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Food Inspector v. Bhaskaran

Kerala High Court
Oct 13, 1980
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Structured Summary of the Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

This is an appeal against an order of acquittal passed by the Additional Judicial Magistrate of First Class, Trivandrum, in a prosecution under the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act ("the Act"). The Food Inspector, Trivandrum Circle, filed a complaint alleging that the accused sold 750 grams of toor dhal to him at about 12 noon on 1 January 1978 which, on analysis, was found to be adulterated. The accused was tried for offences punishable under section 16(1)(a)(i) read with section 7(1) of the Act.

The prosecution examined Pw.1 (Food Inspector), Pw.2 (Regional Food Inspector / Local Health Authority), Pw.3 (an attestor to the mahazar) and Pw.4 (Executive Officer, Kazhakoottom Panchayat). Documents marked included Ext. P4 (mahazar) and Ext. P6 (report of the Public Analyst). Under section 313 Cr.P.C., the accused admitted sale of the 750 grams of toor dhal and receipt of price, sampling, receipt of the analyst's report and intimation of that report, but denied culpability and claimed that the dhal had been purchased by him on 2 January 1978 from a merchant (Dw.1) at Chalai (Potti Velu) as per a bill (Ext. D1) and that the Food Inspector took the sample from that purchased quantity. The trial court acquitted the accused on the ground that there was no evidence to show that the article purchased by the Food Inspector was unfit for human consumption.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the trial court erred in acquitting the accused by requiring proof that the article was "unfit for human consumption" rather than applying the scope of section 2(ia)(f) of the Act as explained by the Supreme Court in Delhi Municipality v. Tek Chand.
  2. Whether procedural rules framed under the Act (specifically Rule 7(3) and Rule 19 of the Rules) were violated and, if so, whether such violations vitiate the Public Analyst's report and the prosecution case.
  3. Whether delay in analysis could have permitted insect multiplication in the sample so as to cast doubt on whether the sample was insect-infested at the time of purchase by the Food Inspector.
  4. Whether the accused was entitled to the defence under section 19(2)(a)(ii) of the Act by reason of a warranty/bill (Ext. D1/D2) showing purchase from Dw.1, thereby exempting him from liability.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant (Public Prosecutor)'s Arguments

  • The trial court misconstrued the scope of section 2(ia)(f) of the Act; after the Supreme Court's decision in Delhi Municipality v. Tek Chand the prosecution is not always bound to prove that an article was "unfit for human consumption" — it suffices to prove the article consisted wholly or in part of filthy, rotten, decomposed or insect-infested vegetable substance, etc.
  • Reliance was placed on the Supreme Court decision (Tek Chand) and this Court's decision in Food Inspector v. Divakaran to show that the trial court's requirement of proving "unfitness" was incorrect.

Respondent (Accused)'s Arguments

  • Rule 7(3) and Rule 19 of the Rules under the Act are mandatory; violations (failure to add preservative under Rule 19 and alleged delay under Rule 7(3)) vitiate the analyst's report and entitle the accused to acquittal. Reliance was placed on Municipal Corporation, Gwalior v. Premchandra (for mandatory nature of Rule 19) and on Radhey Lal Gupta v. State regarding delay and possible growth of insects.
  • The Public Analyst's report does not disclose the extent of infestation clearly and is therefore defective (relying on Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. Paran Das Jain).
  • The accused claimed a warranty/bill (Ext. D1/D2) evidencing purchase from Dw.1 and relied on section 19(2)(a)(ii) of the Act as a defence.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Delhi Municipality v. Tek Chand ((1980) 1 SCC 158; AIR 1980 S.C. 360) Interpreted section 2(ia)(f) — prosecution need not always prove the article was "unfit for human consumption"; proving that the article consisted (wholly or in part) of filthy, putrid, rotten, decomposed or insect-infested substances is sufficient. The court followed this authoritative Supreme Court pronouncement and held that the trial court's acquittal reasoning based on absence of proof of "unfitness" could not be sustained.
Food Inspector v. Divakaran (1980 KLT 369) Applied the same construction as Tek Chand at the High Court level. The court noted that this Court had followed the Supreme Court decision and relied on it to support the appeal.
Municipal Corporation Of Delhi v. Kacheroo Mal (1976 (2) S.C.R. 1) Earlier construction of clauses under section 2(ia)(f) (construed differently by earlier decisions). The court observed that Tek Chand distinguished this earlier decision; the differing earlier construction could not be maintained in light of Tek Chand.
Municipal Corporation, Gwalior v. Premchandra (ILR (1971) M.P. 591) Held Rule 19 mandatory; failure to add preservative vitiated analysis. The court respectfully disagreed with this reasoning, holding Rule 19 to be directory in light of its language and precedent (see Food Inspector v. Ksheeravyavasaya Co-op. Society).
Radhey Lal Gupta v. State (1979 F.A.J. 100) Used to argue that delay between sampling and analysis may allow insect growth and vitiate the analyst's report. The court distinguished Radhey Lal Gupta on facts and law (noting the subsequent amendment to Rule 7(3) setting a 45-day period) and found its reasoning inapplicable to the present case.
Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. Paran Das Jain (1978 F.A.J. 115) Argued that a Public Analyst's report which does not disclose extent of insect infestation is defective. The court found this contention addressed by Ext. P6 (which showed extent of insect-damaged grains as 13% by count and uric acid measurement) and did not accept that the report was defective here.
Food Inspector v. Ksheeravyavasaya Co-operative Society (1977 KLT 370) Held that Rule 19 is directory (i.e., not mandatory). The court followed this Division Bench decision and treated Rule 19 as directory, supporting its conclusion that absence of preservative in this case did not vitiate the analysis.
Dhan Raj v. Municipal Corporation of Delhi (Crl. Misc. (Main) No.33 of 1969, decided 3-4-1972) Earlier authority referenced in relation to whether infestation rendered food "unfit for human consumption." The court noted that decisions relying on such earlier authorities were rendered obsolete on the specific point by the Supreme Court's later pronouncement in Tek Chand.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court addressed each contention raised on appeal in sequence and applied statutory provisions, evidentiary presumptions and binding precedent as follows.

