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State Of Kerala v. John
Structured Summary of the Opinion
Factual and Procedural Background
This appeal challenges an order of acquittal by the Judicial Magistrate of 1st Class, Changancherry, in a prosecution under the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act ("the Act").
On June 11, 1976 at about 6:30 a.m., the Food Inspector (Pw.1) purchased 675 ml of buffalo milk (from a quantity of about 5 litres) from the first accused, who was carrying the milk to the Co-operative Milk Supply Society at Nedumkunnam. The milk belonged to the second accused and was sent for sale through the first accused. The public analyst's report (Ex. P5) indicated that the sample did not conform to prescribed standards and contained added water.
The accused were charged under Ss. 2(1)(a) and 7(1) read with S. 16(1)(a)(1) of the Act for selling adulterated buffalo milk. At trial, the first accused admitted the milk belonged to the second accused and that the Food Inspector took the sample; the first accused denied having received any price. The second accused admitted sending the milk through the first accused and said he was unaware of the Food Inspector's purchase; he stated the Society sent milk to Kottayam for pasteurization and he was paid roughly once in two weeks. The Society's Secretary (Dw.1) testified for the defence.
The trial court found the purchase by Pw.1 and ownership by the second accused proved, and also found that the milk supplied to the Society was "for consideration in money," but relying on the decision in Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. Lakshmi Narayan concluded there was no "sale" within the Act and acquitted the accused.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the purchase of a sample of milk by a Food Inspector from the accused amounts to a "sale" within the special definition of "sale" in the Act.
- Whether the trial court correctly applied the decision in Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. Lakshmi Narayan to hold that there was no sale under the Act on these facts.
- Whether non-compliance with the mandatory provisions of section 13(2) of the Act (as amended) deprives the accused of a valuable right such that a conviction would be unsafe and justify upholding an acquittal.
Arguments of the Parties
Learned Public Prosecutor
- Strongly attacked the trial court's acquittal which was based on a finding of "no sale" under the Act.
- Contended that the facts proved and admitted (purchase by Pw.1, ownership by second accused, milk supplied "for consideration") established a sale within the meaning of the Act.
- Argued the trial court misapplied the precedent it relied upon and that that precedent had no application to the facts of this case; accordingly the acquittal should be set aside and the accused convicted.
- Relied on settled authority that a purchase by a Food Inspector for analysis is a "sale" under the special definition in clause (xiii) of S.2 of the Act.
Counsel for the Accused
- Did not attempt to uphold the reasoning on which the trial court entered the acquittal (i.e., the application of the Municipal Corporation decision).
- Contended instead that the acquittal could be sustained on a different and valid ground: flagrant violation of mandatory provisions in S.13(2) of the Act which allegedly deprived the accused of a valuable right (to have the sample sent for analysis to the Central Food Laboratory) and caused serious prejudice.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. Lakshmi Narayan ((1976) 1 SCC 546; AIR 1976 SC 621) | Trial court relied on this decision to conclude there was no "sale" under the Act in the facts of the case. | The appellate court held that this decision had no application to the facts before it and that the trial court erred in relying on it. |
| Food Inspector v. Chenkathil Gopalan ((1971) 2 SCC 322) | Establishes that a purchase by a Food Inspector for analysis is a "sale" under the special definition of "sale" (clause (xiii) of S.2) in the Act. | Applied to support the proposition that the Food Inspector's purchase of the sample constituted a sale under the Act. |
| M.R. Ruparel v. State of Maharashtra (AIR 1966 SC 128) | Identified as authority for the settled law that purchase by a Food Inspector is a sale under the Act. | Relied upon as part of the body of authority establishing that a Food Inspector's purchase is a sale within the meaning of the Act. |
| State of Uttar Pradesh v. Partar Singh (AIR 1964 SC 1135) | Another authority cited for the principle that purchase by a Food Inspector amounts to a sale under the Act. | Used to reinforce the settled legal principle relied upon by the appellate court. |
| Sarjuo Prasad v. State of U.P (AIR 1961 SC 631) | Cited among authorities confirming that purchase by a Food Inspector is a sale under the Act. | Referential support for the appellate court's conclusion on the meaning of "sale" in the Act. |
| State of Kerala v. Alasserry Mohammed (1978 Crl. L.J. 925 at pp. 931–32) | Expresses that if an article of food sold to a Food Inspector is proved adulterated it is immaterial whether the sample is representative; "A person who stores or sells such sample is liable to be punished under S. 16(1)(a)(u) of the Act." | Applied to support the proposition that liability can attach on the basis of the sample purchase/analysis and that representativity of the sample is immaterial for liability under the Act. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The appellate court proceeded in two principal strands of analysis:
-
Analysis on "sale" and the trial court's error:
- The court accepted as established and undisputed that Pw.1 purchased the sample from the first accused; that the milk belonged to the second accused; and that the milk supplied to the Society was for consideration in money.
