1. Petitioner is a kudikidappukari in respect of a building in Sy. Nos. 8/1 and 8/2 of Elamkulam Village in the possession of the 3rd respondent. On a petition filed by the 3rd respondent for shifting the kudikidappu to a land to be acquired, under S. 75(3) of Kerala Land Reforms Act, 1963, the Revenue Divisional Officer, Fort Cochin, 2nd respondent herein, passed an order for shifting and directed alternate land to be acquired for accommodating the kudikidappukari. The petitioner came to this court by way of O.P No. 5225 of 1975 which was dismissed by this court. It appears, Land Acquisition Proceedings were being pursued slowly. The 3rd respondent, therefore, had to come to this court by way of O.P No. 4404 of 1980 which ended with a direction by this court to the Sub Collector, Fort Cochin to complete the Land Acquisition Proceedings within eight months. The time was subsequently extended by orders passed in C.M.Ps The Land Acquisition Proceedings were ultimately completed and the 3rd respondent deposited before the Land Acquisition Officer 87% of the cost of acquisition as also the cost of shifting in March, 1982. Meanwhile, on the allegation that the petitioner was reconstructing the kudikidappu building, the 3rd respondent filed a suit, O.S No. 704 of 1981 for injunction and obtained a temporary injunction, the correctness of which is now challenged before the appellate court. In March, 1982 the Revenue Divisional Officer, Fort Cochin, passed the consequential order for evicting the petitioner and issued Ext. P1 notice to her. The notice was admittedly served by affixture. There is dispute regarding the exact date on which the petitioner came to know about the notice, whether it is 20th or 25th of March, 1982. Whatever that be, on 5-4-1982 the petitioner filed the present petition under Art. 226 of the Constitution of India to quash Ext. P1 notice issued by the R.D.O and to direct him not to take any steps to evict the petitioner from her kudikidappu. The O.P was preceded by a Caveat O.P filed by the 3rd respondent. Learned counsel for the petitioner pointed out that the Full Bench of this Court in the decision in George v. State of Kerala (1981 K.L.T 224) has held that it is the Government who is the statutory authority contemplated under S. 75(3) of the Kerala Land Reforms Act, 1963, the Government had no right to delegate its authority to the Revenue Divisinoal Officer, that there was no such delegation either and therefore the Revenue Divisional Officer had no jurisdiction at all to deal with the matter under S. 75(3) of the Act. This decision has set at rest the controversy regarding the Revenue Divisional Officer's jurisdiction to deal with matters under S. 75(3) of the Kerala Land Reforms Act. Viewed in this light it is clear that the order for shifting passed by the Revenue Divisional Officer and which was unsuccessfully challenged in O.P No. 5225 of 1975 was an order without jurisdiction and illegal. There can be no doubt that an order which suffers from inherent lack of jurisdiction is void in law. If that be so in the normal course, it must follow that the order of shifting passed by the Revenue Divisional Officer under S. 75(3) could not be pursued by him to any extent.

2. Learned counsel for the 3rd respondent contends that it was open to the petitioner to raise this contention in O.P No. 5225 of 1975, that it was in fact raised but negatived and therefore it is no longer open to him to raise it at this stage. Alternatively, it is contended for the 3rd respondent that even if this ground of attack was not levelled against the Revenue Divisional Officer's order in O.P No. 5225 of 1975, the petitioner is disabled from raising that ground in a fresh proceeding. In other words, the 3rd respondent relies on the principle of res judicata and the principle in Order II Rule 2 CPC. in support of his contentions. For this purpose reliance is placed on the observations of this Court in the decision in Raghavan Nair v. State Insurance Officer (1971 KLT 583 (F.B)) where Raman Nayar, C.J speaking for the majority of the Bench, observed as follows in paragraph 17:

“The principles underlying statutory provisions like the Limitation Act and S. 11 and Order II, Rule 2, of the Code of Civil Procedure, are, we should think, applicable to petitions under Article 226 of the Constitution. These provisions are not to be regarded as embodying technical rules of procedure. They are based upon principles of public policy aiming at justice, the securing of which is the very object of article 226.”

3. That was a case in which the inter se seniority of certain members of the State service was in issue.

4. It is no doubt true that ordinarily the principles referred to above would govern a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. But the question is whether these principles would have any application in this case. What is canvassed in this petition is not either a question of fact or a mere question of law but a question of inherent lack of jurisdiction in a particular statutory authority. I think an answer to this question must be found in the decision of the Supreme Court in Sunder Dass v. Ram Parkash ((1977) 2 SCC 662 : AIR. 1977 SC. 1201). In that case the question arose whether in the executing court one of the parties can raise a contention that the decree passed was without jurisdiction and therefore a nullity. Dealing with this question, the Supreme Court observed as follows:

“Where there is lack of inherent jurisdiction, it goes to the root of the competence of the court to try the case and a decree which is a nullity is void and can be declared to be void by any court in which it is presented. Its nullity can be set up whenever and wherever it is sought to be enforced or relied upon and even at the stage of execution or even in collateral proceedings. The executing court can therefore, entertain an objection that the decree is a nullity and can refuse to execute the decree. By doing so, the executing court would not incur the reproach that it is going behind the decree, because the decree being null and void, there would really be no decree at all”.

