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Madan Gopal v. Dr. V. Rugmini & Another

Kerala High Court
Mar 17, 1988
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Structured Summary of the Opinion (Balakrishnan, J.)

Factual and Procedural Background

The C.M. appellant (petitioner) filed an indigent original petition under Order XXXIII Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure seeking permission to sue as an indigent person to recover Rs. 6 lakhs from the respondents (medical practitioners) for alleged professional negligence and dereliction of duty.

The petitioner was the husband of Mala, who he married on 16-4-1982. By early 1983 Mala was pregnant and received prenatal treatment from the first respondent (Civil Surgeon). On 19-9-1983 Mala developed labour pain and, as directed by the first respondent, was admitted to Lakshmi Nursing Home run by the second respondent. The respondents examined Mala on several occasions and assured the petitioner that no complications were anticipated. On 21-9-1983 Mala was taken to the labour room; the respondents asked the petitioner to bring two bottles of B positive blood, which he procured. On his return he was told that his wife had died after delivering a stillborn child.

The petitioner alleged negligence by the respondents and filed the indigent original petition for damages. The respondents denied negligence, disputed the petitioner's indigency, and contended that the petition was defective because the parents of the deceased were not impleaded and that the claim, being under the Fatal Accidents Act, 1855, was barred by limitation. The court below found the petitioner to be indigent. The court below rejected the petition on two grounds: (1) the suit was barred by limitation, and (2) the petitioner failed to furnish full particulars of the parents of the deceased, contrary to section 3 of the Fatal Accidents Act. The appeal is against that order. The petition was filed on 23-7-1986; the date of death of Mala was 21-9-1983.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the petition as framed falls within the purview of the Fatal Accidents Act, 1855 (i.e., whether the claim is one under the provisions of the Fatal Accidents Act).
  2. If the Fatal Accidents Act applies, whether Article 82 of the Limitation Act (two years from date of death) governs the period of limitation, as opposed to Article 113 (residuary) if it does not apply.
  3. Whether the petition complied with section 3 of the Fatal Accidents Act by identifying all persons entitled to the benefit of damages (specifically, whether the parents of the deceased were required to be impleaded and were omitted).

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

  • The appellant's primary contention was that Section 1A of the Fatal Accidents Act does not apply where death itself gives rise to a cause of action for the defendants; the Act only applies where the deceased had acquired a cause of action that the plaintiff continues.
  • The appellant argued that the phrase "if the death had not ensued" in Section 1A supports a requirement that, hypothetically, the deceased would have had a cause of action had death not occurred.
  • It was asserted that Mala's death was instantaneous and that she could not have had a cause of action against the respondents; consequently the Fatal Accidents Act would not apply and the residuary Article 113 of the Limitation Act would be relevant (as argued by counsel for the appellant).

Respondents' Arguments

  • The respondents denied the allegations of negligence.
  • They contended the petition was defective for not impleading the parents of the deceased Mala as required by section 3 of the Fatal Accidents Act.
  • They contended the petitioner's claim, being under the Fatal Accidents Act, was barred by limitation.
  • The respondents also disputed the indigency of the petitioner (though the court below found indigency and that finding was not argued on appeal).

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Baker v. Bolton (1808 (1) Camp. 493) At common law a civil court could not treat the death of a human being as an injury; "actio personalis moritur cum persona"—a personal action died with the person. Used to illustrate the historical common-law rule that death did not give rise to a civil cause of action, thereby explaining the legislative need for Fatal Accidents legislation.
Osborn v. Gillet (1873 LR 8 Ex. 88) Confirmed that a plaintiff could not recover for loss of society where the deceased was killed outright at the accident scene (i.e., death did not give rise to a civil action at common law). Served as an additional authority showing the common-law inability to claim for death itself, reinforcing the point that statutory reform (Lord Campbell's Act) was required to create such remedies.
Gobald Motor Service v. Veluswami (A.I.R. 1962 S.C. 1) Explained the distinct nature of causes of action under sections of the Fatal Accidents Act (S.1 and S.2): S.1 creates a cause for dependants; S.2 provides compensation to the estate; the two claims are different and may be separately recoverable. The court relied on this Supreme Court explanation to clarify that the Fatal Accidents Act creates a new action for dependants independent of any cause of action surviving in the deceased's estate.
Johnson v. Porto Novo Cundasamy (I.L.R. Madras Series Vol. 28, 1905, p. 479) Held that the "representative" mentioned in the Fatal Accidents Act includes all persons for whose benefit the right of action was given, and that the action is for their benefit, not for the deceased's personal estate. Applied to justify the invocation of Article 82 of the Limitation Act (two-year period for actions under the Fatal Accidents Act) by treating the claim as one brought for the benefit of dependants/representatives defined by the Fatal Accidents Act.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court began by identifying the primary question whether the petition falls under the Fatal Accidents Act, because that determination controls which limitation provision applies (Article 82 if the Act applies; Article 113 if it does not).