  1. On the trial court's requirement of proving "unfitness": The court held that the trial court erred in its narrow approach. The Supreme Court's decision in Delhi Municipality v. Tek Chand clarified that under section 2(ia)(f) prosecution need not always prove "unfitness for human consumption" — proof that the article consisted wholly or in part of filthy, putrid, rotten, decomposed or insect-infested substances suffices. The court followed Tek Chand and this Court's decision in Food Inspector v. Divakaran to conclude that the trial court's basis for acquittal could not stand.
  2. On Rule 7(3) (period for Public Analyst to send report) and admissibility of the analyst's report: The court observed that under section 13(5) of the Act a report signed by a Public Analyst, unless superseded under subsection (3), may be used as evidence of the facts stated therein. In the present case the Public Analyst's report (Ext. P6) was not superseded. Ext. P6 showed receipt of the sample on 6 January 1978 and the report was signed on 18 January 1978. Although the report did not state the exact date of analysis, it must have taken place between these dates. The court applied the presumption that official acts are done regularly; the prosecution was not obliged to adduce additional evidence about delivery to the Local Health Authority unless challenged. No such challenge was made below, Pw.2's evidence (Local Health Authority) went unchallenged and Exts. P7 and P8 were proved. Hence Rule 7(3) did not undermine the analyst's report in this case.
  3. On Rule 19 (adding preservative to samples): The court held that Rule 19 is directory and not mandatory, following an earlier Division Bench decision (Food Inspector v. Ksheeravyavasaya Co-op. Society). Rule 19 permits addition of preservative "as may be prescribed"; rule 20 prescribes preservatives for milk/cream etc., but no preservative has been prescribed for toor dhal or foodgrains. Therefore the Food Inspector was not obliged to add any preservative to the toor dhal sample and no vitiating violation of Rule 19 occurred. The court expressly disagreed with Municipal Corporation, Gwalior v. Premchandra on this point.
  4. On the delay and possibility of insect multiplication (relying on Radhey Lal Gupta and related authorities): The court found that the analysis in the present case was conducted between 6 and 18 January 1978 — at most an 18-day interval — whereas Rule 7(3) permits the Public Analyst 45 days to send the result to the Local Health Authority. The court noted that the 45-day sub-rule was introduced by amendment dated 4 January 1977; earlier decisions (such as Radhey Lal Gupta) involved facts where the amendment did not apply and where the Public Analyst had given evidence about rapid insect growth in certain conditions (e.g., samples in cloth/paper containers, rainy season). By contrast, here the Food Inspector's unchallenged evidence indicated the sample was divided into three equal parts and placed in three clean, dry bottles in accordance with law. Ext. P6 reported 13% insect-damaged grains by count and noted uric acid 20.0 gms per 100 gms. On these facts and with the statutory 45-day allowance, the court found the delay argument inapplicable and the earlier decisions distinguishable.
  5. On the warranty / section 19(2)(a)(ii) defence: The accused relied on Dw.1's evidence and Ext. D1/D2 as proof that the dhal had been purchased by him from Dw.1 and that the sample sold to the Food Inspector was from that purchased lot. The court found material inconsistencies: Pw.1 stated no warranty or bill was shown to him; Ext. D1 contained a correction to the date (the '2' struck out, indicating January rather than December); Ext. D1 and D2 had different serial numbers and related to different articles. There was no evidence proving the specific quantity sold to the Food Inspector was the same quantity purchased from Dw.1 in the same state. Therefore the statutory defence under section 19(2)(a)(ii) was not established.