(Emphasis supplied)

5. The Revenue Divisional Officer had no statutory authority to take a decision on a question arising under S. 75(3) of the Kerala Land Reforms Act. This court held so in George's case, overruling the contrary view taken in Suthi Bai Kamath's case (1977 K.L.T 644). Naturally it follows that the Revenue Divisional Officer had even initially no jurisdiction at all to deal with this matter. In dealing with a matter arising under S. 75(3) of the Kerala Land Reforms Act, he had only such rule to play as any other officer of the Kerala Government functioning in any other department could play. In other words, he could play no rule at all. The order of shifting passed by the Revenue Divisional Officer which is now sought to be implemented by means of Ext. P1 notice is an order totally without jurisdiction even initially. I do not think the principles referred to in Raghavan Nair's case can be applied to a case where the earlier order was an order vitiated by inherent lack of jurisdiction. Such a case will be governed by the dictum in Sunder Dass's case. I am, therefore, unable to agree with the objection raised by the 3rd respondent that the petitioner is precluded from raising the plea of nullity of the order passed by the Revenue Divisional Officer either on principle of res judicata or on the principle underlying Order II, Rule 2 CPC.

6. It is not correct to say that want of jurisdiction on the part of the Revenue Divisional Officer had been raised before this court in O.P No. 5225 of 1975. It is no doubt true that in the order passed by Vadakkel, J. there is an observation to the following effect:

“In view of what is stated above and in so far as it is admitted that the third respondent has only land less than an acre in extent on which there is kudikidappu of the petitioner, I am not prepared to say that Ext. P1 order is in any manner vitiated by errors of law on the face of the record nor that it is in excess of the authorised officer's jurisdiction or that the authorised officer has failed to exercise any jurisdiction vested in him.”

7. Nothing stated in this passage would go to show that the inherent lack of jurisdiction on the part of the Revenue Divisional Officer had been raised before this court or had been adjudicated upon by this court. What this court observed in the above order was that the order of the Revenue Divisional Officer was not in excess of his jurisdiction. In other words, it was assumed that the Revenue Divisional Officer had jurisdiction to pass an order under S. 75(3) of the Kerala Land Reforms Act and the court felt that jurisdiction had not been exceeded by him During the course of the hearing in this O.P, the records in O.P No. 5225 of 1975 were brought over. On verification I find that the lack of jurisdiction on the part of the Revenue Divisional Officer was not raised as a ground of attack in that O.P It cannot, therefore, be said that this ground had been urged earlier before this court and negatived by this court. This ground was not urged before this court and therefore this court had no occasion to decide upon it. It is argued that since the plea was not raised in the earlier O.P it cannot be raised now. I do not think a plea of inherent lack of jurisdiction could be so shut out. That is because, the order, being without jurisdiction, is a nullity and as pointed out by the Supreme Court in Sunder Dass's case, the plea of nullity could be raised whenever and wherever the order is sought to be enforced. I am, therefore, not in agreement with the contention raised by the 3rd respondent that this plea cannot be raised or accepted in this O.P

8. Learned counsel for the 3rd respondent strenuously contended that even if the shifting order passed by the Revenue Divisional Officer suffers from a jurisdictional defect, the petitioner should not be granted relief under Article 226 of the Constitution on account of the delay in coming to this court and on account of his past conduct. The Full Bench decision in George's case referred to above was pronounced on 25th February, 1981. The fresh suit between the parties was filed some time in August, 1981. It appears, a temporary injunction order was passed in November, 1981. The argument is that it was open to the petitioner to move this court even in those months of 1981 and since he waited till 5-4-1982 to file this O.P such delay would disentitle him from getting relief. I am afraid I am unable to agree with this submission. It may be that the petitioner became aware of the Full Bench decision even in February, 1981. If that be so, she would have been justified in thinking that the Revenue Divisional Officer would not take further proceedings in the matter in the light of the view taken by the Full Bench. It is pointed out that at the instance of the 3rd respondent, in O.P No. 4404 of 1980, this court had directed the Land Acquisition Officer to expedite his proceedings. However, the petitioner was not a party to that O.P It is true, as pointed out by the learned counsel for the 3rd respondent, that O.P No. 4404 of 1980 had been mentioned in the civil suit. At best the petitioner could have moved this court to quash the Land Acquisition proceedings at that stage. She has not now moved this court for any relief regarding the Land Acquisition proceedings. The relief she claims is with reference to Ext. P1 notice which is a notice arising out of the proceedings under Section 75(3) of the Kerala Land Reforms Act. That notice itself was issued on 20-3-1982. Even assuming that the petitioner became aware of the notice or order on the very same day, it can be seen that she has filed the present O.P within fifteen days therefrom. Looking at the matter from this angle, it cannot be said that there are laches on the part of the petitioner. The circumstance that the petitioner might have come to know about the Land Acquisition proceedings earlier would not be a ground to disentitle him from seeking the relief with reference to Ext. P1 notice.

9. Learned counsel for the 3rd respondent contended that the petitioner tried to avoid Ext. P1 notice being served on her and also tried to avoid the notice in Caveat O.P No. 25 of 1932 being served on her. Whether she avoided service or she was not available for service are matters in dispute before me and I do not think I am really called upon to decide those disputes. They are matters which do not have any significant bearing on the question of the entitlement of the petitioner to relief in this O.P On a careful consideration of the circumstances submitted by the 3rd respondent, I am unable to find any justification for refusing a relief in this O.P to the petitioners relief which will only prevent the fructification of an illegal and void order without even initial jurisdiction.

10. In the result, the O.P is allowed but under the circumstances, without costs. Ext. P1 is quashed.

11. Learned counsel for the 3rd respondent, at this stage, submitted that in the view this court has taken on the matter, it must be taken that the original application filed by the 3rd respondent under S. 75(3) of the Kerala Land Reforms Act is still deemed to be pending. The submission appears to be correct. That being so, the 1st respondent will treat the application as pending, ignoring the earlier orders passed by the Revenue Divisional Officer and dispose of the same in accordance with law expeditiously. Issue carbon copy of this judgment to the parties on usual terms.

12. Allowed.