To determine the scope of the Fatal Accidents Act, the court traced its legislative and doctrinal history. It explained that at common law no civil action lay for causing death (actio personalis moritur cum persona), and decisions such as Baker v. Bolton and Osborn v. Gillet exemplified that rule. The court noted the development of statutes (Lord Campbell's Act of 1846 and later reforms) to address the gap in common law, and described section 1A of the Indian Fatal Accidents Act as reproducing the substance of the earlier English provisions.

The court quoted and relied on doctrinal exposition (from Winfield and Jolowics) explaining that the right of action created by the Fatal Accidents Act is "new in its species"—a new action for the benefit of dependants—and that for such an action to exist the circumstances of death must be such that the deceased, had he or she been injured and not killed, could have sued for that injury (the "hypothetical ability" test).

Applying these principles to the petition, the court observed that the original petition alleged that Mala died as a result of the respondents' negligence and incompetence (after delivering a stillborn child), and that those allegations showed Mala had a cause of action against the respondents for negligence. Because that cause of action would have existed (had death not ensued), the dependants (including the husband) could bring the new action under the Fatal Accidents Act. Thus the petition squarely fell within the purview of the (Indian) Fatal Accidents Act.

Having held that the Fatal Accidents Act applied, the court turned to limitation. It identified Article 82 of the Limitation Act, 1963 as prescribing a two-year limitation period for actions under the Fatal Accidents Act, with the period starting from the date of death. The court applied Article 82: Mala died on 21-9-1983, and the petition was filed on 23-7-1986, i.e., beyond two years. Accordingly the petition was time-barred, and the court below was correct in rejecting the petition under Order XXXIII Rule 5 CPC.

The court also noted the additional ground on which the court below relied: non-disclosure of all persons entitled to benefit under section 3 of the Fatal Accidents Act (failure to name the parents). The court observed that section 3 requires the persons entitled to damages to be mentioned in the plaint to preclude subsequent separate actions. While acknowledging this defect may be curable, the court declined to decide that issue because the time-bar was dispositive.

The court further noted that the lower court's finding of indigency in favour of the petitioner was not disturbed on appeal (the respondents' counsel did not address that point), and the appellate court saw no reason to take a different view regarding indigency.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The court affirmed the decision of the court below and rejected the indigent original petition (i.e., refused to permit the suit to proceed) on the ground that the claim under the Fatal Accidents Act was barred by limitation. The court also accepted the court below's additional ground that relevant particulars under section 3 of the Fatal Accidents Act were not furnished, but did not enter a final finding on that point because the time-bar disposed of the matter.

Implications:

  • Direct effect on the parties: The petitioner's claim was dismissed as time-barred; the court below's order rejecting the indigent petition is sustained; the parties are to bear their own costs.
  • Statutory application: The court clarified that where a deceased would, hypothetically, have had a cause of action had death not ensued, an action by dependants under the Fatal Accidents Act is available and Article 82 of the Limitation Act (two-year period from date of death) governs such claims.
  • No broader precedent was purportedly created by this decision; the court applied established principles and prior authorities to the facts before it and declined to decide the possible curability of the pleading defect under section 3 because of the dispositive limitation bar.

End of summary based exclusively on the provided opinion.

Show all summary ...

Balakrishnan, J.:— The C.M appellant is the petitioner in an application in the court below under Order XXXIII Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure for permission to sue as an indigent parson. He seeks recovery of Rs. 6 lakhs from the respondents, who are medical practitioners, as damages for the alleged professional negligence and dereliction of duty.

2. The petitioner is the husband of deceased Mala. He married her on 16-4-1982 and since then she had been residing in her husband's family. The petitioner and his wife had a very happy married life. By early 1983. Mala was enceinte and was taken to the first respondent Civil Surgeon for prenatal treatment. The first respondent examined Mala and assured the petitioner that everything was normal and there would not be any complications. On 19-9-1983, Mala developed labour pain and as directed by the first respondent she was admitted in the Lakshmi Nursing Home run by the 2nd respondent. Both respondents examined Mala and again assured the petitioner that everything was normal and no special treatment or attention was called for. On 20th and 21st, September, 1983 both respondents examined Mala. On 21st, she was removed to the labour room under the direction of the respondents. They asked the petitioner to bring two bottles of blood of group B positive. The Petitioner rushed put in search of blood and brought the blood. On arrival he was told that his wife died after giving birth to a still born child. The petitioner attributes utter negligence to and want of due care on the part of the respondents. With these allegations petitioner filed the indigent original petition for damages. The respondent denied the averments in the petition and contended that no negligence was shown by them. They also contended that the petition is defective since the parents of the deceased Mala are not impleaded in the suit and that the petitioner's claim being under the provisions of Fatal Accidents Act, 1855 the same is barred by limitation. The indigency of the petitioner was also disputed. The court below upheld the plea of the petitioner that he was really an indigent person unable to pay the requisite court fee. The finding of the court below regarding the indigence of the petitioner though challenged in the cross objection no argument was addressed on this point by the counsel for the respondents. The petitioner is employed and is a resident of Cochin. He has produced the salary certificate and acted upon it. We see no reason to take a different view.