Holding and Implications

APPEAL ALLOWED; ORDER OF ACQUITTAL SET ASIDE.

Consequences and immediate effects:

  • The order of acquittal is set aside and the appeal is allowed.
  • The case is remitted to the trial court for fresh disposal from the defence stage in accordance with law and in light of this judgment.
  • The accused is at liberty to raise any further contentions in support of his defence before the trial court as permitted by the remand.

Broader implications noted in the opinion:

  • The court treated the Supreme Court's decision in Delhi Municipality v. Tek Chand as authoritative on the construction of section 2(ia)(f), and indicated that earlier conflicting decisions on that point are no longer good law to the extent they conflict with Tek Chand.

No new legal principle was invented by this court beyond applying the Supreme Court's interpretation and distinguishing prior High Court decisions on the facts; the direct effect is the vacatur of the acquittal and remand for further proceedings.

Show all summary ...

1. This is an appeal against an order of acquittal passed by the Addl. Judicial Magistrate ofl Class, Trivandrum, in a case coming under the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, hereinafter called the Act. On a complaint filed by the Food Inspector, Trivandrum Circle, alleging that the accused sold 750 grams of toor dhal to him at about 12 noon on January 1, 1978 which, on analysis, was found to be adulterated, the accused was tried for offences punishable under section 16(I)(a)(i) read with S. 7(1) of the Act.

2. In support of the prosecution case, Pw. 1, the Food Inspector, Pw. 2, the Regional Food Inspector, Pw. 3, one of the attestors to the mahazar and Pw. 4, the Executive Officer, Kazhakoottom Panchayat, were examined and documents including Ext. P4 mahazar and Ext. P6 report of the Public Analyst, were marked.

3. When examined under S. 313 Cr. P.C on the prosecution evidence, the accused admitted sale of 750 grams of toor dhal to the Food Inspector on the alleged date, the receipt of the price, the sampling and the entire action of the Food Inspector and also receipt of the copy of the report of the Public Analyst along with intimation; but, in denying guilt, he stated that the article of food involved in the case was purchased by him on January 2, 1978 from the shop of one Potti Velu at Chalai as per a bill; that if was from that quantity the Food Inspector took the sample and that he also showed the bill to the Food Inspector.

4. The merchant from whom the accused claims to have purchased toor dhal was examined as Dw. 1 and Ext. D1 cash bill and Ext. D2 said to be the counter-foil of the same were marked.

5. The learned Magistrate acquitted the accused on the only ground that there is no evidence to show that the article of food purchased by the Food Inspector was unfit for human consumption.

6. Assailing this order of acquittal, the learned Public Prosecutor submitted that the trial court has not properly understood the scope of S. 2(ia)(f) of the Act; that the law on the point is now well settled by an authoritative pronouncement of the Supreme Court in a recent case, Delhi Municipality v. Tek Chand ((1980) 1 SCC 158 : AIR. 1980 S.C 360), that in a case coming under section 2(ia)(f) of the Act the prosecution is not always bound to prove that the article of food sold by the accused was unfit for human consumption but it is enough if they prove that the article consisted wholly or in part of any filthy, putrid, rotten, decomposed or deceased animal or vegetable substance or was insect infested.

7. Following the decision of the Supreme Court, this Court also has held so in Food Inspector v. Divakaran (1980 KLT. 369). In the recent case the Supreme Court distinguishing the earlier decision in Municipal Corporation Of Delhi v. Kacheroo Mal . (1976 (2) S.C.R 1) a different construction was put on the various clauses under S. 2(ia)(f) of the Act According to Their Lordships, the last clause “or is otherwise unfit for human consumption” is residuary provision which would apply to a case not covered by or squarely falling within the clauses preceding it and the words “or is otherwise unfit for human consumption” are disjunctive of the rest of the words preceding them. The acquittal of the accused on the ground mentioned cannot therefore be sustained.