- The trial court erred by adopting the accused's argument that the milk was merely being taken to the Society for storage and onward dispatch for pasteurization and sale by the Co-operative Milk Supplies Union, and therefore the first accused was not carrying the milk "for sale" to the Society.
- The appellate court examined the Society's role and the ledger (Ex. D1), noting that the Society collected milk as an agent of the Co-operative Milk Supplies Union, Kottayam, paid price to the supplier (second accused) periodically, and that the second accused had acknowledged price receipt in the ledger—facts that supported a finding of sale or supply for consideration.
- Relying on the statutory special definition in clause (xiii) of S.2 and established precedents (cited above), the court concluded that a purchase by a Food Inspector for analysis constitutes a "sale" under the Act and that the trial court's reliance on the Municipal Corporation decision was misplaced and inapplicable to these facts.
-
Analysis on procedural non-compliance under S.13(2) and related provisions:
- The accused's counsel relied on non-compliance with mandatory provisions in S.13(2) (as amended) to seek to sustain the acquittal. The court reviewed how S.13 and S.11 had been substantially amended and described the current procedure laid down by the Act after amendment.
- The court summarized the new procedure: the Public Analyst now delivers the report to the Local (Health) Authority (not the Food Inspector); the Local (Health) Authority must forward a copy of the report to the vendor and the person whose particulars are disclosed under S.14A, informing them of a ten-day period within which they may apply to the court to have the relevant part(s) of the sample sent to the Central Food Laboratory; the court must requisition the parts from the Local (Health) Authority within five days and must not continue proceedings until it receives the Director of Central Food Laboratory's report; the Director's certificate (subject to a proviso) is final and conclusive.
- The court characterized the right conferred on an accused under the old S.13(2) and under the present S.13 as "a very valuable one" and observed that the provisions are mandatory in nature. The opinion records that these provisions had not been complied with in the present case and that, by flagrantly violating them, the accused had been deprived of a valuable right resulting in serious prejudice.
- Because of this procedural violation the court concluded that it would be unsafe to convict the accused on the basis of the Public Analyst's report alone.
The court therefore reached two findings in tension: it found the trial court was wrong to rule there was no sale; but it also found procedural non-compliance with S.13(2) that made conviction unsafe.
Holding and Implications
HOLDING: The appeal is DISMISSED. The trial court's acquittal is not disturbed.
Reason for the disposition:
- The appellate court held that the trial court erred in concluding there was no "sale" under the Act—purchasing by a Food Inspector is a "sale" under the statutory definition and the facts showed the milk was supplied for consideration.
- However, because the mandatory procedure under S.13(2) (as amended) was not complied with and the accused were deprived of a valuable right to have the relevant part of the sample sent to the Central Food Laboratory (thereby suffering serious prejudice), it would be unsafe to record a conviction based solely on the Public Analyst's report; on this ground the acquittal stands.
Implications:
- Direct effect on the parties: the acquittal entered by the trial court remains in force; the appeal by the prosecution is dismissed.
- The opinion identifies and applies established case law on the meaning of "sale" under the Act but does not purport to create a new precedent; the court explicitly notes that the ground of acquittal (trial court's "no sale" finding) was wrong but nevertheless declines to interfere because of the procedural violation. The decision thus affirms that procedural safeguards in S.13 are mandatory and that breach of those safeguards can render conviction unsafe even where substantive proof of sale and adulteration exists.
