstick for deciding the correctness or otherwise of the Government's view as reflected in the Circular dated 3rd May 1984. The writ petition is misconecived. The petitioner has no legal right to continue in service beyond the period for which appointment was made in Ext. P1 either in terms of rule 9(a)(i) of the rules or by virtue of the observations or directions contained in the decision of the Supreme Court in Narayan's case (1984 K.L.T 17). The result, therefore, is that the writ petition is dismissed. No costs.
12. Dismissed.
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