8. But the learned advocate appearing for the accused-respondent submitted that there are valid grounds on which the acquittal can be upheld. The counsel contended that rule 7(3) and rule 19 of the Rules framed under the Act are mandatory in nature and they have been violated in this case and the accused is entitled to the benefit of the same. The counsel relying on a decision of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in Municipal Corporation, Gwalior v. Premchandra (ILR. (1971) M.P 591) contended that rule 19 is mandatory and that failure of the Food Inspector to add preservative to the sample has vitiated the result of the analysis Relying on Radhey Lal Gupta v. State (1979 F.A.J 100), it was argued that there was delay caused in the analysis; that the insects in the sample might have multiplied and grown before the sample was analysed and therefore it cannot be said with certainty that the sample in question when purchased by the Food Inspector was really insect infested. Another argument advanced relying on a decision reported in Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. Paran Das Jain (1978 F.A.J 115) is that the report of the Public Analyst does not disclose as to what was the extent of insect infestation and to that extent the report is defective and cannot be relied on Finally it was argued that the accused is entitled to the benefit of S. 19 of the Act as the sample purchased by the Food Inspector from the accused was covered by a warranty issued by Dw. 1.

9. I shall now deal with these points one by one as regards rule 7(3), the argument is that there is no evidence on the side of the prosecution to show that the Public Analyst delivered his report to the local (Health) Authority within 45 days from the date of receipt of the sample for analysis. Under sub-section (5) of S. 13 of the Act, a report signed by a by a Public Analyst, unless it has been superseded under sub-section (3), may be used as evidence of the facts stated therein in any proceeding under the Act. In this case the report of the Public Analyst has not been superseded by a certificate issued by the Director of Central Food Laboratory. The report of the Public Analyst is per se evidence. The report which is in the prescribed form and which contains the relevant and necessary data, shows that the sample was received on January 6, 1978 and the report was signed on January 18, 1978. There is nothing in the report showing the actual date of analysis but it must have taken place between 6th and 18th of January 1978. The analysis of the sample is an official duty performed by the Public Analyst and the presumption is that all official acts have been done properly and regularly. The prosecution is not bound to adduce evidence unless there is challenge from the accused that the report of the result of analysis was not delivered to the Local (Health) Authority within 43 days as prescribed under rule 7(3). The accused had no case before the trial court that rule 7(3) has been violated and thereby he has been in any way prejudice. The Local (Health) Authority was examined as Pw. 2 and no question is seen put to him in this respect. Exts. P7 and P8 were proved by Pw. 2 and his evidence in this regard stands unchallenged as there was no cross-examination.

10. The other argument that rule 19 is mandatory and the failure of the Food Inspector to add preservative to the sample has vitiated the result of the analysis has no merit. Rule 19 is not mandatory as is clear from the express words therein. It is only directory and it has also been so held by a Division Bench of this Court in Food Inspector v. Ksheeravyavasaya Co-opertive Society (1977 KLT. 370). What rule 19 states is that any person taking a sample of any food for the purpose of analysis under the Act may add a preservative as may be prescribed from time to time to the sample for the purpose of maintaining it in a condition suitable for analysis. Under rule 20 preservative in respect of milk, cream, etc. has been prescribed. By virtue of rule 19, the Food Inspector can only add a preservative, which may be prescribed from time to time, to the sample. Admittedly no preservative has been prescribed for toor dhal or foodgrains. Therefore, there has not been any violation of rule 19 in a the case and the Food Inspector was not bound to add any preservative to the sample purchased by him] With due respect I am unable to agree with the reasoning given in Municipal Corporation Gwalior v. Premchandra (I.L.R (1971) M.P 591).

11. Still another argument of the counsel for the accused was that on account of the delay in the analysis, the possibility of the insects having multiplied and grown during the time taken for analysis cannot be ruled out and with certainty it cannot be said that at the time when the Food Inspector purchased the sample it was really insect infested and that the report of the P. Public Analyst is bad as it does not show the extent of damage caused to the article of food. This argument, as stated earlier, is based on the decisions reported in Raney Lal Gupta's case (1979 F.A.J 100) and Municipal Corporation of Delhi's case (1978 F.A.J 115).