This summary is drawn exclusively from the provided opinion and does not add facts or inferences beyond that text.
1. This appeal is directed against an order of acquittal passed by the Judicial Magistrate of 1st Class, Changancherry, in a case under the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act which will hereinafter be referred to as ‘the Act’ for brevity.
2. On June 11, 1976 at about 6.30 a.m Pw. 1, the Food Inspector, purchased 675 ml. of buffalo milk from a quantity of about 5 litres from the first accused who brought the same for supply to the Co-operative Milk Supply Society at Nedumkunaam, for the purpose of analysis. The milk belonged to the second accused who sent it through the first accused, his servant, for sale in the Society. As per Ex. P5, the report of the public analyst, the sample sent for analysis did not conform to the standard prescribed and also contained added water.
3. The accused were therefore prosecuted for offences punishable under Ss. 2(1)(a) and 7(1) read with S. 16(1)(a)(1) of the Act for having sold adulterated buffalo milk.
4. Although the first accused admitted that the milk belonged to the second accused and that the Food Inspector took some milk from the quantity of milk which he was carrying to the society, he denied Laving received any price.
5. The second accused admitted that the milk was sent by him through the first accused to the Society, but he stated that he was not aware of the purchase of the sample by the Food inspector and that the Society to the which he supplied the milk will send the same to Kottayam for pasteurization and that he used to receive the price once in two weeks.
6. One witness (Dw. 1) the Secretary of the Society, was examined on behalf of the accused.
7. The trial court on a consideration of the evidence, found that Pw. 1 purchased the sample of buffalo milk as alleged from the first accused, that the milk belonged to the second accused and that “the milk supplied by the accused in the Society was for consideration in money”, but relying on a decision reported in Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. Lakshmi Narayan ((1976) 1 SCC 546 : AIR. 1976 SC. 621) held that there was no sale as defined under the Act as the milk which the Society collected was not intended for sale as such, and acquitted the accused.
8. The learned Public Prosecutor very strongly attacked the order of acquittal based on the finding that there was no sale in accordance with the definition of the Act and contended that on the facts proved and admitted, there was a sale in accordance with the provisions of the Act, and that the trial court has not properly understood the decision relied on, which has no application to the facts of the case and therefore the order of acquittal should be set aside and the accused convicted for the offences with which they were charged.
9. The reasoning and ground on which the order of acquittal was based are clearly wrong and unsustainable as rightly pointed out by the learned public prosecutor. It has been sufficiently proved in the case that Pw. 1 purchased a sample of buffalo milk for the purpose of analysis in accordance with the provisions of the Act from the first accused who was carrying the same to the society at the Nedumkunnam and that the milk belonged to the second accused. These facts were not disputed before the trial court and are not disputed before this Court also. The trial court fell into a serious error by accepting the argument advanced on behalf of the accused that the milk from which Pw. 1 purchased the sample was being taken for the purpose of storing in the Society which only sent the same for sale to the Co-operative Milk Supplies Union, Kottayam and therefore it cannot be said that the first accused was carrying the milk for sale to the Society at Nedumkunnam. The second accused was a member of this Society to which he was supplying milk through the first accused, his servant. The Society after collecting the milk will send the same to the Co-operative Milk Supplies Union, Kottayam which will sell the same after pasteurisation. It has also come out in evidence that after the pasteurization, if it was found that water had been added to the milk there will be proportionate deduction in the price of the milk and the price of the milk was being paid to the second accused by the Society once in two weeks. The ledger Ex. D1 kept in the Society and relied on by the accused clearly proves this. The second accused has put his signatures in Ex. D1 acknowledging the receipt of the price of milk supplied. The Society was collecting the milk as an agent of the Co-operative Milk Supplies Union, Kottayam, to whom the second accused was supplying the milk This apart, the purchase of the sample of buffalo milk by Pw. 1 from the first accused, is clearly a sals within the definition of the word ‘sale’ under the Act. The decision relied on by the trial court has no application to the facts of the case. It is now settled law and is also clear from the special definition of ‘sale’ in clause (xiii) of S. 2 of the Act, the a purchase by Food Inspector for analysis is a sale under the Act. (See Food Inspector v. Chenkathil Gopalan : (1971) 2 SCC 322; M.R Ruparel v. State of Maharashtra : AIR. 1966 SC 128; State of Uttar Pradesh v. Partar Singh : AIR. 1964 SC. 1135; and Sarjuo Prasad v. State of U.P (AIR 1961 SC. 631). If an article of food sold to a Food Inspector is proved to be adulterated, it is immaterial whether the sample purchased by him is a representative sample or not of the entire stock. “A person who stores or sells such sample is liable to be punished under S. 16(1)(a)(u) of the Act.” (See State of Kerala v. Alasserry Mohammed : 1978 Crl. L.J 925 at p. 931 & 932).