3. The court rejected the petition on two grounds, viz., (1) the suit is barred by limitation, and (2) the petitioner did not furnish full particulars of the parents of deceased Mala and this violated section 3 of the Fatal Accidents Act. The appeal is directed against that order.

4. The first point that would arise for consideration is whether the petition as framed would come within the purview of the Fatal Accidents Act, 1855. If the claim is one under the provisions of the Fatal Accidents Act, 1855, article 82 of the Limitation Act would apply and if not, article 113 is applicable. The relevant portion is section 1-A of the (Indian) Fatal Accidents Act, 1855 reads as follows:—

“1A Suit for compensation to the family of a person for loss occasioned to it by his death by actionable wrong-Whenever the death of a person shall be caused by wrongful act, neglect or default, and the act, neglect or default is such as would (if death had not ensued) have entitled the party injured to maintain an action and recover damages in respect thereof, the party who would have been liable if death had not ensued shall be liable to an action or suit for damages, notwithstanding the death of the person injured, and although the death shall have been caused under such circumstances as amount in law to felony or other crime.

Every such action or suit shall be for the benefit of the wife, husband, parent and child, if any, of the person whose death shall have been so caused, and shall be brought by and in the name of the executor, administrator or representative of the person deceased;”

5. The main thrust of argument of the counsel for the appellant is that Section 1A of the Fatal Accidents Act does not apply to any case where death itself gives rise 10 a cause of action for the defendants and the Act applies only in a case where the deceased himself/here self had acquired a cause of action and the Act enables the plaintiff to continue that action. The argument is that the words occurring in Section 1A “if the death had not ensued” indicate that view and it is pointed out that plaintiff could bare his claim only on cause of action on which the deceased could have sued for damages. The counsel argues, that in the present Case there was instantaneous death of Mala, and she could not have the wrong-doer and her death did not give rise to any cause of action to the respondents.

6. To understand the real scope of the nature of the cause of action under Fatal Accidents Act it is necessary to trace the legislative history. This section 1A of (Indian) Fatal Accidents Act, 1855 is in substance a reproduction of section I and II of Chapter 9 and 19 to Victoria 1846 (Lord Campbell's Act). At common law of England no civil action lay against a person for causing death of another. If a negligent driver was killed in the accident which he himself caused, nothing was recoverable from him his estate or insurer by other persons if any injured in the accident. “Action Personalis Moritur cum Persona” which means a personal action dies with the person was a general rule applicable to torts. Later on the applicability of this maxim was extended even in cases of death of injured person. By the growth of motor traffic and its accompanying toll of accidents, the defects of the law ware noticed by the legislature and accordingly the Law Reforms (Miscellaneous Provision) Act, 1934 was passed to provide generally for the survival of cause of action in tort. This act provided for the survival of cause of action subsisting when the tortfeasor or the injured person died; however it did not as such created a cause of action.

7. At common law there was separate rule that death could not give rise to cause of action in other persons, although they were dependant on the deceased. This rule derived from the decision of Lord Ellenborough in Baker v. Bolton (1808 (1) Camp. 493) that “in a civil court the death of a human being could not be complained of as an injury”. In that case the plaintiff and his wife were passengers in a stage coach which was upset by the negligence of the defendants. The plaintiff himself was bruised and his wife was seriously hurt and she died a month after. It was held that the plaintiff could recover for the loss of her society during that month and not after her death.

8. In a later case Osborn v. Gillet (1873 LR 8 Ex. 88) the plaintiff could not recover for the loss of society of his daughter who was run over and killed outright at the scene of the accident by the defendant's negligence. The development of Railways in England led to great upsurge in the number of accidents, fatal and non-fatal and this made a change in the law imperative. In 1846 the Fatal Accidents Act, otherwise known as Lord Campbell's Act was passed and it changed the common law so far the dependants who were specified in the Act. Thereafter the Fatal Accidents Act, 1976 was passed replacing the earlier legislation. This Act provides that whenever the death of a person is caused by the wrongful act, neglect or default of another such as would (if death had not ensued) have entitled the injured person to sue and recover damages in respect there of then the person who would have been liable if death had not ensued shall be liable to an action for damages on behalf of the dependants notwithstanding death of the person injured. The learned authors “Winfield and Jolowics in the book “Winfield and Jolowics on Tort” 11th Edition edited by W.V.H Rogers have described the nature of action under the English Fatal Accidents Act, 1976, in the following terms:

“The right of action created by the Fatal Accidents Act is “new in its species, new in its quality, new in its principles, in every way new” it is not the deceased's own cause of action which is caused to survive, it is a new action for the benefit of his dependants. For this new cause of action to exist, however, it is necessary that the circumstances of his death should have been such that the deceased himself, had he been injured and not killed, could have sued for his injury. One must consider the hypothetical ability of the deceased to sue as at the moment of his death, with the idea fictionally that death has not taken place. If therefore, the deceased had been run over in the street through nobody's fault but his own, there will be no claim no behalf of his dependants; nor will there be such a claim if by contract with the defendant the deceased had excluded any possibility of liability to himself, but if the contract merely limited the amount of the defendant's liability, then the deceased could have sued for some damages, the way is open for the dependants' claim, and that claim, being independent of the deceased's will not be affected by the limitation of liability.”

9. It is clear that the action lies for the benefit of the deceased's dependants, and the provisions of the (Indian) Fatal Accidents Act, 1885 also enable the deceased wife, husband, parent and child, if any, to file suit for damages. The right of action created by the Fatal Accidents Act is not the deceased's own cause of action, which is caused to survive but it is a new action for the benefit of the dependants. The nature of the liability of the wrong-doer has been explained by the Supreme Court in Gobald Motor Service v. Veluswami (A.I.R 1962 S.C 1). The Court held:

“The cause of action under S. 1 and that under S. 2 are different. While under S. 1 damages are recoverable for the benefit of the persons mentioned therein, under S. 2 compensation goes to the benefit of the estate; whereas under S. 1 damages are payable in respect of loss sustained by the persons mentioned therein, under S. 2 damages can be claimed inter alia for loss of expectation of life. Though in some cases parties that are entitled to compensation under both the sections may happen to be the same persons, they need not necessarily be so; persons entitled to benefit under S. 1 may be different from those claiming under S. 2 Prima facie as the two claims are to be based upon different causes of action, the claimants, whether the same or different, should be entitled to recover compensation separately under both the heads.”

10. In the instant case the contention of the petitioner is that Mala died after giving birth to a still, born child. In the original petition it has been alleged that on account of the negligence and incompetence of the respondents herein, the petitioner lost his life partner and their off spring and the life of the petitioner's wile was priceless, and he claimed damages for the mental agony and torture that he had undergone and for the dark future he has to face. The allegations in the petition thus show that Mala had a cause of action against the respondents for damages for their negligence and incompetence. This cause of action shall survive and the dependants of deceased Mala are entitled to claim damages on the basis of this cause of action. The husband also had acquired a new cause of action independent of the deceased's own cause of action. Therefore, the claim put forward by the petitioner squarely comes within the purview of the (Indian) Fatal Accidents Act, 1883.

11. Under article 82 of the Limitation Act, 1963 two years is the period of limitation prescribed for filing such a suit and the period would begin from the date of the death of the person injured. Article 82 is in the following terms;

“By executors, administrators or representatives under the Indian Fatal Accidents Act, 1855 (13 of 1855) Two years The date of death of the person killed”

12. It has been explained in an earlier decision reported in Johnson v. Porto Novo Cundasamy (I.L.R Madras Series Vo. 28, 1905 page 479) that the representative mentioned in the (Indian) Fata Accidents Act, 1855 would include all persons for whose benefit the right of action was given. It was also held in that decision that the right of action conferred by the Act is not for the benefit of the personal estate of the deceased, but for the benefit of his wife, parent and child. Therefore, in our view article 82 of the Limitation Act is the relevant article applicable to this case. The learned counsel for the appellant contended that the relevant article applicable in this case is article 113. That is residuary article applicable to suits for which no period of limitation is provided elsewhere in the schedule. When there is a specific article in the statute, the residuary article has no application. Mala died on 21st September, 1983 and the suit was filed only on 23-7-1986. The allegation made by the applicant in the application shows that the suit would be barred by law and the court below was right in rejecting the application under Order XXXIII rule 5 C.P.C The other reason for rejecting the petition is that the petitioner did not divulge all particulars of the persons for whom or on whose behalf such action was brought and the nature of the claim in respect of such action was brought. Under section 3 of the Fatal Accidents Act every one of the persons entitled to the benefit of damages has to be mentioned in the plaint obviously for the reason that no separate action can be brought by any of them later on. This may be a curable defect. Since the petition is clearly barred by time, we do not propose to enter a finding on this point.

13. The court below rightly rejected the indigent original petition. We see no reason to interfere with the finding of the court below. The C.M.A and cross-objection are distressed. The parties will suffer their own costs.