12. As borne out from the records in the present case, the analysis of the article of food purchased from the accused must have been done on any of the days between January 6 and 18. Even if it is assumed that the analysis was done only on the date on which the report was signed by the Public Analyst, there was only a delay of 18 days, where as under rule 7(3), the Public Analyst has been given a period of 45 days to send the report of the result of his analysis to the Local (Health) Authority from the date of receipt of the sample for analysis. In other words, the restriction or limitation in this regard is that the analyst should complete the analysis within 45 days from the date of receipt of the sample. This sub-rule was introduced by an amendment by Notification No. GSR. 4(E) dated 4-1-1977. Formerly there was no such period prescribed. In Radhey Lal Gupta's case (1979 F.A.J 100), the sample of article of food was purchased by the Food Inspector on September 15, 1976, long before sub-rule (3) of Rule 7 was amended prescribing a period of 45 days. In that case, the Public Analyst himself was examined as a witness and it was on the basis of the evidence of the Public Analyst that the learned Judge came to the conclusion that the probability of growth of insects during the period cannot be ruled out. There the Public Analyst has given evidence that generally insects grow within a period of 15 days to one month and the growth can be earlier, if the sample is taken in cloth or paper container, because such containers are liable to absorb much moisture. The Public Analyst further stated that if the samples are taken in right fit glass containers there still can be a natural growth of insects therein but the period of growth would be roughly between one to two months, depending upon the season. It was during rainy season that the sample in that case was taken and the period between taking of the sample and the second analysis was three weeks. It was in these circumstances that the learned Judge held that the probability of insects having grown within a period of three weeks during the month of September, which is admittedly a rainy season, cannot be ruled out. In view of the evidence in the case under consideration and the provisions in sub-rule (3) of Rule 7, with great respect, I am unable to agree with the reasoning in this case also. The standard for food-grains has been prescribed by the legislature and rule 7(3) has also been subsequently amended fixing a period for the Public Analyst to send the report of result of his analysis. The legislature must have taken all these aspects into consideration while prescribing the standard for the foodgrains and fixing a period of 45 days under rule 7(3) on the facts also, this decision has no application to the instant case. The evidence of Pw. I in the case on hand shows that the sample was divided into three equal parts and filled up to three clean and dry bottles in accordance with the provisions of law. There is no reason to disbelieve his evidence on the point. The argument that the report of the Public Analyst is vitiated, as it does not disclose the extent of damages or insect infection in the sample is equally devoid of any merit. Ext. P6 report has clearly shown the extent of insect damaged grains as 13 per cent (by count) and the analyst also noticed uric acid 20.0 gms. per 100 gms. All these apart, it may be noted that in Radhey Lal Gupta's case (1979 F.A.J 100) and Municipal Corporation of Delhi's case (1978 F.A.J 115), the charge against the accused was that he sold an article of food which was adulterated; within the meaning of S. 2(i)(f) of the Act and the learned Judge in the first case relying on Kacheroo Mal's case (1976 (2) S.C.R 1) and the learned Judges in the second case following the decision in Dhan Raj v. Municipal Corporation of Delhi (Crl. Risc. (Main) No. 33 of 1969, decided on 3-4-1972) held that in a case coming under S. 2(i)(f), the prosecution has also to prove that the article of food was unfit for human consumption. It was on the ground that it cannot be said that on account of insect infestation the same was unfit for human consumption that the appeal was dismissed in the Municipal Corporation of Delhi's case (1978 F.A.J 115). These decisions on this point are no longer good law in view of the recent pronouncement of the Supreme Court in Delhi Municipality v. Tek Chand (AIR. 1980) As regards the other points, I am in respectful disagreement.

13. is now coming to the last point, namely, that the accused is entitled to the benefit of S. 19(2)(a)(ii) of the Act, the counsel relied on the evidence of Dw. 1 and Ex. D1 and D2. It has come out in the evidence of Pw. I that no warranty or bill was shown to him by the accused. There is correction in Ex. D1 said to be the warranty issued to the accused by Dw. 1. The date 2-12-78 originally shown in Ex. D1 is seen corrected by striking of ‘2’ indicating that the purchase was in the month of January. Ex. D2 was marked through Dw. 1 who claimed the same to be the counterfoil of Ext. D1. But both are entirely different and distinct containing different serial numbers and relating to different articles of food purchased. It is true that Dw. 1 has given evidence that toor dhal was purchased by the accused from his shop as per Ex. D1 bill. But there is no evidence that it was from the quantity purchased from the shop of Dw. 1 that the accused sold the sample in question to the Food inspector, fit is not enough that the article purchased by the accused was covered by a warranty, but it roust also be proved that it was sold to the Food Inspector in the same state as he purchased it from the warrantor. This evidence is lacking in this case. Therefore on this ground the acquittal in this case cannot be upheld.

14. In the result this appeal is allowed, the order of acquittal is set aside and the case is sent back to the trial court for disposal afresh from the defence stage in accordance with law and in the light of this judgment. The accused will be at liberty to raise further contentions, if any, in support of his defence.

15. Allowed.