10. In fairness to the learned advocate appearing for the accused, it has to be said that he did not make any attempt to support the reasoning on the basis of which the acquittal was entered. But be strongly contended that the order of acquittal can be sustained on a valid ground. The counsel pointed out that the mandatory provisions in S. 13(2) of the Act have been flagrantly violated in this case and thereby the accused have been deprived of a very valuable right conferred on them and on this short ground the order of acquittal has to be upheld. S. 13 of the Act, as it now stands after the amendment has undergone a very substantial change and a new law and procedure have been prescribed thereunder. S. 11 of the Act has also been amended bringing out substantial changes in the procedural law relating to taking of the sample. Before the amendment, after dividing the sample into three parts, it was obligatory on the part of the Food Inspector to deliver one of the parts to the person from whom he has taken the sample. Now none of the parts of the sample taken is to be delivered either to the vendor or to the person whose particulars have been disclosed under S. 14A of the Act. Under the new procedure, the Food Inspector shall send one of the three parts of the sample to the Public Analyst for analysis under intimation to the Local (Health) Authority and the remaining two parts to the Local (Health) Authority. A right had been conferred on an accused-vendor under sub-s. (2) of S. 13 (Old), to question the correctness of the report of the Public Analyst by making an application to the court for sending the part of the sample given to him or the part produced in court by the Food Inspector to the Central Food Laboratory for analysis. This right has been preserved and retained under the present S. 13 of the Act, although the procedure prescribed therein is different. The Public Analyst will now deliver the report of the result of analysis to the Local (Health) Authority and not to the Food Inspector. On receipt of the report from the Public Analyst to the effect that the article of food is adulterated, the Local (Health) Authority shall after the institution of prosecution against the person from whom the article of food was taken and the person, if any, whose name, address and other particulars have been disclosed under S. 14A, forward a copy of the report of the result of analysis to the vendor and the person whose name and particulars have been disclosed under S. 14A, informing them that they may, if it is so desired, make an application to the court within a period of ten days from the date of receipt of the copy of the report to get the sample of article of food kept by the Local (Health) Authority analysed by the Central Food Laboratory. When such an application is made to the court, the court shall require the Local (Health) Authority to forward the part or parts of the sample kept by the said Authority to the court within a period of five days from the date of receipt of such requisition. The court shall not, in such a case, continue with the proceedings pending before it until it receives the report of the result of the analysis from the Director of Central Food Laboratory. The certificate issued by the Director shall supersede the report given by the Public Analyst. Under proviso to sub-section 5 of S. 13, any document purporting to be a certificate signed by the Director of the Central Food Laboratory, except a certificate with respect to the analysis of the part of the sample of any article of food referred to in the proviso to sub-section (1A) of S. 16, shall be final and conclusive evidence of the facts stated there in. The right conferred on accused under S. 3(2) of the Act is a very valuable one and the provisions contained therein are mandatory in nature. Admittedly these provisions in S. 13(2) have not been complied with. By flagrantly violating these mandatory provisions, the accused have been deprived of a valuable right conferred on them resulting in serious prejudice to them. In the circumstances, it would be unsafe to enter a conviction on the basis of the report of the Public Analyst. Although the ground on which the acquittal was founded is wrong, in the light of the facts and circumstances mentioned above, it is not safe to interfere with the order of acquittal. This appeal therefore fails and is hereby dismissed.
11. Dismissed.
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